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Part	I	 Introduction	1 Introduction	
"That is why despite its imperfections, the European Union can be, and 
indeed is, a powerful inspiration for many around the world. Because the 
challenges faced from one region to the other may differ in scale but they 
do not differ in nature. […] This federalist and cosmopolitan vision is one 
of the most important contributions that the European Union can bring 
to a global order in the making." 
(van Rompuy and Barroso 2012 - EU Nobel Prize acceptance speech) 
 
By all accounts, the European Union (EU) is the front-runner of regional cooperation 
and integration in the world. And – as illustrated through the paradigmatic quote 
above – its leaders and institutions are equally enthusiastic about its attractiveness 
beyond its own borders.  
The founders of what would later become the EU conceived of a united 
Europe with the aim of pacifying the continent in the aftermath of the Second World 
War – and rendering another war impossible. Lack of cooperation between European 
states – and especially between France and Germany – was deemed the underlying 
cause for two consecutive world wars. As Robert Schuman put it when announcing 
one of the triggers for European integration: “L’Europe n’a pas été faite, nous avons 
eu la guerre” (Schuman 2014 [1950]). The success of the European project convinced 
future Europeans that the same model that had united the former arch-enemies 
France and Germany and helped to close the wounds of European division would also 
be applicable to other world regions torn by conflict or trapped in poverty.  
With ups and downs often motivated by the current state of European 
integration, this belief has remained present for decades – despite the wide-spread 
conviction that European integration is a ‘sui generis’ phenomenon. This belief has 
nurtured policies that aim at promoting regional cooperation and integration in almost 
all other regions of the world. However, it is by no means self-evident that an 
endeavour that is seen as largely successful in Europe will also work elsewhere: not 
only do the conditions in other world regions vary from those in post-World War and 
contemporary Europe; the problems and opportunities encountered by local policy-
makers also differ, as does their willingness to engage in regional cooperation and 
even integration.   
Introduction 
 
  2 
The tension between the EU’s desire to support regional cooperation and 
integration beyond its borders and the exceptional nature that is often ascribed to the 
EU stands at the centre of this research project. This study analyses empirically 
whether and to what extent the EU has been successful in promoting regional 
cooperation and integration. The following section of this introduction expands on the 
practical and academic motivation behind this project, laying out how this study seeks 
to address existing gaps in policy and research. Subsequently, section 1.2 presents the 
research questions addressed in this work and section 1.3 lays out the research design 
that will be developed to answer that very question. The introduction concludes with 
a plan of the study that presents the central arguments made in each chapter (section 
1.4). 
1.1 Research	interest	and	relevance	
This study sets out to assess the EU’s true relevance and success in influencing regional 
cooperation and – ultimately – integration in other areas of the globe. Success is 
thereby defined as the attainment of the objectives the EU has set itself in terms of 
promoting regional cooperation and integration. Formulated differently, this thesis 
assesses the EU’s role as a region-builder. Based on previous works that have used the 
term, region-building is understood as a politically-backed community-building project 
comparable to state-building (Langenhove 2011: 47; Kühnhardt 2010: 12).1 The 
following paragraphs discuss why this research is timely both from a practical and an 
academic perspective. 
1.1.1 Practical	and	political	relevance	
The political relevance of examining the EU’s role as a region-builder follows from the 
fact that promotion of regional cooperation and integration belongs to the EU’s oldest 
endeavours to embark on common external policies.2 The encouragement of regional 
cooperation and integration has been a golden thread ever since, running through 
many external EU policies – and distinguishes these from the foreign policies of both 
EU member states and other international actors. This long-standing experience 
makes the case especially relevant to better assess two intertwined issues of central 
                                                             
1 Quite obviously, region-building can be driven both from within the region and externally. This study 
focuses on the external dimension and, more specifically, on the EU’s role therein. 
2 A search in the treaty database of the European External Action Service (EEAS) reveals that the first 
contractual agreements aiming at promoting regional cooperation and integration were signed from 
1980 onwards, with an agreement between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
ASEAN states being the first one (EEAS 2014b; 2014a). 
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importance to the EU’s standing in the international arena: firstly, its chances of 
promoting regional cooperation and integration in an increasingly multipolar world 
and, secondly, in more general terms, its performance as a contested foreign policy 
actor. 
The	EU’s	contribution	to	a	‘negotiated	wold	order’?	–	promoting	
regional	cooperation	in	times	of	emerging	powers		
As the quote at the beginning of this chapter shows, the EU’s nature as arguably the 
most developed regional integration endeavour influences its self-portrayal as a 
foreign-policy actor. However, the goal of encouraging regional integration and 
cooperation beyond the EU’s borders is not pursued just by the EU leaders and 
institutions cited above. It is rather a general and long-lasting objective embodied in 
EU external relations (almost) since the outset and a goal that distinguishes the EU 
from other actors.3 This goal is mentioned to varying extents in the Treaty on European 
Union (2012a: 21), the EU Global Strategy (European Union 2016: 32–9), it’s preceding 
European Security Strategy (Council 2003: 9), the EU’s development policy objectives 
(Commission 2011a: 7–8; European Parliament, Council & Commission 2005: 49) and 
in regional strategy papers that sketch out the EU’s policy priorities towards specific 
regions (e.g. European Commission 2008; 2007d: 1; 2007e: 10–2).4 The European 
Council was even more outspoken in this regard. In its 2001 Laeken Declaration that 
convened the European Convention to draft the Constitutional Treaty, it also tasked 
the Convention to address how to “develop the Union into […] a model in the new, 
multipolar world” (European Council 2001: 21). 
As this thesis – and especially its second chapter – will show, this 
programmatic endeavour is not just pure rhetoric. It also influences real practice. The 
EU is without a doubt the world’s most zealous actor in promoting regional 
cooperation and integration. It does so as part of its own enlargement policy, which 
sees states being gradually integrated into the EU, but also when interacting with its 
wider neighbourhood. Here, different regional initiatives have been developed in the 
context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) – a policy that seeks to 
strengthen ties between the EU and its neighbours in Northern Africa and the Levant 
as well as in Eastern Europe. On a global level, the EU has promoted the further 
                                                             
3 Already in 1962, then President of the EEC Walter Hallstein sketched out in a speech how the 
nascent economic integration schemes in Latin America could provide a “domaine possible de 
coopération future” (1962: 3–4) and how these could learn from European experiences (1962: 10). 
4 The cited strategy papers were drawn up for the funding period 2007-2013. From 2014 onwards, 
country or regional strategy papers are only used exceptionally (EEAS / Commission 2012: 10). 
Therefore no newer papers were available at the time of writing. 
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regional integration of organisations such as the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC), the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the 
Andean Community (see for example Haubrich Seco 2011). 
Against this background, two aspects make this field especially interesting 
from a practice-oriented perspective on EU external action. Firstly, the fact that the 
promotion of regional cooperation – as a general “conviction or even obsession” [#05, 
EEAS senior official]5 embodied in the EU’s external action – is pursued across different 
external policies such as trade policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP). This implies that, in this particular field, the EU does in principle live up to its 
commitment of overcoming the divide between the more technical fields of EU 
external action – such as development, trade or climate policy – and traditional foreign 
policy as embodied in the CFSP. In light of the repeated stress placed on consistency 
of EU external action in the Treaty of Lisbon (TEU 2012: Art. 21, Art. 18(4)), it becomes 
all the more interesting to assess whether the EU does truly achieve this objective for 
which it has been combining numerous of its instruments for decades already.6 
The second aspect that makes the study of EU promotion of regional 
cooperation a timely and relevant endeavour is the changing pattern of international 
relations. Promoting regional cooperation and integration is a policy that is 
increasingly being challenged by the evolving reality of international relations. A brief 
look at global gross domestic product (GDP) shares reveals the extent to which 
international patterns are changing. While in the year 2005, the EU, the US, Japan and 
Canada made up for 49 % of the world’s GDP, in 2017 their share had dropped to 39 
%. Projections see it at 34 % in 2023 (International Monetary Fund 2016).7 In line with 
economic developments, traditionally Western-dominated fora like the G8 have lost 
relevance in favour of broader groupings that include emerging actors such as the G20. 
As new emerging and regional powers increase their relevance and seek to at least 
share power and global influence with the traditionally dominant West, it becomes 
more difficult for the EU and others to set the rules for mutual engagement. Because 
power is increasingly split among different actors and less concentrated on the West, 
                                                             
5 Interviews are an important source in this study. They are quoted in square brackets with a 
reference to a numerical code and the position of the interviewee. Whenever an interview is 
repeatedly referenced in the same section, only the code and ibid. are quoted. Using the code, 
further information on the interview can be found in Annex B. 
6 Chapter two will lay out which policies the EU employs to encourage regional integration and 
towards which regions it acts. 
7 The IMF data accounts for growing EU membership, i.e. the data for 2000 and 2005 does include all 
current 28 EU members. The shares are calculated on the basis of PPP (purchasing power parity) 
adjusted data. 
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it becomes more and more difficult for the EU to engage with partners in the 
framework of their regional groups and clusters without granting at least the most 
important of them a privileged role as primus inter pares. States such as Brazil, South 
Africa, Indonesia and Nigeria, which were dealt with mainly in the context of their 
regional groupings, do now call for an individual relationship with the EU. No less 
marked are demands from EU politicians and experts that the EU engage with such 
partners on a privileged basis to retain influence in global affairs (Brok 2014: 7; e.g. 
Renard 2012; Keukeleire and Hooijmaaijers 2014: 14).   
These calls have not remained unheard by the EU. So-called ‘strategic 
partnerships’ with leading regional and global actors are its most visible reaction to 
these developments. The agendas of these partnerships deal with bilateral matters, 
but also seek to reach a common understanding on regional and global issues. But, 
while these relationships reinforce contacts with emerging and established powers, 
they may also conflict with the broader goal of encouraging regional cooperation 
because they single out individual states. As global power shifts make stronger 
bilateral ties with leading actors indispensable, the EU’s engagement in ‘effective 
multilateralism’8 and for regional cooperation – both formats in which its own role is 
more likely to be recognised by others (cf. Costa 2013: 1224–5) – could be 
compromised. These tensions between bilateral and multilateral and regional 
approaches are also present in other fields of EU foreign policy. At the time of writing, 
discussions are mounting on the adequacy of the multilateral tracks of the ENP: the 
Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean. While these instruments 
seek to improve regional cooperation between EU neighbours with sometimes recent 
histories of conflict behind them, critics argue that they force states with very different 
situations into a common straightjacket and thus call for stronger differentiation (Tocci 
2014: 5; Leigh 2014: 4; Non-paper DE,PL,UK et al. 2014; AFET 2014; see also European 
Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy 2017). Instead of encouraging meaningful regional cooperation, this 
approach may well force all states to cooperate at the speed of the lowest common 
denominator – or to form smaller groups that bring the idea of regional cooperation 
ad absurdum. In the context of enlargement policy, regional cooperation is also not 
undisputed. While its reputation is certainly more powerful than in the wider 
neighbourhood – it is often seen as a training ground for future EU membership –, 
                                                             
8 The term ‘effective multilateralism’ stems from the 2003 European Security Strategy and is 
described in that document as “the development of a stronger international society, well-functioning 
international institutions and a rule-based international order” (Council 2003: 9). 
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detractors contend that it can take some countries hostage of the limited progress of 
their peers (cf. Bechev 2011: 90–1). 
These situations do not only interfere with the EU’s objective of encouraging 
regional cooperation – they also shake some of the most deeply grounded principles 
on which EU external action is built. The EU’s promotion of regional cooperation is one 
among several endeavours aimed at building what has been termed a “negotiated 
world order” (Smith 2013: 659) in which multilateralism and rules would shape a more 
foreseeable and resilient international system.9 As Michael Smith aptly puts it, the EU 
pursues a “post-sovereign diplomacy and approach to governance in a world where 
many actors are resolutely ‘sovereignist’ in their approaches” (2013: 663). If we find 
the EU to be successful in promoting regional cooperation beyond its borders, it may 
have made a contribution to a “negotiated world order”. On the contrary, if the EU has 
failed, prospects are gloomy that it will succeed in a world in which emerging powers 
most attentive of their sovereignty are playing an increasing role. Beyond this aspect 
of possibly contributing to a rules-based international order, the following paragraphs 
will show that assessing the EU’s performance in promoting regional cooperation has 
also more general implications for EU external action. 
Assessing	the	performance	of	EU	external	action	in	a	contested	environment	
The degree to which the EU is able to influence and shape the decisions of other actors 
is key to the legitimacy of its external action. Quite obviously, this observation is true 
for any other actor in international relations. However, the EU is a particular case for 
two reasons. The first lies in its novelty in international affairs. It confers the EU less 
legitimacy in foreign policy than that of states – which have been the natural actors in 
this field for centuries.10 The second follows from the fact that the EU encroaches on 
the competences of its member states like no other international or regional 
organisation. As a consequence of these two factors, the EU is traditionally under 
stronger pressure to justify its external competences than states are.  
Unlike with states, this pressure originates from two ends, with both citizens 
and member states scrutinizing EU policies and action. While data from the yearly 
Eurobarometer or from the Transatlantic Trends survey shows that citizens are quite 
                                                             
9 Other endeavours are the emphasis on the use multilateral fora, and therein especially the United 
Nations or contributions to the further application and codification of international legal norms 
through their inclusion in treaties concluded by the EU with foreign partners. 
10 While states are the drivers of formalised foreign policy at the very least since the Westphalian 
Peace of 1648, the EU’s (then EEC) first external endeavours are less than 60 years old and have only 
gradually grown over time. 
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supportive of a stronger role for the EU in international affairs (in contrast to other 
policy areas)11, a sense of reluctance does still often dominate their understanding of 
the activities of the EU, an institution met with distrust by most citizens (Commission 
2014a: 95; Bruttel 2014: 287–8; Commission 2018: 11).12 Most headwind does 
nonetheless come from the member states’ governments. Their often hesitant 
position can be attributed to at least two factors that have traditionally dominated 
discussions on the further expansion of external competences for the EU.  
First and most importantly, foreign policy belongs to the policy fields most 
closely connected to national sovereignty.13 It is therefore not surprising that member 
states seek to preserve this area from ‘intruders’ as much as possible. After all, each 
additional EU competence in this area carries the risk of hampering the perception of 
member states as those who steer and command foreign policy – a field that usually 
brings positive approval ratings to governments. A second, often connected, reason 
why additional EU competences in foreign affairs are regularly met with reluctance, 
relates to the pressure that the EU exerts on member states when expanding its 
competences in external policy fields. This pressure can be formal as for example 
through judgements of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) that draw the boundaries 
between EU and national competences – with the ECJ’s case law often leaning towards 
expanding EU competences.14 But it can also be informal: constant exposure to the 
EU’s foreign policy system creates a compulsion for agreement as numerous studies 
have shown – even fields that are organised intergovernmentally can be subject to a 
                                                             
11 An average of 63 % of respondents to the Eurobarometer survey are in favour of a common foreign 
policy of the member states of the EU, with approximately 25 % against (European Commission 
2013a). Support for other policy areas such as monetary union is consistently lower and rejection 
rates higher (European Commission 2013b; 2013c). In a similar vein, 73 % of the EU respondents to 
the 2014 Transatlantic Trends survey find it either ‘very desirable’ or ‘somewhat desirable’ that the 
EU exerts a strong leadership in world affairs (German Marshall Fund 2014: 5). The Transatlantic 
Trends survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund does not include all EU states. The 2014 
edition includes ten EU member states with results for this question being consistent over the last 
ten years and with previous editions that included less EU countries.  
12 For a study that surveys how the EU institutions have sought to counter citizens’ distrust on 
European integration see Sternberg(2013). 
13 The ability to enter into relations with other actors is for example a common part of state 
definitions. To mention one prominent example in international public law, the Montevideo 
Convention defined statehood “as a person of international law … [possessing, M.H.S.] the following 
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states.” (Montevideo Convention 1933: 1). 
14 For example, Art. 216(1) TFEU foresees that the EU also gains external treaty-making competences 
whenever it receives an internal competence in a specific policy field. This principle of implied 
external competences was codified in the Treaties following a ruling of the ECJ (ECJ, Commission v. 
Council (ERTA), ECR 263, 1971). 
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‘coordination reflex’ (Wessels 1980: 23) or ‘Brusselisation’ (Howorth 2001: 787; Allen 
1998: 54). 
At the same time, a general consensus seems to exist among member states 
and observers that the significance of the EU and its member states in an increasingly 
multipolar world hinges upon the EU’s ability to be coherent in its foreign policy (TEU 
2012a: Art. 21(3); Gauttier 2004; Gebhard 2011). To some extent, this is a paradoxical 
position of the member states: while governments usually speak in favour of a stronger 
EU role in international affairs in general, they often remain hesitant when it comes to 
taking specific steps that could imply loosening their grip over EU action. This 
apparently inconsistent situation has been portrayed as a “capability-expectations” 
(Hill 1993: 315–8) or a “credibility” (Regelsberger et al. 1997: 4–5) gap. While they 
bring forth different nuances, both concepts depict a situation in which the 
expectations regarding the EU’s external clout are beyond the instruments or 
capacities it has at its disposal to achieve them. As current discussions show, these 
concepts are still as topical as when they were coined in the 1990s. Therefore, either 
the EU’s capabilities must increase or the expectations placed on it must diminish. 
Against this background, the EU’s actual performance with the instruments it has at 
hand is a central element in this equation. If the EU punches below its weight in a field 
in which it should play a significant role, it will be difficult that member states grant it 
further competences – especially after having gained new ones in several fields lately 
through the Lisbon Treaty.  
For all these reasons, assessing the performance of EU external action is 
eminently important from a policy-oriented point of view. This thesis undertakes this 
effort in a field in which the EU has been active for decades – the promotion of regional 
cooperation -, using its most developed external action instruments, but which is 
challenged by the on-going transformation of the international system. 
1.1.2 Academic	relevance	
Beyond the practical rationale outlined above, this study seeks to make contributions 
to three distinct gaps in the academic research of EU foreign policy. These three gaps 
are introduced in turn, moving from the most general to the most specific argument.  
Shifting	the	focus	on	the	EU’s	impact	in	foreign	affairs	
Firstly, this thesis contributes to placing a stronger emphasis on the impact of EU 
foreign policy abroad and of the promotion of regional cooperation more specifically. 
This argument, which was already made from a policy-oriented perspective above, is 
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also important from an academic point of view. As a political system that is always in 
flux, the EU is “a fertile breeding ground on which new governance mechanisms and 
structures regularly emerge and grow” (Panke and Haubrich-Seco 2016: 499) – not 
least in the field of EU external action. In this field, changes in governance and policy-
making have been sparked most often through formal treaty changes but also as a 
result of informal adaptation to new challenges (Diedrichs et al. 2011: 24–30). In 
consequence, research on EU external action has been mostly inward-looking. It has 
concentrated on analysing the negotiation and formulation of EU external policies 
between the member states, between member states and EU institutions, between 
the institutions themselves as well as inside the institutions. 
In the meantime, assessing the EU’s impact on or even its potential genuine 
contribution to international affairs has been less of a focus in the literature (Smith 
2013: 656). A notable exception lies in the field of enlargement policy, and – more 
recently – in neighbourhood policy. In the same way as this latter policy draws from 
many of the instruments of enlargement policy, both fields of research are strongly 
influenced by the Europeanization literature, which focuses on assessing the local 
impact of EU influences (for discussions and reviews of this focus see Radaelli 2012, 
Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2012 and Schimmelfennig 2015). Beyond these fields, studies 
on the EU’s impact as an international actor do exist (e.g. Ginsberg 2001 or, more 
recently, the special issued edited by Arne Niemann and Charlotte Bretherton 2013) 
but are nonetheless scarce compared to studies on the inner workings of EU external 
action. By analysing the EU’s impact on a policy field in which it has been active for a 
considerable period of time, this study takes a step towards reducing this gap. It does 
so by developing a theoretical model that will also be suitable for analysing the EU’s 
impact on other external fields. 
A	look	beyond	systemic	argumentations	
Much has been written about the emergence of regional cooperation and integration. 
A number of ever more refined theories deal specifically with the emergence of 
European integration and have also been applied to other world regions (see the 
review in Mattli 1999b: 19–40 and the contributions to Paul 2012), with a prominent 
precursor having begun this endeavour already decades ago (Haas 1967). Most of 
these theories focus on regional interdependence, for example as a result of conflicts 
or trading, to explain the emergence and development of regional cooperation.  
In comparison, relatively few academic literature deals with the role of 
external factors in fostering regional cooperation. When external factors are taken into 
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account, most of the literature argues from a systemic perspective.15 This perspective, 
which one could also term ‘macro’-perspective, analyses interaction between regions 
and regional organisations using the international system – or what Kenneth Waltz 
called the “third image” (2001[1959]: 12) of international relations – as their vantage 
point. This literature surveys whether and how the interaction between regional actors 
affects matters such as the stability of the international system or coordination in large 
international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) (e.g. Hänggi 2003; 
Santander 2005; Söderbaum et al. 2005; Smith 2008: 79–109; Rüland 2010: 1273–8). 
Another variant looks at how regionalism has developed in the global South, 
identifying the increasing multipolarity of the international system and global trade 
flows among the drivers (e.g. Hettne and Söderbaum 2000; Söderbaum and Shaw 
2003). 
These works rarely analyse how such interactions may shape the participating 
organisations themselves. Those that do are confronted with considerable problems 
as the systemic perspective does not open the ‘black box’ inside the organisations and 
cannot reveal whether interaction between two regional actors has influenced their 
internal set-up. While studies taking such a perspective do for example survey whether 
interaction between the EU and regional organisations such as ASEAN or SADC has led 
the latter to strengthen their institutional setup so that they can cope with the better 
organised EU (e.g. Hänggi 2003: 199) or to strengthen their common regional identity 
(e.g. Gilson 2002: 20–5; 2005: 310), they can only hypothesise why this may or may 
not have happened – but not test whether their expectations hold true (e.g. Doctor 
2015: 977–9).  
This comes as no surprise. The systemic perspective makes it difficult to shed 
light on the reasons and causal mechanisms that may have led to an EU impact on 
regional cooperation beyond its borders because it does not go beyond correlation. 
Consequently, empirically assessing the EU’s real impact on other regional endeavours 
often went short and the impact of the EU was frequently evaluated rather 
optimistically (Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2005: 250–1; e.g. Söderbaum et al. 
2005: 377). Even though a relatively recent contribution from Christopher Hill and John 
Peterson (2014: 92–4) shows that also sceptical assessments can be based on a 
                                                             
15 There are also several, if only partial, exceptions to this finding. These works mention the 
instruments used by the EU to encourage regional integration, but do not empirically test for their 
impact. Pietrangeli’s (2009) overview of EU efforts in supporting worldwide regional cooperation and 
Santander’s (2005) article on the EU-Mercosur relationship and several contributions included in 
Lombaerde and Schulz(2009) belong to this category. More recently, the 2012 special issue of West 
European Politics edited by Börzel and Risse (2012a) moves further to also assess the results of EU 
actions. 
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systemic perspective, the fact that assessments of the EU’s impact based on similar 
premises arrive at opposing assessments just highlights the potential for empirical 
analyses in this field. In order to address this gap, this study will use a theoretical model 
that analyses the relationship between the EU and other regional endeavours from a 
‘micro’ perspective. This perspective concentrates on the behaviour of individual 
actors in response to EU influences. 
Using a ‘micro’ approach does also allow circumventing two further 
disadvantages of systemic studies. Firstly, systemic approaches make it difficult to 
distinguish whether and how other exogenous factors influence regional cooperation. 
It is however important to take these factors into account. After all, the EU is by no 
means the only actor that may shape decisions taken by other governments and 
regional organisations. In the field of regional cooperation and integration, multilateral 
trade negotiations or the actions of the United States are for example likely to have an 
influence on how cooperation evolves. It is therefore essential to identify whether 
such influences may have played a role. Here again, the micro-perspective proposed 
by this study makes it possible to empirically test which considerations influence a 
specific organisation and its agents when deciding to step up cooperation. By zooming 
in on the micro level and focusing on causal explanations, the risk of overlooking 
influences beyond the EU becomes much smaller.16 Secondly, also local factors are 
likely to shape whether external influences gain traction. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, to imagine that states decide to cooperate with each other just because of 
external motivations. Still, parts of the literature analysing this phenomenon created 
that impression by focusing on the EU’s objectives rather than on its impact (Farrell 
2007: 310–3; Smith 2008: 79–109). Therefore, this study not only adopts a micro-
perspective but also uses theories that account for local agency. In addition, most of 
the data for the analysis is collected at the level of the addressees of EU action.  
Broadening	the	range	of	cases	
This study makes a third contribution to the existing academic literature on the EU’s 
role in global regional cooperation by expanding the range of cases that are typically 
analysed in this field. It broadens this range both on a conceptual and a geographical 
level. Conceptually, the study avoids focusing just on the promotion of regional 
integration but also includes regional cooperation. The rationale for this choice 
becomes clear if we take a closer look at the genesis of regional integration. The most 
common definition of regional integration conceives it as the transfer and pooling of 
                                                             
16 The design of the case studies is also chosen to reduce this risk. See section 1.4 below and chapter 
5.1 for more detail. 
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some degree of authority or sovereignty to a regional body by more than two states 
in geographical proximity of each other (Goltermann et al. 2012: 4; Börzel 2013: 508). 
Clearly, this implies that the transfer of sovereignty to a regional level has to be 
preceded by some degree of (intergovernmental) regional cooperation, which in turn 
can be defined as the “joint exercise of state-based political authority in 
intergovernmental institutions” (Börzel 2013: 508). Surprisingly, most academics have 
however concentrated on analysing the EU’s relations with other formal and highly 
institutionalised regional integration organisations such as ASEAN, the African Union 
or SADC (e.g. Camroux 2010; Warleigh-Lack 2010; Sicurelli 2016: 147–54).17 This 
excludes a significant part of what the EU actually does to encourage cooperation. As 
the mapping in chapter two will show, the EU not only engages with established 
regional integration schemes, but does in fact spend most of its efforts in encouraging 
regional cooperation – be it as a potential basis for integration or as a goal in itself. 
Broadening the range of cases analysed therefore better reflects the reality of the EU’s 
actions – and makes it possible to reap the advantages of a broader comparison.18 
Along with this conceptual broadening, the present analysis also expands the 
regional scope considered in previous studies. As a result of their focus on relations 
between the EU and formal ROs, previous works have seldom engaged in cross-
regional analyses (for an exception see Lenz 2012). Taking into account different 
regions has a number of advantages however. Beyond better reflecting the reality of 
the EU’s actions as mentioned above, this broader scope does allow to analyse 
whether the different instruments and policies the EU employs to foster regional 
cooperation have varying effects and in how far the EU’s success is dependent on the 
degree of leverage it has on a region. Common sense would lead us to expect that the 
EU is more successful the more dependent its partner is on it. Whether this is in fact 
the case or not will be elucidated by our analysis. 
1.2 Research	questions	
This dissertation seeks to explain ‘how, to what extent and under what conditions does 
the EU succeed in promoting regional cooperation beyond its borders?’ This research 
question (RQ) comes forth from the research interests explained above. If the EU is 
able to influence regional cooperation beyond its borders, we may conclude that the 
                                                             
17  Farrell(2007) is an exception to this finding as she includes both EU-RO relations and enlargement. 
But as an overview article it remains descriptive. 
18 For example, this allows taking into account the role of the varying degrees of EU leverage to which 
regions are likely exposed or avoiding that results are extrapolated from regions in which a relatively 
high degree of integration already existed to all cases with which the EU interacts. 
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EU has an impact in an external action field in which it has engaged for a considerable 
period of time.  
As the wording shows, this research question can be divided along the ‘how’, 
‘to what extent’ and ‘under what conditions’ of EU (lack of) success in promoting 
regional cooperation. Accordingly, sub-research question (SRQ) 1 addresses the ‘how’ 
asking ‘What instruments does the EU employ to promote regional cooperation?’ This 
question seeks to assess through which policies and instruments the EU seeks to foster 
regional cooperation and integration. Is regional cooperation promoted through the 
EU’s development policy or does it also play a role in sectoral external action fields or 
in the CFSP? Does the EU pressure or even threaten others in order to encourage them 
to pursue regional cooperation or does it seek to lead by example? The answers to 
these questions will allow us to gauge in how far promoting regional cooperation and 
integration is an objective that runs through the EU’s external action – and in how far 
the instruments used vary according to the partner the EU engages with.  
These answers also provide the basis for the assessment of the EU’s actual 
impact or success in encouraging regional cooperation. This is the focus of SRQ 2 which 
asks ‘To what extent is the EU able to influence the emergence and development of 
regional cooperation outside the EU?’ The bulk of the empirical analysis will be devoted 
to this question, which will survey whether there is a causal connection between the 
efforts undertaken by the EU and regional cooperation and integration in its partner 
states or organisations. In order to assess this question, the study will trace whether a 
change in regional cooperation can be attributed to the EU – or whether it is likely to 
have been motivated by the actions of other local or international actors. In doing so, 
this question addresses the key practical and academic motivation behind this work 
which is to assess whether the EU does have an actual impact in promoting regional 
cooperation. 
Even if the EU were to have a considerable impact, it is unlikely that it would 
achieve the same degree of success across all the cases studied. After all, the EU 
interacts with states and regions in its immediate neighbourhood and with others far 
away. This has implications as to the interdependence of the EU with its partners. As 
the 2014 events in Ukraine show, instability in Eastern Europe is much more likely to 
influence or even pose a threat to the EU than lack of regional cooperation in the 
Pacific. At the same time, the EU’s influence and leverage over others differs greatly. 
Trade concessions or restrictions are for example much more influential when applied 
to a Northern African country than towards India. This study will therefore assess the 
role of different conditions in modulating and modifying the EU’s impact. SRQ 3 
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therefore asks ‘How does EU leverage influence its success in promoting regional 
cooperation?’ In answering these questions, the focus will lie on a cross-case 
perspective, comparing the EU’s success across cases and regions and setting this in 
relation to factors as the ones mentioned above.  
Put together, the answers to these three sub-research questions will allow us to 
answer our main research question. Their interrelation is pictured in the figure below 
before we move to introducing the research design of this thesis. 
 
Figure 1.1: Main and sub-research questions 
1.3 How	to	assess	EU	impact	on	regional	cooperation	-	the	
analytical	argument	
Answering these research questions does not seem easy. Since the EU’s partners are 
subject to many other influences besides those of the EU, isolating the particular 
influence of an EU action is complicated. Coping with this empirical hurdle and with 
other challenges is the central objective of the research design for this thesis. To 
confront this challenge the study adopts a micro-perspective to peer into the decision-
making of the EU’s partners when deciding when reacting to an EU impulse in the field 
of regional cooperation. This perspective brings us close enough to the thick of the 
action so that we are able to distinguish EU influences on regional cooperation from 
other influences as they may come from multilateral trade negotiations or from the 
policies of other international actors such as the United States of America (USA). As a 
result of using this micro-perspective a considerable amount of our empirical research 
takes place on the side of the EU’s partners – assessing their incentives and responses 
RQ: How, to what extent and under what conditions does the EU 
succeed in promoting regional cooperation beyond its borders?
SRQ1: 
What instruments does 
the EU employ to 
promote regional 
cooperation?
SRQ2: 
To what extent is the EU 
able to influence the 
emergence and 
development of regional 
cooperation outside the 
EU?
SRQ3:
How does EU leverage 
influence its success in 
promoting regional 
cooperation?
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to EU action. In doing so, our research design fulfils the aspiration of focusing on the 
impact of EU external action. 
In order to be able to take this micro-perspective, this study uses a diffusion 
approach. Diffusion theories start from the premise that political innovations and 
changes tend to spread over time and space. While diffusion is also used to explain 
patterns of innovation across many cases, one of its most notable advantages lies in 
conceiving change as a situation that involves a sender and a receiver of influence. In 
our case, the sender is the EU and the receiver its respective partner organisations or 
states, which may or may not react to the EU’s influence. As diffusion approaches focus 
on causal mechanisms, they furthermore allow us to study different explanations for 
the spread – or diffusion – of innovations without changing the general setup of the 
whole model. It therefore becomes possible to study different explanations without 
adding more independent variables to our research design. Thus, our research 
maintains a dependent and an independent variable throughout the whole study and 
examines the role of a range of possible connections between them. 
‘Institutional change modelled according to EU aims’ is our dependent 
variable. It reflects the changes in institutions of regional cooperation on the side of 
the EU’s partners. Since this research undertaking seeks to assess the success of the 
EU in promoting regional cooperation, our dependent variable concentrates on such 
changes that are ‘modelled according to EU aims’ – that is on such solutions that were 
directly or indirectly promoted by the EU. The adoption of solutions promoted by 
others than the EU would also have an impact on regional cooperation – but not count 
as a success of the EU’s foreign policy. Our independent variable is defined as the ‘use 
of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation’. It reflects how the EU encourages 
regional cooperation as part of different external policy fields – such as trade or 
diplomatic relations – and which instruments it uses to promote it, for example 
technical assistance or highlighting its own experience. The assessment of the 
independent variable will already allow us to reply to our first SRQ ‘What instruments 
does the EU employ to promote regional cooperation?’  
To figure out whether and how the EU and its instruments affect the decisions 
of EU partners when engaging in regional cooperation or even in regional integration, 
this study analyses the role of different causal mechanisms. These causal mechanisms 
are developed from two strands of thought prevalent in both IR and EU studies. On 
the one hand, a strand that focuses on material incentives and conditionality and, on 
the other side, a strand focusing on the role of social factors such as the EU`s renown 
or a desire by the recipient to be applauded internationally. The five causal 
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mechanisms and their respective hypotheses aim to cover all possible paths of EU 
influence on regional cooperation beyond its borders. This plenitude permits us to 
assess the second SRQ “To what extent is the EU able to influence the emergence and 
development of regional cooperation outside the EU?” 
The EU maintains institutionalised relations with virtually every state in the 
world and with dozens of regional organisations and groups.19 With most of these 
groups, the EU aims at encouraging regional cooperation.20 From all of these, this 
study selects two regions for in-depth case studies: the Western Balkans21 and the 
Mercosur region. EU action towards the Western Balkans is largely driven by the 
sobering insight that the EU was unable to prevent the violent break-up of Yugoslavia 
in its most immediate ‘backyard’. On that basis, efforts have been directed at pacifying 
and stabilising the region and finding ways for the newly independent republics to 
cooperate with each other – not least in view of future accession to the EU – which in 
itself represents the strongest incentive the EU can offer. EU relations with Mercosur 
have mainly been driven by trade interests – with arduous negotiations for a trade 
agreement taking place between 1999 and 2004 and again since 2010 - and by the 
objective of establishing closer cooperation between the two regional organisations.22 
This selection allows us to study the EU’s influence on cases from two regions towards 
which the EU should have different degrees of leverage – arising for example from the 
varying degrees of trade dependence, geographical proximity, etc. But also the 
different policies that the EU uses to engage with neighbours – such as Enlargement 
Policy – and with partners further away – such as trade or development policy – should 
provide it with different ways of exerting influence. Thus, as a result of this case 
selection, our analysis is able to respond to the third of our SRQs, namely “How does 
EU leverage influence its success in promoting regional cooperation?”  
Answers to our research questions are sought both on the within- as on the 
cross-case levels. While the within-case studies allow us to assess the pertinence of 
the diffusion mechanisms in explaining the EU’s influence on regional cooperation, the 
cross-case analysis makes it possible to set the influence of the EU in relation with 
                                                             
19 See the Treaty Database of the EEAS that gives an overview of formalised contacts between the 
EU and states and international organisations (European External Action Service Treaty Database). 
20 See the mapping in chapter two for a detailed account of the EU relationships with regional groups.  
21 As chapter 7 will show, the term ‘Western Balkans’ is a rather recent one and does not have a 
generally recognised meaning. In the context of the EU and for the purpose of this work, it includes 
Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia and Albania. 
22 Mercosur stands for ‘Common Market of the South’ (Mercado Común del Sur) and is formed by 
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
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factors that vary between the two regions, such as the dependence of a region on the 
EU. Inside the two regions, the study analyses seven cases, three from the Western 
Balkans and four from Mercosur. The case studies use process-tracing to uncover 
whether – and to what extent – the hypothesised causal mechanisms can explain the 
changes in regional cooperation observed. The process-tracing draws on documents 
of the involved institutions as well as on data from 80 semi-structured interviews 
conducted between 2011 and 2013 with policy-makers in the headquarters of the 
organisations studied and the capitals of the states involved. On the basis of the results 
of the case studies, the cross-case analysis uses ordinal comparison to set the 
prevalence of different mechanisms and the success of the EU in promoting regional 
cooperation in relation to its leverage, the instruments used and the idiosyncrasies of 
the regions studied.  
Beyond being a tool for answering the research questions posed at the beginning 
of this chapter, the design outlined in these paragraphs proposes a framework that 
can be used to assess the impact of the EU in promoting regional cooperation or other 
norms and practices also in different cases than those analysed here, thereby 
providing an avenue to overcome the lacunae identified in systemic approaches.  
1.4 Outline	of	the	study	and	its	main	arguments	
This study is organised into four parts. The first part, to which this introduction 
belongs, lays the ground for the analysis. It defines the research question and presents 
the background against which this study is conducted as well as the gaps in research 
and political practice that it addresses. The second part develops the analytical 
framework to find answers to the research question, which the third part addresses 
through an empirical analysis. To do so, it builds on seven case studies on the EU’s 
influence on regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and Mercosur and on a 
cross-case analysis. On the basis of this analysis, the fourth and final part answers the 
research questions and sets these results in relation to the research gaps identified at 
the beginning of the analysis. 
Part	I:	Introduction	Chapter	Two:	Mapping	EU	promotion	of	regional	cooperation	
This first chapter has laid the groundwork for the analysis defining the research 
questions and highlighting the significance of the topic under analysis both from an 
academic and a policy perspective. Chapter two provides the reader with the 
necessary background on the EU’s efforts in encouraging regional cooperation beyond 
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its borders. This is done by mapping all the relationships in which the EU aims to 
promote regional cooperation with countries and groups of countries and by reviewing 
the existing academic literature on the matter. This chapter will show that the EU seeks 
to promote regional cooperation and integration towards many of its partners and 
that a focus on the impact of these policies can enrich existing analyses and provide 
advice for political practice. 
Part	II:	Analytical	Framework		Chapter	Three:	Theoretical	Framework	
The third chapter draws on a diffusion approach to construct an explanatory model. 
This chapter shows that diffusion is useful to analyse the reasons and conditions under 
which the EU may influence regional cooperation beyond its borders because it allows 
us to build upon a wide variety of theoretical accounts. Doing so, we can analyse 
different competing and concurrent explanations for the EU’s influence. Firstly, the 
chapter constructs a diffusion approach that enables us to assess the questions at 
hand from a micro-perspective that focuses on the reasons why EU partners decide to 
engage in regional cooperation or not. In a second step, and profiting from the 
flexibility of the diffusion approach, the model is filled with life by developing five 
hypotheses that advance explanations for the EU’s possible impact on regional 
cooperation. In a third and final step, scope conditions are defined. These are factors 
that are expected to modify and influence the effect of the EU in promoting regional 
cooperation. They allow us to survey the role of aspects that are likely to differ 
between different regions – such as the EU’s degree of leverage over its partners or 
local conditions. Chapter	Four:	Operationalisation	
Chapter four develops indicators to assess the manifestations of our dependent and 
independent variables as well as for the five hypotheses. Our dependent variable, 
‘Institutional change modelled according to EU aims’, is operationalised with an index 
that includes key elements of institutional change, such as the core function of an 
institution or its competences. The operationalisation of our independent variable, 
‘Use of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation’, captures the multifaceted 
nature of EU external action surveying the three broad fields of EU foreign policy: trade 
and economic relations, development cooperation and technical assistance, and 
political relations. The five causal mechanisms are operationalised in a way that allows 
us to identify whether, how and why the EU’s partners react to European influences. 
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Chapter	Five:	Methods	
This chapter defines the key elements of our research design and the methods of 
analysis employed. It thus connects the theoretical expectations with the empirical 
analysis in part III. The chapter outlines a case-study design that allows us to reach 
conclusions both on the case-study level as well as across cases. Once this design has 
been explained, the chapter moves to choose the regions from which the in-depth case 
studies are taken. Based on the mapping from Chapter Two, two regions are selected 
using the diverse-case selection method: the Western Balkans and Mercosur. After 
choosing the regions, the chapter establishes the criteria to select the individual case 
studies in each region. In a third step, the chapter selects and justifies the methods of 
analysis that will be used in the empirical part of this thesis. It reasons that process-
tracing is the most adequate method to test the hypotheses in the individual case 
studies and ordinal comparison for the cross-case analysis. Finally, this chapter sets 
out the methods used to retrieve empirical material for the analysis. Qualitative 
analysis of policy-making documents and 80 semi-structured interviews are the two 
sources of evidence used. Especially the interviews make it possible to base the 
analysis on novel information especially retrieved for the purposes of this study. 
Part	III:	Tracing	EU	Impact	on	Regional	Cooperation	Chapter	Six:	EU-Mercosur	
Chapter six is devoted to the empirical analysis of the EU’s efforts to promote regional 
cooperation in the Mercosur region. It begins by analysing the local context in which 
regional cooperation developed in the Southern Cone and assesses the scope 
conditions ‘degrees of statehood’ and ‘power asymmetries’, showing a marked 
resistance to delegate decision-making to regional bodies and its reliance on the EU as 
a trader and investor. After assessing our IV, we process-trace the EU’s impact on four 
cases of institutional change in the region. Overall, the analysis finds that the EU has 
had considerable influence on Mercosur’s institutional change and that lesson-
drawing, a causal mechanism particularly dependent on local initiative, was especially 
relevant. Chapter	Seven:	EU-Western	Balkans	
Following the same structure as for Mercosur, this chapter studies the EU’s impact on 
institutional change in the Western Balkans. In a region deeply scarred by the Yugoslav 
wars, our analysis finds how the attachment to national sovereignty and a rather 
transactional understanding of cooperation shape the local context. The assessment 
of our IV confirms the EU’s extraordinarily high efforts to promote regional 
cooperation across all the instruments at its disposal. A process-tracing of three cases 
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shows that, despite its strong leverage on the Western Balkans, EU influence in the 
region can be modified by local resistance. Chapter	Eight:	Cross-case	analysis	
On the basis of our case studies, chapter eight adds a cross-case level of analysis to our 
study. It draws together the results for our SRQ1 and 2 and replies to our SRQ3. 
Focusing on the variation between the cases and regions, it opens up the analysis and 
adds an inductive part to our study. This analysis discusses the role of our scope 
conditions, how they interact with the causal mechanisms and whether they can 
explain cross-regional variation in the EU’s impact on regional cooperation. 
Part	IV:	Conclusions	and	Implications	Chapter	Nine:	Conclusion	
This concluding chapter answers our research questions and summarises the main 
contributions of the thesis in light of the academic and practical research interest. On 
the basis of the results, it highlights some paths for further research and provides 
suggestions on possible approaches. 
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2 Mapping	EU	promotion	of	regional	cooperation:	nature,	genesis	and	analysis	
This chapter introduces the reader to the EU’s efforts to encourage regional 
cooperation beyond its borders. It shows that the EU seeks to promote regional 
cooperation and integration among a wide range of third countries. In addition, it 
argues that focusing on the impact of this policy enriches existing academic analyses 
and has implications for political practice. The chapter begins with a brief section that 
defines ‘regional cooperation’ (2.1). On that basis, a second section maps how, why 
and towards which regions the EU tries to act as an “external federator” (Santander 
2005: 286) (2.2). The third section discusses how these efforts have been analysed in 
the academic literature and outlines the contribution of this thesis to this body of 
literature (2.3). The conclusion sums up the main findings and paves the way to Part II 
of this thesis, which develops the analytical model for the study. 
2.1 Regional	cooperation	and	integration	beyond	the	EU’s	
borders	–	essence	and	definition	
Different meanings are attached to the terms ‘regional cooperation’ and ‘regional 
integration’ in the academic literature. In fact, books on regionalism tend to begin by 
stating that even the term ‘region’ is undefined. Often, rather lengthy considerations 
about what a region is and what it is not follow (see for example Langenhove 2011: 
63–92). Without delving into such discussions (but having them in mind), the goal of 
this section is to define what to include and what to exclude from these two labels for 
the purpose of our analysis – and to mark the separation between ‘cooperation’ and 
‘integration’ and illustrate it with specific examples. 
We start from the definition mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, 
according to which regional cooperation entails “joint exercise of state-based political 
authority in intergovernmental institutions” (Börzel 2013: 508).23 The first implication 
of this definition is that we understand regional cooperation as an enterprise that is 
mainly undertaken by national governments. This excludes both regional cooperation 
between sub-national entities (as for example the Euroregions supported by both the 
Council of Europe and the EU) and those in which civil society or non-governmental 
organisations cooperate across borders (e.g. the European confederation of 
                                                             
23 While Börzel’s definition does not specify whether ‘state-based’ does also refer to subnational 
structures, the focus of this thesis and of most of the literature lies on cooperation between (nation-
)states. 
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development NGOs CONCORD). A second set of criteria relates to the regional 
character of the initiatives considered. In practice, this means that only initiatives with 
more than two member states are considered. This excludes most cross-border 
cooperation projects, which usually involve cooperation between authorities in two 
contiguous countries and are supported by the EU as part of its regional, enlargement 
and neighbourhood policies (Commission, DG REGIO 2014). Secondly, regions are 
understood as geographically contiguous spaces, implying that only such cases of 
cooperation will be considered in which the vast majority of its members are 
neighbours. In practice, this excludes a number of initiatives that are sometimes 
considered instances of regional cooperation, such as the PALOP (Países Africanos de 
Língua Oficial Portuguesa), an organisation that englobes countries from lusophone 
Africa.  
A final – and rather obvious – criterion follows from the focus of our analysis. 
Since we are interested in EU promotion of regional cooperation beyond its borders, 
we will place our emphasis on regions whose membership is mostly formed by 
countries that are not (yet) part of the EU. Hence, groups such as the Visegrád Four 
(V4) formed by the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia do not lie in our 
focus. 
In the introduction to this thesis, we posited that there is a strong case for not 
only including regional integration in our analysis, but also instances of regional 
cooperation – after all cooperation is a prerequisite for integration. Regional 
cooperation is also the broader term of the two, encompassing integration as its most 
far-reaching variant. Taking into account that the literature often focuses on the EU’s 
relationship with other regional integration organisations, it is important to establish 
the boundary between the two terms. Definitions of regional integration focus on 
varying issues such as the inclusion of economic concerns (economic integration) 
(Mattli 1999b: 1), the signature of international treaties (Mattli 1999a: 2–3) or the 
existence of autonomous legal statuses for regional organisations (Fawcett 2013: 3). A 
common criterion in most of the definitions lies in that fact that the transfer of 
sovereignty to an institution at a higher level than the member states is a necessary 
condition. Therefore this transfer of sovereignty shall be the decisive element to 
distinguish regional integration from cooperation for the purpose of our study.  
Finally, the existence of a regional organisation is not a necessary condition 
for regional cooperation, but it is a necessary implication of regional integration as 
defined here. After all, if a transfer of sovereignty takes place, the transferred 
competences will usually be handed over to a regional body. Some definitions will only 
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speak of regional integration if it serves more than one purpose (e.g. more than just 
trade integration; cf. Goltermann et al. 2012: 4). To cover as many instances as 
possible, and for the sake of simplicity, we abstain from including this former 
criterion.24 Table 2.1 below lists the criteria to define regional cooperation and 
integration. 
	 Regional	cooperation	 Regional	integration	constituents	 states	number	of	constituents	 more	than	two	relationship	between	constituents	 geographical	neighbours	EU	membership	 constituents	are	mostly	non-members	transfer	of	sovereignty	 no	 	 yes	existence	of	a	regional	organisation	 possible	 	 yes	
  Table 2.1: Criteria to define regional cooperation and integration 
2.2 The	role	of	regional	cooperation	in	EU	external	action	
Being one of the oldest goals in the EU’s external action, the promotion of regional 
cooperation (and integration) is found across diverse EU policies and pursued with 
many partner regions. It can therefore be described as a ‘golden thread’ that runs 
through most of the EU’s geographic policies and also through the majority of its 
sectorial policies such as its environmental policy. In the EU’s geographic policies, 
which can be pictured as a set of concentric circles around the EU, promotion of 
regional cooperation plays a role in enlargement policy, in the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), as well as in relations with the wider neighbourhood (e.g. 
Central Asia) or in the direct engagement with other regional organisations, such as 
the African Union (AU) or ASEAN. In the EU’s sectorial policies, the encouragement of 
regional cooperation is a goal present in fields such as development, trade or foreign 
policy in a classical sense (CFSP). This section delves into the different motives that 
drive this action and reviews how and where the EU seeks to encourage regional 
cooperation. 
Why?	–	“Between	logic	and	political	will”	
Taking into account that virtually every other actor in foreign policy engages with 
partners on an individual, bilateral basis, this propensity for regional approaches raises 
                                                             
24 Applying such a definition would for example exclude regions with a sectorial approach to regional 
integration, which may be the most common in cases in which regional cooperation is nascent (note 
the example of the European Steal and Coal Community). 
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the following question: why does the EU frequently  choose bi-regional approaches –  
despite the fact that it is often more complicated than working bilaterally? Different 
explanations can account for this phenomenon. First of all, this propensity may simply 
be grounded in the EU’s need – as a regional actor itself – to justify its external relations 
and to differentiate them from those of its member states. Recalling the argument 
made in the introduction, EU foreign policy is always subject to at least a double 
legitimacy check – from its citizens, and most importantly, from the member states. In 
consequence, the EU needs to justify the conduct of external relations either through 
the exercise of competences that it has received from the member states (the case of 
trade or development policies) or by providing an added value, a format that no one 
else is able to offer.  
A second possible motivation for promoting regional cooperation and 
integration may be related to the wish to justify its own role in the international 
system. Being a sui generis actor creates the pressure to justify one’s own role not just 
to citizens and member states, but also to other international actors. In such a context, 
increasing the number of regional actors on the global stage may reduce this pressure 
and create less hostile conditions for the EU itself. Such motivation has been 
mentioned by several interviewees who are and were involved in negotiations 
between the EU and other regional organisations [#13, former COM official in 
Montevideo delegation; #04, EP official; #37, DG Trade official; #20, former senior 
official, Argentinean MFA] and is also discussed in the literature (Söderbaum et al. 
2005: 377; Sbragia 2010; Schünemann 2008: 127–8). The EU’s praise of those who 
“emulate” (Council 2008b: 11) it, take it as a “point of reference” (Commission 2008: 
3) for their own regional integration or have the “political ambition” [#01, former EU 
senior official] to pursue the EU’s path point in a similar direction. Related to this 
motivation is the conviction that regional groupings could play a stronger role on the 
global stage by acting as building blocks for global agreements within international 
institutions. While heralded in academia as one of the possible benefits of cooperation 
between regional organisations (e.g. Rüland 2010: 1273–8) and also mentioned by the 
Commission in older policy documents (Commission 1994: 13) and in the 2003 
European Security Strategy (Council 2003: 9), overall results in this area are so far 
modest according to sources within the EU institutions [#1, former EU senior official; 
#5, EEAS senior official; #4, EP official] and EU attempts to encourage such cooperation 
formats are still met with scepticism by individual member states as notes from the 
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discussions in Council Working Groups show (e.g. German Permanent Representation 
to the EU 2016b).25 
A third possible reason for promoting cooperation abroad may be found in 
the Union’s own institutional development. Born as an economic endeavour to bridge 
political alienation and to overcome the economic ruin that followed World War II, 
European integration saw the gradual growth of external supranational competences, 
which were first introduced as complementary policies to the Community’s internal 
market policy – with trade being the first external policy. Eager to expand its power, 
the European Commission could have sought to develop its own foreign policy 
competences in relative independence from the member states by promoting 
relations with other regional organisations and, later on, by encouraging their creation 
and further development. The likelihood of such an institutional logic, which can be 
understood as a broadly defined institutional path-dependence (cf. Pierson 2000: 
252), is reinforced by the fact that support for regional cooperation is one of the areas 
in which the EU can most simply achieve international visibility due to its recognised 
status as the frontrunner of regional integration. At the same time it is a field that can 
be easily connected to the traditional external competences of the EU in trade, 
economic and development policy. This motivation was highlighted by several officials 
from the EU and another regional organisation involved in negotiations with the EU 
[#01, former EU senior official; #07, DG DEVCO official, #03, Latin American 
ambassador]. According to a former Argentinean negotiator: “It’s their way of telling 
themselves that they are doing more than just trade agreements” [#20, former senior 
official. MFA Argentina].26 
Fourth, the EU’s emphasis on encouraging regional cooperation and 
integration may be rooted in an interest to promote international trade and open up 
new markets for European exporters, investors, and customers. Supporting regions in 
creating common markets or at least some joint rules increases the size of those 
markets and should ease the negotiation process considerably by reducing the number 
of counterparts with which the EU has to negotiate.27 This argument has often been 
                                                             
25 This and some of the following arguments were also presented in Haubrich Seco (2011).  
26 It is important to note though that the independence of the Commission from member states is 
always relative, since projects and instruments above certain financial thresholds can be blocked by 
member states through the comitology procedures. 
27 Similarly, in the context of enlargement negotiations, dealing with a group of countries may create 
the expectation that negotiations might become easier to manage in a regional setup. Instead, it 
creates a dissonance between the eminently bilateral incentives the EU can offer, of which accession 
is arguably the strongest, and taking a country hostage of its neighbour’s shortcoming. As chapter 0 
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reiterated in the literature and also by the EU itself in older policy documents (e.g. 
Commission 2006c: 5). Nonetheless, it does not explain why the EU conducts regional 
negotiations with regions that have close to no commercial relevance for the EU, such 
as Central America which accounts for 0,4 % of EU trade (DG TRADE 2013h) and with 
which the EU signed an association agreement in 2012 after tedious [#01, former EU 
senior official] negotiations. Furthermore, a closer look at the negotiation procedures 
shows that the EU’s will to open up new markets does not by itself justify the often 
cumbersome process of negotiating with regional groups, which often suffer from a 
great lack of internal coordination.28 Finally, negotiating with regional groups does 
often prevent the EU from establishing direct and quicker links with those members 
whose markets are especially attractive – a disadvantage regularly mentioned by EU 
officials involved in trade negotiations [#01, former EU senior official; #05, EEAS senior 
official; #15 EEAS official, delegation Uruguay; #52, senior EEAS official]. In a world 
characterised by large emerging markets and relatively low economic 
interdependence among developing economies, such a course of action cannot be 
explained just by the EU’s wish to open up opportunities for European traders. Instead, 
it appears that more nuanced explanations are needed.29   
Taking into account that acquiring new markets does not provide sufficiently 
convincing motives for EU promotion of regional cooperation, a fifth rational motive 
may prove more convincing. Instead of seizing (economic) interdependencies, EU 
action may well be oriented at other types of interdependence. Conflict prevention, 
resolution and post-conflict recovery stand at the centre of the EU’s emphasis in the 
promotion of regional cooperation towards Africa, Asia and parts of Europe (especially 
the Western Balkans) (see Commission 2008: 4,  and as examples for the individual 
regions, respectively: EU, AU and Morocco 2014: 3–4, Council 2012d: 16, Council 2014: 
11). This emphasis in policy documents and corresponding utterances by EU officials 
                                                             
will show, the relationship between the Western Balkans and the EU is often complicated by such 
dissonances. 
28 In most cases, the EU’s counterpart at the negotiation table will be represented by all of its member 
states. Coordination on the EU side is also more complicated than it appears on paper. The European 
Commission has the competence to negotiate trade and association agreements with third parties, 
once it has received a mandate by the Council. These negotiations are nonetheless closely monitored 
by the Council and the member states through the Trade Policy Committee in the Council. Once the 
agreement has been negotiated, it needs to be approved and often individually ratified (in the case 
of so-called ‘mixed agreements’) by all member states. This grants them considerable influence also 
during the negotiations. 
29 Beyond the EU’s own preferences, on which this section focuses, explanations should also include 
the considerations of the respective counterpart. For example, Mercosur’s decision to negotiate with 
the EU as a regional bloc is first and foremost rooted in Mercosur’s nature as a – certainly incomplete 
- customs union, a factor that often remains unmentioned in the EU-focused literature. 
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and their counterparts from partner regions show that the Union conceives regional 
cooperation as a stabilising and pacifying factor [#01, former EU senior official; #05, 
EEAS senior official; #14, former Council senior official; #65, Serbian official; #72, 
former Stability Pact official]. 
None of the above-mentioned arguments, which could be termed as being of 
a rational nature or related to institutional considerations, seems to provide a full 
picture of the forces at place. Instead a combination of these fused with possible 
normative motivations – namely, genuine conviction that bi-regional engagement 
serves a higher purpose beyond function or familiarity – could account for why the EU 
invests considerable resources in encouraging regional cooperation despite the fact 
that it has not always been a successful endeavour from a rational point of view. This 
conviction becomes quite clear when speaking to EU officials working on external 
action or reading policy documents of the European Commission (exemplarily 
Commission 2012; Council 2012e: 2). Instead of ‘just’ proposing regional cooperation 
and integration to manage existing interdependences, as the conventional academic 
trail of reasoning would suggest (e.g. Mattli 1999b: 42), the line of argument used by 
EU interviewees is often the opposite. Where interdependence is low, functional 
cooperation shall serve to increase it, the argument goes. According to this logic, 
economic, political or social interdependences are not phenomena that need to be 
managed but desirable developments to be nurtured. In a renewed reading of Jean 
Monnet’s argument, and Walter Hallstein’s ‘material logic’ (Hallstein et al. 1969: 20-
21, 24-25), the closer the (economic) interlinkages in a region, the more difficult it 
becomes for neighbours to engage in conflicts. Typical statements mentioned in this 
context read like the following: “After all, regional integration has led to peace and 
prosperity in the EU”30 [#01, former EU senior official; in the same vein, #79, senior 
EEAS official].  
These substantiated statements go hand in hand with more general 
utterances that highlight the virtues of regional cooperation and integration beyond 
utilitarian considerations. Asked why it was in the interest of the EU to encourage 
cooperation beyond its borders, EU actors engaged with different regions replied: “We 
believe that – and this is very European – integrated blocs work better”, “bi-regional 
relations are part of our philosophy […] even if it’s difficult [to conduct them, M.H.S.]”, 
“simply from the conviction that it [our model of integration, M.H.S.] was the best way 
to advance in the process31, “we export the regional model” or simply “the EU 
                                                             
30 Translated from German by the author. 
31 Translated from Spanish by the author. 
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promotes regional integration around the world, you will know that.” [respectively: 
#52, EEAS senior official; #15, EEAS official, delegation Uruguay; #13, former COM 
official in Uruguay delegation; #04, EP official; #37, DG Trade official]. Relying on 
concepts like ‘conviction’ or ‘philosophy’, these statements share the normative 
gravitas of some of the quotes from EU leaders presented at the beginning of this 
dissertation. In the academic literature such normative, but eminently unreflexive 
behaviour has been highlighted by Federica Bicchi (2006) in her article “Our size fits 
all”, proposing that EU normative action can also be explained by a natural tendency 
of institutions to promote their own experiences as these are deemed superior. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that also among EU actors the picture is 
far from being rosy. Together with the above-mentioned convictions, also other views 
emerge that indicate a loss of euphoria on the results of encouraging regional 
cooperation when compared to the optimism European institutions and actors 
radiated in previous years (cf. Farrell 2007: 299, Council 2003: 9). Such views range 
from admitting that aspirations to spread regional cooperation ignored or didn’t place 
enough emphasis on local conditions [e.g. “we used to judge a lot from the point of 
view of our own model”, #53, EU official, delegation to Uruguay32], over doubts 
regarding the effectiveness of the policies pursued [“our projects are good, but the 
results are not taken up by the countries”, “a lot of money has been spent on this and 
results have been spare”33; respectively: #52, EEAS senior official, and #05, EEAS senior 
official], to openly disengaging from a normative goal: “Brazil wants Mercosur, so we 
want it as well”, “if bilateral is easier, we take that road” [#52, EEAS senior official, and 
#08, EEAS official]. 
In sum, it becomes apparent that EU encouragement of regional cooperation 
and integration follows at least a number of logics that lie between rational self-
motivation, institutional considerations and the pursuit of a normative conviction 
according to which closer cooperation and integration is beneficial also for the EU’s 
partners. While this conviction is often voiced in an a priori unreflected way that 
strengthens the view that it is of a normative nature, sceptical statements by EU policy-
makers themselves show that there is a loss of optimism compared to some older 
utterances from EU representatives. All in all, the statement of a high EEAS official 
sums up EU motivations well: “What we do is a combination of logic and political will” 
[#05, EEAS senior official].  
                                                             
32 Translated from Spanish by the author. 
33 Translated from Spanish by the author. 
Mapping EU promotion of regional cooperation: nature, genesis and analysis 
 
 29 
How?	–	Regional	objectives	and	regional	formats	
Broadly speaking, one can discern two different means by which the EU encourages 
regional cooperation. On one hand, pursuing particular substantive objectives that 
privilege regional solutions over bilateral ones and, on the other hand, by using 
regional formats of engagement, either in an exclusive or – in most cases – a 
complementary fashion. Unsurprisingly, both do often go hand in hand, but regional 
objectives are often also pursued bilaterally and regional formats are used to tackle 
bilateral problems in less conflictive frameworks.34 While the practicalities of real 
politics are also often behind such choices, the following overview shows that regional 
approaches are a systematic choice rather than a coincidence in EU external action. 
Moving along the concentric circles presented above, we can see that regional 
objectives play an important role in the circle closest to the EU: enlargement policy. As 
a result of the post-war heritage in former Yugoslavia, to which five out of the seven 
countries currently preparing to accede the EU used to belong, ‘good neighbourly 
relations and regional cooperation’ were defined as political criteria in the accession 
process – in addition to the political conditions contained in the so-called Copenhagen 
criteria.35 While these further criteria were specifically established for the countries of 
the Western Balkans, they are also taken into account for further accessions, especially 
in light of the experience made with the Cypriot accession in 2004.36 Regional 
objectives also play a role in the ENP. For example, policies on energy security or 
environmental governance pursued with all ENP countries in the Eastern 
neighbourhood call for the management of these fields through regional cooperation 
(Commission and HR/VP 2012a; European Commission n.a. [2010]). Further away from 
the EU, the proactive management of conflicts – or of disputes that may lead to 
conflicts – through regional cooperation ranks high among the EU’s objectives towards 
groups of countries in Central Asia (Council 2015; 2007), the Horn of Africa (Council 
2011a) or the Sahel region (Commission and HR/VP 2011). These cases represent 
regions in which rivalry up to military confrontation dominates neighbourly relations 
and in which the EU has no functioning regional organisation as a counterpart to 
                                                             
34 From a negotiation perspective, discussing a problematic bilateral issue in a regional context in 
which further issues are on the negotiating table can allow to use these dossiers as bargaining chips. 
35 The ‘Copenhagen criteria’ are three sets of criteria defined by the European Council in 1993 in 
Denmark that should be met before acceding to the EU. They include stable political institutions able 
to guarantee democracy and human rights, a functioning market economy and the ability to 
implement the obligations arising from membership (European Council 1993).  
36 Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island with a Turkish-Cypriot north and a Greek-Cypriot south. 
Since its accession to the EU, Cyprus, itself not a NATO member, is able to block EU initiatives for 
closer cooperation with NATO, to which Turkey belongs. Conversely, Turkey can block NATO 
attempts to work more closely with the EU.  
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engage with. Under such conditions, a bilateral engagement with individual countries 
would certainly be the most simple and promising approach to achieving immediate 
policy returns – and is the approach most often pursued by other actors towards these 
regions.37 This exemplifies the emphasis placed on bi-regional engagement by the 
EU.38 Finally, in the last of our concentric circles, regional objectives also dominate in 
the EU’s engagement with partners like the AU and the different sub-regional 
organisations on the African continent. In this particular example, supporting 
regionally-led conflict management ranks high among the declared objectives of the 
EU and is implemented through the African Peace Facility, a financing instrument that 
supports African-led peace operations under the mandate of the AU or the local sub-
regional organisations. 
Regional formats are common in the policy fields mentioned above, but also 
in several others. In some cases, the EU engages with third countries exclusively in 
regional groups (as in the case of trade policy towards the African sub-regional 
organisations) or with a bi-regional stream complementing bilateral policies (as in the 
case of the ENP). This goes as far as to encouraging the formation of regional 
counterparts where there were none before. The Sahel region and the Western 
Balkans are two cases in point, representing different degrees of EU engagement. In 
the Sahel, a region characterised by limited cooperation – if not rivalry – between 
neighbours and a lack of state control over large areas especially in border regions, EU 
objectives have remained modest, seeking to establish regular regional meetings at 
the highest political levels and build regional structures, for example to increase the 
exchange of information between law enforcers (Commission and HR/VP 2011: 3; 
Mogherini 2015). In the case of the Western Balkans, EU engagement goes much 
further – to the extent of ‘inventing’ the ‘Western Balkans’ as a term and a politically 
defined region. This neologism was coined by the Austrian Council presidency in 1998 
as a result of the politically delicate need to find a neutral term – meaning a term to 
refer mainly to the states that had emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia without 
mentioning Yugoslavia – while taking into account both the stigma associated with the 
term ‘Balkans’ and the intricacies of political realities.39 Ever since, EU policies towards 
this group of countries have included numerous region-building objectives. 
                                                             
37 The US engages with all these countries on a bilateral basis. In the case of Central Asia, China and 
Russia are important exceptions to this approach, as they engage with the region through regional 
organisations as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO). 
38 This emphasis goes as far as to trying to create regional counterparts to engage with where there 
are none. See the discussion of regional formats in the following paragraphs for examples. 
39 Chapter 7.1 below explains in more detail how the term ‘Western Balkans’ was coined. 
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It is important to note that regional objectives and formats are often fostered 
using bilateral means. A case in point is that of enlargement policy, where candidate 
countries are encouraged to engage in regional formats (e.g. the Central European 
Free Trade Area [CEFTA] originally formed by Poland, Hungary, former Czechoslovakia, 
Slovenia and Romania) but the incentives and conditions set to encourage such 
behaviour are defined in bilateral interactions or agreements with the individual 
states, in this case the respective accession treaties. The EU promotes regional 
cooperation beyond its borders using a widespread set of instruments throughout its 
portfolio of external policies. At the diplomatic level, the EU sustains a series of so-
called biregional relationships with the regions that are deemed to be most important 
for the EU, including East Asia, Latin America and Africa. Embedded in and alongside 
these relationships, meetings are held with sub-regional organisations (e.g. ASEAN or 
Mercosur) and common agendas are developed. International agreements are in place 
with most sub-regional organisations.40 Trade agreements are in place or pursued with 
many regional organisations in the world (Commission 2013g). In the sphere of 
development assistance, support for regional cooperation and integration 
complements the assistance given by the EU to individual states and amounts to 
almost 10% of total aid commitments by EU institutions41, and its share has been 
growing in the European Development Fund (EDF) (Herrero and Gregersen 2016: 1–
2).42 Institutionalised parliamentary relations between the European Parliament and 
regional and sub-regional parliamentary assemblies are in place with almost every 
region of the world (European Parliament 2015).  
The following section will survey the regions towards which the EU 
encourages regional cooperation. It shows that EU promotion of regional cooperation 
is a policy with an almost global scope – and also provides the basis for the selection 
of the case studies undertaken in chapters six and seven. 
Where?	–	A	policy	with	global	reach	
To map where the EU promotes regional cooperation, it is useful to recall the 
definitions of regions established earlier in this study as well as our research question. 
Regions were defined in section 2.1 (see p. 23) as groups constituted by more than two 
states that are geographical neighbours. Following our research question ‘How, to 
                                                             
40 See the afore-mentioned EEAS Treaty Database (European External Action Service 2014). 
41 Calculated for aid commitments in the years 2005-2013 (latest data available) using data from the 
OECD Creditor Reporting System for development assistance. 
42 The EDF is the EU’s dedicated budget for development assistance measures in the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific regions (ACP). 
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what extent and under what conditions does the EU succeed in promoting regional 
cooperation beyond its borders?’, we are further interested in cases in which the EU 
tries to encourage regional cooperation at least with some degree of active 
engagement, i.e. we survey all relationships between the EU and other regions towards 
which the EU seeks to engage as a region-builder. While the degree of intentional 
engagement can be defined in different ways (and will be defined later as we spell out 
the EU’s instruments to promote regional cooperation and thereby define our 
independent variable), orienting our mapping according to our research question 
implies that we are not looking at cases in which the EU’s regional model is copied or 
interpreted by any other actor without at least some involvement of the EU in the 
process. This is in line with our interest in assessing the effectiveness of a policy that 
is intentional.43 This definition does also imply that the mere provision of EU funds to 
a regional cooperation initiative is not per se a sufficient criterion to contend that the 
EU is actively promoting regional cooperation. Not all regional initiatives that do 
receive EU funding do so because of an express EU intention to encourage regional 
cooperation. A number of them (e.g. the Central European Initiative or the Council of 
Baltic Sea States) draw a significant share of their funds from the EU because they have 
successfully applied for EU-funded programmes that are also available to national 
actors. Orienting our mapping according to our research question also allows us to use 
the results to define our population of cases, i.e. the pool of cases to which our 
hypotheses could in principle apply (Geddes 1990: 134–5) and among which we will 
later select our specific case studies (George and Bennett 2005: 83). 
Having defined the kind of cases we are interested in, we now need to look 
for the existence of specific EU region-building policies to individually identify the 
regions. We determine whether such a policy exists or not on the basis of EU policy 
strategies issued by the EEAS, by those Commission DGs that predominantly deal with 
external action, the so-called ‘RELEX family’44, and – in individual cases – by the Council 
and the European Council. The respective documents were retrieved from the 
websites of the different institutions and from the databases of international 
                                                             
43 In practice, this does not exclude any particular case since the operationalisation of our 
independent variable in chapter 4.3 also includes ‘low-threshold’ instruments as the praise of 
regional cooperation in speeches or public utterings.  
44 This includes DG ELARG, DG DEVCO (before 2011: DG DEV and DG AIDCO), DG TRADE and DG RELEX 
before the start of the EEAS in December 2010. FPI, the service managing the implementation of 
several EU foreign instruments, is not included, as it has no strategic functions. DG ECHO, the 
Commission’s DG responsible for humanitarian aid, is also not included as it lies in the nature of 
humanitarian aid that it can only be programmed to a limited extent. Other DGs with a prominent 
external mandate as DG CLIMA and DG ENV are not included here as their international activities 
take place predominantly in global multilateral arrangements. 
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agreements maintained by the EEAS (EEAS 2013) and the Council (Council 2013a). In 
some cases, policy documents that were not publicly available had to be requested 
from the EEAS, the Commission or the Council according to the procedure established 
by Regulation (EC) 1049/2011 on public access to documents (European Parliament 
and Council of the European Union 2001). This information was contrasted with the 
literature in order to ensure that no cases were left out of the survey.  
Cases were included in our mapping if they met two criteria. First, the 
respective EU policy had to have been active at least between the end of 2010 and 
mid-2012 at the very least. A follow-up check in 2015 showed that there were no 
newer policies to add. The second criterion to conduct our mapping follows from our 
interest in the EU’s impact beyond its own borders. As a consequence, we only 
consider groups whose membership involves a considerable number of states that are 
not – or not yet – members of the EU. Table 2.2 below summarises these two criteria. 
Criteria	to	map	EU	promotion	of	regional	cooperation	Population	 consists	 of	 relationships	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 regionally	 confined	groups	of	states	towards	which…	
• an	EU	region-building	policy	exists,	
• and	whose	membership	 is	 formed	by	a	 considerable	number	of	 states	that	are	not	EU	members.	
        Table 2.2: Criteria to map EU promotion of regional cooperation 
The results of our mapping show that the EU encourages regional cooperation virtually 
all over the globe. We identify 31 regions towards which the EU sustains a region-
building policy. Only a few states in the world do not belong to at least one of these 
regions. Nonetheless, a ‘blind spot’ and some ‘grey areas’ do also become apparent: 
neither Canada nor the US belong to any of the regions focused on by such policies.45 
And while Russia belongs to several region-building policies promoted by the EU, the 
focus of these policies does clearly lie on strengthening regional cooperation among 
Asian states and Russian participation remains anecdotal at best.46 Similarly, Australia 
and New Zealand are involved in the EU’s relationship with Asia, but certainly with a 
role derived from being important regional stakeholders. The results of the mapping 
                                                             
45 While the EU seeks to strengthen the Organisation of American States (OAS), to which the US and 
Canada belong, the focus of both the OAS itself and of the EU is clearly on Latin America. 
46 In fact, Russia rejected to be included in the ENP at the time of its inception, and therefore also in 
its region-building components. Instead, Russia sought a privileged approach from the EU, in a move 
that exemplifies how region-building policies are contested by the changing patterns of international 
relations (cf. section 1.1.1 above). This approach was framed in the so-called four common spaces of 
EU cooperation with Russia: economy, legal cooperation, external security, and research, education 
and culture. 
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are shown in table 2.3 below. The table lists EU relationships with regions and not with 
individual regional organisations, therefore reflecting the broader scope of our study 
as compared to studies that concentrate on relationships between formal ROs. It also 
reflects that EU strategies often target particular regions rather than individual 
organisations. Therefore, some relationships include EU engagement with several 
regional organisations in a single region. The clearest example for this is the EU-
Western Balkans case, where a large number of organisations pursuing functional 
cooperation in specific areas (e.g. energy, trade, etc.) are subsumed under the 
common goal of promoting cooperation in the region. 
To simplify the overview of EU relationships with regions beyond its borders 
in which the EU tries to encourage regional cooperation, the individual instances are 
classified in different categories. The categories reflect whether the relationships have 
a continental scope, are focused on formally organised sub-regions, on loosely defined 
groups of countries or incorporated in the two policy frames that govern EU 
relationships with its closer neighbourhood: the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) and negotiations to enter the EU. Obviously, sub-regional relationships are often 
also part of larger relationships. For example, the relationship between the EU and the 
African continent also embodies the relationship with ECOWAS. Annex A to this thesis 
presents the list below in more detail, also including the individual strategy documents 
in which the EU outlines its intention to encourage regional cooperation in the 
respective region. 
Institutionalised	
bi-regional	
relationships	
Relationships	with	
formal	sub-regional	
organisations	
Relations	
with	
groups	of	
countries	
Sub-regional	
and	multi-
country	
initiatives	in	
the	ENP		
Accession-
related	sub-
regional	
cooperation	EU-Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	 EU-League	of	Arab	States	 EU-Sahel	 EU-Eastern	Partnership	 EU-Western	Balkans	EU-Africa	 EU-West	Africa	(ECOWAS/UEMOA)	 EU-Central	Asia	 EU-Black	Sea	region	 	EU-Asia	 EU-Southern	Africa	(SADC)		 EU-Arctic	region	 EU-EuroMed	/	Union	for	the	Mediterranean	 	EU-East	Asia	 EU-Central,	Eastern	and	Southern	Africa	(COMESA)	 	 EU-Maghreb	 	EU-Europe	(CoE)*	 EU-Eastern	Africa	(EAC)	 	 EU-Arab	Mediterranean	Countries	 	EU-Europe	(OSCE)*	 EU-Indian	Ocean	Region	(IOC)	 	 	 	
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	 EU-Central	Africa	(CEMAC,	CEEAC,	CEPGL)	 	 	 		 EU-Caribbean	(CARICOM,	OECS,	Cariforum)	 	 	 		 EU-Andean	Region	(Andean	Community)	 	 	 		 EU-Central	America	(SICA)	 	 	 		 EU-Southern	Cone	(Mercosur)	 	 	 		 EU-Persian	Gulf	(GCC)	 	 	 		 EU-Pacific	region	(SPC,	PICTA)	 	 	 		 EU-South	East	Asia	(ASEAN)	 	 	 		 EU-Southern	Asia	(SAARC)	 	 	 		 EU-Horn	of	Africa	(IGAD)	 	 	 	
*The EU’s relations with the OSCE and the CoE are governed by different strategies / memoranda – 
otherwise they could be presented as one single relationship. 
Table 2.3: Relationships between the EU and regions with an EU region-building policy47 
As we can see from this list, EU encouragement of regional cooperation spreads to all 
continents and takes different forms. It ranges from relationships with encompassing, 
but non-binding common agendas as the EU-Africa relationship and its Joint Africa-EU 
Strategy, over highly-institutionalised relationships with sub-regional organisations 
such as the EU-Central America association governed by an association agreement 
with a trade accord and binding commitments, to loose attempts to engage groups of 
countries that barely view themselves as a region as in the EU-Sahel case. It further 
becomes apparent that EU efforts in promoting regional cooperation reach from 
engaging with and further supporting regional cooperation and integration where it 
already exists (the case of the Andean Community, the AU or ASEAN) to trying to foster 
regional cooperation where there was none before (e.g. the Western Balkans, 
Euromed / Union for the Mediterranean or the Sahel). 
                                                             
47 To present the list as concisely as possible, the different organisations are mentioned in acronyms 
here. The full denominations are listed in Annex A. 
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The table above shows that EU promotion of regional cooperation is a 
widespread phenomenon – even if some of the statements of EU officials reflected in 
the previous paragraphs express declining optimism over the last years regarding its 
effects, certainly also as a result of the growing relevance of emerging powers 
demanding a privileged EU approach. As a widespread phenomenon, also political 
science literature in general and academic research focusing on the EU in particular 
have developed different theories to study the EU’s impact on regional cooperation 
elsewhere. The following section briefly reflects upon the most relevant approaches 
and highlights in how far they are suited to study the questions posed by this study. 
2.3 Theoretical	perspectives	on	EU	promotion	of	regional	
cooperation	
In light of our research question and in order to be able to develop an appropriated 
theoretical framework, we must know which approaches the existing literature offers 
to survey (the EU’s) external influence on regional cooperation elsewhere and in how 
far these approaches can provide a basis for our research. For the sake of avoiding 
lengthy reviews of the rich literature on EU external action or the even broader IR 
literature, this review concentrates on the efforts that have been undertaken so far to 
analyse in how far regional cooperation and integration can be influenced and 
promoted from the outside.48 It will show that there are both desiderata in the 
literature in this regard as well as different foundations on which to build a suitable 
explanatory model. These results then provide the basis for the development of an 
explanatory model in Part II of this thesis. This review takes up the keywords that were 
discussed in chapter 1 as regards the academic relevance of this project and therefore 
looks for the contribution that existing approaches could make on three aspects: 
impact assessment, providing a perspective that goes beyond systemic 
argumentations, and expanding the range of cases typically covered by the literature.49  
Until recently, research on the active promotion of regional cooperation and 
integration has often been rather descriptive and certainly a niche of either EU studies 
or IR. Academics arguing from the perspective of EU studies have often concentrated 
on discussing the EU’s intention to encourage regional cooperation and integration 
and how far this represents a novel, outspokenly multilateral approach in foreign 
                                                             
48 While the theories reviewed here could in principle also be applied to the external influence of any 
other regional organisation than the EU, the literature does clearly focus on the EU as the RO that 
does most obviously conduct an own foreign policy / external action. 
49 The ensuing part of this section is updated and expanded from a paper presented by the author at 
the 7th Annual Graduate Conference at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem in December 2011. 
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affairs .50 Studies that would allow for an empirical analysis of the effects of these 
efforts have often had its origin in the discipline of IR. As a consequence, they 
commonly adopted a rather systemic perspective. This perspective is concerned with 
the impact that regional cooperation and integration may have on how international 
actors deal with each other and on the whole realm of international relations (e.g. on 
cooperation in international institutions cf. Rüland 2010; Dent 2004). Focusing on 
approaches that go at least one step beyond the systemic perspective, this review 
starts with models drawn from interregionalism studies, continues by reviewing the 
external governance approach and concludes with the scholarship on the EU’s role in 
transforming border conflicts by promoting (regional) cooperation. In following this 
sequence, we gradually move from models that argue from a more systemic 
perspective to models that also include a micro perspective. 
Insights	from	the	study	of	interregionalism		
In the IR literature, the thesis that the EU promotes regional cooperation and 
integration well beyond its borders has been put forward most frequently by scholars 
in the field of interregional relations, making this field of study the obvious start of our 
review. These scholars have read the EU’s efforts in promoting regional integration 
from the point of view of their theories and argued that the EU seeks to promote 
“regionalism through interregionalism” (Hänggi 2003: 199; similarly Santander 2005). 
Although interregionalism studies are indeed characterised by their theoretical 
eclecticism as several scholars from this field have argued (Rüland 2002: 9–10; 
Söderbaum and van Langenhove 2005: 252–3), most of the studies in this area have 
been led by realist and liberal institutionalist understandings of IR. Out of the 
interregionalism literature, the following paragraphs will review two models that seem 
useful for researching the promotion of regional cooperation. Institution-building	in	interregionalism	
Starting from a liberal-institutionalist perspective, Jürgen Rüland (2006: 302–6) has 
argued that the engagement of the EU with other regions and groups of states can 
encourage the setting up of regional institutions elsewhere. Such an influence in the 
creation of institutions can in theory happen by two means. Firstly, the states the EU 
                                                             
50 While encouraging regional cooperation and the relations between regional organisations is 
certainly a contribution to a ‘negotiated world order’ when compared to plain bilateral relations 
between states, the frequently connected bi-regional preferential trade treaties have often been 
criticised as hampering the development of a truly multilateral trade system with global rules 
applying to all actors (most prominently by Bhagwati 2008). 
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engages with may wish to set up common institutions to cooperate among themselves 
in view of a stark asymmetry between their own political cohesion and that of the EU. 
Secondly, less powerful states may want to push forward cooperation with the EU to 
improve their position in their own region by making it more predictable through 
stronger regional institutions (Hänggi 2003: 199). The difference here lies in the 
motivations for increased cooperation and is of less relevance at this point of our 
analysis. What is relevant is the fact that in both arguments cooperation does not 
result because the EU deliberately encourages it but by sheer exposure to the EU, i.e. 
cooperation between the EU’s partners is a by-product of the EU’s relations with them.  
Understanding closer regional cooperation as a deliberate decision taken by 
individual actors, the model does go beyond a purely systemic perspective. But how 
does it fare in light of the two other aspects that orient this review: assessing impact 
and allowing to broaden the cases studied? While the broad understanding of 
institutions on which this model is based – institutions are conceived as enduring and 
interconnected rules and practices that assign roles to actors, guide their behaviour 
and influence their expectations (cf. Keohane et al. 1995: 4–5) – would allow to use it 
to analyse the EU’s impact not just on formal ROs but also on less institutionalised 
forms of cooperation, the model seems ill-equipped to trace causality to an extent that 
allows us to assess whether further closer regional cooperation in a region can be 
related to EU influence or not. While it looks at feasible motives (stark asymmetry 
towards the EU and ‘anchoring’ the own region with a predictable partner), it does not 
delineate a causal chain to connect these motives to a particular behaviour. It becomes 
clear that this model cannot be the only theoretical basis to trace EU promotion of 
regional cooperation and that further analytical frameworks need to be explored. 
Nonetheless, the motives outlined by the model may well describe possible scope 
conditions.51  Collective	identity-building	in	interregionalism	
With Julie Gilson’s (2002: 20–5) collective identity-building hypothesis, a second 
explanatory model for the promotion of regional cooperation was added to the 
literature. Although it is still nested in a systemic perspective that explores how regions 
influence international relations, this model relies on social constructivism. It tries to 
explain the influence that engaging with a stronger, more coherent region like the EU 
can have on other groups of states. Gilson sets up the hypothesis that the self-
perception and identity of a group of states will change if it engages with another 
                                                             
51 See section 3.4 below. 
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group. This change in self-perception may then affect its interests and, by implication, 
its behaviour. According to Gilson, the influence on self-perception can take two 
different paths. Firstly, cooperation between states can change how political elites 
perceive themselves (e.g. as speaking not only for themselves, but also for their 
neighbours) and encourage more cooperation. Secondly, the perception of the 
interlocutor (in this case by the EU) can shape a common identity that encourages 
cooperation as well.52  
If one surveys the model regarding its ability to consider the impact of an 
external policy, we see that tracing the causality of such an impact empirically is 
extremely difficult due to the struggle of identifying the exact reasons for a change in 
self-perception – especially if assessed without taking into account further possible 
influences on regional cooperation (e.g. economic support or pressure). Yet, the model 
points at an interesting concept that can be useful in the context of this research and 
in combination with further explanatory factors. Gilson argues that a group of 
countries “may, in fact, derive its own identity in part as a result of being accepted as 
a ‘region’ by a discernible and pre–defined regional other (...)" (Gilson 2005: 310). 
From this quote, one can deduce a rather untraditional concept of power: power is not 
only a matter of economic strength or military muscle – but also of having a common 
identity and visibility (in Gilson’s terms: being “discernible and pre-defined”). Similarly 
to the institution-building model, the asymmetry between the EU and its respective 
counterparts is the main explanation for the strengthening of regional cooperation. In 
line with the model’s social constructivist inspiration, the creation of a common 
identity is thus explained by the challenges of facing a materially more powerful 
partner, but mainly as a result of the wish to define oneself in opposition to others. In 
Gilson’s terms, the engagement with the EU acts as a “mobilizing agent” (2005: 310) 
for East Asian cooperation. As with the previous model, flexibility to adapt to both 
regional organisations and looser groups of states does not seem a problem, especially 
taking into account that the Gilson’s model was designed to analyse ASEM, which has 
itself a hybrid structure.53 
                                                             
52 Gilson (2005: 320) argues that this has been the case in South East Asia as a consequence of the 
engagement with the EU in the ‘Asia-Europe Meetings’ (ASEM). Such cooperation can also rest on 
the wish to differentiate oneself from others. 
53 ASEM is not a meeting of two regional organisations, but a format that involves member states of 
two regional organisations (the EU and ASEAN) and the regional secretariats, three states close to 
ASEAN (China, Japan and South Korea) and a number of further states (India, Mongolia, Pakistan, 
Australia, New Zealand and Russia). 
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External	governance	approach	
The external governance approach put forward by Sandra Lavenex (2004) and further 
developed by Lavenex and Frank Schimmelfennig (2010) is a further way of 
conceptualising the EU’s efforts to influence international affairs. Its strength lies in 
that it does not only consider the ‘traditional’ means of foreign policy as represented 
by the CFSP but is in principle applicable to the whole range of its external action. Since 
the matter under consideration here - promotion of regional cooperation - touches 
upon a whole range of EU policies (trade policy, development policy, neighbourhood 
policy, enlargement), we will briefly review the potential of the approach in the 
following paragraphs. 
Starting from the assumption that the EU attempts to transfer its own rules 
and policies to influence third countries, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig outline three 
different modes of external governance: hierarchical governance, network governance 
and market governance. Hierarchical governance makes use of binding prescriptions 
and is seen as limited to accession countries and, to a limited extent, to states in the 
European Economic Area. Network governance relies on voluntary agreements with 
other actors; objectives are set between the EU and others but they are implemented 
according to national rules. Such governance arrangements would be especially 
common in association agreements. Market governance argues that rules are 
established and propagated through competition with other rules. Such governance 
occurs for example when internal EU rules (e.g. competition policies) create such 
externalities that affect the behaviour of external actors (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
2010: 7–9). 
The external governance approach provides useful insights and is in principle 
flexible enough to accommodate different types of addressees of EU influence (e.g. 
regional organisations, individual states, etc.). Nonetheless, it becomes clear that 
especially hierarchical governance is applicable only to a limited number of cases. 
Since the approach strongly concentrates on the ‘EU part’ of external governance, it 
does not allow to trace the EU’s impact all the way down to the agency of local actors. 
It concentrates on how the EU acts in different policy contexts rather than on the 
process of transfer and implementation of the policies. As a consequence of this, the 
model is not applicable as an analytical framework for our study. It can be useful 
though as an overarching taxonomy to classify what the EU does in which policy areas 
and to capture why the EU is inclined to different modes of governance in different 
contexts, a choice that is likely to influence its impact. Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 
also advance some ideas on how the adoption of norms could be measured (2010: 17). 
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These ideas deserve a closer look and can inform the operationalisation of variables 
later on.  
Scholarship	on	the	EU’s	role	in	the	transformation	of	regional	conflicts	
The EU’s role in encouraging regional cooperation beyond its borders has also been 
explored by a ramification of conflict research. This literature has explored how the EU 
tries to promote regional cooperation in order to reduce the virulence of regional or 
border conflicts and transform them at least into peaceful disputes. This work has 
been put forward mainly by Thomas Diez and others (Diez et al. 2006: 571–3; Diez et 
al. 2008) and has outlined four different theoretical models to explain the EU’s impact 
in promoting regional cooperation.  
Although the work by Diez et al. has concentrated mostly on cases in the EU 
or bordering on the EU and thus the explanations rely heavily on the transformative 
power of an accession perspective on candidate states, three of the four theoretical 
paths it outlines could also be applied further away.54 These three remaining 
explanatory frameworks are termed ‘compulsory impact’, ‘enabling impact’ and 
‘connective impact’ by their authors. ‘Compulsory impact’ explains the promotion of 
regional cooperation through ‘carrots and sticks’. Following this argumentation, the 
EU can set incentives (e.g. accession, association agreements) to promote regional 
cooperation. ‘Enabling impact’ would rely on providing conflicting actors with a new 
context to legitimise their departure from conflict (e.g. legal frameworks or arguments 
of the kind ‘Europeans have achieved economic progress because they refrained from 
fighting each other’) and, finally, ‘connective impact’ refers to supporting exchange 
between conflicting parties.55 
In how far can these three pathways of conflict transformation be applied to 
our research on the promotion of regional cooperation? How do these explanations 
fare with regard to impact assessment, going beyond a systemic perspective and 
allowing to expand the range of cases typically studied?  
                                                             
54 We exclude the fourth one, “constructive impact”, because it relies on a change of identities of 
conflict actors through a continued and intensive exposure to a ‘European’ discourse (cf. Diez et al. 
2006: 574). Such a strong exposition seems feasible only in the EU or its most immediate 
neighbourhood and therefore hinders the applicability of the model to a broader set of cases. A 
recent book, co-edited also by Thomas Diez, expands the cases by including studies further away 
from the EU (Diez and Tocci 2017). 
55 The so-called San José dialogue in the 1980s in which the EU contributed to solve the conflict in 
Central America by seating the states of the region around one table can be seen as a successful case 
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Firstly, all the models are flexible enough to capture the involvement of the 
EU with states, regions and even non-state groups and have indeed already been 
applied to different types of actors (from regional organisations, over individual 
countries to sub-national entities).56  Secondly, it seems possible to trace the causality 
of the EU’s influence in the three models, albeit to different extents. The case of 
‘enabling impact’ is certainly the easiest in this regard as the impact can be traced by 
analysing the discourse of conflicting actors. Also in the cases of compulsory and 
connective impact it should be possible to find enough empirical material to connect 
regional cooperation to the EU’s influence. It does nonetheless remain uncertain 
whether such an impact could be isolated from other, exogenous influences – one of 
our key motivations to favour micro views over systemic approaches. Thirdly, we see 
that, while all models look beyond a purely systemic perspective, unfortunately only 
the enabling impact model explicitly focuses on the active agency of the addressees of 
EU action as it considers how local actors adapt EU influence to legitimise changes in 
their behaviour. Therefore it is the only of the three models that explicitly opens up 
the ‘black box’ inside the regions and organisations addressed by the EU meeting a 
central condition outlined in the introduction: to reflect local factors. 
In	search	of	an	eclectic	approach	
The paragraphs above have reviewed a number of models drawn from three strands 
of IR and EU studies that could in principle be applicable to assess our research 
question since they do at least take a step beyond the perspective of the international 
system. Our review has shown that almost all the models include some relevant points 
for our analysis. All of them are flexible enough to meet one of our main criteria: being 
able to accommodate different addressees of EU influences without regard to their 
precise nature as formalised regional organisations, (groups of) individual states or 
loose regional initiatives. While the collective-identity building approach drawn from 
interregionalism studies is difficult to test empirically, its constructivist premises shed 
light on a broader definition of power that can be very useful to analyse the EU’s ‘soft 
power’ or ‘power of attraction’ when encouraging regional cooperation. In a similar 
vein, the institution-building approach coming from interregionalism studies is also 
complicated to assess empirically, but highlights two motives that can alter the EU’s 
impact on other regions: stark organisational asymmetry in comparison to the EU and 
the wish of small states in a region to gain more legal and political certainty in their 
own region by engaging with the EU. The external governance approach highlights 
                                                             
56 The cases included in Diez et al.(2008) are Northern Ireland, Cyprus, Israel-Palestine and Baltic 
states-Russia. 
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different EU approaches when dealing with partners but does not factor in the agency 
of the local actors to a degree that would allow for testing the impact of specific EU 
actions. Finally, the approaches stemming from research on the transformation of 
regional conflicts highlight the diversity of possible EU influences on regional 
cooperation beyond its borders (incentive-based, discursive and mediation-based), 
but only the discourse-based focuses explicitly on how EU partners might actively react 
to and use an EU influence. In sum, the review highlights that the literature offers quite 
a large number of possible explanations that should be taken into account to assess 
the EU’s impact as region-builder beyond its borders. It also shows though that none 
of the models reviewed suffices by itself to cover sufficient possible explanations and 
to assess them in practice. This conclusion calls for a synthetic model that allows 
factoring in different motives and causal chains to explain whether and how local 
actors may react to EU influences. At the same time, the desired model needs to 
accommodate these – and possibly further explanations – under one common 
framework that allows to compare the influence of different factors. 
Conclusion	
Regional cooperation is a global phenomenon in which a number of states decide to 
jointly exercise political authority in intergovernmental institutions. In this study, 
regional cooperation is understood as a phenomenon comprising at least two or more 
states that are geographical neighbours. This exercise of political authority can span 
from mere ad hoc cooperation on a specific political issue to the permanent transfer 
of (some degree of) sovereignty to a regional body above the states. In the latter case, 
we speak of regional integration. Regional integration can therefore be seen at the end 
of a continuum describing different degrees of regional cooperation. The transfer of 
sovereignty can span from a one-time authorisation to a regional body to exercise a 
specific authority to the permanent transfer of policy fields. While regional integration 
obviously requires some kind of regional organisation towards which sovereignty is 
transferred, regional cooperation can function without a regional body.  
The overview of EU activities to promote regional cooperation beyond its 
borders allows us to distinguish between regional objectives and regional formats. 
Regional objectives are substantive political goals in which regional solutions are 
privileged above bilateral ones, for example the regional management of conflicts. 
Regional formats are ways of engagement used by the EU instead of bilateral ones or 
complementing them. Trade negotiations with sub-regional groups as pursued with 
African regions are a case in point. While regional objectives and formats do often go 
hand in hand, objectives are often also pursued bilaterally (e.g. regional cooperation 
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as a part of the bilateral Stabilisation and Association process with Western Balkan 
states) and bilateral objectives can be dealt with in regional formats.  
Several possible factors contribute to explain the EU’s long-standing tendency 
to encourage regional cooperation beyond its borders and to privilege regional 
approaches over bilateral ones. The wish to justify its own sui-generis role in the 
international system as a regional organisation towards its own member states and 
towards other international actors does certainly play a role. The EU’s own 
institutional development and the need to ground any new activity according to the 
principle of conferral of competences may have encouraged the EU to develop foreign 
policy activities along already transferred competences with an eminently regional set-
up, such as trade or economic policy. Also, opening up markets for European traders 
ranks high among the EU’s external objectives. Doing so with regionally constituted 
markets could provide certain benefits of scale and higher legal certainty. Similarly, 
tackling clearly regionally constituted interdependences like regional conflicts is an 
argument often mentioned by the EU itself. It becomes apparent though that none of 
these rational arguments can explain on their own, or even in conjunction, why the EU 
privileges regional approaches even when they are more complicated and less 
promising than bilateral ones. Interviews with EU policy-makers reveal that the 
normative conviction that regional cooperation is ‘right’ or ‘good per se’ is very present 
in their mind-set, albeit with a decreasing degree of optimism as regards the results of 
the EU’s policy. In sum, the EU’s motivation to encourage regional cooperation beyond 
its borders stems from a mixture of rational motives, institutional path-dependency 
and normative conviction. 
A geographic mapping of the EU’s activities to encourage regional cooperation 
shows that these motives spark action on an almost global scale, covering 31 
relationships with other geographical regions for which the EU has formulated a 
region-building policy - often including several regional organisations in each of these 
regions. This phenomenon has also found its way into academia and more specifically 
into theoretically grounded approaches in political science. A review of different 
approaches taken in IR and EU studies reveals that there are several docking points in 
the literature to study the impact of EU promotion of regional cooperation, but that 
none of them provides a sufficiently encompassing approach. Therefore the role of the 
next part of this thesis and of the ensuing chapter three in particular will be to develop 
a theoretical model that allows us to take into account several strands of thought to 
assess “how, to what extent, and under what conditions the EU [does] succeed[s] in 
promoting regional cooperation beyond its borders”. 
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Part	II An	Analytical	Framework	to	Study	the	
External	Promotion	of	Regional	Cooperation	3 Theoretical	framework	
The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical model that allows us to find answers 
to the research question guiding this work – “how, to what extent and under what 
conditions does the EU succeed in promoting regional cooperation beyond its borders?” 
– as well as to the sub-ordinate research questions. The model shall allow to discern 
how the EU tries to achieve its goal of promoting regional cooperation beyond its 
borders and how successful that effort is. It will also draw a road map for the empirical 
analysis in chapters 6, 7 and 8. This chapter argues that a diffusion framework that 
incorporates hypotheses from several strands of thought is the best suited approach 
to tackle the diverse paths through which the EU potentially influences regional 
cooperation and integration elsewhere in the world.  
This argument is developed in four sections. The ensuing section 3.1 outlines the 
expectations the model needs to meet in order to add to already existing work. 
Starting from this basis, section 3.2 develops the explanatory model, moving from the 
general to the specific. It first selects an appropriate diffusion approach, then adapts 
its parameters to the study of our research question and defines the dependent and 
independent variables. The two following sections move to the core of the model 
developing the hypotheses that will be tested in the empirical parts of this study (3.3) 
and formulating the scope conditions under which the hypotheses are expected to be 
most applicable (3.4). A conclusion sums up the model and connects it to the ensuing 
operationalisation chapter. 
3.1 Guiding	criteria	
To clarify how to undertake an assessment of the EU’s success in promoting regional 
cooperation, it is helpful to first think about the matter in an abstract way. From such 
a perspective, a theoretical framework which captures and assesses the EU’s influence 
on regional cooperation beyond its borders needs to take into account a number of 
interactions and link them together: (I) the structure and setup of the engagement 
between the EU and other regions and states as well as the decision-makers involved 
on both sides; (II) the instruments used by the EU and their content and; finally, (III) 
how the use of these instruments might translate into local impact. Translating these 
complex interactions into a parsimonious explanatory framework is done best by 
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unpacking them into their different elements. Each element will now be discussed to 
distil the necessary components of the explanatory framework.  
Structure	and	Flexibility	
A challenge stands at the beginning of our model: creating one common model for 
different cases of regional cooperation which diverge in their set-up. Thus, a model 
combining structure and flexibility is needed. This can be achieved by conceptualising 
the process of having an impact on regional cooperation as involving a sender and a 
receiver of influence. In this process, the EU is regarded as the entity exercising 
influence and the counterpart states and institutions as those receiving the influence 
and reacting to it. This is in line with the research questions of this thesis. At the same 
time, such a setup accommodates the EU’s relationships with both states and regional 
organisations and allows to consider the idiosyncrasies inherent to each case. 
Consequently, a model is needed which posits the EU’s actions to promote regional 
cooperation as the independent variable and the response from the EU’s counterpart 
as the dependent variable. Figure 3.1 below shows the general setting of the 
explanatory model. Starting from this observation, the precise nature of the 
independent and dependent variables and the hypothesized connection between 
them will be further elaborated on in sections 3.2.3 and 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3.1: General setup of the independent and dependent variables 
Plenitude	
In a second step, connecting independent and dependent variables, it can be 
concluded that EU influence on regional cooperation beyond its borders may come 
through a range of paths. It may, for example, consist in development assistance 
offered by the EU, which may or may not be explicitly conditional upon specific 
achievements by the EU’s partner in the field of regional cooperation. In a similar vein, 
Independent Variable
EU instruments to 
promote regional  
cooperation
Dependent Variable
Response of the EU’s 
counterpart
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the EU may exert direct pressure on an actor to pursue regional cooperation against 
that actor’s declared will, thereby applying coercion. Taking into account the EU’s role 
as the world’s most developed regional integration project covering more policy areas 
than any other comparable organisation, its experience may also have an influence on 
others without the direct, active involvement of the EU. This could be the case simply 
by providing an example that others choose to follow especially when engaging in 
cooperation in novel policy areas – or even by providing an example that others seek 
to avoid.57 What all these paths have in common is that they can be understood as the 
result of instrumental calculations by the respective actors oriented at solving specific 
functional problems. 
But one may also think of other ways of influence for the EU that can be better 
explained leaning on constructivist ontology. Through the political dialogues it sustains 
with almost every region or country it deals with, the EU may convince other actors 
that a certain policy or institutional solution is the correct one for a given local 
situation. Finally, and again taking into account the EU’s character as the most 
developed regional integration scheme to date, another possible mechanism of 
influence comes to mind, namely the possibility that other regional organisations or 
cooperation endeavours may emulate EU institutional solutions to enhance their 
legitimacy.58 In this context, the primary goal is not to solve specific functional 
problems, but to address ideational matters such as legitimacy.  
It can be concluded from the arguments presented above that the theoretical 
model will be of a higher explanatory value if it combines at least two different 
explanations that explain the influence of an international actor. In order to 
accomplish this, the model will include hypotheses derived from two strands of 
thought. On the one hand, a strand that focuses on material incentives and 
conditionality and, on the other side, a strand originating in social ontology focusing 
on social factors for influence such as the EU`s renown or a desire by the recipient to 
be praised internationally. The paths of influence and their attribution to different 
ontologies are summed up in table 3.1 below. 
                                                             
57 The clearest example for such a development is the fact that – in light of the complications of the 
sovereign debt crises in the Euro Area - several regional organisations have stepped back on their 
once declared objective of achieving a monetary union (see for example Ecowas Parliament 2012). 
58 In practice, such emulation may lead to a different behaviour than the template adopted. This 
behaviour seems feasible when one observes the institutional set-up of organisations such as SADC, 
which closely resembles the characteristics of the EU but functions in a very different way. This is 
discussed in more detail in the development of the hypotheses in section 3.3 below. 
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Ontology	 Potential	paths	of	EU	influence	Material	 Development	aid	/	technical	assistance	Conditionality	Coercion	Learning	Social	 Persuasion	Emulation	
                  Table 3.1: Ontological mapping of potential paths of EU influence 
At first sight, the combination of different theoretical accounts may pose a problem in 
terms of comparability across the case studies analysed. This would be the case if 
different analytical frameworks relying on different variables or even different 
epistemological approaches were used. In order to minimise this dissonance, the 
theoretical model should accommodate all the possible paths of influence under one 
common epistemological framework, including a common definition of the dependent 
and independent variables. The next sections in this chapter will argue that a diffusion 
approach based on a common rationalist epistemology is the best choice for 
combining the two theoretical strands outlined above. 
Attribution	of	impact	
As well as covering the whole array of potential sources of EU influence on regional 
cooperation, the model also needs to offer testable explanations on how EU actions 
do or do not impact on the decisions and actions of local policy-makers. As identified 
in the introduction and in chapter two, an overly strong focus on structural and 
systemic explanations is one of the main shortcomings of the literature investigating 
the promotion of regional cooperation by external actors such as the EU. Often 
conferring the EU’s counterparts limited agency, this view has frequently led to 
overconfident assessments of the EU’s influence. The theoretical model in this thesis 
will therefore adopt a mid-range approach that incorporates the agency of the 
recipients of EU influence. Omitting the reactions of local actors to the EU’s influence 
would represent a great short-coming in an analysis of the conditions for EU impact, 
especially taking into account that previous research has shown that the adaptation 
(or “localisation”) of foreign norms or institutions is essential for their success in a new 
context (Acharya 2004; 2009; Radaelli 2005). Summing up, this implies that the 
theoretical model needs to include two loci of action: what the EU does but also how 
its counterparts react to these actions. The ensuing section will show that the diffusion 
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approach, which relies on causal chains to explain social and political processes, offers 
a good template to incorporate local agency. 
Table 3.2 below summarises the requirements for the theoretical model as 
established in the preceding paragraphs. Keeping these criteria in mind, the following 
sub-chapter develops the building blocks of a theoretical model based on a diffusion 
framework. 
Guiding	criterion	 Requirements	for	the	theoretical	model	Structure	and	Flexibility	 Factor	in	EU	actions	as	independent	variable	while	being	applicable	to	diverse	setups	on	the	dependent	variable	Plenitude	 Factor	in	ontologically	diverse	influences	Impact	 Mid-range	approach	with	a	 focus	on	 local	 agency	on	 the	side	of	the	dependent	variable	
        Table 3.2: Guiding criteria for the main theoretical model 
3.2 Building	blocks	of	the	theoretical	model	
This sub-chapter defines the main parameters of our theoretical model. After a 
clarification on the different strands of diffusion research (3.2.1), it adjusts the 
diffusion approach to our object of study (3.2.2), while focusing on incorporating the 
role of EU leverage towards other actors in the framework. Subsequently, section 3.2.3 
closes the sub-chapter with a precise definition of the dependent and independent 
variables. 
3.2.1 Three	strands	of	diffusion	research	
Originating from communications research, diffusion is most generally defined as “the 
process in which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time 
among the members of a social system” (Rogers 2003: 5). While this general definition 
has evolved, it already points at one of the main characteristics of diffusion research: 
its flexibility. Whereas this flexibility is one of the appealing advantages of the 
theoretical concept as it provides a common framework to gather hypotheses and 
causal mechanisms59 from different schools of thought, it also comes with a certain 
peril of eclecticism. It is therefore important to position the approach that will be used 
here in the academic debate on diffusion processes and – from there on – to specify 
                                                             
59 Causal mechanisms can be defined as "ultimately unobservable physical, social, or psychological 
processes through which agents with causal capacities operate, but only in specific contexts or 
conditions, to transfer energy, information, or matter to other entities" (George and Bennett 2005: 
137). 
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and adapt the characteristics of the diffusion approach that are especially important 
when studying EU external action. 
All diffusion studies have in common that they can be classified as part of a 
broader research agenda that investigates processes of policy convergence. Starting 
from the observation of a growing similarity between national policies and institutions 
(Elkins and Simmons 2005: 34; Holzinger et al. 2007a: 11), this research field defines 
policy convergence as the “tendency of policies to grow more alike, in the form of 
increasing similarity in structures, processes, and performances" (Drezner 2001: 53).60 
As the above definition shows, policy convergence defines a result. The processes that 
lead to this result have been grouped by the literature under the terms policy transfer 
and policy diffusion (Holzinger et al. 2007a: 13–4).  
Nevertheless, the distinction between policy transfer and policy diffusion is 
not always consistent and the terms have often been used interchangeably and in 
different relationships to each other.61 While Holzinger et al. (2007a: 17) propose a 
distinction between the two terms according to which policy transfer focuses on the 
“content and process of policy transfers” (micro level) and policy diffusion on the 
“sequences of adoption” of transfers (macro level), this distinction is certainly not 
upheld by the rest of the literature.62 Not wanting to contribute to a division that is 
more of a semantic than substantive nature, this thesis follows the concept ‘diffusion’ 
as it is the one that is most widely shared across the disciplinary divide. It is also the 
concept under which proponents of the newest research in the field chose to subsume 
thoughts both from the comparative politics and IR strands (Börzel and Risse 2009; 
2012a; Jetschke and Lenz 2011; 2013). 
While almost all diffusion research shares the same assumptions and similar 
methods, it is important to note that it is divided along distinctions that are more 
motivated by a cleavage between disciplines than by substantive differences. With this 
in mind, one can differentiate three different fields of policy diffusion research, as 
pictured in figure 3.2 below. The first and older area of diffusion research gained 
                                                             
60 Despite its name, policy convergence does not just limit its focus to the realm of policy, but also 
includes polity (structures) and politics (processes) – as shown by Drezner’s definition. 
61 This is demonstrated by the fact that Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 344–5) regard policy diffusion as 
a precursor of policy transfer, others subsume diffusion under policy transfer (Bulmer and Padgett 
2005: 106–7) and others again judge the two research areas as parallel to each other Holzinger et 
al.(2007a: 17). 
62 In addition, macro studies that investigate whether certain processes of diffusion appear more 
frequently in certain sequences of time are seldom and often look at correlations rather than at 
causal relationships (Gilardi 2005; see for example Gray 1973). 
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prominence as field of study in the 1990s (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 36; Graham et al. 
2012) and can be situated in comparative politics. This area appears most commonly 
under the label of ‘policy diffusion’. A second and newer field of diffusion research – 
often termed ‘norm diffusion’ – is located within the IR discipline and focuses 
especially on the diffusion of international norms such as human rights (Finnemore 
1993; Checkel 1999; Risse et al. 1999; Acharya 2004; 2009; Jetschke and Rüland 2009; 
Risse et al. 2013).63 The third and newest field of research is closely linked to the 
research of Europeanisation – and thereby to EU studies. While discussions on how to 
make diffusion research more fruitful for EU studies existed before (Olsen 2002: 937–
40; Jordan 2005), the prominence of this strand has been growing since the end of the 
2000s (Börzel and Risse 2009; 2012a; Jetschke and Lenz 2013). Although this latter 
literature draws also from the IR field of diffusion studies, its focus on the transfer of 
institutions places it close to the comparative politics literature. This study draws most 
from the latter field. As the following section explains, the Europeanisation-inspired 
diffusion literature is the one that most closely factors in questions of leverage, a 
decisive advantage for a study that seeks to assess the EU’s impact across different 
contexts. 
Figure 3.2: Three strands of diffusion research and respective studies  
                                                             
63 Although the IR diffusion research has taken up central terms from the comparative politics 
strands, the theoretical discussions in both areas have developed quite independently from each 
other. An attempt to draw the two strands together is undertaken by Holzinger et al. (2007b).  
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3.2.2 Adjusting	diffusion	to	the	object	of	study:	the	
importance	of	hierarchy	
What all strands of diffusion research have in common is that they strive to 
accommodate different theories and their respective expectations under a single 
epistemological and heuristic framework, thereby fulfilling the ‘plenitude’ criterion 
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter. This is a powerful argument to favour the 
diffusion approach against competing models as the ones presented in the literature 
review. To provide this common framework, diffusion delivers a set of common 
characteristics around which to group the hypotheses derived from different 
theoretical schools. These common characteristics ensure that the results remain 
comparable even across theories that focus on different ontologies.  
This allows including both material and social mechanisms of policy 
transmission. A debate exists however on whether diffusion should only include 
processes of policy transmission on a voluntary basis or also those that involve a 
hierarchical or even coercive relationship between sender and receiver. While those 
that understand diffusion as a phenomenon that occurs in the absence of hierarchical 
relationships are in the majority (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 34–5; Tews 2005: 65; 
Holzinger et al. 2007a: 13; Jetschke and Lenz 2011: 454), this stance poses a problem 
when studying the influence of the EU on other actors as it limits the pool of possible 
cases to those states and regions towards which the EU has no hierarchic let alone 
hegemonic relationship, thereby excluding – for example – states from its 
neighbourhood. Following such an understanding of diffusion would seriously limit the 
amount of possible research questions and hamper comparison across situations with 
diverging contextual conditions, as it would exclude significant variation in the EU’s 
leverage on the cases studied.64 
Furthermore, authors that reject coercion as a diffusion mechanism often 
maintain that hierarchical forms of transmission are already well covered by other 
theoretical strands such as policy transfer, regime theory (Tews 2005) or those 
focusing on regional hegemons (Jetschke and Lenz 2011: 454). While this argument is 
certainly true, it cannot be taken on board if the purpose of the study is to compare 
across different cases and mechanisms without applying a different (and potentially 
incompatible) theory to each of them.  
                                                             
64 This lack of comparative research across different levels of leverage was also identified in the 
introduction (see p. 13). 
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This study therefore aligns itself with those authors that include ‘coercion’ as a 
possible mechanism of diffusion (Levi-Faur 2005: 25–7; Radaelli 2005: 926–7; 
Meseguer 2005: 72; Fuchs 2007: 184). In the context of EU external relations – and 
hence in the context of this study – it is important to note that coercion will in most 
cases be limited to the modification of incentives (conditionality) or to legal ‘coercion’ 
rather than to military threats, a point that has also been made by proponents of the 
Europeanisation strand of diffusion studies (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 6). 
3.2.3 Dependent	and	independent	variables	
The EU’s potential impact on other actors is conceived as a strand of action in which 
the EU represents the sender (i.e. the independent variable) and the EU’s counterparts 
(states or regional organisations) are the receivers with their reaction to the EU’s 
impact being the dependent variable.  
The dependent variable, which in section 3.1 was still defined rather generally 
as the “response of the EU’s counterpart”, can now be spelled out in more detail taking 
into account the Europeanisation-inspired diffusion approach this analysis draws from. 
Such studies suggest concentrating on institutional change as the dependent variable, 
thereby encompassing both the creation as well as the modification of regional 
cooperation institutions (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 3–4).65 In the context of this research 
a definition of institutions will be applied, according to which…  
…institutions are social structures and systems of rules, both formal and informal, 
that have the potential to shape the behaviour of actors.  
Box 3.1: Definition of institutions 
With its focus on the effect that institutions may have on the behaviour of actors, this 
definition comes close to the normative institutionalist understanding from March and 
Olsen (1989: 17) as reflected for example by Keohane et al. (1995: 4–5).66 This focus is 
                                                             
65 Choosing this established definition of the dependent variable makes also sense in the interest of 
a stronger consistency with previous studies. As Exadaktylos and Radaelli (2012: 31) note in a review 
of Europeanisation research, Europeanisation-inspired studies are too often characterised by having 
each a different way of defining their dependent variable. 
66 March and Olsen (1984; 1989) do not present an express definition of institutions but sketch out 
what elements they see as part of institutions: "Political democracy depends not only on economic 
and social conditions but also on the design of political institutions. Bureaucratic agencies, legislative 
committees, and appellate courts are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also 
collections of standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, 
interests, and beliefs.” (March and Olsen 1989: 17). For an overview on the different strands of 
institutionalism refer to Peters(2012: 36–7). 
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important if we take into account that the objective of EU promotion of regional 
cooperation is not just to create or shape institutions but to have a lasting impact on 
the practice of regional cooperation. Therefore a definition is chosen that allows 
including formal institutions as organisations and rules but also highlights that these 
are expected to affect the actual interests and behaviour of actors. It follows from the 
research question that the study will focus on such institutions that can be considered 
as relevant for the overall development of cooperation in the respective region and 
that are – in principle – modelled after the aims of EU institutions, as these are the 
institutions that might have been subject to diffusion from the EU.67 
The independent variable is formed by the use of the EU instruments to 
promote regional cooperation beyond its borders. While the specific EU actors and 
their actions may vary in the different case studies, it can already be advanced that 
these actions are likely to be present along the three broad areas of external action 
through which the EU engages with most other international actors: CFSP and political 
dialogue, technical and development assistance and trade policy. It is also important 
to note already here that the self-portrayal of the EU as a successful example of 
regional cooperation is to be understood as an EU action to promote regional 
cooperation abroad, as it is an active endeavour to shape its discourse and relationship 
with other actors.  
Taken together, the independent and dependent variables can now be 
pictured as follows.  
 
Figure 3.3: Visualisation of the independent and dependent variables 
                                                             
67 This is elaborated in more detail in the case selection in chapter 5.  
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3.3 Paths	of	EU	influence	-	hypotheses	
Now that both the dependent and independent variables have been specified, it is 
possible to formulate hypotheses on the connection between the two. These 
hypotheses represent tentative and testable answers to the research question: How, 
to what extent and under what conditions does the EU succeed in promoting regional 
cooperation beyond its borders? and to its sub-questions.  
Taking into account the two different types of potential EU influence on regional 
cooperation, the following paragraphs first develop hypotheses following the 
materialist strand of explanation and then move to the ones originating from social 
ontology. The hypotheses derived from materialist ontology are classified as utility-
driven explanations and those from constructivist ontology as legitimacy-driven 
explanations. This denomination, which follows Heinze (2011), reflects the focus of the 
hypotheses most closely. Utility-driven explanations focus on the role of material 
incentives in explaining the potential impact of the EU on decisions to pursue regional 
cooperation. Legitimacy-driven explanations highlight the role of the EU in serving as 
an instrument for increased recognition (by the EU itself or by other actors, including 
local ones). It is important to highlight at this point that the hypotheses will be 
formulated concentrating on the addressee of the EU’s actions (i.e. from the point of 
view of the dependent variable). This is necessary as the ultimate goal of this research 
is not to enumerate what the EU has done to encourage regional cooperation but to 
test under which conditions EU actions lead to an actual effect. In this context, 
formulating the hypotheses from the point of view of the EU would not reveal anything 
regarding the EU’s effectiveness. 
3.3.1 Utility-driven	explanations:	Incentives	and	Lesson-
drawing	
Incentives:	conditionality	and	assistance	
Making material incentives conditional on the accomplishment of a certain step or 
policy is an approach that the EU has often used with accession candidates (cf. 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005b), the countries of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process (SAP) (see for instance Bieber 2011) as well as in its wider 
neighbourhood as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy (Baracani 2009; e.g. 
Sasse 2008). The principle behind such policies is to influence the utility calculations of 
the addressee by connecting the pursuit of or the compliance with a certain policy to 
material or political rewards (so-called positive conditionality) or by sanctioning non-
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compliance (negative conditionality). While incentives can be both of a material (e.g. 
access to funding) and non-material nature (such as an increased diplomatic 
relationship with the EU), this type of diffusion mechanism will be seen as an 
explanation built on a utility-driven rationality since incentives appeal to a rational 
logic of instrumentality and most of incentives that the EU can offer can ultimately be 
translated into benefits of an economic nature.68 
In order to formulate a hypothesis to test for the effectiveness of 
conditionality, this study understands conditionality as the connection of an objective 
in a specific issue area with incentives or punishment – often in a different area. An 
example for such a connection is the conditioning of the negotiation of the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between Serbia and the EU to the 
extradition of alleged war criminals to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia in The Hague (European Commission 2007f). Therefore, if EU 
conditionality triggers agency by the EU’s counterpart in creating or changing a certain 
institution, the justification for this action is likely to connect the institutional change 
to an (expected) achievement in another area of the relationship with the EU. 
Therefore it can be expected that 
H1a: if the EU applies its instruments to promote regional cooperation, the EU’s 
interlocutor pursues institutional change to avoid the EU-imposed costs of not doing 
so.  
Box 3.2: Hypothesis H1a – conditionality 
While the formulation of the hypothesis presents conditions as a potential ‘cost’ that 
is communicated ex-ante by the EU to its partner, also EU-set ex-post rewards for 
institutional change can be included into this definition. After all, missing such an 
anticipated reward can be understood as an opportunity cost that the EU’s partner 
incurs in case it does not act in accordance to the EU objective.69 In practice, most of 
EU conditionality works with such opportunity costs rather than with direct costs, i.e. 
it connects a certain objective to the ex-post award of additional resources or the start 
of further political steps, as in the case of the above-mentioned example of the 
extradition of alleged war criminals. 
                                                             
68 Furthermore, since non-material incentives will be well covered by the constructivist hypotheses 
explained later on, it is considered that adding them as an own causal mechanism also at this point 
does not provide an additional explanatory value. 
69 A term from microeconomic theory, ‘opportunity costs’ define the foregone income or value that 
would have emerged from selecting an alternative choice than the one chosen (Nicholson and Snyder 
2012: 464). 
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Beyond the classical understanding of incentives as conditionality that was 
reflected above, it is also important to take into account that technical assistance, 
capacity-building measures and Official Development Assistance (ODA) can also be 
seen as incentives since they can be used to influence the cost-benefit calculation of 
another actor, especially when it stands before the decision to pursue a certain policy 
or to create or reform an institution. This is a distinct case from conditionality both 
from a political logic as from the logic of action that it entails. Politically seen, 
conditionality entails a strong sense of hierarchy. From the point of view of the logic 
of action, the provision of assistance aims at the achievement of specific objectives 
but is not conditioned upon them. Contrary to conditionality, assistance is usually 
granted ex ante, while conditionality requires the EU’s counterpart to deliver first for 
the EU to act in accordance. It can be argued that in such cases, 
H1b: If the EU applies its instruments to promote regional cooperation, the EU’s 
interlocutor pursues institutional change because it has been supported by the EU for 
doing so.  
Box 3.3: Hypothesis H1b - assistance 
Lesson-drawing	
Beyond the two cases mentioned above, in which the EU can be seen as the leading 
actor pushing for a certain institutional change, material factors and utility calculations 
can also be the decisive factor without a direct, specific involvement of the EU. This 
can be the case, for example, when the addressee of EU influence decides to pursue a 
certain institutional change because of the EU’s successful experience with a given 
institution. Here, the above-mentioned role of the EU in highlighting its own success 
as a regional integration project comes into play. 
Such cases have been termed lesson-drawing or learning in both the diffusion 
(Elkins and Simmons 2005: 42–5; Meseguer 2005; e.g. Rose 1991) and the 
Europeanisation literatures (Bauer et al. 2007: 414–5; e.g. Jacoby 2006: 62–4). Most 
likely, an institutional change of this kind will be observed in the absence of direct 
incentives offered by the EU. As a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, the EU’s 
counterpart will in such cases justify the institutional change by functional reasons 
(e.g. the creation of a supranational court in a regional organisation is likely to be 
justified with a lack of legal compliance by the member states). Furthermore, as 
Richard Rose (1991: 23), the conceiver of the lesson-drawing concept (Holzinger and 
Knill 2007: 93), has highlighted, if such a change is motivated by material factors and 
utility calculations, it is to be expected that it is accompanied by a thorough evaluation 
of the advantages and disadvantages of the innovation. This may be observed, for 
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example, in the commissioning of studies on the EU’s experience with a certain 
institution (possibly comparing that option to others). The role of thorough and 
rational evaluation in lesson-drawing is further emphasised by the fact that it is 
conceived of as a process that can also lead to the modification or even rejection of a 
given template (Rose 1991: 26).70 Summing up the above considerations, in the 
framework of our study the presence of lesson-drawing would imply that, 
H2: If the EU applies its instruments to promote regional cooperation, the EU’s 
interlocutor pursues institutional change because it positively assesses the costs and 
benefits of a corresponding EU-level example. 
Box 3.4: Hypothesis H2 - lesson-drawing 
3.3.2 Legitimacy-driven	explanations:	persuasion	and	
emulation	
Beyond the above-mentioned mechanisms and hypotheses, both the IR-rooted 
diffusion research and the sociology of organisations point at further possible drivers 
of institutional change that may be linked to EU influence. 
Persuasion	
Research on the diffusion of international norms such as human rights has argued that 
persuasion can play an important role in the propagation of political innovations (cf. 
Risse et al. 1999; Simmons 2009). ‘Persuasion’ takes up constructivist ontology to 
capture cases in which the diffusion of political innovations (as norms or institutions) 
is presumed but no direct offers of material or ideational incentives let alone the use 
of coercion seem to be at the origin. According to this argumentation, norms are 
transferred or promoted by convincing the recipient that those norms are the most 
appropriate ones to follow. In other words, the sender influences and changes the 
initial preferences of the recipient. Persuasion processes have been seen as 
responsible for the dissemination of, for example, human rights’ norms with the main 
driver for their adoption being the legitimacy given to them by international 
organisations such as the UN (Acharya 2009: 152). Political dialogues - as those 
institutionalised in most EU relationships with states or regional organisations – could 
be arenas for the diffusion of institutional change by persuasion. 
                                                             
70 The modification of policy templates as a result of rational evaluation is also discussed by Strang 
and Meyer (1993: 500). 
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Pinpointing cases of persuasion is more difficult than identifying diffusion by 
incentives or lesson-drawing for two main reasons. Firstly, research on persuasion in 
general faces a specific challenge as it is difficult to distinguish whether changes in 
preferences have actually been internalised or whether such changes are just being 
declared to the public.71 But only actual changes in preferences can be considered 
(successful) persuasion. Jeffrey Checkel sheds light on this distinction with his 
discussion of ‘type I’ and ‘type II’ socialisation. Type I socialisation or ‘role-playing’ 
implies that actors behave in accordance with a specific norm because it offers 
advantages in a given and specific context.72 It does not imply that they are also 
convinced by the norm and change their preferences accordingly. Type II socialisation, 
instead, implies that actors accept and internalise the norm to the extent that they are 
convinced by its content and take it for granted (Checkel 2005: 804). This study can 
overcome this hurdle since it solely focuses on those instances in which institutional 
change has already happened. This means that the consequence of the alleged 
persuasion has already taken effect. Only after institutional change can be observed, 
this study inquires into the motivation behind it. If such a reform was discussed in 
negotiations between the EU and its partner(s) it may be the result of persuasion as 
long as the institutional change is preceded by a change in the assessment of its utility 
that cannot be ascribed to a lesson-drawing process. Still, a second difficulty remains, 
as it can be difficult to exclude hidden conditionality or bargaining tactics (as for 
example adopting relatively cost-free norms in order to gain a better position to be 
able to reject the ‘painful’ ones). In this situation, the safest approach is to argue that 
the absence of material incentives and of utility-related assessments is an indicator for 
persuasion.  
In conclusion, while persuasion has to be taken with a pinch of salt, it’s 
relevance in the literature and its role as a competing hypothesis to lesson-drawing 
still make it worth testing for. The existence of persuasion would thus imply that 
H3: If the EU applies its instruments to promote regional cooperation, the EU’s 
interlocutor pursues institutional change because it is convinced of its adequacy. 
Box 3.5: Hypothesis H3 - persuasion 
                                                             
71 The main difficulties in identifying persuasion are succinctly described by Deitelhoff 
(2006: 149–52). 
72 Speaking in terms of our distinction of causal mechanisms, actors behaving in line with type I 
socialisation act according to a utility-driven rationality. 
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Emulation	
The literature on the development of organisations has pointed to the possibility that 
organisations do not change or are created necessarily as a result of new functional 
demands. Instead, other reasons such as the pressure to increase their credibility, to 
legitimise their existence or their will to remain active may explain why organisations 
change. This broad line of argumentation on the development and change of 
institutions is reflected in the normative strand of neo-institutionalism (cf. March and 
Olsen 1989: 64–7; Brunsson and Olsen 1993), and especially in sociological 
institutionalism (cf. Meyer and Rowan 1977: 345; Oliver 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 
2003: 147–52; Hall and Taylor 1996: 946–50). 
One such explanation that builds on the relationship between organisations is 
the ‘mimetic isomorphism’ hypothesis put forward by the sociological institutionalists 
Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell (1983; 1991). DiMaggio and Powell observe an 
increasing homogeneity between organisations. According to one of their 
explanations, policy-makers in charge of organisations may choose to imitate other 
organisations that enjoy a higher legitimacy, regardless of whether this is adequate for 
their own organisation’s function and context.73 Such behaviour is especially likely to 
happen under conditions of uncertainty, in which profiting from the legitimacy of an 
established and recognised organisation and its institutions – as the EU could be – may 
be especially tempting (DiMaggio and Powell 1983: 154; 1991: 69–70).74 In other 
words, isomorphic organisations legitimise themselves externally by imitating others 
rather than internally by fulfilling their tasks. Translated into the context of our study, 
emulation would imply that,  
H4: If the EU applies its instruments to promote regional cooperation, the EU’s 
interlocutor pursues institutional change because it expects to profit from the 
reference to the EU. 
Box 3.6: Hypothesis H4 – emulation 
                                                             
73 DiMaggio’s and Powell’s thoughts build on similar – though less elaborate – ideas put forward by 
Meyer and Rowan (1977: 345). While Meyer and Rowan argue that a particular organisational design 
may become popular and legitimised once a certain number of actors have adopted it, DiMaggio and 
Powell also hypothesise on specific causal mechanisms behind the phenomenon. 
74 Besides the mimetic isomorphism reflected here, DiMaggio and Powell also highlight two other 
potential mechanisms by which organisations may become more homogenous: coercive 
isomorphism, driven mostly by legal and formal requirements of principals, and isomorphism 
through the fluctuation of employees between organisations. The important point in common is that 
these processes are not driven by the wish to improve the organisation’s efficiency (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983: 150–4). 
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Beyond leading to the formulation of the above expectation regarding institutional 
change, the emulation mechanism also provides indications regarding institutional 
practice that are worth including in the specific context of this study. While already Di 
Maggio and Powell speak of “ritual” behaviour in institutional isomorphism and 
thereby implicitly point to a divergence between the design of an organisation and its 
behaviour in practice (1983: 151; cf. also Strang and Meyer 1993: 500), they do not 
expand on this divergence. But this discrepancy is decisive for two reasons. Firstly, it 
can be seen as a further indicator for emulation, allowing to sharpen the identification 
of the mechanism. Since emulation does imply that institutional change is not pursued 
to change or improve the performance of the respective institutions, a deliberate 
divergence between design and practice strengthens the evidence for emulation. 
Secondly, in the specific context of this study, emulation and such discrepancy may 
explain one of the situations mentioned in the previous section of this chapter: 
organisations that resemble the EU but act differently in practice; that is, presumably 
according to local needs and pressures rather than following the institutional model 
that was adopted. Such behaviour has been taken up by more recent literature under 
the label of a ‘decoupling’ between design and practice (Jetschke and Rüland 2009) 
and is also relevant to our research question, which aims to address the success of the 
EU’s promotion of regional cooperation.75 After all, if regional cooperation institutions 
are adopted but they do not result in a corresponding practice, then it is difficult to 
speak of a successful policy.76 Instead, we may then have found a conceptual weakness 
of the EU’s policy. Following these considerations, in cases in which we find the 
emulation mechanism at work, the empirical study will delve deeper and survey 
whether such emulation has also led to a discrepancy between institutional design and 
institutional practice. This ‘emulation’ mechanism completes our set of five 
hypotheses that will be used to find answers to our research questions. 
3.3.3 Synthesis	
The different causal paths are summarised in the figure below, showing their 
respective links to a materialist or constructivist ontology. The hypotheses arguing 
from a materialist ontology focus on utility-driven explanations, those arguing from a 
constructivist ontology focus on the role of legitimacy in exerting change. 
                                                             
75 The mentioned study finds that elements of the EU’s institutional framework have been 
adopted by ASEAN, but are not applied as they contradict the local practice of integration. 
76 Although the policy may then still be considered useful for the EU as it may itself draw 
legitimacy from the fact that others refer to it as an example even if they don’t follow it. 
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Figure 3.4: Visualisation of the hypotheses and the independent and dependent variables  
The hypotheses developed in this section cover a wide array of possible paths of 
influence by which the EU may have influenced the emergence of regional cooperation 
beyond its borders. As the study deals with different policy fields (e.g. trade, 
development and political relations) for all of which the EU promotes regional 
cooperation as an essential element, it is unlikely that any of the mechanisms and 
hypotheses outlined above will appear in isolation from the others. It is for example 
perfectly imaginable that EU counterparts react to both incentives and persuasion 
efforts by the EU. Therefore, the analytical framework has to take into account that 
the hypotheses are not always mutually exclusive and that their impact needs to be 
ranked in order to assess which of the mechanisms was the most decisive one in each 
case (if any of them played a role). Furthermore, distinguishing the effect of individual 
causal mechanisms more precisely is a matter that has been regarded as an open issue 
by the theoretical literature on diffusion processes (Elkins and Simmons 2005: 39; 
Holzinger and Knill 2007: 105). Therefore, special attention will be devoted in the 
analytical framework to distinguish and rank the effect of the different causal 
mechanisms. Most of the effort in this regard will be undertaken in the following 
chapters when developing the operationalisation of the mechanisms and when 
choosing the methods of analysis. But also the analysis of the scope conditions under 
which we expect the mechanisms to work more or less effectively, contributes to 
distinguishing the impact of the different causal mechanisms. The following section 
discusses the scope conditions and relates them to the different causal mechanisms.  
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3.4 Scope	conditions	
Scope conditions are qualifications of the general validity of a theoretical statement. 
For example, the existence of friction is a scope condition that modifies the general 
validity of the expectation that a stone and a feather dropped from the same height 
should arrive on the ground at the same time – as we would expect as a result of 
gravity. Translated into our study, scope conditions affect the existence or the 
magnitude of the effects of our causal mechanisms. They complement the hypotheses 
by stating the conditions under which the presumed causal mechanism is expected to 
apply and can be considered enablers and catalysts of diffusion processes.77 
The role of scope conditions is especially important when using a diffusion 
approach. As they are defined across all the mechanisms analysed, they contribute to 
ensuring the consistency of the study. They are also especially relevant for the study 
at hand and for sub-research question three (SRQ 3: “How does EU leverage influence 
its success in promoting regional cooperation?”) that strives to compare the EU’s 
influence across different contexts because they allow us to reflect these diverse 
contexts of leverage in more detail and to integrate them into our analytical 
framework.78 
The literature has identified a considerable number of scope conditions that 
enable or shape diffusion processes. These include the geographical proximity of 
political entities, cultural, institutional, or socio-economic similarities, but also other 
factors such as whether the policies subject to diffusion aim at distributing income or 
not.79 While all these are important factors that can play a role in diffusion processes 
in general, the scope conditions most relevant to this research can be found among 
those that have been identified by the strand of diffusion research that originates from 
Europeanisation. This is the case because the Europeanisation strand of diffusion 
research focuses strongly on relative positions in terms of power and development. As 
                                                             
77 In the diffusion literature, the concept ‘scope conditions’ is used to denote factors that “mediate 
or filter” (Börzel and Risse 2012b: 198, in the same vein Holzinger et al. 2007a: 30–1) the effect of a 
diffusion process. A similar understanding prevails also in the related literature on socialisation (e.g. 
Zürn and Checkel 2005: 1048). This can be confusing as, outside of these literatures, the term is more 
frequently used to refer to conditions that delineate the domain of applicability of a specific theory. 
Following this latter understanding, scope conditions are necessary preconditions that need to hold 
for a theory to be applicable at all (George and Bennett 2005: 25; Harris 1997).  
78 As Radaelli (2005) shows, the context under which institutions or policies are diffused are 
significant even in relatively homogenous areas as the EU and on rather technical and specific policies 
as the regulatory impact assessments he analyses. 
79 An overview on the different scope conditions identified in diffusion studies is given by Holzinger 
et al. (2007a: 30–1). 
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this strand stems from the study of the adaptation of member states and accession 
candidates to EU requirements, it is more familiar with the role of leverage in shaping 
diffusion processes, reflecting the afore-mentioned importance of hierarchy. This 
research has distinguished five broad types of scope conditions: Domestic incentives, 
degrees of statehood, regime type (autocratic versus democratic), the role of power 
asymmetries (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 10–3) and social (Jetschke and Lenz 2011: 457) 
or cultural proximity (Strang and Meyer 1993: 490–1).80 Out of those five groups of 
scope conditions, three seem the most relevant for this study: domestic incentives, 
power asymmetries and degrees of statehood. They are presented in turn and, where 
necessary, expanded by parameters specific to the emergence and development of 
regional cooperation. 
Domestic	incentives	
Domestic incentives, understood as national or regional pressures or incentives to act 
in a certain way, stand at the beginning of diffusion processes. They include several 
elements. First, crises or situations of uncertainty during which policy-makers need to 
reform established policies or create new ones are periods of time especially open to 
external influences. It is in such periods that a functional demand for new policies and 
institutions arises or in which sticking to an institutional template with a proven track 
record and legitimacy can reduce uncertainty. The role of crises or critical events as 
catalysts of change has been widely confirmed both by the historical institutionalist 
literature (here under the label of ‘critical junctures’, see for example Collier and 
Collier 1991: 29–31)81 as well as by the scholarship on diffusion processes (e.g. Lenz 
2012: 157).82  
In addition, a second domestic incentive may appear in the context of regional 
cooperation. The policies or institutions promoted by the EU may be useful to address 
                                                             
80 Strang & Meyer do not belong to the Europeanisation school of diffusion research, but their work 
has inspired part of its research. Jetschke and Lenz do not actually explicitly use the term ‘scope 
conditions’ but they highlight the role that a common (colonial) history between sender and receiver 
of diffusion or the amount of reporting in local media about the sender may play in shaping the 
effectiveness of diffusion. 
81 Collier and Collier borrow the term “critical juncture” from Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage 
theory on the formation of party systems.   
82 There is no common view in the literature on whether crises and uncertainly constitute a scope 
condition or a precondition (implying that no diffusion is possible without a crisis preceding it) for 
diffusion. The IR literature tends to highlight the importance of uncertainty, while the EU literature 
– in accordance with its inclusion of diffusion as a result of legal obligation – tends to grant it less 
relevance. Nonetheless, this has little implication on the fact that it has to be taken into account. In 
order not to overload the analytical framework with additional categories, this study conceives crises 
and uncertainty as a scope condition. 
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local disputes either between national policy-makers or between different positions 
of cooperating states. It is for example easy to imagine a situation in which a policy 
promoted by the EU is supported especially by smaller states in a regional grouping, 
which can then use the EU’s support in their favour to add weight to their arguments 
or increase their bargaining power. To a certain extent, such a situation is a variation 
of what has been observed in Europeanisation processes when national policy-makers 
adhere to EU demands to underpin their own political agenda (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005a: 11–2).83 Taking into account these aspects allows to reflect the 
importance of local conditions and agency that was mentioned in section 3.1 above. 
Power	asymmetries	
The scope condition that most directly pays tribute to the main research question and 
to the research interest in comparing the EU’s influence across different settings is that 
of power asymmetries. This element is also directly reflected in sub-research question 
three. Power asymmetry is understood as the degree of dependence on the EU of the 
receiver of EU influence. The importance of including power asymmetries lies in the 
fact that the success of the EU in transmitting a certain policy, idea or norm is likely to 
change according to its leverage towards the country or region involved. This 
expectation is confirmed by empirical Europeanisation studies (Kelley 2004: 453; e.g. 
Grabbe 2003: 318)  
In the context of this study, dependence can take two forms. First and most 
prominently, as an economic category, concentrating on the dependence of the EU’s 
counterpart on investments from the EU economy, on access to its market, on public 
funding in terms of ODA or technical assistance, etc. Secondly, other factors, like a 
possible role of the EU as a significant provider of international legitimacy or security 
will be taken into account. Clearly, both categories of dependence are of a dynamic 
nature and can evolve over time. This means that the EU’s leverage on its counterpart 
may change over the time scope of the analysis. For example, the power of influence 
of the EU might decrease if it is seen as being currently in crisis or as decreasing in its 
economic importance in relation to others. While such perceptions are often likely to 
affect the statements of policy-makers in a given moment, it is important to note 
though that only changes of a more fundamental nature, as changing trade flows or a 
                                                             
83 It is obviously also imaginable that the EU directly chooses to support those policy-makers or states 
that are more in line with its objectives. But as a direct EU activity, this falls under the scope of the 
independent variable. 
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diversification of international donors, are likely to affect the EU’s leverage on 
professional policy-makers.  
Degrees	of	statehood	
Lastly, degrees of statehood are understood as the "degree to which they [the states 
or international organisations, M.H.S.] are able to adopt, implement, and enforce 
decisions" (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11). Seen from an empirical perspective, the case 
for including this scope condition in our analysis lies in the fact that regional 
cooperation and integration often require legal and administrative changes that may 
pose a challenge to states with low administrative capacity. To mention an example, 
building a common market requires a strong amount of standardisation to facilitate 
trading, both inside each country and between the different countries. Naturally, 
companies profiting from limited competition will oppose such attempts of 
standardisation as these are likely to limit their influence on national market 
regulation.  
Beyond this, there is also a further element to statehood that is not taken 
into account by Börzel and Risse. States that have seen their national sovereignty 
compromised – be it because of colonial experiences or because of recent conflicts 
with neighbouring states – will usually be especially attached to protecting their 
national sovereignty. Regional cooperation and, even more so, integration naturally 
pose a challenge to this attachment. Taking this into account, this study will also 
consider the degree of adherence to national sovereignty as an important element of 
statehood. Seen from an empirical point of view, the cases analysed in this study are 
likely to be ones in which this factor plays a role. Having set the elements of our last 
scope condition, it is important to mention that a limited degree of statehood may – 
at least in theory – also have a positive effect on the EU’s influence on regional 
cooperation. While it may be more difficult to implement regional cooperation in 
practice for the above-mentioned reasons, the interest in regional cooperation may 
also be stronger if policy-makers expect that regional cooperation will increase the 
role of the state. 
Linking	scope	conditions	and	causal	mechanisms	
Taking the three scope conditions together, an important common characteristic 
emerges: as shown in the table below, all three have elements that can be divided into 
those belonging to a material ontology and those belonging to a social ontology. 
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Scope	condition	 Material	ontology	 Social	ontology	Domestic	 incentives	 in	EU	partner	region	 Functional	 demand	 for	 new	policies/institutions	 Pursuit	of	legitimacy	Power	 asymmetries	between	 EU	 and	partner	region	 Economic	 or	 security	dependence	on	the	EU	 Dependence	 on	legitimation	by	the	EU	Degrees	of	statehood	in	EU	partner	region	 Capacity	to	enforce	decisions		 Attachment	 to	 the	preservation	 of	 national	sovereignty	
   Table 3.3: Scope conditions and their defining elements 
As the remainder of this section shows, those elements pertaining to a material 
ontology are expected to play a relevant role in enabling and shaping the causal 
mechanisms ‘conditionality’, ‘assistance’ and ‘lesson-drawing’ while those with a focus 
on social perceptions are expected to spur the mechanisms ‘persuasion’ and 
‘emulation’. These expectations will be taken into account when addressing the role 
of different conditions in the EU’s effectiveness in influencing regional cooperation. At 
this point, it is also important to note that differences in the manifestations of the 
scope conditions are likely to lie between the two different regions studied rather than 
within the region itself. This is the case as two of the three scope conditions (i.e. power 
asymmetries and degrees of statehood) refer to conditions that are constitutive of a 
state or region’s nature as its history and its economic and political development.  
The scope condition of domestic incentives was introduced as the ‘trigger’ 
that motivates policy-makers to adapt current institutional solutions to new conditions 
or even to introduce wholly new solutions. Thus, by definition, domestic incentives 
may be present for all five hypotheses. Nevertheless, a closer look at the causal 
mechanisms reveals that domestic pressures are especially relevant for two of the 
mechanisms: lesson-drawing and emulation. While a lack of domestic incentives is 
likely to impair their effectiveness, it does not hinder the EU from setting conditionality 
or incentives or to engage in persuasion to push for institutional change. In contrast, 
lesson-drawing and emulation, where the receivers of EU influence are in the thick of 
the action, need to be induced locally. In consequence, lesson-drawing and emulation 
will not occur in the absence of domestic incentives. 
Power asymmetries reflect the dependence of the target of EU influence on 
the EU, be it in a material manifestation or in terms of legitimation. As the literature 
on conditionality has shown, material power asymmetries and the resulting leverage 
are both a prerequisite and a catalyst for conditionality (Kelley 2004: 453; Moravcsik 
and Vachudová 2003: 46–9; Sedelmeier 2011: 22). In a similar vein, the perception of 
a greater legitimacy of the EU – that is, a power asymmetry as seen from a social 
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perspective – will be a necessary prerequisite and a catalyst for emulation processes. 
After all, if the EU is not perceived as having a sufficient legitimacy, local policy-makers 
will not decide to adopt an EU template to profit from its legitimacy. Therefore, the 
higher the perceived asymmetry in terms of legitimacy between EU solutions and 
other solutions, the more likely it is that an institutional change will have been induced 
by emulation. While a stronger legitimacy of the EU might also be seen as facilitating 
a lesson-drawing process, emulation and lesson-drawing processes can be 
distinguished through the operationalisation since lesson-drawing is characterised by 
the presence of rationalised assessments of different policy options. Consequently, we 
can conclude that conditionality is unlikely to be an effective causal mechanism in the 
absence of a sufficient asymmetry in material power and that emulation will not be a 
decisive mechanism in the absence of an asymmetry in terms of legitimacy. 
Finally, as regards the degrees of statehood of the target of the EU’s influence, 
one can conclude that a limited degree of statehood is likely to play an especially 
important role when emulation is at play. This is the case for two reasons. Firstly, if 
sovereignty enjoys a special relevance, local policy-makers will probably choose a 
response to the EU’s influence that allows them to gain legitimacy but does not at the 
same time compromise their sovereignty. This is also in line with the decoupling 
behaviour that was presented as a possible consequence of emulation. Secondly, a low 
administrative capacity of the addressee of EU influence implies that it will be more 
difficult to implement regional cooperation or integration as advocated for by the EU. 
Also in such cases, a shallow response or no effective implementation are likely.  
The table below sums up the three scope conditions and their expected 
influence on the causal mechanisms. It distinguishes whether a scope condition is likely 
to be an enabling prerequisite for the mechanism to work at all or whether an increase 
in the respective condition is likely to increase (‘+’) or diminish the impact of the 
individual mechanism (‘-‘). Combinations where we expect no interaction or where this 
interaction is unclear to be positive or negative are left blank. 
Scope 
condition 
Causal mechanism 
 H1a: 
conditionality 
H1b: 
assistance 
H2: 
lesson-
drawing 
H3: 
persuasion 
H4: 
emulation 
Domestic incentives 
Functional 
demand 
+ + Enabling +  
Seek for 
legitimacy 
   Enabling Enabling 
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Scope 
condition 
Causal mechanism 
Power asymmetries 
Economic / 
security 
dependence 
Enabling, + +    
Dependence 
on 
legitimation 
 +  + Enabling, + 
Degrees of statehood 
Capacity  - -  - 
Attachment to 
sovereignty 
-    + 
Table 3.4: Scope conditions and their expected interaction with the causal mechanisms 
Conclusion	
This chapter set out to develop a theoretical model that allows to assess “how, to what 
extent and under what conditions the EU succeeds in promoting regional cooperation 
beyond its borders” – the main research question guiding this thesis – as well as the 
sub-research questions. Three criteria guided the survey for an adequate theoretical 
model. Building on the desiderata of previous research, it was argued that a model 
could best contribute to the literature by providing both structure and flexibility to 
accommodate relationships between the EU and different regional organisations and 
states, plenitude to cover the various possible EU influences on regional cooperation 
and a focus on impact to be able to empirically assess the EU’s success or lack of 
success when encouraging regional cooperation (sub-chapter 3.1). 
These three criteria led to the choice of a diffusion approach in sub-chapter 
3.2. Diffusion is flexible enough in the definition of the dependent variable and allows 
including several ontological perspectives under one epistemological umbrella. 
Furthermore, its micro-perspective allows to assess the specific impact of the EU in the 
decisions of the actors it engages with. Out of different diffusion approaches, the one 
inspired by Europeanisation research was deemed the most adequate to our purposes 
since it factors in the role of leverage and different degrees of influence on other 
actors, thereby matching the focus of our third sub-research question (how does EU 
leverage influence its success in promoting regional cooperation?). 
This model was adapted to better fit our research interest. These adaptations 
refer to the role of hierarchical relations and coercion in the EU’s ties with others, 
especially in its closer neighbourhood. Once the model was adapted to our purposes, 
the chapter moved on to specify the dependent and independent variables. As we are 
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interested in the EU’s influence on regional cooperation and integration elsewhere, 
‘institutional change modelled according to EU aims’ is defined as our dependent 
variable. The focus on institutional change allows considering both the creation of new 
regional cooperation initiatives as well as the modification of existing ones. In this 
context, a wide definition of institutions was chosen to also include the EU’s potential 
influence on rules of regional cooperation, such as trade legislation. Reflecting the EU 
side, ‘Use of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation’ was defined as our 
independent variable. 
The ensuing sub-chapter 3.3 moved to the core of the model: the hypothetical 
connection – or diffusion mechanisms – between our dependent and independent 
variables. This sub-chapter argued that the EU can influence cooperation in other 
regions through two broad ways. On one hand, by setting material incentives or 
providing technical solutions for existing regional problems deemed superior to local 
approaches and, on the other hand, by means of its role as the frontrunner of regional 
cooperation and integration. In this context it was argued that adopting EU solutions 
might increase the legitimacy of their adopters. The former path reflects an 
instrumental logic of action, while the latter argues from a social ontology. From these 
two strands of thought, five hypotheses were spelled out reflecting the potential 
impact of different EU instruments. They are presented in the table below: 	 	H1a	(conditionality)	 If	 the	 EU	 applies	 its	 instruments	 to	 promote	 regional	cooperation,	 the	 EU’s	 interlocutor	 pursues	 institutional	change	to	avoid	the	EU-imposed	costs	of	not	doing	so.	H1b	(assistance)	 If	 the	 EU	 applies	 its	 instruments	 to	 promote	 regional	cooperation,	 the	 EU’s	 interlocutor	 pursues	 institutional	change	 in	 the	 expectation	of	 being	 rewarded	by	 the	EU	 for	doing	so.	H2	(lesson-drawing)	 If	 the	 EU	 applies	 its	 instruments	 to	 promote	 regional	cooperation,	 the	 EU’s	 interlocutor	 pursues	 institutional	change	because	it	positively	assesses	the	costs	and	benefits	of	a	corresponding	EU-level	example.	H3	(persuasion)	 If	 the	 EU	 applies	 its	 instruments	 to	 promote	 regional	cooperation,	 the	 EU’s	 interlocutor	 pursues	 institutional	change	because	the	EU	persuaded	it	of	its	adequacy.	H4	(emulation)	 If	 the	 EU	 applies	 its	 instruments	 to	 promote	 regional	cooperation,	 the	 EU’s	 interlocutor	 pursues	 institutional	change	because	it	expects	to	profit	from	the	reference	to	the	EU.	
Table 3.5: Overview of hypotheses 
The causal mechanisms outlined are likely to have a different effect in light of 
contextual factors. To reflect this, the final sub-chapter 3.4 developed a number of 
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scope conditions which are likely to act as enablers or catalysts of the diffusion 
processes. It was argued that diffusion processes are first dependent on the presence 
of domestic incentives that spur them. Such incentives can be the functional demand 
for new solutions to existing problems or the wish to profit from the legitimacy 
attributed to such solutions. Power asymmetries between the EU and its interlocutors 
were developed as a further central scope condition that also reflects the study’s 
interest in assessing in how far EU leverage affects the EU’s impact on regional 
cooperation beyond its borders. Degrees of statehood are the third scope condition 
that will be considered in this study. As for the other two scope conditions, also 
degrees of statehood can be understood as having a material and social expression. 
The remainder of sub-chapter 3.4 developed expectations on the links between the 
different scope conditions and the hypotheses. Generally speaking, the social variants 
of the scope conditions are expected to modulate the impact of the persuasion (H3) 
and emulation (H4) mechanisms, while the ones developed from a material ontology 
should affect the conditionality (H1a), assistance (H1b) and lesson-drawing (H2) 
mechanisms. As the scope conditions are likely to differ between the regions studied, 
they will also play a central role in the cross-case comparison over the cases in the two 
regions in chapter 0. The ensuing chapter operationalises the variables and hypotheses 
developed in this chapter, connecting them to implications observable in the case 
studies. 
 
 
 
 
  
Operationalisation 
 
  72 
4 Operationalisation	
Assessing the causal influence of the EU on regional cooperation beyond its borders 
requires measuring our variables. In order to be able to do this, this chapter develops 
indicators that can be assessed across the cases studied. Beyond enabling empirical 
research, this exercise is also important to distinguish the effects of different 
explanatory mechanisms from each other. Therefore, special attention is paid to 
developing indicators that are unambiguous for each diffusion mechanism.  
The ensuing sub-chapter 4.1 sets the ground by reviewing the criteria for a 
meaningful operationalisation. The two following sub-chapters then map the 
indicators for the dependent (4.2) and independent variables (4.3). In accordance with 
the diffusion approach and its focus on causal mechanisms, a major part of the 
operationalisation concentrates on the hypothesised diffusion mechanisms (4.4). The 
conclusion sums up the main elements of the operationalisation before moving to the 
methodological basis of the analysis. 
4.1 Guiding	criteria	
Operationalisation seeks to translate theoretical concepts into manifestations that can 
be observed empirically. This is done by assigning observable indicators to the concept 
to be analysed or measured (Miller 2007a: 85–6). For the indicators to be clear and 
unambiguous expressions of the theoretical concepts analysed, they have to meet 
several criteria. These criteria are elaborated in turn as they will guide the 
development of indicators to assess the EU’s impact on regional cooperation. 
First of all, the indicators developed should be valid, that is, they should 
measure what they intend to measure. To meet this aim, King, Keohane and Verba 
(1994: 25) suggest to construct indicators than can be interpreted as directly as 
possible. The goal here is to limit the need for contextual explanations to the necessary 
minimum. This is important since contextual explanations always bear the risk of 
increasing the ambiguity of the statements. Furthermore, several indicators will be 
developed for each causal mechanism and for the dependent and independent 
variables. This helps in increasing the validity of the analysis by pointing at specific 
patterns of evidence for each concept (Miller 2007a: 94). If the data for these different 
indicators stems from different sources, this also represents a triangulation that 
increases the validity further. 
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Secondly, the indicators used (and the data collected during the analysis) 
needs to be reliable. It must be possible for other researchers to replicate the data 
collection and the conclusions reached on its basis (King et al. 1994: 25–6). While 
achieving reliability does not only depend on the construction of the indicators, their 
design can also contribute to this effort. Constructing the indicators in a transparent, 
systematic and well-documented way and grounding them firmly in theory will allow 
other researchers to understand their origin and to replicate them, thereby increasing 
the reliability of the study as a whole.  
For a study that aspires to reach conclusions not only within the cases studied 
but also across the cases a third and last requirement is of special importance: 
comparability. Generally speaking, to achieve a maximum degree of comparability the 
research design shall not be biased towards any of the cases studied. For the indicators 
this implies that they have to be designed in a way that allows using them also in the 
analysis of other cases. At the same time, the very nature of comparative social science 
calls for some precaution regarding this aspiration. Where social interaction and 
culture play a role and cases are compared across different settings that may be 
subject to idiosyncrasies, the “problem of equivalence” may arise. This means that the 
same indicators may have different meanings across cultural and social contexts – they 
may be identical but not equivalent (Deth 1998: 2–9). Comparative studies, and 
especially those using qualitative methodology have often been criticised for not 
considering this problem (cf. Stegmueller 2011: 471–2). Increasing comparability is 
also useful with regard to external validity, that is, the extent to which the results from 
this study are generalizable also to similar cases. While limitations of external validity 
are inherent to qualitative research, this study aspires to at least provide a research 
design that could be applied also to similar cases in which the EU  has (or other actors 
have) tried to influence regional cooperation beyond their own borders.  
Judging from the impetus and technicality of the debate on the matter 
(Adcock and Collier 2001: 534–6; Deth 1998; Przeworski and Teune 1970: 74–134), 
achieving comparability and dealing with the problem of equivalence may seem the 
most difficult task in our operationalisation. But here again the focus of this study on 
the mechanisms of promotion of regional cooperation provides an important 
advantage. After all, it is inherent to processes and causal mechanisms that they imply 
activity. That makes them easier to observe and judge than a policy, which is a more 
abstract and constructed category. If we can convincingly determine that a certain 
policy objective – in our case, promoting regional cooperation – is pursued in all cases 
studied, then we can concentrate on observing the activity aimed at achieving that 
objective, that is: the mechanisms at play and their effect on the targets of that policy. 
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This allows us to ensure what Gerring calls “causal comparability”, i.e. that the 
presumed relationships between the independent and the dependent variable are 
comparable (Gerring 2001: 176–7).  
On the basis of these three main methodological requirements, the next three 
sub-chapters develop the indicators for the dependent and independent variables and 
for the diffusion mechanisms. 
4.2 Dependent	variable	–	Institutional	change	
	
Institutional change modelled according to EU aims in the target region or organisation 
is our dependent variable. As argued in the previous chapter, institutions are defined 
as social structures and systems of rules – both formal and informal – that have the 
potential to shape the behaviour of actors. Institutional change encompasses both the 
creation as well as the modification of regional institutions. 
In the context of this research, institutional change is understood as a variable 
measured against an ordinal index. The ordinal measure implies that different degrees 
of institutional change can be ranked next to each other (Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 
145–6). Using an index suggests that our variable institutional change consists of 
several dimensions.84 The use of an ordinal measure makes it possible to relate the 
degree of institutional change to different factors such as the goals of the EU in 
promoting specific institutional solutions, the diffusion mechanisms and EU 
instruments at work and the scope conditions under which these take place. This will 
allow us to reach more nuanced conclusions both on the within-case as on the cross-
case levels of analysis. In contrast, a nominal measure would only tell us whether 
institutional change has taken place or not, thereby not giving a feel for the magnitude 
of change undertaken. 
The choice of an index to measure institutional change is rooted in neo-
institutional thinking. Since institutions constantly adapt to their environment (Peters 
2012: 36–7), not every institutional change can be significant for our purposes. The 
objective is to distinguish irrelevant change from such change that could have an 
influence on political practice. Using a weighted index of institutional change allows us 
                                                             
84 An index is a measure that includes several dimensions of a variable. Indexes can be additive, 
meaning that each aspect increases or decreases the overall value of the variable to the same degree, 
or weighted. In this latter case, individual aspects can be given a higher importance than others 
(Johnson and Reynolds 2012: 150–2; Miller 2007b: 138–41). 
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to reflect this thought in our operationalisation by isolating the essence or core 
function of the institution. This core function represents the threshold below which 
institutional change is not deemed significant enough to argue that there has been an 
EU impact in promoting regional cooperation. In addition, the index allows us to 
measure a relatively complicated phenomenon as institutional change by combining 
as simple indicators as possible (Miller 2007b: 137). As we can use relatively simple 
and abstract indicators that are valid also in different social and political contexts, it 
becomes easier to compare institutional change across cases. 
The index consists of four dimensions that are important facets of almost 
every political institution: the aforementioned core function, actors, decision-making 
and competences. These elements can be illustrated with the example of the majority 
rule, one of the most common political institutions. As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the core function is the key element of the institution. In the example of 
the majority rule, the fact that decisions need to be supported by a majority of voters 
is the core function of that institution. Actors are the agents involved in the institution, 
e.g. those forming the constituency entitled to vote. Decision-making refers to rules 
that organise the ways decisions are taken – in the case of our example this could be 
a simple majority or an absolute majority. Finally, competences are the capacities and 
tasks that the institution is entitled to deal with. In our example this could refer to the 
areas of a polity in which decisions are taken with the majority rule. 
The analysis will look for change in these four dimensions. Change in each of 
these dimensions will be scored with one point. Depending on the number of 
dimensions in which we can observe change, the variable institutional change will be 
categorised as none (score 0), moderate (1-2) or substantial (3-4). Since the core 
function represents a threshold in the scale, changes that affect all or several of the 
dimensions but the core function will still be categorised as ‘moderate’. In practice, 
this implies that an institution that changes in all four dimensions will score as 
‘substantial’ (4) in terms of institutional change while change in all dimensions but the 
core function would yield a ‘moderate’ score (1). 
Change in the dimensions of our variable can come through different means. 
These means serve as our indicators and will be assessed nominally according to 
whether they are present or absent. Institutional change will often imply legal or 
normative changes, which can manifest themselves through the conclusion of new 
agreements, the modification of existing norms or the normative changes implied with 
the creation of intergovernmental or supranational organisations. Apart from 
normative change, institutional change also encompasses organisational innovations 
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such as the creation of new organisations, the redesign of existing ones (for example 
by changing their competences or the actors involved in them) or the creation of semi-
permanent cooperation projects or programmes to achieve a specific goal within a 
broader policy. Table 4.1 below lists the mentioned indicators. The ensuing sub-
chapter concentrates on the operationalisation of the independent variable. 
Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
	
Indicators	(with	regard	to	the	individual	elements)	
Core	function	 Creation	of	new	organisations	Modification	 of	 existing	 organisations	 (change	 of	 core	 function,	actors,	decision-making,	competences)	Creation	of	new	legal	norms	or	rules	Modification	of	legal	norms	or	rules	Creation	 of	 semi-permanent	 ad	 hoc	 cooperation	 projects	 or	programmes	
Actors	Decision-making	Competences	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	dimensions	changed.	The	core	function	represents	a	threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 4.1: Indicators for the dependent variable ‘institutional change modelled according to EU 
aims’ 
4.3 Independent	variable	–	EU	instruments	
The purpose of operationalizing the independent variable – that is, the use of EU 
instruments to promote regional cooperation beyond its borders – is in principle to 
simply identify what means the EU uses to promote regional cooperation. In most 
cases, the instruments can be identified by direct observation of the relevant sources 
such as policy documents or interviews. In addition, the fact that the instruments 
considered all originate from the same set of EU actors limits the aforementioned 
problem of equivalence and of a possible lack of comparability. Thus, operationalising 
the EU instruments may seem a relatively simple exercise. 
Still, the sheer amount of instruments that the EU can use to promote regional 
cooperation beyond its borders presents a challenge for succinct operationalisation. 
Since not covering all those instruments would distort the multifaceted character of 
the topic at hand, comparability across the different regions and cases will be ensured 
by categorising the instruments into broader clusters. This makes it possible to draw 
more conclusive results in the cross-case analysis. Following this approach, this section 
will first identify the instruments found in the three fields of EU external action: (i) 
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trade and economic relations, (ii) development cooperation and technical assistance 
and (iii) political relations and the sources that will be used to assess them. 
4.3.1 EU	instruments	across	policy	fields:	Narrowing	down	
the	scope	of	EU	external	action	
The independent variable consists of the instruments used by the EU to influence the 
behaviour of other actors towards regional cooperation. To identify them in the 
observable world, these instruments need to be operationalized (Gerring 2001: 35–
48). To know where to look for these instruments, it is useful to bear in mind a broad 
definition of foreign policy such as the one proposed by Christopher Hill (2003: 3): "the 
sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor (usually a state) 
in international relations". Such a broad definition emphasises that foreign policy goes 
beyond diplomacy and is scattered over different policy fields.  
The definition is especially well-suited to the EU, whose foreign policy 
competences were first established as complementary policies to its economic 
integration. This was the case of the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) established in 
1957 by the EEC Treaty of Rome (1957: 3) or of the EU’s development policy, which 
was initiated by granting trade concessions to former colonies. Only over time did EU 
foreign policy evolve to include more traditional areas of state foreign policy such as 
diplomacy, security and crisis management (nowadays summarised under CFSP and 
CSDP).85 As a result, several of the most developed foreign competences of the EU, 
such as the CCP, are eminently economic and lie beyond the scope of more traditional 
definitions of foreign policy. This multifaceted nature of the EU as a foreign policy actor 
is also exemplified by the popularity of the rather abstract and comprehensive term 
‘external action’ used to refer to the sum of EU policies with external implications.86 In 
conclusion, the nature of foreign policy in general and of EU foreign policy in particular 
implies that instruments used to encourage regional cooperation may be found across 
several external policy fields. 
In light of this wide array of instruments that the EU could use to encourage 
regional cooperation, it is useful to organise the broad concept of ‘foreign policy’ and 
the corresponding indicators along three more specific policy fields: trade and 
economic relations, development cooperation and technical assistance, and political 
                                                             
85 A useful historical overview on the development of EU external competences is given by Edwards 
(2011). 
86 Another reason for the use of this term certainly lies in the reluctance of EU member states to 
share a denomination like ‘foreign policy’, so strongly attached to national sovereignty. 
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relations. These policy fields correspond with the segments into which most of the 
contractual agreements of the EU with other states or regional organisations are 
divided.87 Apart from this classification along policy fields shown in table 4.2 below, 
the indicators can also be classified according to whether they are located more on 
the strategic and planning phase of policy-making (thereby reflecting the EU’s 
intentions) or on its implementation stage (thereby reflecting the application of the 
instruments). This sorting will simplify the operationalisation.  
Policy	fields	in	EU	foreign	policy	Trade	and	economic	relations	Technical	assistance	and	cooperation	Political	relations	
                                                   Table 4.2: Policy fields in EU foreign policy 
It is now in these three policy fields in which the intention to promote regional 
cooperation and the instruments used are to be identified. To identify intention and 
instruments, possible manifestations of regional cooperation objectives and policies 
will be developed and listed for each of the three policy fields.  
Since – as mentioned in the first paragraphs of this sub-chapter – the goal here 
is to identify the presence or absence of an instrument, an assessment of its relevance 
in comparison to other political goals is in principle not necessary and simple 
observation of the indicators would suffice. Nonetheless, the study will gain in depth 
if we also assess the intensity of the EU’s engagement. To mention an example, if the 
EU represents the vast majority of external funding aimed at regional cooperation in a 
specific case, it is also fair to expect that it should have a stronger effect on the actual 
results of the policy as if the EU was only one among many other donors in this field. 
After identifying their manifestations, most indicators will therefore be assessed along 
an ordinal non-dichotomous scale with the expressions none – low – medium – high. 
The values for each of the indicators will be aggregated to form an index that shows 
the extent to which a specific instrument was employed by the EU. For each of the 
policy fields identified, the subsequent three sections will now present the indicators 
                                                             
87 The overwhelming majority of such agreements are signed under Article 217 of the TFEU as so-
called ‘association agreements’. They combine provisions related to the EU’s CCP with provisions on 
political relations (including CFSP) and such ones on development and technical cooperation. In most 
cases, the agreements also include provisions on competences of EU member states (e.g. cultural 
cooperation). Such agreements are signed and ratified by both the EU and its member states and are 
termed as ‘mixed agreements’. Agreements signed by the EU can be found in the Council’s 
Agreements’ Database (Council of the European Union 2013a). 
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used to identify manifestations of the independent variable ‘Use of EU instruments to 
promote regional cooperation’.  
4.3.2 Trade	and	economic	relations	
As mentioned previously, the CCP plays a prominent role in the EU’s relationship with 
most external partners. Whenever the EU strives to conclude preferential trade 
agreements with its partners, regional integration is often on the agenda. Several 
reasons justify this: regional integration increases the size of the counterpart market 
covered by the agreement but also provides more stable rules since unilateral changes 
by individual countries are less likely. When it comes to the planning and strategy level 
in the field of trade, the EU may communicate its priorities in speeches from EU 
representatives with a political mandate, in Communications from the Commission on 
trade policy, in Council conclusions, in the (Regional) Strategy Papers prepared under 
the lead of the EEAS, the former Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) 
of the Commission or for Development Cooperation (DG DEVCO) that describe the 
policy priorities towards specific countries and regions over the EU’s seven year 
indicative budgeting period88 or in the yearly Enlargement Strategy prepared by the 
Enlargement DG (DG ELARG) for those countries in the SAP or in the Enlargement 
process.89 Other, more specific, policy documents may be published ad hoc, for 
example in preparation of meetings.90 Besides these sources, also the evidence from 
interviews undertaken by the author with EU policy-makers and officials from the 
EEAS, the Council and DG Trade will be used to identify the intention to promote 
regional integration in trade matters.  
To understand the importance of regional cooperation in the sources 
mentioned, the empirical analysis will judge the emphasis given to this objective in 
comparison to other objectives.91 Since the emphasis given to an objective can only be 
understood in the specific context in which it is voiced (e.g. in a country strategy paper 
against other objectives), this assessment will be performed using ‘anchor examples’, 
                                                             
88 The Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) establishes indicative ceilings for the majority of 
expenditures of the EU and is adopted by the Council and the EP for periods of seven years.  
89 An overview of the process and decisive actors in the programming of the EU’s external 
instruments before and after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon is given by Stroß(2012). 
90 See for example a Commission input for a European Council meeting (Commission 2013d). 
91 This approach is followed because other options, like counting the number of mentions of ‘regional 
cooperation’ or similar terms, would not necessarily reflect the real importance given to the matter 
as it wouldn’t mirror the relative relevance in which the objective of regional cooperation stands in 
comparison with other objectives. 
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a common technique in qualitative content analysis.92 Anchor examples are passages 
in a text that exemplify how a low, middle or high manifestation looks in the text 
analysed (Mayring 2010: 92). Using anchor examples allows us to ensure a 
comparability of our analysis while taking into account that a ‘low’ emphasis on 
regional cooperation can look differently in Council conclusions than in an interview 
with an official from DG Trade. These anchor examples are defined in the respective 
part of the empirical analysis. 
On the level of implementation, trade policy offers a rather small number of 
publicly available sources to assess the relevance of promoting regional cooperation 
in this field. The most prominent part of trade policy consists in the negotiation of 
trade agreements. These negotiations are confidential to avoid the tactical drawbacks 
that may arise if either a negotiating partner or interest groups enjoy privileged 
information. Therefore negotiation documents are difficult to obtain. Still, some 
sources are publicly available. This is the case of information on technical assistance 
projects in trade issues, so-called trade-related technical assistance (TRTA), which may 
be used to facilitate regional integration. Also, market access offers exchanged by 
negotiators in the course of negotiations are often made public ex-post.93 And, once 
concluded, trade agreements or trade chapters of association agreements are public. 
Apart from these publicly available sources, again evidence from interviews will be 
used to identify the EU’s instruments in promoting regional integration. It is advisable 
to not only rely on interviews with EU policy-makers, but also on evidence from their 
counterparts in negotiations. This will help to elucidate in how far the EU encourages 
regional cooperation not just in theory, but also in practice. The table below 
summarises the indicators used in the field of trade policy, and how they are 
aggregated to form an index. 
Use	of	EU	instruments:	trade	and	economic	relations	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 0	–	2	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 0	–2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 0	–2	
                                                             
92 More specifically, this approach is used in qualitative intensity analysis, a variety of qualitative 
content analysis that assesses the intensity or relevance of specific information with regard to a 
variable on an ordinal scale (Mayring 2010: 101–9). 
93 Negotiations for preferential trade agreements usually proceed in three phases. In a first phase, 
the parties discuss and draft the rules and the text of the future agreement. The second phase begins 
when the parties simultaneously present their so-called market access offers. These detail the 
reduction in tariffs or quotas that the party is willing to offer to the other parties. Finally, negotiations 
are held on both rules and market access to find a compromise. 
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Use	of	EU	instruments:	trade	and	economic	relations	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 project	 documentation	 and	
assessments.	
0	–	2	
amount	 of	 trade-related	 technical	 assistance	 oriented	towards	regional	cooperation	and	integration.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	partners.	 0	–	2	
Use	of	trade	and	economic	relations	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	middle	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 0	–	16	categorisation	of	emphasis	 and	amount	 as	none	 (0)	–	moderate(1)	–	 substantial	 (2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
 Table 4.3: Indicators for the independent variable: trade and economic relations 
4.3.3 Development	cooperation	and	technical	assistance	
Development cooperation and technical assistance play an important role in the 
foreign policy of the EU – one of the major donors of ODA (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2012: 275) and sometimes criticised for not being a 
“global player” but just a “global payer” (Brok 2010).94 In terms of planning and 
strategy, the EU’s intention to encourage and promote regional cooperation and 
integration through ODA and technical assistance may again be found in speeches 
from EU political representatives, but also in landmark documents on development 
policy such as the European Consensus on Development (European Parliament et al. 
2005), in Communications from the Commission, in Council conclusions, in (Regional) 
Strategy Papers or Enlargement Strategy reports, etc. Interviews with EU policy-
makers charged with programming EU development cooperation will further be 
undertaken to elucidate the existence and emphasis given to the objective.  
On the implementation level – and opposed to the case of trade policy – the 
amount of data available on development cooperation is abundant. Besides the 
provisions on cooperation included in treaties and agreements between the EU and its 
partners, cooperation projects involve much data in terms of project descriptions, 
contracts, evaluations, etc. – much of it available publicly. In addition, the 
comprehensive reporting system to which the members of the Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD submit themselves and its detailed 
categorisation allow distinguishing the amount and relative importance of ODA flows 
                                                             
94 Taken together, the EU institutions and the EU member states are the largest donors of ODA 
worldwide. 
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aimed at facilitating regional cooperation. Individual cooperation projects that do not 
fall under the definition for ODA can be identified from EU documents and databases. 
Beyond these data, utterances by policy-makers from the EU and its partners will allow 
to assess the existence and importance of cooperation instruments aimed at fostering 
regional cooperation. The following table summarises the indicators used in this field, 
their respective units of assessment and how they are aggregated to an index.  
Use	of	EU	instruments:	development	cooperation	and	technical	assistance	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 0	–	2	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 0	–	2	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 0	–	2	
absolute	 and	 relative	 budgetary	 relevance	 of	 development	
cooperation	 projects	 aimed	 at	 fostering	 regional	cooperation.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 project	 documentation	 and	
assessments.	
0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	 partners	 (officials	 present	 in	 negotiations	 and	implementation).	 0	–	2	
Use	of	development	cooperation	and	TA	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	middle	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 0	–	16	categorisation	of	emphasis,	 relevance,	number	 and	amount	 as	none	 (0)	 –	moderate	 (1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 4.4: Indicators for the independent variable: development cooperation and technical 
assistance 
4.3.4 Political	relations		
Finally, regional cooperation may also play a role in the political pillar of EU foreign 
policy. In this pillar, the focus lies on the diplomatic relations – often preceding and 
accompanying the two afore-mentioned areas – and also on security matters. 
Discussions in this field often serve to shape and agree on the priorities over the whole 
spectrum of cooperation and set the ground for the more operational work in the two 
other pillars. What singles out the political pillar is its focus on diplomatic negotiations 
and declarations as instruments of foreign policy, which then may or may not provide 
the ground for closer cooperation in other areas and increase mutual recognition. In 
terms of planning and strategy, EU political priorities in this area may be expressed in 
the EU Treaties, in general speeches by political representatives outlining the self-
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perception of the EU and its political objectives, or in the strategic documents 
mentioned also for the two previous pillars.  
The differences to the two previous fields of foreign policy lie rather in the 
area of implementation, where the focus is on non-binding, non-material exchanges 
such as summits, regular political dialogues (including parliamentary ones if relevant 
to the case), other senior official meetings, démarches and declarations on a region or 
specific countries. As in the case of trade negotiations, the agendas and content of 
discussions in political dialogue meetings are often not public. Therefore in this case, 
information obtained from interviews with policy makers will be especially important 
to grasp the content and priorities of such meetings. The table below summarises the 
indicators according to the two phases of policy-making and groups them into an 
index. 
Use	of	EU	instruments:	political	relations	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 0	–	2	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 0	–	2	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 0	–	2	
relevance	of	political	dialogues	with	a	regional	focus	 0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 statements	 and	 declarations	 mentioning	
regional	cooperation.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	 policy-makers	present	in	/	tasked	with	negotiations	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	 in	 interviews	with	policy-makers	 from	EU	partners	present	in	/	tasked	with	negotiations	 0	–	2	
Use	of	political	relations	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	middle	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 0	-	16	categorisation	of	relevance	and	emphasis	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 4.5: Indicators for the independent variable: political relations  
4.4 Diffusion	mechanisms	
Foreign policy takes place in a multicausal world. At any given time, the EU is likely to 
have several instruments at its disposal – and actively use them. The aim of analysing 
the causal mechanisms is therefore to distinguish which of these instruments had an 
impact on the actions of the EU’s partners – and how they did so. While the analysis 
of the independent variable shows us which instruments were used by the EU, only an 
analysis of the causal chain between these instruments and the actions of the EU’s 
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partners can shed light on the effectiveness of the EU in encouraging regional 
cooperation. In order to do so, the present sub-chapter develops indicators for each 
of the five hypothesised causal mechanisms developed in sub-chapter 3.2. 
Three points are worth considering to ensure that the operationalisation of 
the mechanisms allows us to distinguish which – if any – of the EU’s instruments was 
effective. Firstly it is important to highlight that the variables considered are assessed 
in non-dichotomous scales. While the first aim is to assess whether a diffusion 
mechanism is present or not (for which a dichotomous scale would suffice), assessing 
the intensity of the mechanisms is necessary in view of the fact that we may have cases 
in which several mechanisms play a role. After all, the EU has several mechanisms at 
its disposal that it can use at the same time. Secondly, it is central that the analysis 
concentrates on the impact of the diffusion mechanisms on the addressees of the EU 
instruments. Otherwise, the analysis of the mechanisms would not test for the 
connection between our independent and dependent variables but often just reiterate 
the analysis for the independent variable. To put it simply, while the analysis of the 
independent variable can establish whether and to which degree conditionality was 
used by the EU, the analysis of the diffusion mechanism ‘conditionality’ allows us to 
trace whether conditionality had an actual impact on institutional change. Therefore 
the operationalisation of the causal mechanisms focuses on indicators that denote an 
impact on local agency.95 Finally, the objective is to develop several indicators for each 
concept (in this case: for each mechanism) to uncover patterns of evidence that allow 
to increase the validity of the analysis. The indicators are based on previous empirical 
analyses that investigate similar mechanisms as well as newly developed for this study. 
In order to make the make the variables more manageable and comparable also 
in the cross-case comparison, the values for the individual indicators will be 
aggregated to build indices that reflect each variable in a simple numerical value – as 
previously done for the dependent and independent variables. The indicators are 
presented in the same order as the hypotheses in chapter 3, starting with 
conditionality and finishing with emulation. 
4.4.1 Incentives:	Conditionality	
The defining element of conditionality is the connection of an objective in a specific 
policy area with incentives in a different area. Thus, the most prominent manifestation 
                                                             
95 As mentioned in section 3.4 (pp. 41 and following), also the process-tracing method used will 
contribute to ensuring that changes in the dependent variable can be attributed to specific diffusion 
mechanisms and by implication to the independent variable. 
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of conditionality is the explicit connection of financial or political actions to the 
achievement or non-achievement of a specific objective.96 Such a connection can 
occur in agreements, speeches or negotiations. EU actions that may be conditioned to 
a specific objective include financial disbursements, technical cooperation, increased 
political recognition, improved market access, support in international organisations 
or an improved status in the SAP or Enlargement process for countries in the closer 
neighbourhood. While this indicator is the central condition, in order to be credible, 
conditionality also needs to be assessed. It therefore usually comes along with review 
and assessment measures. Manifestations of these can be the issuance of (regular) 
reports, declarations or negotiations on the matter. In order to have an impact on the 
EU’s partner, the use and the assessment of conditionality need to be perceived as 
such by the EU’s counterpart.97 
As conditionality is a matter that has often been subject to empirical research 
in EU studies, previous work offers valuable guidance to further refine the indicators. 
More specifically, Frank Schimmelfennig and Guido Schwellnus (2007: 273–6) develop 
a series of indicators to assess EU conditionality that can be adapted to the aims of this 
study. Their indicators arise from the context of EU accession negotiations and aim at 
assessing the strength of conditionality (i.e. they measure a non-dichotomous variable 
with more than just two values). According to Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, the 
strength of conditionality increases with the following characteristics: (i) an incentive 
is connected to a specific norm change, (ii) that norm is prominently mentioned by the 
EU, (iii) that norm is prominently used to judge the maturity of the counterpart or (iv) 
the respective norm is formulated in an unambiguous and binding way as in the case 
of legal rules. While many of the elements associated with regional cooperation are of 
a political nature and difficult to formulate as unambiguous and binding norms (in the 
case of the EU, the principle of loyal cooperation enshrined in Art. 24(3) TEU can be 
seen as such a case), others are instead rather technical and may well be formulated 
in such way (e.g. the need for a set of joint standards in a common market). In the case 
of more abstract or political conditions, it is Schimmelfennig’s and Schwellnus’ focus 
on prominence which is interesting. The prominence the EU attaches to a norm to 
judge a certain partner represents a useful proxy for the purpose of this study. It allows 
assessing conditionality in the case of more abstract or political conditions, which 
might otherwise not be recognised as such conditions because of their lack of clarity 
and specificity. As in the case of the independent variable, the emphasis the EU 
                                                             
96 This is equally applicable to non-achievement or to negative incentives in the case of negative 
conditionality.  
97 Otherwise we would only assess the use of conditionality by the EU – as already done for the 
independent variable. 
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attaches to norms related to regional cooperation will be assessed by resorting to 
anchor examples from the documents and interviews analysed.  
The above paragraphs reflect the situation from the perspective of the sender 
– an issue well-researched in studies related to the EU or the international financial 
institutions (IFIs). Yet, turned around, the same arguments offer a way of assessing not 
just the existence but the impact of conditionality – our focus here as it is indispensable 
to judge whether this diffusion mechanism does actually connect EU instruments and 
institutional change. If institutions and policy-makers from the EU’s counterparts 
consistently and prominently mention the role of EU requirements in a specific policy 
field, we can conclude that the conditionality mechanism was at play. This is a fair 
assumption to be made, since over-reporting of conditionality by policy-makers from 
the EU’s counterpart is likely to be low.98 After all, admitting that one was pushed into 
a certain action may undermine the perceived autonomy of governments and policy-
makers. Justifications of institutional change in connection with conditionality can be 
manifested in public utterances such as speeches, statements or official documents. 
Since, as argued above, admitting conditionality in public may be uncomfortable, it is 
more likely that the effect of conditionality will be reflected in personal statements 
during interviews. In line with the considerations above, manifestations related to 
conditionality do not necessarily need to refer to it in an explicit way. They may instead 
refer to the assessment of conditionality. For example, a certain institutional 
innovation may be brought in connection with the approaching deadline for the 
respective enlargement progress report. Following the considerations of 
Schimmelfennig and Schwellnus, if mentions of an EU requirement are especially 
prominent and frequent they may point at a case of conditionality that might not be 
obvious otherwise. Taken together, these indicators will be used to assess the impact 
of conditionality in triggering institutional change. The indicators reflecting emphasis 
will be classified in an ordinal scale along the categories none (0), moderate (1) and 
substantial (2). The category ‘none’ implies that no manifestation was found. The 
values for these indicators are then added to form an index that reflects the impact of 
conditionality and takes a score of between 0 and 10. Table 4.6 below lists the 
indicators for the impact of conditionality and shows how the index is constructed. 
 
                                                             
98 While one can imagine situations in which it may be useful for executives to justify an unpopular 
measure to their constituencies by referring to it as a requirement of the EU in view of the greater 
good of EU accession, this argumentation is unlikely to happen in interviews with a foreign 
researcher. Such interviews (see sub-chapter 5.4 for more detail) allow us to assess whether 
references to EU requirements were “consistent and prominent” as mentioned above. 
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Impact	of	conditionality		 	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
prominence	 of	 mentions	 of	 EU	 conditionality	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	
documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	of	mentions	of	connections	established	by	the	EU	between	its	financial	or	 political	 actions	 and	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	 specific	 regional	 cooperation	objective	in	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 justifications	 of	 a	 specific	 institutional	 change	 with	 expected	improvements	in	a	functionally	different	area	voiced	in	speeches,	statements,	
official	 documents	 and	 in	 interviews	 with	 policy-makers	 from	 the	 EU’s	counterpart.	
0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 justifications	 of	 a	 specific	 institutional	 change	 with	 an	 EU	assessment	procedure	in	speeches,	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	–	2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 to	 EU	 requirements	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	
documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	–	2	
Impact	of	conditionality	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-10)	 0	-	10	categorisation	of	prominence	and	emphasis	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
 Table 4.6: Indicators for the diffusion mechanism ‘conditionality’ 
4.4.2 Incentives:	Assistance	
Beyond positive or negative conditionality which always presupposes prior action by 
the EU’s partner that is rewarded (or punished) ex post by the EU, also assistance 
offered to encourage regional cooperation can have an impact.  
Mentions in documents, statements and interviews with officials and policy-
makers from the EU’s counterpart serve to assess whether EU assistance triggered or 
influenced institutional change aimed at increasing regional cooperation. Similar to 
the case of conditionality, it is reasonable to expect that EU partners may underreport 
the role of assistance and highlight their own contributions. In practice, this problem 
remains manageable as the information from the EU’s partners is contrasted with that 
of EU actors, allowing to triangulate. And as for the case of conditionality, this 
expected tendency to underreport has the advantage that whenever EU partners 
report that assistance was decisive, it is sound to assume that they are not 
overemphasising its impact. To assess the intensity of the impact of EU assistance on 
local institutional change, the analysis will also rely on statements from documents 
and officials from the beneficiaries of EU technical assistance. Indicators for intensity 
concentrate on the sustainability and duration of the institutional change and include 
the permanence of institutions created with assistance from the EU. As in the case of 
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conditionality, the assessment of the impact of the assistance mechanism will be 
reflected as an ordinal variable formed by several indicators and categorised along the 
categories none, moderate and substantial.  Table 4.7 below lists the indicators and 
shows how their score enters the index variable. 
Impact	of	assistance		
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
emphasis	 of	 explicit	 mentions	 of	 EU	 assistance	 as	 a	 trigger	 for	 institutional	change	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	counterparts.		 0	–	2	
relevance	of	EU	assistance	in	the	design	of	institutional	change	as	reflected	in	
speeches,	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	–	2	
duration	 of	 institutional	 change	 created	 with	 EU	 assistance	 as	 reflected	 by	
documents	from	and	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	–	2	
Impact	of	assistance	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-3)	–	substantial	(4-6)	 0	–	6	categorisation	of	emphasis,	 relevance	and	 duration	 as	none	–	moderate	 –	 substantial	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
 Table 4.7: Indicators for the diffusion mechanism ‘assistance’ 
4.4.3 Lesson-drawing	
Lesson-drawing occurs when an actor decides to seek and take on board the 
experience of others to solve a specific problem. This logic implies two elements that 
form the core of this diffusion mechanism and guide the development of indicators. 
First, lesson-drawing can occur without a direct involvement of the sender. And 
second, it is driven by functional and utility calculations on the side of the EU’s 
counterpart.  
In consequence, to identify lesson-drawing, the absence or limited relevance 
of direct EU incentives is a central indicator. This does not exclude that the EU may be 
exerting a more general influence addressed at a wider public, for example by praising 
the virtues of regional cooperation in general terms. But it excludes direct influences 
aimed at convincing a specific actor to behave in a certain way. Lesson-drawing also 
implies that the initiative for the action lies in the hands of the EU’s counterpart rather 
than on the side of the EU. This initiative can manifest itself for example in requests 
for the experience of (EU) policy-makers or experts or in the organisation of public 
discussions. As a process that is led by rational calculations, lesson-drawing is also 
likely to be accompanied by analyses and studies by experts, officials or policy-makers 
that weight the advantages and disadvantages of specific institutional changes (Lenz 
2012: 159). The commissioning or authoring of such studies or the organisation of 
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expert meetings at the initiative of the EU’s counterpart are therefore further 
indicators for lesson-drawing.99 As lesson-drawing processes imply rational analysis 
and utility calculations, they can also lead to deliberate adaptations of foreign 
templates to local realities (Rose 1991: 26; Strang and Meyer 1993: 500). Such 
adaptations are a clear indicator for lesson-drawing and can be manifested in technical 
documents or in statements of involved experts or officials. It is important to highlight 
though that only those modifications of foreign templates that can be attributed to 
the consideration of functional advantages or disadvantages can be seen as indicators 
for lesson-drawing.100 In line with the arguments above, institutional changes arising 
from lesson-drawing are likely to be justified to stakeholders or the public with 
eminently functional reasons, for example with the need to tackle an existing problem 
in a more effective way. In addition to the mere presence of the indicators elaborated 
above, their number and intensity will be taken into account to judge the strength of 
lesson-drawing as a mechanism of institutional change, forming a nominal and several 
ordinal scales that are aggregated to form an index variable as shown in table 4.8 
below. 
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
relevance	of	EU	incentives	specifically	directed	at	the	observed	institutional	change	as	evidenced	 in	documents,	 interviews	with	actors	 from	the	EU	and	its	counterpart.	 0	–	2	
degree	of	initiative	by	the	EU’s	counterpart	as	evidenced	in	documented	or	reported	requests,	public	discussions.	 0	–	2	
number	 of	 analyses	 and	 studies	 by	 experts,	 officials	 or	 policy-makers	commissioned	 or	 authored	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	
documents	or	interviews.	 0	–	2	
adaptation	of	foreign	templates	to	local	conditions	as	a	result	of	functional	considerations,	manifested	in	technical	documents	or	interviews.	 0	/	1	
predominance	 of	 justifications	of	 the	 institutional	 change	with	 functional	reasons	 and/or	 weighting	 of	 alternative	 policies	 evidenced	 in	 official	
documents,	public	statements	or	interviews.	 0	–	2	
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-9)	 0	-	9	categorisation	of	adaptation	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	degree,		predominance	and	number	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	categorisation	of	relevance	as	none	(2)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(0).101	
 Table 4.8: Indicators for the diffusion mechanism ‘lesson-drawing’ 
                                                             
99 In cases in which such studies have been commissioned by the EU’s partner at the expenses of the 
EU, it will be necessary to assess who took the initiative.  
100 If they instead follow other considerations, they are likely to indicate emulation processes as will 
be shown below.  
101 Relevance of EU incentives is counted in the opposite direction (i.e. high incentives score as 0) as 
such incentives denote that action did not stem predominantly from the EU’s partner but from the 
EU.  
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4.4.4 Persuasion	
As shown while developing the hypothesis in the previous chapter, persuasion focuses 
on changes in the preferences of policy-makers. Since preferences cannot be directly 
observed, this makes it probably the diffusion mechanism most difficult to identify in 
practice. Therefore, two important points must be borne in mind when developing 
indicators for the impact of persuasion. First, persuasion is by definition a mechanism 
clearly initiated and driven by the sender of a specific influence. Second, the central 
logic to persuasion is that of conviction. Decision-makers have to be convinced by their 
persuaders to change their preferences and act accordingly. Thus, the following 
paragraphs concentrate on identifying predominant agency of the sender and 
conviction as the two essential elements of persuasion. 
Apart from the insights that stem from the analysis of the independent 
variable, predominance in the activity of the sender, i.e. of the EU, can be identified 
also by looking closer at the presumed diffusion process. With political dialogues being 
the most likely arena for persuasion processes between policy-makers, investigating 
who was predominant in placing specific points on the agenda of such discussions 
provides a first indicator. Outside of political dialogues, such predominant agency can 
also be manifested in targeted support for epistemic communities that advocate the 
positions pursued by the EU and aim at changing the perceptions and preferences of 
local policy-makers.102 In a similar vein, EU support can also be directed at selectively 
empowering political actors that pursue an agenda supportive of that of the EU. This 
argument has been developed from the perspective of a material ontology (Börzel and 
Risse 2007: 492) but there is no reason why this logic could not also be applied to 
processes of persuasion where arguments and information are the resources. If such 
empowerment occurs, we would expect EU actors to especially highlight like-minded 
political actors in public utterances or through diplomatic means such as visits and 
meetings. Both epistemic communities and political actors can then act similarly to 
what the norm diffusion literature terms ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (see exemplarily 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). By publicly advocating EU-promoted positions, they can 
contribute to changing the preferences of decision-makers. 
To identify conviction, it is useful to refer to the elements that go hand in hand 
with the process of convincing someone of a certain position. Such a process is, firstly, 
likely to take a certain amount of time as it implies an adaptation of existing 
                                                             
102 The term epistemic community was introduced by Ernst Haas in IR literature and refers to "a 
network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area." (Haas 1992: 3). 
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preferences to a new source of influence. The permanence of a specific topic on the 
agenda of political dialogues between the EU and its target is an indicator for the time-
span of persuasion.103 Research on socialisation has furthermore identified a number 
of conditions that make persuasion more probable.104 The novelty of the target of 
influence to a specific context – in our case to regional cooperation or to a closer 
relationship with the EU – is one of these conditions. As the argument goes, a novel 
actor will be more motivated to take up new points of view on a given matter and 
therefore to change its preferences. This argument also holds conversely: the more 
recognised and experienced the sender of influence, the greater his persuasive 
potential. Therefore we can take the difference in experience in regional cooperation 
as an indication that persuasion is likely. Taking into account that the EU is the most 
developed integration endeavour and will virtually always be the more experienced 
actor, this indication should nonetheless not be overemphasised. Persuasion will also 
be more probable if the interaction between the sender and the recipient occurs in 
less politicized and insulated arenas than in public (Checkel 2005: 813). This latter 
condition certainly holds for discussions in political dialogues. While these three 
conditions are not by themselves sufficient indicators of persuasion, they point at a 
pattern of evidence consistent with persuasion. 
Beyond the process of convincing someone, successful persuasion implies 
that preferences will have changed – as opposed to merely instrumental reactions to 
a different context.105 Thus, Checkel highlights that the effects of persuasion should 
remain observable over a significant period of time (Checkel 2005: 813). In 
consequence, behaviour according to the new preferences should be constant over 
time and across different contexts (Checkel 2001: 566). In the context of this thesis, 
such constant behaviour can be expressed in political decisions consistent with the 
institutional change and in commitment to the change. This commitment can be 
observed in terms of funding or of the relevance given to the specific institutional 
change in policy-making. In a similar yet different vein, if persuasion has been 
successful and therefore has modified the preferences of actors, these new 
preferences may soon be taken for granted. If this is the case, the preferences may 
                                                             
103 The permanence of a topic on the agenda is obviously only a valuable indicator as long as the topic 
is not just kept on the agenda but also actively discussed. As many international negotiations are 
held under the implicit rule ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’, the empirical analysis will 
in such cases inquire whether a topic was still actively discussed or not. 
104 The referred research from Jeffrey Checkel uses the term ‘normative suasion’, a process analogous 
to persuasion. In a later article, Checkel himself uses ‘persuasion’ to refer to the same phenomenon 
(Checkel 2006: 364). 
105 Recall how Checkel distinguishes between type I and type II socialisation, as highlighted in the 
development of the persuasion hypothesis (see section 3.3 above). 
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well be absent from public debate, as has been highlighted by Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink (1998: 904). While Finnemore and Sikkink argue that this absence 
makes it hard to discern the changed preferences in practice, it is also possible to turn 
this absence into an indicator. If the other above indicators point at persuasion, but 
the preferences seem absent from public discourse, it is likely that persuasion will have 
taken place.106  
Due to its elusive nature, the focus on patterns of evidence is especially 
convenient when assessing the presence of persuasion. Thus, the persuasion 
hypothesis will only be regarded as valid if a clear majority of the indicators can be 
observed at the same time. This approach allows us to detect patterns of evidence that 
increase the validity of the analysis as discussed in the introduction to this 
operationalisation chapter. In our index for the impact of persuasion, this is reflected 
by shifting up the threshold from which on the index scores as ‘none’ to six out of 13 
possible points.107 Like for the previous hypotheses,  table 4.9 below lists the indicators 
for the persuasion mechanism and the scales in which they will be assessed. 
Impact	of	persuasion		 	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	of	the	EU	in	setting	items	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	bilateral	agenda	as	observed	in	meeting	agendas	and	interviews	with	participants	of	meetings.	 0	–	2	
significance	of	EU	support	to	epistemic	communities	that	pursue	an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.	 0	–	2	
presence	 of	 selective	 empowerment	 of	 political	 actors	 that	 pursue	 an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.			 0	/	1	
Duration	of	a	topic	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	bilateral	agenda.	 0	–	2	
significance	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 experience	 in	 regional	 cooperation	 /	integration	between	EU	and	target.	 0	–	2	
presence	of	interaction	in	relatively	unpoliticised	and	in-camera	settings.	 0	/	1	
duration	of	behaviour	by	the	target	that	is	consistent	with	the	institutional	change,	also	across	different	contexts	as	observed	in	political	decisions	and	commitment	 to	 the	 institutional	 change	 (e.g.	 in	 terms	 of	 funding	 and	relevance	in	policy-making).	
0	–	2	
absence	of	 the	changed	preferences	from	public	debate,	coupled	with	their	
presence	in	interviews	with	policy-makers.	 0	/	1	
Impact	of	persuasion	scores	as	none	(0-6)	–	moderate	(7-11)	–	substantial	(12-13)	 0	-	13	categorisation	of	presence	and	absence	as	yes	(1)		–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance,	 significance	 and	 duration	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	 moderate	 (1)	 –	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
  Table 4.9: Indicators for the diffusion mechanism ‘persuasion’ 
                                                             
106 This also emphasises the importance of interviews in retrieving data for the analysis, as interviews 
allow to directly test for preferences not observable otherwise. 
107 The value ‘six’ is chosen as it represents considerably more than a third of the possible points and 
because it requires that at least three indicators have been found – with a high probability of the 
score being spread over more than three indicators.  
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4.4.5 Emulation	
Two elements stand at the core of emulation as it was described in the theory chapter: 
the quest for externally induced legitimation by referring to the EU as an example or 
model and the likeliness of a deliberate discrepancy between the adoption of 
institutional change and its application in practice (‘decoupling’).  
Therefore, the starting point and primary indicator for emulation is 
legitimacy-seeking behaviour. Such behaviour will be indicated by prominent 
references to the success of the adopted institutional change elsewhere. If such 
references are predominant above other possible ways of legitimation and refer to the 
EU as a model, we can conclude that the quest for external legitimation was decisive 
in the adoption. Such legitimacy-seeking may be found through interviews with 
decision-makers, in official documents relating to institutional change, or in 
justifications made by decision-makers to their local parliaments, the public or the 
press. In a similar vein, if a specific institutional change was borrowed and adopted 
although functionally more adequate alternatives were available and known, it is likely 
that we are witnessing emulation (Jetschke and Murray 2012: 180–1). Beyond clearer 
references, Meyer and Rowan (1977: 349–50) have highlighted that the quest for 
external legitimisation can be manifested already in such detailed elements as 
borrowing the vocabulary used from other organisations. While also this latter 
indicator can be taken into account, explicit references are obviously the stronger 
indicator since they would reflect a clearly intended behaviour.  
The second step is then to observe the discrepancy between the institutional 
change and its application in practice. It is possible to observe this discrepancy by 
comparing the once set goals with reports, both in documents and in interviews, on its 
application. Such reports will be retrieved both from local participants and decision-
makers (e.g. officials), from stakeholders as NGOs, from EU policy-makers as well as 
from secondary and academic literature on the matter. In the course of this 
comparison, it is important to assess whether the observed discrepancy is intended or 
not. Otherwise we would be just witnessing a different development than once 
intended but not a deliberate ‘decoupling’.  
Three further indicators do not by themselves indicate emulation but 
contribute to a pattern of evidence. First, changing institutions without a thorough ex-
ante assessment or ex-post evaluation of the effectiveness of the changes can point at 
policy-makers that are more interested in the further benefits associated with change 
– such as increased legitimacy – than in their actual functioning. This has been 
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highlighted by previous literature adopting a diffusion framework to differentiate 
emulation from lesson-drawing processes motivated by an instrumental rationality 
(Elkins and Simmons 2005: 44; Lenz 2012: 159)108. Second, if no functional demand for 
the institutional change can be observed, it is likely that the change was motivated by 
other reasons, such as the wish to increase legitimacy (Jetschke and Murray 2012: 
180–1). A third indicator that can point at emulation is the absence of clear and reliable 
performance indicators to assess the effectiveness of the institutional change 
adopted. If goals and performance indicators are ambiguous, it is easier to recur to 
external models to legitimise the institutional change (Meyer and Rowan 1977: 356–
7). Nonetheless, this indicator needs to be taken with a pinch of salt since many other 
reasons, such as the wish to ensure adaptability to a changing context, can justify 
ambiguous goals in a political context. As in the case of persuasion, the necessary 
caution will be reflected by shifting up the ‘none’ category of the variable to a higher 
score: three out of seven possible points.109  
Impact	of	emulation		 	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	 of	 prominent	 references	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 adopted	institutional	change	elsewhere	 0	–	2	
presence	of	functionally	more	adequate	and	known	alternatives	to	the	change	adopted	 0	/1	
adoption	of	EU-promoted	institutional	change	without	its	application	in	
practice	
0	/1	
adoption	 of	 institutions	 without	 a	 thorough	 assessment	 of	 their	effectiveness	 0	/	1	
absence	of	a	functional	motivation	for	the	institutional	change	 0	/	1	
presence	of	ambiguous	goals	and	performance	indicators	 0	/	1	
Impact	of	emulation	scores	as	none	(0-3)	–	moderate	(4-5)	–substantial	(6-7)	 0	–	7	categorisation	of	adoption,	absence	and	presence	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	predominance	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
  Table 4.10: Indicators for the diffusion mechanism ‘emulation’ 
                                                             
108 Elkins and Simmons do not use the term ‘emulation`, but speak of ‘adaptation’, a group of 
mechanisms characterised by being less rational than (scientific) learning.  
109 The value ‘three’ is chosen as it requires that at least two indicators are found. With most 
indicators being nominal and having a maximum value of ‘one’, it is most probable that a score of 
‘four’ requires more than three indicators. This would represent a significant pattern of evidence.  
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Conclusion	
This chapter has spelled out indicators to measure the variables and the hypothesised 
causal mechanisms connecting them. After discussing the relevant criteria to develop 
the indicators, the dependent variable ‘institutional change modelled according to EU 
aims’ was operationalised in sub-chapter 4.2. It was defined as a variable measured 
against an ordinal index. The index consists of four elements that reflect the degree of 
institutional change: core function of the institution, actors, decision-making and 
competences. The use of an index allows us to distinguish between different elements 
of institutional change making it easier to compare the result of the EU’s promotion of 
regional cooperation also across cases and regions.  
The ensuing sub-chapter 4.3 operationalised the independent variable ‘EU 
instruments to promote regional cooperation’. Following a broad understanding of 
foreign policy and in line with the EU’s nature as an external actor, the indicators were 
defined along the three policy fields ‘trade and economic relations’, ‘development 
cooperation and technical assistance’ and ‘political relations’. The independent 
variable is assessed using ordinal indices with the categories none, low, middle and 
strong. In order to increase the comparability across cases and regions, the individual 
instruments applied by the EU are also grouped in four clusters that reflect different 
logics of external action: threat-, condition-, incentive- and role model-based. These 
clusters add a layer of abstraction allowing us to set the different types of instruments 
in relation with the results in the cross-case analysis.  
The fourth section of this chapter identified indicators for the diffusion 
mechanisms conditionality, assistance, lesson-drawing, persuasion and emulation. 
While the focus of the operationalisation of the independent variable lay on identifying 
which instruments where used by the EU, the indicators for the causal mechanisms 
elucidate which mechanisms did actually have an impact on the actions of EU partners. 
Taking care to reach an unambiguous operationalisation for each of the five 
mechanisms, several indicators were developed for each mechanism and aggregated 
to indices that allow to assess the impact of each mechanism. The indicators for each 
mechanism complement each other – together they form patterns of evidence that 
denote the presence of the individual causal mechanisms. While the principal aim is to 
assess the presence or absence of specific causal paths in the with-in case analysis, the 
operationalisation of the mechanisms as ordinal variables will allow us to rank their 
relevance with a view to the cross-case analysis. 
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Now that this chapter has connected the theoretically developed mechanisms 
and variables with indicators that can be assessed in practice, the following chapter 
lays down the methodological basis for the empirical analysis.   
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5 Methods	
The present chapter develops the methodological framework that connects the 
theoretical expectations with the empirical test that will be pursued in part III of this 
thesis. The chapter proceeds in four sub-chapters summed up in a conclusion. The first 
sub-chapter (5.1) argues that a case-study approach is the most appropriate in light of 
the research questions posed. It then develops a specific case-study design that allows 
reaching conclusions regarding the cases analysed as well as across them. Sub-chapter 
5.2 selects the two regions that will be studied by applying the ‘diverse case’ selection 
method. The remaining two sub-chapters focus on the methods for our empirical 
analysis. Sub-chapter 5.3 is devoted to the analytical tools used to reach valid 
conclusions from the cases studied at the case and cross-case levels. On this basis, sub-
chapter 5.4 explains how the data for the analysis will be generated and gathered. It 
discusses the two types of data sources used, documents and semi-structured elite 
interviews, as well as their value for the analysis. A conclusion sums up the results and 
connects them to the ensuing empirical analysis. 
5.1 Case-study	design		
This piece of research is based on the intensive study and comparison of case studies. 
Case-study research is though by no means the only method available in social science 
research in general or in political science more specifically. Large-n studies relying on 
statistical analysis are also often used to reach valid conclusions when the aim is to 
address questions about the impact of specific stimuli, as in the case of this thesis. 
Therefore, the choice of a case-study approach needs to be well-founded. In addition 
to this more general distinction between large-n and small-n research designs, the 
options available to design small-n case-study research are plentiful. In light of the 
myriad of potential research designs available, the two following sections explain first 
why a case-study approach is the best-suited to answer the research questions posed 
in this thesis. On this basis, a specific case-study design is developed that allows us to 
reach conclusions both at the level of the individual case studies as well as across the 
case studies.  
5.1.1 The	case	for	a	case-study	approach	
Case studies can be undertaken with a view to understanding the specific case studied 
itself or with the aim of drawing inferences valid for a larger number of cases. 
Following the latter understanding, a case study is often defined as "an intensive study 
of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units." 
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(Gerring 2004: 342). As the main research question of this thesis (“How, to what extent 
and under what conditions does the EU succeed in promoting regional cooperation 
beyond its borders?”) implies, our interest goes beyond the single case. Especially in 
such a situation, the choice for an approach based on a limited number of case studies 
may not seem straightforward. But four major points speak in favour of a case-study 
approach.  
First and most prominently our research interest lies in uncovering the 
motivation and causal links behind decisions to establish and change certain 
institutions. It does not just aim at finding institutional change as such or at 
determining its mere coincidence with a certain stimulus from the EU. Speaking in 
abstract terms, we are interested in causality rather than in mere incidence or 
coincidence. 110 Questions of causality require delving into actual decision-making and 
interaction and to uncover the operational links between different procedural steps 
(Yin 2009: 9). This can be better achieved by case studies as they allow looking at 
processes linking independent and dependent variables. This is important since 
“causal arguments depend not only on measuring causal effects. They also presuppose 
the identification of a causal mechanism [...]; otherwise, it is unclear whether a pattern 
of covariation is truly causal in nature." (Gerring 2004: 348) (see also Leuffen 2007: 
148–9).111 As large-n studies always involve a higher level of aggregation that can 
obscure the identification of causal mechanisms, a small-n approach is better suited 
to uncover them.  
These advantages also apply to a second element that is closely related to the 
issue of causality: equifinality. As argued in the setup of the theoretical model in the 
previous chapter, several different factors may have an influence on the development 
of regional cooperation. From a methodological point of view this means that we have 
to confront equifinality, i.e. situations in which several causal paths may have led to 
the observed outcome (George and Bennett 2005: 20). This issue is especially 
important for this piece of research since we are interested in discerning which of the 
hypothesised mechanisms was decisive in each of the cases studied. The closer our 
research design allows us to zoom into the actual decision-making and the involved 
processes, the more we can “peer into the box of causality to the intermediate causes 
                                                             
110 The lack of focus on causality is actually one of the desiderata of the existent literature on the 
promotion of regional cooperation (see introduction and chapter 2.3). 
111 Heichel and Sommerer (2007: 112) make the same argument more specifically for diffusion 
studies. 
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lying between some cause and its purported effect” (Gerring 2004: 348; cf. George and 
Bennett 2005: 20–2).  
Thirdly, the effect of scope conditions is also easier to take into account in 
case studies. This is especially so if the presence and effect of the scope conditions is 
likely to vary across the cases studied.112 Put simply, case studies allow us to look much 
closer into the context of the individual cases and to define the variance of the scope 
conditions independently for each of the cases (Gerring 2004: 348). In contrast, large-
n approaches always run the risk of masking the role of scope conditions (George and 
Bennett 2005: 20–2; Yin 2009: 12) and are less suited for the detection of boundaries 
between contextual factors and our hypothesised mechanisms (Yin 2009: 19). As we 
argued before that diffusion processes concerning regional cooperation are likely to 
be influenced by scope conditions, this advantage is one that should be seized. 
Lastly, issues of data collection also speak in favour of pursuing a case-study 
approach. Social interaction can always be subject to certain idiosyncrasies (such as 
different understandings of hierarchy) which can be better taken into account from a 
closer perspective. In consequence, case studies allow for a contextualised comparison 
that is impossible in large-n studies (George and Bennett 2005: 19). Only such an 
approach can take into account potential problems of equivalence while still ensuring 
conceptual validity. Closely related is the fact that case studies are more accessible to 
the use of several types and sources of data for the empirical study. Again, this allows 
to better deal with the idiosyncrasies of individual cases and provides us with more 
information about our object of study. In turn, having more knowledge about the case 
and its specific context allows us to triangulate data from different sources and check 
whether it converges (George and Bennett 2005: 18), thereby increasing the internal 
validity of our conclusions. 
In view of these four advantages, this study opts for a case-study approach 
that closely analyses the influence of the EU on regional cooperation and integration. 
Choosing a case-study approach does however not imply abdicating from the 
aspiration of reaching a number of cross-case conclusions as well. In order to achieve 
these goals, a common research design that allows reaching in-case as well as cross-
case results will be applied. This aspiration is built on two central foundations: the type 
of case-study design used and the selection of the regions and cases. The following 
section deals with the first foundation and develops a specific case-study design. 
                                                             
112 See the discussion on the scope conditions and their variation in section 3.2.2 above. 
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5.1.2 Case-study	design	
The case-study design applied in this thesis pursues two objectives. It exploits the 
advantages inherent in a case-study analysis mentioned above while adding a 
comparative perspective that allows us to draw conclusions also across cases. As put 
by Beach and Pedersen (2013: 74–5), while the within-case analysis assesses the 
existence or absence of the hypothesised causal mechanisms, the cross-case 
perspective allows us to learn more about the magnitude of the causal effects. 
Translated into our study, a combination of within- and cross-case analysis is necessary 
to compare the impact of the EU’s efforts under varying conditions – a matter on which 
the main research question and sub-research question three more precisely focus on. 
But it is also advisable for two methodological reasons. 
Combining	the	within-	and	cross-case	levels	
First, a combination of case and cross-case analysis is fitting for the purpose of testing 
the effect of hypothesised causal mechanisms. This is the case for a number of reasons. 
Thorough case studies provide us with the necessary proximity to actually detect the 
causal mechanisms at work. While a single case study can be useful to disprove a causal 
mechanism when performed on a crucial case113, it will always be limited in terms of 
its confirmatory power (Gerring 2004: 350). Since our research relies on the 
confirmation or rejection of hypothesised causal mechanisms, testing them on 
different cases provides stronger evidence. In addition, the combination of case-study 
and cross-case analysis is especially indicated to investigate situations in which we may 
have similar outcomes (i.e. dependent variables) and similar influences (i.e. 
independent variables) but different interactions between them, as it allows us to 
focus on the role of different causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005: 82). This 
is indeed the case of our research topic. While the outcome is likely to be different in 
detail in terms of success, policy areas, duration, etc., we can only study the potential 
influence of the EU on such cases in which there has been some sort of institutional 
change.114 The same applies to the independent variable, albeit to a lesser extent. In 
                                                             
113 A crucial case is one that is critical for a broader theory or concept. These can be cases that have 
defined or exemplified a concept (such as the 1789 French revolution) or cases with an unlikely result 
in terms of the theory used (Gerring 2001: 219–21). The latter ones are often referred to as ‘deviant’ 
cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 302). In other terms, a crucial case is one "in which a theory that 
passes empirical testing is strongly supported and one that fails is strongly impugned." (George and 
Bennett(2005: 9). 
114 This does not imply a selection bias on the side of the dependent variable (i.e. selecting only cases 
on which there has been an EU influence), since institutional change may also have occurred without 
an EU influence.  
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all cases studied we have an intention of the EU to encourage regional cooperation, 
although the mix of the instruments used differs.115 
Second, the combination of within- and cross-case analysis helps to pursue 
more structured, transparent and hence more replicable research. This follows from 
using the same structure, variables, hypotheses and types of data for all the cases 
studied. This is the reason why proponents of a case study-approach inclined to 
methodological rigor often recommend a combination of both individual case studies 
and a comparative perspective (King et al. 1994: 45; George and Bennett 2005: 67) or 
at the very least argue that these are perfectly compatible (Gerring 2004: 350; Hall 
2012: 27–8). 
To combine within- and cross-case analysis in a structured manner, this thesis 
proceeds in two steps. In the first step, the case studies for the two regions are carried 
out. In the second step, the results of the case studies are compared with each other. 
This case-study design follows a logic of replication that stands in contrast to a 
sampling design. This contrast is shown figure 5.1 in below. While sampling designs 
are similar to the practice used in surveys, where all respondents are dealt with as one 
unit of analysis and conclusions are drawn from the whole of the results, a replication 
design follows the logic of repeated experiments as it is common to many natural 
sciences (Yin 2009: 53–9). The same research design is subsequently applied to several 
units of analysis and conclusions can be drawn both from the individual cases as well 
as from the comparison of these results.  
                                                             
115 The mapping presented in chapter 2.2 shows this intention in general terms, the case studies in 
chapters 6 and 7 will show it for the specific case studies. 
Methods 
 
  102 
 
Figure 5.1: Contrast of sampling and replication case-study designs 
 
First	step:	Single-case	analysis	
The case studies undertaken in the first step are analysed in three layers as shown in 
figure 5.2 below. They are first embedded into the contextual explanations necessary 
to understand possible idiosyncrasies of the individual regions and to situate the cases 
into their regional context. This first contextual layer reflects on the role of the scope 
conditions and pays tribute to the important role of contextual information for 
process-tracing analysis (on the latter see Beach and Pedersen 2013, manuscript: 153–
9 and section 5.3 below). Furthermore, this first layer prevents the risk of losing the 
big picture, a risk always inherent to mechanistic theories as Checkel (2006: 368–9) 
notes. In a second layer, the study concentrates on two fields (referred to as ‘I’ and ‘II’ 
in the figure below): market integration and institution-building. These two fields have 
been chosen because they are relevant for the development of regional cooperation 
as a whole116 and because they have been traditionally highlighted by the efforts of 
the EU.117 The (potential) importance of the fields for regional cooperation will also be 
                                                             
116 This is confirmed by most integration theories and by studies that reflect the emergence of 
regional cooperation and integration. 
117 The objectives of EU promotion of regional cooperation were surveyed in more detail in chapter 
2.2 above. 
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accounted for in the contextual layer. Market integration refers to the creation of 
regional markets, usually through trade liberalisation or efforts to harmonise trade 
rules or market conditions. Institution-building refers to the creation of and support 
for permanent regional institutions. In order to be able to closely analyse the EU’s 
influence on institutional change in these two fields, the empirical analysis 
concentrates on several specific cases of institutional change in each of the two fields. 
This third layer allows to trace actual decision-making processes and to exclude to the 
maximum extent possible that external influences are overseen in the analysis.118  
 
Figure 5.2: Visualisation of the case-study design (based on Yin 2009: 46) 
The case analysis will allow distinguishing whether and in how far the hypothesised 
causal mechanisms explain institutional change for each of the cases, fields and 
regions. As a result we will be able to determine which of the causal mechanisms 
played the most, second most, and etc. important role in each of the fields and regions 
analysed. 
Second	step:	cross-case	analysis	
After undertaking the case analyses for the two regions, the results will be compared 
to each other in an ordinal comparison that allows us to ascertain how the relevance 
of the mechanisms varies in influencing institutional change in each of the two 
regions.119 For example, we may then conclude that conditionality is consistently the 
mechanism with the highest explanatory power in the first region and lesson-drawing 
                                                             
118 Controlling for potential influences exogenous to our hypotheses is especially important when 
using an x-centered research design that seeks to explain different causal paths as is our case 
(Gschwend and Schimmelfennig 2007: 23). 
119 How the ordinal comparison will be performed is explained in section 5.3 below. 
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the one explaining most of EU-influenced institutional change in the second region. 
This comparison will allow us to assess if and how the stronger presence of certain 
mechanisms leads to a stronger EU effect on regional cooperation beyond its borders 
and how these mechanisms relate to the scope conditions present in each case, 
including the power asymmetries between the EU and the respective region. Having 
set the case-study design that will be applied in this work, the next sub-chapter fills in 
the structure pictured in figure 5.2 above with specific regions and sets out the criteria 
for the selection of the fields and cases. It first explains the criteria guiding the 
selection of the regions and then performs the actual selection. 
5.2 Selection	of	regions,	fields,	and	cases	
A careful and well-founded selection is central to our aspiration to reach both with-in 
case and cross-case conclusions. In our study, the main task in this regard lies in 
choosing the regions to be studied among all those towards which the EU has acted as 
region-builder. The fields, and the cases on which the with-in case analysis will be 
performed, are embedded in them. Therefore, the bulk of this sub-chapter lays out an 
adequate case-selection method that is then used to select the two relationships 
between the EU and other regions. Once these have been selected, further criteria are 
developed for the selection of the fields and cases in the two regions. 
In social science research, a case can be defined as an “an instance of a class 
of events” (George and Bennett 2005: 17). A case consists of a “unit of analysis” which 
is observed at a particular point in time (Gerring 2004: 342). Following this 
understanding, two main choices have to be made to select the cases for our study: 
the choice of units of analysis and that of the specific time frames during which the 
units will be analysed. Two criteria guide these choices. Firstly – and most obviously – 
the cases need to be relevant to the research questions driving this study (George and 
Bennett 2005: 83). Secondly, the selected cases need to be placed in relation to the 
rest of cases that could potentially be analysed, i.e. to the population of cases. While 
this latter criterion is not required for the analysis with-in the cases, it is necessary to 
assess the domain of applicability of our cross-case conclusions (Seawright and Gerring 
2008: 306). The population consists both of our studied cases, which form the sample 
for our analysis, as well as of all unstudied cases. Only if the relationship between these 
two groups is clear, can we establish how and under what conditions our cross-case 
conclusions may be applicable to the whole population of cases, i.e. be representative. 
The following paragraphs lay down the case-selection technique applied in this thesis.  
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5.2.1 The	case	for	a	diverse-case	selection	
Small-n research as the present one is always more prone to selection bias, "commonly 
understood as occurring when some form of selection process in either the design of 
the study or the real-world phenomena under investigation results in inferences that 
suffer from systematic error" (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 59). The reason is that small-
n research cannot rely on the randomised selection of cases commonly used in large-
n research designs.120 Therefore a number of purposive (i.e. non-random) case 
selection techniques have been proposed to minimise selection bias as far as possible 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008). Out of these techniques, two seem most appropriate to 
our research questions and to our combination of with-in case and cross-case analysis: 
the typical-case method and the diverse-case method. They are the most adequate 
because they aim at selecting a representative sample of cases while still allowing for 
an intensive analysis within the selected cases (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299–301). 
Out of these two potential selection techniques, this study opts for the diverse-case 
selection. It will guide the selection of the two regions for our study. This choice is 
motivated by two main reasons: on one hand, the complications inherent to the 
selection of typical cases and on the other, a number of advantages that make the 
diverse-case selection more fitting to our diffusion approach and our research 
questions. 
The main obstacle for the typical-case method lies in the prerequisites that it 
establishes to select the cases. It aims to draw a representative sample by choosing 
such cases that “exemplif[y] a stable, cross-case relationship, (...) well explained by an 
existing model” (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 299). While this is arguably a feasible 
method to achieve representativeness, it implies that the selection needs to be based 
on a previous analysis and knowledge about the ‘stable cross-case relationship’. 
Consequently, Seawright & Gerring propose to select typical cases among those cases 
that have proven to be in line with the hypothesised expectations of a large-n analysis 
(2008: 299–300). But this requirement collides with the fact that (as mentioned in the 
introduction) many of the regions towards which the EU has engaged as a promoter 
of cooperation have not been studied from this point of view, neither in small- nor 
large-n studies. Furthermore, as Rohlfing (2008: 1499) points out, such a selection 
would hinge on the reliability of the previous large-n analysis. In addition, a selection 
based on the results of a previous analysis implies selecting on the dependent variable. 
                                                             
120 A random selection is not suitable for small samples as individual cases in a smaller sample are 
more likely to deviate strongly from the mean of both the sample and the population. In practice, 
this means that a randomly selected sample is likely to include cases with extreme characteristics 
and therefore to be biased from the outset. 
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As convincingly and widely argued, a selection on the dependent variable may be 
useful to disprove established theories or to improve an existing model, but is not 
useful to achieve generalizable results (King et al. 1994: 129–32; Collier and Mahoney 
1996: 59–63; Geddes 1990: 132–3).121 
Opposed to this, a diverse-case selection can be based exclusively on the 
independent variable, thereby minimising the problems inherent in a selection on the 
dependent variable (King et al. 1994: 137). In addition, a selection of diverse cases is 
well-suited to deal with equifinality (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 300), i.e. with the 
role that different causal paths may play in leading to the same result. Thereby, this 
selection method addresses a concern that was identified at several points in the 
previous argumentation and that is one of the central motives behind the choice for a 
diffusion approach. The main disadvantage of the diverse-case selection technique is 
that the representation of a high variation of cases may distort the internal distribution 
of the cases along that variation, i.e., in practice, there may be many more ‘low’ than 
‘high’ cases or vice versa than reflected in our selection (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 
301). Nonetheless, this disadvantage is justifiable if the main objective of the research 
is to assess the role of different causal mechanisms and to compare their prevalence 
in a secondary comparison (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 74), as it is the case for our 
study. The central aim of the diverse-case selection method is to cover the widest 
range of values possible along a relevant dimension (Seawright and Gerring 2008: 300–
1), in our case the independent variable ‘Use of EU instruments to promote regional 
cooperation’. The ensuing section performs this selection. 
5.2.2 Population	and	selection	of	the	regions	
The survey conducted in chapter 2.2 led to 31 EU relationships with other regions 
towards which the EU has formulated a region-building policy and in which the EU uses 
some kind of instrument to promote regional cooperation. Still, a pre-selection is 
necessary if we want to reach a comprehensive assessment regarding the different EU 
instruments. This is the case because, as table A.1 in the annex reveals, not all cases 
are covered by one central element of our independent variable ‘EU instruments to 
promote regional cooperation’: trade and economic relations – especially not trade.  
                                                             
121 Geddes shows in her article how the results of three prominent studies change dramatically if a 
case selection along the dependent variable is avoided (Geddes 1990: 148–9). While Geddes’ article 
has been censured for misinterpreting the aims of the studies she criticises, her conclusions on the 
role of selection along the dependent variable remain valid (Collier and Mahoney 1996: 80–7). 
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The cases for which trade and economic relations do not play a role can be 
clustered into two groups. On one hand, a number of cases have a more multilateral 
character, bringing together on the EU side both the actors of the EU institutions and 
representatives from the member states. These arrangements (specifically: the EU-
CELAC process, the EU-Africa Partnership, the ASEM and the EU-ARF), overlap with 
region-to-region encounters and do not directly deal with trade aspects. This does not 
mean that trade issues are not discussed in these formats, but practical policy and 
negotiations are conducted in the sub-regional or bilateral formats these wider 
frameworks overlap with (for instance between the EU and ECOWAS for the EU-Africa 
Partnership). On the other hand, a second group in which trade relations are not part 
of the regional perspective is that of the relations with groups of states (e.g. with the 
states in the Sahel region). This pre-selection, discarding the cases in which trade 
relations do not play a direct role, leaves us with 15 cases. These are listed in box 5.1 
below. EU-West	Africa	(ECOWAS/UEMOA),	EU-Southern	Africa	(SADC),	EU-Central,	Eastern	and	Southern	Africa	(COMESA),	EU-Eastern	Africa	(EAC),	EU-Indian	Ocean	Region	(IOC),	EU-Central	Africa	(CEMAC,	CEEAC,	CEPGL),	EU-Caribbean	(CARICOM,	OECS,	Cariforum),	EU-Andean	 Region	 (Andean	 Community),	 EU-Central	 America	 (SICA+),	 EU-Southern	 Cone	(Mercosur),	EU-Persian	Gulf	 (GCC),	EU-South	East	Asia	 (ASEAN),	EU-UfM/EuroMed,	EU-Arab	Mediterranean	Countries	(AMFTA),	EU-Western	Balkans.	
Box 5.1: Pre-selection of EU relationships with regions 
Two	regions:	high	and	low	
Out of the remaining 15 regional relationships, two are to be selected according to the 
diverse-case selection technique. In practice, this means that an EU relationship with 
another region will be selected that shows a high value of the independent variable 
‘Use of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation’ and another case showing a 
low value. In order to perform this selection, figure A.1 in annex A groups the 15 
regions along the intensity of the independent variable. This grouping is performed 
along the three dimensions of the independent variable that were outlined in the 
operationalisation in subchapter 4.2 above: trade and economic relations, 
development cooperation and technical assistance and political relations.  
The selection of the ‘high’ case, i.e. the case in which most EU instruments are 
applied to foster regional cooperation, is straightforward. The EU-Western Balkans 
case brings together virtually every single instrument available in the EU foreign policy 
toolbox. In each of the three broad elements of the independent variable, the EU-
Western Balkans case ranks highest. After the traumatic experience of the EU’s 
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inability to prevent or even to react more effectively to the wars that accompanied the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, the EU has been deploying all its tools and instruments to 
stabilise and integrate the region, ranging from diplomatic relations, over cooperation 
even in military terms up to the offer on an accession to the EU to all countries in the 
region, with all the financial and political implications this entails. The EU-Western 
Balkans will thus be our ‘high’ case.  
The selection of a ‘low’ case is more complicated not only because there are 
more of them, but also because it is not always easy to delineate the boundaries 
between the different instruments used by the EU. This is often the result of growing 
interaction between former Community or external relations instruments and those 
of the CFSP. This confirms to a certain extent that one of the main objectives of the 
Lisbon reforms of the EU foreign-policy architecture is translating into practice.122 
Although the group is more heterogeneous, it becomes clear that we can form a group 
of ‘low’ cases out of which to select the second case for our empirical analysis. As figure 
A.1 in the annex shows, they all have in common that they rank relatively low in terms 
of the instruments applied by the EU to promote regional cooperation. Out of this 
group we can now select our ‘low’ case.  
Now that we have established the ‘low ’group according to our selection 
criterion, also other differences inside this group leap to the eye and can be considered 
for the selection. For example, it can be argued that the effectiveness of the EU in 
promoting its policy goals is likely to vary according to the leverage it has towards its 
counterparts. In light of the fact that the ‘high’ case is by all means very dependent on 
the EU123, it seems sensible to choose one of the potentially less dependent cases in 
our ‘low’ group for the analysis. Arguably, the relationship between the EU and 
Mercosur is such a case. As opposed to for example most regional groupings in Africa, 
the Mercosur region is not highly dependent on EU development cooperation. 
                                                             
122 The case of the EU’s relationship with the League of Arab States serves to illustrate this point. On 
one hand, it is manifest that the relationship was and still is governed by the instruments available 
through the CFSP. Politically, it is driven by ministerial meetings between EU and LAS foreign 
ministers and by meetings between the HR/VP and the Secretary General of the LAS. Funding for 
common projects is generally drawn from the Instrument for Stability, thereby implying only limited 
financial and technical resources from the EU. On the other hand, some specific (and limited) projects 
are increasingly being financed through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) (European Union 2012), thereby bringing together the Community and intergovernmental 
pillars. 
123 This strong dependence becomes obvious from the analysis of the scope conditions in chapter 
7.1. 
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Dependence on the EU as a trade partner is high, but this is a factor that applies to 
every case in our survey.124 The EU-Mercosur relationship will thus be our ‘low’ case. 
Having selected our ‘low’ and our ‘high’ case for the analysis, the remaining 
task is to identify the time frames during which the cases will be analysed. The EU-
Mercosur case will be analysed in the time frame between 1992 and 2012 and the EU-
Western Balkans case in the time frame between 1999 and 2012. These time frames 
cover periods in which major institutional changes took place in the two regions. As 
the analysis will concentrate on specific instances of institutional change, the bulk of 
the analysis will be focused on narrower points in time. The following section briefly 
selects the two fields that will be studied inside the EU-Western Balkans and EU-
Mercosur relationships and presents the criteria for the selection of the individual 
cases within the fields. 
5.2.3 Fields	and	cases	
Two fields that are characteristic targets of the EU’s region-building efforts will be 
analysed inside each of the two regions. Inside these fields, specific cases of 
institutional change are studied, tracing whether and to what extent EU instruments 
had an influence. The purpose of this structure is to narrow down the analysis as much 
as possible to oversee other exogenous influences on regional cooperation.  
The two fields have been selected taking into account the EU’s own focus in 
its region-building policies and their relevance for the overall evolution of regional 
cooperation. One of the consistent traits across the different region-building policies 
pursued by the EU is the focus on market-building policies and on institutionalisation 
of new or existing cooperation initiatives. In addition to being in the focus of the EU, 
these two fields can be considered as being decisive for the overall development of 
regional cooperation. Both theoretical accounts of the development of regional 
integration and cooperation as well as large-N empirical analyses testify to this. This 
selection is reflected in the updated depiction of our case-study design that is 
presented below. 
                                                             
124 The EU is the first or second most important trade partner to virtually every other trade actor in 
the world. 
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The cases analysed inside the fields will be selected and presented in the respective 
case-study chapters. They are reflected in the figure above as ‘Cases 1-7’. As the cases 
are more dependent on the idiosyncrasies of the respective regions and its 
relationship to the EU, this allows us to ground their selection in light of the respective 
context. In line with our aspiration to replicate the same design for the EU-Western 
Balkans and the EU-Mercosur relationship, this selection will nonetheless be 
governed by four common criteria. First, we need to concentrate on cases in which 
institutional change has actually taken place. As convincingly discussed by Radaelli 
(2012: 5) with regard to Europeanisation studies, starting the study from the effect 
rather than from the alleged cause (EU influence, in our case) makes it easier to 
distinguish possible alternative explanations. Second, the cases have to be selected 
out of those individual instances of institutional change towards which the EU has 
applied its instruments to promote regional cooperation. Third, the cases shall be 
narrow enough so that external influences on institutional change, for example as a 
result of trade negotiations with other partners than the EU, can be identified and 
isolated. This is central to our research design as it allows us to identify the EU’s 
specific influence on a given institutional change. Finally, while the cases need to be 
narrow enough, they also need to be still important enough to have the potential to 
influence the overall development of cooperation and integration in the studied 
region. 
5.3 Methods	of	analysis	
In line with our two-level case-study design, two methods of analysis will be used to 
test the hypotheses and answer the research questions. The bulk of the analysis will 
CONTEXT CONTEXT 
Region I: Mercosur Region II: Western Balkans 
Field I 
Market integration 
Cases 1, 2 
Field II:  
Institutionalisation of RC 
Cases 3, 4 
  
Field I:  
Market integration 
Case 5 
Field II: Institutionalisation 
of RC 
Cases 6, 7 
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be conducted on a with-in case level using a process-tracing method. The results of 
this analysis will then be compared on a cross-case level using ordinal comparison with 
a view to assessing the order of magnitude and relevance of the hypothesised causal 
mechanisms. This sub-chapter justifies and explains the choice of these two methods 
of analysis. 
Before introducing the two methods of analysis it is useful to clarify two 
implications that arise from an analysis that argues on two levels of aggregation and 
that are worth to be kept in mind when reading the remainder of this chapter. Firstly, 
it is important to note that process-tracing and ordinal comparison are two methods 
of analysis based on different understandings of causality. As process-tracing seeks to 
establish the links in a causal chain, it is based on a deterministic understanding of 
causality. This means that it identifies elements that are necessary and sufficient for 
our causal mechanism to be present (Gerring 2004: 349). In contrast, our cross-case 
analysis seeks to identify the comparative relevance of the different causal 
mechanisms once they have been identified. In order to make such an assessment, a 
method is needed that follows a probabilistic understanding of causality. This means 
that the analysis seeks to establish whether the presence of a mechanism increases 
the likeliness of the EU having an impact on regional cooperation beyond its 
borders.125 As highlighted by Beach and Pedersen (2013: 74–5), within-case analysis is 
about the absence or presence of an effect and cross-case analysis is about the 
magnitude of that effect. Secondly, it is worth highlighting that the combination of 
these two understandings provides important advantages especially when dealing 
with equifinality (George and Bennett 2005: 234) and because it reduces the effect of 
measurement errors on the conclusions of the analysis (Mahoney 2000: 402). This 
combination requires a clear separation of the two levels of analysis (Mahoney 2000: 
408–9). In our study, this is done by first analysing the EU-Mercosur and EU-Western 
Balkans relationships on a single-case level and then using the results from these 
analyses as the basis for the cross-case analysis. 
5.3.1 In-case	analysis:	process-tracing		
On the level of with-in case analysis we are interested in testing for the explanatory 
value of our individual hypotheses. In practice, this means that we need a method that 
allows us to ascertain whether the hypothesised causal mechanism links our 
independent variables to our dependent variable. In line with our aim to add to the 
                                                             
125 The general argument holds also in the opposite, negative direction, i.e. in the case in which 
stronger efforts by the EU would not increase, but decrease the impact on regional cooperation. The 
core of the argument is that independent and dependent variable are covariant.  
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existent literature by empirically testing the EU’s influence on regional cooperation 
beyond its borders, we are interested in a method that allows us to move from the 
analysis of correlation (as established by studies arguing from a macro-perspective) to 
causation. This precisely is the aim of process-tracing. 
The	logic	and	advantages	of	process-tracing	
In essence, process-tracing methods aim to bridge the gap that exists regarding the 
mere correlation between an independent variable X and a dependent variable Y and 
an actual, verifiable influence of X on Y. They do so by testing for a causal mechanism 
derived from theoretical expectations that through a number of steps – or intervening 
variables – could explain how X influences Y (George and Bennett 2005: 205–32), i.e. 
they closely trace the process that could connect both variables. In consequence, 
process-tracing is commonly defined as a method that “attempts to identify the 
intervening causal process - the causal chain and causal mechanism - between an 
independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable." 
(Bennett and Checkel 2015: 7; George and Bennett 2005: 137). 
The concept of causal mechanisms stands at the centre of process-tracing and 
distinguishes it from other methods of analysis, such as a historical narrative. Speaking 
in abstract terms, a causal mechanism defines the intervening steps n1 to nn that link 
the two variables, forming a causal chain of the form: 𝑋 → 𝑛$ →	𝑛& → ⋯ →	𝑛( → 𝑌. 
In the context of our study, the hypothesized diffusion mechanisms are the templates 
for our causal mechanisms. Process-tracing then consists of uncovering evidence that 
confirms or disconfirms the steps that form this causal mechanism. This in principle 
parsimonious approach does obviously become more detailed as the complexity of the 
mechanism increases. As a consequence, an analysis based on process-tracing has to 
rely on a sufficient amount of data. On the positive side, this means that process-
tracing can contribute to assess whether and how a certain potential influence has a 
real effect on an outcome, thereby neatly fitting with our research question “how, to 
what extent and under what conditions does the EU succeed in promoting regional 
cooperation beyond its borders?” 
Beyond this more general argument, a further reason to choose process-
tracing is rooted in our theoretical approach and in the topic of this study. As advanced 
in the theoretical chapter, the mechanistic nature of diffusion fits very well with the 
logic of causal mechanisms inherent to process-tracing.126 This mechanistic nature 
                                                             
126 Checkel makes this argument also on a more general basis by arguing that process-tracing is the 
method of choice for mechanistic theories in general (Checkel 2006: 366). 
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allows us to minimise the risk of overlooking exogenous influences on the relationship 
between the EU and institutional change in counterpart regions. Such exogenous 
influences may include the USA, the role of other donors as the World Bank, the 
development of multilateral trade negotiations, and so forth. Due to the mechanistic 
nature of both diffusion and process-tracing, causality can be traced from one step of 
the (hypothesised) causal chain to the next. This makes it possible to trace potential 
paths of causality as closely as possible, thereby significantly reducing the risk of 
overlooking external influences.  
The reasoning behind process-tracing follows from Bayesian logic, with the 
core argument derived from it being that specific evidence supporting a hypothesised 
mechanism reduces the probability that alternative explanations hold true (Mahoney 
2010: 128).127 Or as put by Bennett, “[w]hat is important is […] the likelihood of finding 
certain evidence if a theory is true versus the likelihood of finding this evidence if the 
alternative explanations are true” (Bennett 2006: 341). Process-tracing can be applied 
to different types of research. In accordance with these types, Beach and Pedersen 
distinguish three kinds of process-tracing: theory-building process-tracing aims at 
developing a theoretical explanation from the evidence of a specific case and 
explaining-outcome process-tracing starts from a specific result and tries to establish 
the reasons that led to this result. Finally, theory-testing process-tracing derives 
expected causal mechanisms from a theory and tests these causal mechanisms against 
a specific case (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 13–21). This last variety is the one used in 
this study to test the hypotheses developed in chapter 3. 
Applying	process-tracing	in	practice	
The metaphors of a criminal investigation and detective work are recurrent in 
descriptions of process-tracing (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 22; Mahoney 2010: 130; 
Beach and Pedersen 2011: passim; Bennett 2006: 341). This comes as no surprise as 
both process-tracing and criminal investigations rely on finding specific pieces of 
evidence that either confirm or disconfirm the existence of a hypothesised 
explanation. Like in an investigation, the probability that a hypothesis is valid increases 
with the weight and number of evidence pointing in its direction.128 Following this 
logic, the first step in process-tracing is to delineate a causal mechanism based on the 
                                                             
127 For a detailed discussion of the Bayesian logic underpinning process-tracing methods see Beach 
and Pedersen(2013: 76–88). 
129 See pages 17f. on the ‘plenitude’ criterion. 
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hypothesis we want to test for. The causal mechanism links our independent and 
dependent variables and describes the evidence that would point at its presence. 
The second step consists in finding and assessing the evidence that would 
confirm (or disconfirm) the presence of our causal mechanism. While pieces of 
evidence differ in their confirmatory strength, three types of evidence can be 
distinguished according to their role in process-tracing. Firstly, the simplest type of 
evidence is that which confirms the existence of our dependent and independent 
variables (Mahoney 2010: 125–7). Such evidence can assume many forms. In the 
context of our research, it can for example consist in documents and interviews 
confirming the existence of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation or in 
documents reflecting institutional change. Secondly, so-called ‘sequence evidence’ 
allows us to gain information about the order, timing and functioning of an alleged 
process or causal mechanism (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 178). For instance, 
documents describing operating procedures, the accounts of interviewees, but also 
secondary literature, can provide such evidence. Lastly, mechanism or trace evidence 
is the most important type of evidence in process-tracing. This type of evidence is the 
one that confirms (or disconfirms) the existence of the hypothesized steps of a causal 
mechanism (Mahoney 2010: 128–9; Beach and Pedersen 2013: 178). Such evidence is 
easiest to gain from documents produced as part of our alleged causal mechanism and 
from interviews with directly involved policy-makers. Not all steps of a causal 
mechanism produce evidence that can be directly observed. It may therefore be 
necessary to resort to proxies (Checkel 2006: 367; Panke 2012: 130; Beach and 
Pedersen 2011: 142–7). For example, a study commissioned by policy-makers to weigh 
between two policy options and outline their advantages and disadvantages is a strong 
indicator (more specifically: trace evidence) that a process of rational assessment has 
taken place. Still, in the framework of process-tracing, observations only become 
evidence when combined with contextual knowledge (Falleti and Lynch 2009: 1151–
8; Beach and Pedersen 2013: 125–32). In terms of our previous example, the study is 
an indicator of a rational assessment unless we know that it was commissioned to 
create the impression that a previously taken decision followed rational arguments.  
 Using this process-tracing method we can reach two types of results. We will 
either be able to establish which of the hypothesised mechanisms were relevant for 
the individual instances of institutional change that we analyse. Or we will find that 
none of the hypothesised mechanisms had a traceable influence on institutional 
change. Taking into account that the mechanisms aim at covering the broadest range 
of paths of influence between the EU and its counterparts, this latter result would cast 
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serious doubt on claims that the EU is effective in promoting regional cooperation – at 
least so in the case studied.   
5.3.2 Cross-case	analysis:	ordinal	comparison	
To reach results also across the individual cases studied, the results of the within-case 
analysis will be compared to each other. This will be done by assessing the 
predominance of the hypotheses in each of the two regions and by putting this 
predominance in relation with the scope conditions and the context of the EU’s 
relationship with the respective counterpart. This will allow us to address the “under 
what conditions” element of our research question. Assessing the predominance of a 
mechanism requires a different understanding of causality than the deterministic 
understanding on which process-tracing is based. As convincingly argued in the 
literature (Mahoney 2010: 131; George and Bennett 2005: 13; Beach and Pedersen 
2013: 69–70), process-tracing is not suitable for such an analysis because it focuses on 
within-case inferences and because its deterministic understanding of causality relies 
on establishing the presence or absence of an explanatory element, not its magnitude. 
While there are also deterministic methods of comparison, these are not suited for 
our study as they do not allow to assess explanations that are not mutually exclusive 
(Mahoney 2000: 390). As discussed in the theoretical chapter, there are good reasons 
to expect that EU impact on regional cooperation is not a monocausal phenomenon.129  
For these reasons, our cross-case assessment needs to be based on a 
probabilistic understanding of causality. According to this understanding, the 
likelihood that our dependent variable changes increases with a higher value of our 
independent variable (Gerring 2004: 349). This understanding is comparable to that of 
statistical analyses and allows assessing the relative importance of different 
explanations. Ordinal comparison follows such an understanding. It ranks the cases 
into categories based on the degree to which a phenomenon is present (Mahoney 
2000: 389). In our case, the phenomena along which we rank our cases are the 
different diffusion mechanisms. As a result of this analysis we will be able to assess 
whether the stronger presence of certain mechanisms relates to a stronger EU effect 
on regional cooperation beyond its borders and how these mechanisms relate with 
the present scope conditions, including the power asymmetries between the EU and 
its counterpart region. 
                                                             
129 See pages 17f. on the ‘plenitude’ criterion. 
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5.4 Data	sources	
Having outlined the process-tracing and the comparison methods that will be used for 
the empirical analysis, we can now move to the sources from which we will retrieve 
the data for our study. Documents and information generated through interviews with 
policy-makers will be the two main data sources for the analysis.  
This choice follows from our research questions and from the theoretical 
expectations developed in chapter 3. Furthermore, these two types of data sources 
are well-suited for the process-tracing method used. To answer our research questions 
we need data that reflects the values of the dependent and independent variables and 
data that sheds light on the existence of the hypothesised causal mechanisms, i.e. on 
the process connecting the two variables. While data for the values of the dependent 
and independent variables can be collected to a large extent from written sources, our 
causal mechanisms do not just refer to the mere existence of specific processes, but 
also to the motivations and incentives driving them. In this case it is advisable to rely 
not only on written material, but also on interviews with decision-makers. The 
interviews allow us to delve deeper into the decision-making processes and to uncover 
the spur behind specific decisions. Furthermore, they make it possible to target the 
blind spots left by the document analysis. While policy-making documents tend to 
reflect the outcome of specific decision-making steps, the interviews will fill the gaps 
in between, shedding light on preparatory steps. As the interviews allow to directly 
query the interviewee for the alternatives he or she confronted, they permit to 
investigate the alternatives and considerations that led to a certain result. Both types 
of data and the criteria to select the material are presented in turn. 5.4.1 Document	analysis	
Documents are the first source of information used for this study and are supposed to 
fulfil four main purposes. Firstly, documents are used to reflect the variation of our 
independent and dependent variables, for instance to identify the instruments used 
by the EU to support regional cooperation. Secondly, documents from governments 
and institutions reflect the course of decision-making and implementation processes. 
They serve as so-called “sequence evidence” (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 141), 
providing the skeleton for our process-tracing. Thirdly, documents are used to uncover 
the preferences and incentives of decision-makers in pursuing a specific decision 
instead of other alternatives. However, the utility of documents in reflecting this kind 
of information is limited and, for this purpose, they will be complemented by interview 
material. Finally, documents, and here-in mostly academic and expert literature, are 
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used to assess the context and the scope conditions surrounding our two cases and 
the instances analysed.  
Types	of	documents	
These requirements result in three types of documents that are relevant to our study. 
Policy-making documents from the EU, its counterpart organisations and their 
member-state governments are the first and predominant source of documentary 
information. This includes speeches, policy strategies from the EEAS, or reports from 
organisations supported by the EU in the two regions studied, etc. Reports and 
evaluations from specialised contractors, as agencies evaluating the effectiveness of 
EU technical assistance, also belong to this first category. They are especially useful 
when analysing the role of development and technical assistance projects, which are 
most often carried out by external actors. A second group of documents reflects the 
basic norms and rules of regional cooperation and integration. Treaties, rules of 
procedure or protocols belong to this category. They are often the outcome of policy-
making processes on which the alleged impact of diffusion will be assessed. These first 
two types of documents are the account of eyewitnesses, or primary sources, i.e. 
documents that were produced by the actors studied at the time of the diffusion 
processes under study (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 131). The third and last category is 
formed by the already mentioned academic and expert writings. They complement the 
primary sources and serve to set the stage for the analysis. These secondary sources 
include purely academic studies, policy-oriented works and also press articles. 
These documents are collected from several sources. The vast majority of the 
documents are acquired from the institutions studied and the actors involved in them 
(e.g. member states). Most of the documents have been gathered from public sources. 
These include the websites and databases of the studied organisations, governments, 
interest groups or external contractors as well as printed publications. In addition, 
non-public documents such as internal decision-making documents or policy 
evaluations were also used. These where obtained either from the interviewees or 
other experts or, in the case of the EU institutions, requested on the basis of regulation 
1049/2001 on public access to documents (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2001). In addition, some documents were obtained from sets leaked 
from the involved institutions, e.g. the Brazilian foreign ministry.130 In line with the 
                                                             
130 Occasionally, this meant that documents where partly blackened out (in the case of non-public 
documents requested to the EU institutions). And in the case of leaked documents or those obtained 
from interviewees and experts, it cannot be excluded with certainty that these may have been 
modified. In light of the additional information and validity gained from these documents, it seemed 
though reasonable to accept this risk. 
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process-tracing method used for the research, the selection of the documents 
followed a purposive sampling technique (Beach and Pedersen 2013, manuscript: 
160): those documents were consulted that could shed light on the individual decision-
making and hypothesised diffusion steps. The table below presents a brief overview of 
the types of documents that were consulted for the two case regions. They are 
referenced in detail in the respective chapters. 
EU-Mercosur	documents	
o Agreements	 between	 the	 EU	 and	 Mercosur	 (Framework	 Agreement,	 Memoranda	 of	Understanding)	
o Documents	from	the	Mercosur	institutions	(Council	of	the	Common	Market,	Secretariat,	Parliament,	etc.)	
o Mercosur	member	state	governments	
o Speeches	
o Commission	(former	DG	RELEX,	DG	TRADE	and	DG	DEVCO),	EEAS	and	Council	Secretariat	documents	on	EU-Mercosur	relations.	
o Reports	and	evaluations	from	external	contractors	involved	in	technical	assistance	and	development	cooperation	
o Academic	and	policy-oriented	studies	
EU-Western	Balkans	documents	
o SAP	 documents:	 Stabilisation	 and	 Association	 Agreements,	 progress	 reports,	 meeting	documents,	 communications	 of	 the	 involved	 Western	 Balkans	 governments	 on	 the	negotiations	
o Stability	Pact	documents:	Regional	Table	documents	and	documents	from	the	Working	Table	II	on	Economic	matters	
o RCC	documents:	annual	Working	Programmes,	documents	on	specific	initiatives	
o Speeches	
o EEAS	 and	 DG	 ELARG	 documents	 on	 national	 /	 regional	 strategies	 and	 on	 regional	cooperation	
o Documents	from	the	Council	Secretariat	(especially	DG	C,	formerly	E,	and	COWEB	working	party)	
o Reports	and	evaluations	from	external	contractors	involved	in	technical	assistance	and	development	cooperation	
o Academic	and	policy-oriented	studies	
Table 5.1: Documents consulted for the two regions 
5.4.2 Interviews	
Most available documents shed light on publicised policy priorities and on the 
processes by which these policies are decided upon and implemented. But uncovering 
the motivations and incentives behind the actions of policy-makers and the traces of 
the causal mechanisms will often require data from additional sources. Interviews are 
a helpful source to gain this kind of information as they ideally allow revealing not just 
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the outcome of decisions, but also the alternatives among which policy-makers had to 
choose, the constraints and opportunities they were confronted with and the 
competing influences they were subject to. Interviews with policy-making elites are 
therefore a central source of empirical data for this thesis. 
More specifically, the interview data shall fulfil the following goals. As 
explained above, its main objective is to uncover the motivations, preferences and 
intentions of the institutions and actors involved in alleged diffusion processes. A 
second, closely related, objective is to directly test the hypotheses developed in our 
theoretical framework. Interviews open up a much better opportunity to do this than 
documents because they generate new data specifically tailored to our research 
interest and purposes. It is therefore possible to directly ask interviewees for the 
influences they were subject to when pursuing a certain institutional change and to 
test for our five causal mechanisms and hypotheses (Leech 2002: 665), in most cases 
directly or sometimes by asking for traces for these mechanisms. This opens up a third 
possibility, which is also an important goal of the interviews. As the interviews allow 
us to generate new, more profound data than documents, they also allow us to better 
deal with the already mentioned issue of equifinality. In contrast to documentary 
analysis, questioning policy-makers allows us to query for alternative explanations and 
gauge their relative explanatory value.  
Selecting	the	interviewees	
To achieve these goals the selection of the interviewees is of central importance. 
Generally speaking, three groups of interviewees come into question. Officials and 
other actors from the EU side are especially suited to survey the intentions and 
methods by which the EU encourages regional cooperation. Actors from the EU’s 
counterpart organisations and from the respective governments are essential for the 
analysis, especially taking into account our focus on spotting the EU’s specific impact 
on others. These are the actors whose motivations, preferences and intentions need 
to be analysed most closely. In selecting the groups of actors that will be interviewed, 
the decision-making and policy implementation routines of the analysed organisations 
play a central role. In the case of the EU, several of the analysed policy-fields belong 
to the EU’s exclusive or parallel competences and its bureaucracy is directly involved 
also in those areas pertaining to the realm of foreign affairs.131 This allows 
                                                             
131 The common commercial policy under which trade negotiations are conducted is an exclusive 
competence of the EU (TFEU 2012b: 3), development cooperation is defined as a parallel competence 
in which both the EU and its member states may act (TFEU 2012b: 4). Technical assistance and 
financial disbursements in the context of enlargement policy are governed by the EU’s competence 
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concentrating on EU officials as interview partners. In contrast, decision-making in the 
organisations studied on the side of the EU’s partners is almost always purely 
intergovernmental and the bureaucracies of the regional organisations tend to have 
only a limited – if any – influence on decision-making. In these cases it is therefore 
necessary to concentrate on national decision-makers.132 Finally, a third group of 
interviewees are those external actors closely involved in the hypothesised diffusion 
processes. Consultants, academics and employees of other international organisations 
belong into this category. These three groups are interviewed on the same processes 
and events in order to triangulate the information obtained. In addition, a number of 
interviewees were selected because of their general knowledge of the cases studied, 
even if they were not directly involved in the processes studied. These interviews 
served to gather contextual information, to gain access to other interviewees and to 
triangulate the information retrieved from documents and other interviews. 
To select the individual interviewees, again a purposive sampling is the best 
approach. Random sampling is not advisable neither in combination with the diffusion 
approach adopted nor with the process-tracing method that will be used for the 
analysis (for a discussion of the latter see Tansey 2007: 768–9). Our interest lies on 
highly specific events and actors, i.e. on a policy-specific elite that has first-hand 
information on the studied processes. Hence, the decisive criterion for the selection 
of interviewees is their direct involvement in the studied instances of institutional 
diffusion. Once a solid understanding of the cases has been achieved, identifying these 
individuals is in principle not too difficult a task. The sources used to identify 
interviewees were organisational charts of institutions to find the individuals 
hierarchically responsible for the areas into which alleged diffusion processes fall, 
meeting documents as well as policy-documents or reports, provided that they stated 
the names of the authors.  
In addition to these sources, each interview also included questions querying 
the interviewee for the involvement of other institutions and specific persons in the 
studied diffusion processes. This added a chain-referral sampling to the purposive 
sampling. In the context of elite-interviewing, this combination is indicated for several 
reasons. Most importantly, the chain-referral allowed reducing the risk of not 
interviewing important actors because of a too strong orientation on formal criteria of 
hierarchical responsibility. In theory, chain-referral bears a risk of reinforcing already 
                                                             
to cooperate with non-developing states, also defined as a competence in which both the EU and 
member states shall complement each other (TFEU 2012b: 212). 
132 As will be reflected in the case studies, the interviews concentrated on representatives of those 
member states deemed the most decisive ones in each of the cases.  
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presumed conclusions, as interviewees may be prone to recommend interlocutors 
that share their views. While this risk seems controllable in a small population, it was 
also minimised in practice by not asking just whom the interviewee would recommend 
to speak to, but also who played an important and/or antagonistic role in the process. 
In general, the impression of the author is that interviewees even had a stronger 
tendency to refer to actors that did not share their own position than to those with 
similar views. A second reason in favour of including chain-referral sampling lies in the 
nature of the groups interviewed: relatively sealed-off policy-making elites. In such 
groups, gaining access to one person often depends on being able to refer to common 
acquaintances. Especially in cases in which interviewees had changed positions as a 
result of rotation or in which no organigrammes or meeting documents could be 
found, this approach still allowed to identify individuals that had been involved during 
the time of the alleged diffusion processes. Generally speaking, this combination of 
sampling methods led to a positive result and only few interview partners sought after 
rejected to be interviewed. 
Western	Balkans	interviews	
o EU	officials	in	the	former	Commission	DG	RELEX,	DG	ELARG	and	DG	TRADE,	in	the	EEAS,	in	EU	Delegations	in	Belgrade,	Zagreb,	former	Stability	Pact	officials.	
o Actors	 from	 the	 Western	 Balkans:	 representations	 in	 Brussels,	 Trade	 ministries,	Ministries	of	Foreign	Affairs	/	European	Integration	of	Serbia	and	Croatia	
o CEFTA	2006	(Central	European	Free	Trade	Agreement)	officials	in	Brussels	
Mercosur	interviews	
o EU	 officials,	 relevant	 desk	 officers	 ex	 DG	 RELEX/EEAS,	 DG	 TRADE	 AND	 DEVCO,	delegation	in	Uruguay	(seat	of	Mercosur)	
o Mercosur	secretariat,	officials	from	Brazil	and	Argentinean	in	MFAs	and	in	embassies	in	Montevideo,	and	diplomats	at	the	representations	in	Brussels.	
Table 5.2: Interviewees consulted for the analysis (overview) 
Conducting	the	interviews	
The interviews were conducted on the basis of semi-structured questionnaires with 
open-ended questions.133 This was deemed the best way of achieving the aim of 
tracing the alleged diffusion processes – requiring specific questions testing for them 
– while leaving enough room for the interviewees to provide information beyond the 
theoretical expectations of the author. This reduced the risk of predetermining specific 
                                                             
133 A semi-structured questionnaire lists the questions to be asked but does not prejudge the order 
in which the questions are asked nor does it offer a pre-set list of replies among which the 
interviewee would chose. Such a questionnaire allows the interviewee to point at issues that have 
not been asked and the interviewer to pose ad hoc-questions to elaborate on individual points 
(Gläser and Laudel 2008: 41–2). 
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mechanisms and helps to detect the existence of overseen explanations (Gläser and 
Laudel 2008: 131–2).134 The core of the interviews was therefore formed by questions 
addressing the existence of the causal mechanisms. Introductory questions asked the 
interviewee for his professional experience and for the specific positions and time 
frames in which he dealt with the instances under study. This allowed assessing 
whether there were any blind spots in the evidence obtained. In cases in which the 
interviewees could not remember the specific timing of certain actions, these first 
questions made it also possible to ascribe them more precisely, thereby making the 
process-tracing more accurate. A concluding section in the questionnaire asked for 
further contacts and information sources. 
The overwhelming majority of the interviews were conducted in person. 
While a few interviews conducted on the phone were repeatedly postponed by the 
interviewee, this did never occur for scheduled conversations in direct conversations. 
Being present also created a more comfortable atmosphere for the interviewee, which 
in turn made it easier to gain more profound information and to obtain the referral to 
other potential interviewees. Occasionally, interviewees provided confidential 
documents which they would have probably not sent via e-mail. In addition to these 
advantages, conducting the interviews in person also allowed for longer 
conversations, with the average duration being approximately one hour. In total, 78 
interviews were conducted between May 2011 and December 2013 in Brussels, 
Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Brasília, Zagreb, Belgrade and Sarajevo and over the 
phone. To make the interview less burdensome for the interviewee, the conversation 
was conducted in his or her preferred language whenever possible, meaning that 
interviews were conducted in English, Spanish and German. This approach was 
considered to be the most adequate to gain the most direct and unconstructed 
responses possible. 
In order to gain as much and as sincere information as possible, all 
interviewees were offered anonymity. Approximately two thirds of them requested 
this. Their grounds for requesting anonymity ranged from concerns of being 
identifiable in a small community of policy-makers, being bound to an official 
authorisation to give public interviews or the frank statement that answers would 
                                                             
134 In fact, Europeanisation-inspired research designs have been criticised for being “vulnerable to 
prejudging the EU’s impact and assuming that if change occurs […] then this must be a case of 
Europeanisation at work” (Taylor et al. 2013: 29–30). Radaelli(2012: 5) argues in the same vein, based 
on an extensive review of Europeanisation articles. The same risk pertains to process-tracing, which 
as a result of its micro-focus may overlook latent, structural causes (Bennett and Checkel 2015: 28). 
In this context, leaving room for alternative explanations becomes most important. 
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differ if the interview was not anonymous. Since the high percentage of anonymous 
responses implies that the non-anonymous respondents would stand out 
disproportionately, it was decided to keep all interviewees anonymous and to identify 
them only by the denomination of their position.135 The list of all the interviews 
conducted for this study and the respective codes under which they are cited in the 
text can be found in annex B. Almost all interviewees were asked whether the 
conversation with them could be taped. As a result, more than half of the interviews 
were recorded. In cases in which recording was rejected by the interviewee, notes 
were taken and a record was written down within hours of the conversation. Interview 
documentation remains on file with the author. 
Conclusion	
This chapter has laid out the methodological foundations of this thesis. The first 
section of this chapter has argued in favour of pursing a case-study research that 
combines within-case and cross-case analysis. Several arguments speak in favour of 
this decision. First of all, our interest in determining whether there is a real effect of 
the EU on regional cooperation beyond its own borders implied that we are interested 
not in mere correlation, but in causality. Together with the expectation that several of 
the hypothesised mechanisms may work at the same time, i.e. that we may encounter 
equifinality, this argument speaks in favour of case studies that allow delving deep into 
the studied processes. But, secondly, we are also interested in reaching conclusions 
that hold beyond the individual cases. This calls for a cross-case analysis, which also 
comes with further advantages in terms of increasing the reliability and transparency, 
and thus replicability, of the research. 
Therefore, the analysis will proceed in two steps. In a first step, the research 
design is replicated on seven cases from two regions to assess the existence of our 
hypothesised causal mechanisms. A central element to this first step is the division of 
the analysis in several layers, moving from the context and scope conditions to the 
study of very specific and narrow cases of diffusion in two fields that are typical to the 
EU’s efforts in promoting regional cooperation: institution-building and the creation 
of regional markets. This approach serves to avoid that external factors such as the 
influence of other actors than the EU passes unnoticed. For the second step, the 
results of the case studies are then compared across the two regions to assess the 
                                                             
135 A few interviewees refused to be ascribed to a specific position or even institution as this would 
make it easy to identify them. This resulted in denominations such as ‘senior EU official’ when a more 
specific one was rejected. 
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relative relevance of the mechanisms and to put them in relation with the scope 
conditions of the two relationships studied.  
The two relationships for our analysis are the one between the EU and the 
Western Balkans region and the Mercosur region respectively. These two relationships 
were selected out of a population of 31 cases following the diverse-case selection 
technique. This technique aims to select a representative sample while still allowing 
for an intensive analysis within the selected cases. It does so by choosing cases that 
represent a high degree of variation on the independent variable, in our case ‘Use of 
EU instruments to promote regional cooperation’. While the Western Balkans region 
is the one in which the EU has applied virtually all of its available foreign policy-
instruments including high-level diplomatic relations and the CSDP, the Mercosur 
region is dealt with mostly from a trade and (development) cooperation perspective. 
In line with the two steps in our case-study research design, also two methods 
of analysis will be applied – process-tracing for the within-case analysis and ordinal 
comparison for the cross-case analysis. Process-tracing will allow us to establish the 
presence or absence of the hypothesised causal mechanisms in our individual cases 
and regions. This part of the analysis focuses on addressing the ‘how’ and the ‘what 
extent’ elements of our research question. The results of this analysis will then be 
compared using ordinal comparison, i.e. ranking the cases along the prevalence of the 
different causal mechanisms. This information will then be put in relation with the EU’s 
impact on regional cooperation and with the scope conditions, allowing us to assess 
the ‘under what conditions’ part of our research question.  
This analysis will be performed using two types of data. On one hand, 
documents that reflect the policy-making processes in the EU and the reaction from 
its interlocutors. Such documents include speeches, policy strategies from the EEAS, 
or reports from organisations supported by the EU in our two case-study regions, as 
well as non-public policy documents. The documents serve mainly to assess the 
variation of our two variables and to provide information on the sequence of the 
diffusion processes studied with our process-tracing method. As most documents do 
not provide information on the motivations and incentives of the actors involved, 
interviews with policy-making elites are the second source of data for our analysis. In 
order to assess whether and how EU policies and choices affected decisions on 
institutional change in the regions studied, the majority of the interviews were 
conducted with policy-makers from the governments and organisations of the studied 
regions in Buenos Aires, Brasília, Montevideo, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo between 
2011 and 2013. 
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Together with the two preceding chapters, this methodology chapter has 
presented the analytical tools that will now be used to inquire on the impact of the EU 
on regional cooperation beyond its borders.  
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Part	III Tracing	EU	Impact	on	Regional	Cooperation	6 Empirics	I:	EU-Mercosur		
The EU’s relationship with Mercosur is among the most long-standing with any 
regional organisation. It started in 1991 with high expectations on both sides. The then 
European Communities perceived the newly-founded Mercosur as an eager pupil keen 
to adapt the European integration experience to Latin America’s Southern Cone – and 
were prompt in supporting these efforts. For Mercosur, building a common market 
with aspirations for close political cooperation was high on the agenda in the first years 
of its existence. Despite this promising start, the relationship has ever since been 
heavily influenced by the tedious negotiations about a bi-regional trade agreement. In 
a process that resembles an on-off romance, negotiations began in 1999 on the basis 
of already disputed negotiation directives (Latin America Working Party of the Council 
1999), were suspended in 2004 and have been taken up again in 2010, with an 
exchange of market access offers having taken place in May 2016 (Commission 2016b; 
Commission 2016d).136  
At the time of its creation, Mercosur had set itself very ambitious goals. It 
aimed to become a customs union by January 1st 1995, just three years after its 
founding. To put this goal into perspective, it is helpful to remember that the same 
process took the EU 11 years – from the signing of the Treaties of Rome in 1957 to the 
setup of a yet incomplete customs union in 1968. Nowadays, having celebrated its 25th 
anniversary in 2016, Mercosur can be considered, at best, an ‘imperfect customs 
union’, characterised by a growing number of exceptions to its common external tariff. 
Mercosur’s emergence and its ambition fitted well into the existing relations between 
the European Community and Latin America – where the EC had agreements in place 
with the Andean Pact formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and (at that time) 
Venezuela as well as the regular political ‘San José dialogue’ with the Central American 
states. At the same time, expanding the relationship with Mercosur did not only satisfy 
a sense of cultural and institutional kinship but could be understood as part of a 
broader balancing game in which the EU aimed to increase its influence in a world that 
was perceived as becoming increasingly dominated by the US (see for example 
Grabendorff 2005).  
From its very outset, promoting Mercosur’s further integration was the crux 
of its relationship with the EU. Right after Mercosur’s founding in 1991, the EU put 
                                                             
136 The recently acceded Venezuela does not take part in the trade negotiations (Commission 2016c). 
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together a programme to support Mercosur’s rotating presidencies and the 
organisation’s nascent secretariat with experts and funding, aiming to contribute to its 
institutional consolidation [Consejo del Mercado Común del Sur, Comisión de las 
Comunidades Europeas 1995 (1992); #13, former Commission official at the 
Delegation to Uruguay]. This first agreement sets the tone which was later continued 
in further programmes, a so-called interregional framework cooperation agreement 
(IFCA 1996) and the Commission’s strategic guidelines for its relationship with 
Mercosur, regularly published and updated in the years that followed (e.g. 
Commission 1994). 
This chapter will answer our two first sub-research questions for the EU’s 
relationship with Mercosur: ‘what instruments does the EU employ to promote 
regional cooperation?’ and ‘to what extent is the EU able to influence the emergence 
and development of regional cooperation?’137 The chapter begins by presenting the 
context of the EU-Mercosur relationship and assessing two of the three scope 
conditions set out in the theoretical framework: degrees of statehood and power 
asymmetries (sub-chapter 6.1).138 The ensuing sub-chapter 6.2 answers the first of our 
three sub-questions for the Mercosur region: ‘What instruments does the EU employ 
to promote regional cooperation?’ It shows that the focus of the EU’s efforts in 
encouraging integration in the region lay on two fields: market integration and the 
further institutionalisation of Mercosur. On this basis, four case studies are selected – 
two for each field. The two ensuing sub-chapters (6.3 and 6.4) are then devoted to the 
analysis of the case studies. Through process-tracing the analysis shows whether and 
how the EU’s efforts to encourage regional integration in the Mercosur region 
resonated locally and were successful. The final sub-chapter brings the analysis of the 
EU-Mercosur relationship to a close by drawing conclusions across the four cases 
studied in this chapter. The figure below shows the structure of the study for the EU-
Mercosur relationship. 
                                                             
137 The third sub-question is answered in the cross-case analysis. It draws from variation in the scope 
conditions, which are depending on each region. 
138 As mentioned in section 3.4 (p. 72f.) above, these two scope conditions pertain to the respective 
states’ history and political and economic development and are thus likely to remain stable over the 
time frame and the case studies analysed. They can therefore be analysed for all the case studies in 
a region. Instead, the scope condition ‘domestic incentives’ is more time-sensitive and will therefore 
be analysed in the individual case studies.  
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Figure 6.1: Overview of the study EU-Mercosur 
6.1 Context	and	scope	conditions		
Despite its early aspirations to develop into a similar political construct to the then EC 
and now EU, Mercosur bears important differences to its European counterpart. It is 
characterised by immense discrepancies in economic and population size of its 
member states and differences are also deeply rooted in their history and political 
development. The following paragraphs will analyse the context for regional 
cooperation in the Southern Cone and will thereby also serve to assess two of the 
scope conditions presumed to influence the role of our causal mechanisms: the degree 
of statehood in the Mercosur region and the possible power asymmetries between 
both regions, namely, the EU and Mercosur. 
6.1.1 Regional	cooperation	between	integration	and	the	
prevalence	of	national	sovereignty	–	degrees	of	statehood	
The Mercosur states are extremely diverse in terms of economic potency and 
population size, ranging from the minute Paraguay to the colossal Brazil, a state which 
has developed into one of the world’s largest economies over the last decade and 
boasts an economy three times the size of that of Argentina and 65 times that of 
Context and scope conditions (Chapter 6.1) 
 
 EU instruments to promote regional integration (Chapter 6.2) 
Field I: Market integration (Chapter 6.3) 
• Case study 1: FOCEM 
• Case study 2: Macroeconomic coordination 
Field II: Institutionalisation of regional cooperation  
(Chapter 6.4) 
• Case study 3: Mercosur Parliament 
• Case study 4: Permanent Court of Appeals 
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Paraguay.139 These differences, which are shown in more detail in the figures below, 
do naturally affect the development of Mercosur and must be taken into account when 
assessing institutional and policy choices in the region.   
        Figure 6.2: Population of the four analysed Mercosur states 
        Source: International Monetary Fund(2016) 
Figure 6.3: GDP of the analysed Mercosur states 
GDP in 2011 international dollars (PPP), for Argentina: GDP in current international dollars 
                                                             
139 The size differences would be even larger when comparing nominal GDP data. In order to 
accommodate for changing inflation, purchasing power parity data is used.  
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(PPP) Sources: World Bank(2016), for Argentina: International Monetary Fund(2016) * The 
World Bank did not report data on Argentina until inflation numbers for the country were 
recalculated, therefore the data for Argentina is taken from the IMF (and based on current 
prices). As a background on Argentinean inflation data see for example: The Economist 
[H.C.](2014). 
 
History has reserved a prominent role for regional cooperation and integration in most 
Latin American states, also in the case of those making up Mercosur. The shared 
experience of resisting and ultimately fighting Spanish colonial rule in the first half of 
the nineteenth century helped in establishing a common identity, which leaders still 
make reference to nowadays when defending the virtues of regional cooperation 
(Carvalho 2005: 172–7; Domínguez 2007: 86–7) and even the military regimes of 
Argentina and Brazil cooperated regularly with each other – despite being at enmity 
(Domínguez 2007: 97–9). Also in Brazil, where independence from Portugal was 
achieved through a peaceful transition, regional cooperation is positively connoted, 
up to the extent of being enshrined in the Brazilian constitution as one of the 
fundamental principles of the state: 
“A República Federativa do Brasil buscará a integração econômica, 
política, social e cultural dos povos da América Latina, visando à 
formação de uma comunidade latino-americana de nações.” 
(República Federativa do Brasil 1988: 4)140 
Building on these foundations, numerous regional integration initiatives have spread 
in the region, both with sub-regional and with continental scope all over (Latin) 
America.141  
The excerpt of the Brazilian constitution above and its mention of a 
‘community of nations’ highlights a characteristic that is key to understanding the 
development of regional cooperation and integration in Latin America and the 
Southern Cone more specifically. While cooperation between the states in the region 
is a principle that enjoys an almost unlimited positive connotation, the concept of the 
‘nation’ and its ‘sovereignty’ is paramount in the national political cultures (see for 
example Almeida 2013). Certainly a result of the relatively long periods under foreign 
rule, Latin American states show great attachment to their national sovereignty and 
                                                             
140 “The Federative Republic of Brazil shall seek the economic, political, social, and cultural 
integration of the Latin American peoples, with the goal of creating a Latin-American community of 
nations.” [own translation, M.H.S.]. 
141 Valls Pereira (1999: 8–9) and Malamud (2010: 637–43) provide overviews and trace the origins of 
Latin American regional integration back to the 1940s. 
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guard it jealously. This trait is clearly reflected in the presidential structure of their 
political systems, which provides presidents with a large degree of autonomy in their 
decision-making, even more so in the realm of foreign policy (Malamud 2010: 651).142 
It coincides with a political culture in which personalisation and the attribution of 
specific decisions to the directly-elected presidents play an important role both in 
political communication and the perception of citizens and even government 
bureaucrats. The latter was also confirmed in many of the interviews conducted by the 
author, in which formulations such as “we did this because Lula wanted” or the like 
were common [e.g. #19, former senior official Mercosur Parliamentary Commission / 
Mercosur Parliament; #10, Argentinean representation to the EU]. 
In consequence, we find ourselves in a region that is, on one hand, inclined to 
express strong rhetorical praise and display political willingness to cooperate 
regionally, while on the other, remains fiercely attached to national sovereignty and 
has political systems in which decision-making power is concentrated in the 
presidential executives. In terms of the social aspect of our scope condition ‘degrees 
of statehood’, it seems reasonable to view the Mercosur region as one in which the 
preservation of national sovereignty is deemed primordial. This is likely to slow down 
or even hinder attempts of pursuing regional integration if these imply a delegation of 
decision-making power to institutions above the state – and even more if they risk 
placing authority further away from the respective presidents. Consequently, this 
situation will likely conflict with the EU’s preferred recipe for integration and its focus 
on strengthening the role of regional institutions. While this context does not prevent 
the delegation of power entirely, it makes it more likely that such delegation will be 
limited in scope, linked to special moments or ‘critical junctures’ (Collier and Collier 
1991: 29–31), communicated as a (personal) act of the presidents of the Mercosur 
member states and oriented towards protecting (national) sovereignty against its 
erosion. In sum, delegation of decision-making power is much more likely to be either 
symbolic or communicated and perceived as a ‘saut qualitatif’ than as a process of 
‘managerial politics’ (Hoffmann 1966)143, driven mainly by a bureaucratic or issue-
focused logic – different to what one can often witness in the EU. In line with these 
expectations, the development of Mercosur has regularly been portrayed as hinging 
                                                             
142 See Linz(1990), the comparative articles in Mainwaring and Shugart(1997), and Shugart and 
Carey(1992) for the seminal assessments of the main traits and characteristics of (Latin American) 
presidential systems and Elgie(2005) for a nuanced continuation of the debate. 
143 Nowadays termed ‘low politics’. Stanley Hoffmann does not define ‘low politics’ in his 1966 article, 
but distinguishes what he calls ‘high politics’ (i.e. matters “beyond the purely internal economic 
problems of little impact or dependence on the external relationship to the U.S., Hoffmann 1966: 
874) from “managerial” (1966: 884) or “welfare” (1966: 901) politics. 
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on the action (and inaction) of the presidents of its member states (Malamud 2005; 
2015; Hummel and Lohaus 2012). This perception also influences how Mercosur is 
seen by the EU and its member states, which shape their expectations depending on 
the presumed preferences of Mercosur presidents (e.g. German Permanent 
Representation to the EU 2016a). This assessment has focused on the elements of our 
scope condition that pertain to a social ontology. Beyond this, statehood in a more 
traditional, material, understanding may also have a strong influence on the ability and 
willingness of a government to react to external influences to encourage regional 
cooperation and integration. 
This understanding of statehood can be defined as the degree to which the 
state is able to “adopt, implement, and enforce decisions” (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 
11). In the context of our analysis, we are especially interested in the administrative 
capacity of the states that engage in regional cooperation as the lack of such capacity 
may limit their ability to engage in regional cooperation (and to adopt and adapt 
external influences in this field). In order to assess this condition in an encompassing 
and yet simple way, we resort to data from the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
(WGI) project. The WGI project aggregates data from multiple respected surveys that 
assess different components of governance, including perceptions on government 
effectiveness, rule of law, political stability, absence of violence, etc. Funded by the 
World Bank, it is the only data source that provides longitudinal data on governance 
for a relatively long period of time, starting in 1996 – it therefore allows us to cover 
most of the time frame under analysis here (1992-2012). In particular, we use the WGI 
indicators for two components of governance that are important in our analysis: 
government effectiveness, which reflects elements such as the quality of policy 
formulation and its implementation, and rule of law, which includes questions such as 
the degree of contract enforcement and the performance of the judicial system.144  
When scrutinising this data for the four Mercosur member states under 
analysis, we observe that Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay rank considerably well in 
terms of government effectiveness, with the median values of their scores placing 
them always among the top 50% of all 215 territories analysed. Paraguay, however, 
remains in the lower quintile, reflecting – among other things – the state’s relatively 
weak presence in large parts of the country and its structural corruption. A more 
detailed look into the assessment for ‘government effectiveness’ hints at a trait that 
also becomes apparent in the appraisal of Mercosur’s track record as an organisation 
                                                             
144 See Kaufmann et al.(2010) for further details on the WGI data sources and how these are 
aggregated. 
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(Peña 2002: 286; Malamud 2015: 174–5; da Motta Veiga 2002: 349–54; Olmos 
Giupponi 2010: 57–70): scores are low for the implementation of decisions and 
policies.145 In terms of the rule of law, the four Mercosur member states fare quite 
differently. Again, Paraguay, ranks among the lowest quintile of all countries analysed 
by the WGI. Brazil and Uruguay have stable scores all over the period reflected, albeit 
with different values. While Uruguay ranks among the top 35 %, Brazil lies among the 
lower half of all territories analysed, despite a clearly improving trend over time. 
Perceptions of the rule of law in Argentina fluctuated during the 1996-2012 period, in 
average placing Argentina among the lower third of all analysed states. The rule of law 
scores clearly reflect the Argentine financial crisis between 1998-2002, to which the 
government reacted by freezing all bank accounts in 2001 (the so-called ‘corralito’). 
The data is reported below in brief, with the full scores available in annex C. 
 
                                                             
145 See the biennial country reports of the Bertelsmann Transformation Index for a qualitative 
assessment. The reports do also reflect the implementation track record of the governments (and 
are incorporated into the WGI scores) (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016). 
Empirics I: EU-Mercosur 
 
  134 
 
Figure 6.4: Government effectiveness and rule of law in Mercosur states (1996-2012) 
Source: Own figure with WGI scores on government effectiveness (GE) and rule of law (RL). The 
number shows the relative position in percentage among all countries analysed, with 0 being the 
lowest and 100 the highest possible score. The median for the years 1996-2012 is reported on the 
right. 
 
In sum, statehood in the Mercosur region seems to be reasonably high (with the 
notable exception of Paraguay) and does not pose an impediment for regional 
cooperation and its further development. While the implementation of decisions and 
policies encounters difficulties across the board, the most important characteristic to 
take into account when assessing the impact of the EU’s promotion of regional 
cooperation seems to lie with the strong adherence to national sovereignty and the 
salient role of presidents in the management of regional cooperation. Even in a context 
in which regional cooperation is seen through a positive lens, resistance to delegate 
decision-making power to regional institutions is pronounced, especially in the two 
largest and economically most powerful countries of Mercosur: Brazil and Argentina. 
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This goes hand in hand with a ‘light’ and markedly intergovernmental set-up of 
Mercosur’s institutions (see 6.1.3 below). 
6.1.2 Power	asymmetries	-	EU	leverage	on	Mercosur		
The way in which Mercosur states react to proposals and influences from the EU is 
likely to be shaped by the EU’s leverage on the region or, in other words, by the degree 
of dependence on the EU. This potentiality is reflected in our scope condition ‘power 
asymmetries’. As discussed in chapter three, we expect dependence to take two 
forms: economic and provision of political legitimacy or security. For economic 
dependence, we shall focus on indicators depicting the trade, foreign direct 
investment and development assistance flows between both regions. As is the case 
with statehood, it is important to highlight that while the level of dependence varies 
from one Mercosur state to the other, we are interested in a comparison across 
regions and thus we will use the aggregated numbers for the Mercosur region overall.  
In terms of trade flows, the EU enjoys a strong position vis-à-vis the Mercosur 
region. It has been the region’s most important trade partner in terms of volume over 
the whole period of study (1991-2012), albeit closely followed by the United States 
and China, which has progressed to become Mercosur`s second most important trade 
partner in the last years. In 2014, each of the three trading partners accounted for 
roughly 20 % of Mercosur’s trade volume in goods (DG TRADE 2015). The EU – and to 
a more limited extent also the US – enjoys a specific importance in comparison to 
China as a considerable amount of its exports to the region consist in machinery and 
chemicals with a higher added value and a role as precursors for industrial production 
in the region. Meanwhile, exports from Mercosur to the EU are mostly agricultural 
products and raw materials with a lower added value (DG TRADE 2015).146 Mercosur’s 
trade relationship with the EU is highly asymmetric, with the EU accounting for an 
average of 20 % of Mercosur’s total trade, but Mercosur accounting for less than 3 % 
of the EU’s exports and imports in 2014. Since Mercosur countries were for a long time 
considered developing states, they enjoyed preferential access to the EU market 
through the so-called Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) until the reform of the 
system in 2014.147 Since then, this preference is only being granted to Paraguay, as all 
other Mercosur countries are now considered upper-middle income countries by the 
World Bank (Commission 2016a: 2). Hence, since 2014 the relative gain of the 
                                                             
146 The numbers cited for 2014 include Venezuela, i.e. the trade share of the Mercosur 4 states is 
even lower. 
147 The end of these preferences for most Mercosur states was foreseeable at least since 2011, when 
the Commission first announced a reform of the GSP system. 
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Mercosur countries from concluding a trade agreement with the EU has increased – 
and with it, the EU’s leverage over Mercosur. While it is obvious that the GSP reform 
increased the power asymmetry between Mercosur and the EU in favour of the latter, 
assessing its precise impact is nonetheless complicated. On one hand, a range of 
agricultural products in which Mercosur states are highly competitive have always 
been excluded from the GSP – and thereby unaffected by the loss of preferential 
access. On the other hand, several representatives from Mercosur states mentioned 
in interviews that the GSP reform was a decisive spur towards re-engaging in trade 
negotiations with the EU in 2012 [#28, former senior official, MFA Argentina, phone 
interview; #12, trade section, Brazilian representation to the EU]. 
 In a region that is extremely dependent on extra-regional investment 
(UNCTAD 2012: 5), the EU is also Mercosur’s largest foreign investor, both in terms of 
the accumulated stock as in terms of the yearly inflow of investments (Makuc et al. 
2015: 2). In a similar vein, the EU and its member states are the largest suppliers of 
ODA to the Mercosur states – and the EU is by far the largest donor to Mercosur 
itself.148 In sum, it becomes clear that the EU has certain leverage over Mercosur 
countries in economic terms, even if this leverage has been gradually diminishing in 
relative terms over the period analysed in this thesis.149  
Beyond economic factors, also the role of the EU as a provider of legitimacy 
or security can play a role when it comes to power asymmetries between both regions. 
Nonetheless, in the case of Mercosur this factor seems negligible, even more so as 
especially the large states in the region have gained in confidence over the last years 
– in line with their growing economic role in times of increasing demand for 
commodities. While negligible for the region in general, decision-makers and officials 
in the Mercosur institutions do look upon the EU – either as a yardstick or as a 
phenomenon against which it is important to distance oneself [passim, e.g. #17, 
Uruguayan representative to Mercosur; #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina; 
#40, senior official, MFA Brazil].  
                                                             
148 Calculated for aid commitments in the years 2005-2014 (latest data available) using data from the 
OECD Creditor Reporting System for development assistance, see also Ugarte et al.(2004b: 29). While 
this applies for the timeframe analysed, it is also important to note that only Paraguay does still 
receive bilateral EU ODA from 2014 on, as all other Mercosur states are not eligible for EU aid 
anymore due to their economic performance. They remain eligible only for regional and thematic 
ODA (e.g. for programmes targeted at increasing social cohesion or improving human rights), which 
are much smaller in terms of funding volume.  
149 Up to being influenced by the EU’s sovereign debt crises since 2009, which rendered the EU to be 
perceived as being in a weaker position than its economic fundamentals would suggest [#19, former 
Mercosur official; #15, senior official, EU delegation to Uruguay; #48, senior EEAS official]. 
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Summing up, we observe considerable power asymmetries between the two 
regions in favour of the EU. These are based on the very important role of the EU as 
an export market for Mercosur, as the region’s highest foreign investor and as the 
most important contributor of ODA – all these figures coupled with only small 
relevance of Mercosur for the EU in the same fields. However, while the EU’s role for 
Mercosur remains strong and prominent, it does also become clear that it has 
diminished over the time frame analysed in favour of both the US and especially China. 
The next paragraphs show how the diversity between the Mercosur states has also 
shaped the institutional and political development of the region. 
6.1.3 Mercosur’s	institutional	set-up	and	development	
The diversity of its member states has also shaped Mercosur’s institutional set-up. 
Characterised by what has been termed as a “light” (Domínguez 2007: 109–10) 
institutionalisation, supranational institutions are sparse and most Mercosur decisions 
are prepared and taken in intergovernmental committees in which all Mercosur states 
have the same voting power.  
Despite its light institutionalisation, the number of specialised committees 
and fora established at Mercosur level is considerable – with a recent count leading to 
more than a hundred such committees spanning different levels of seniority – from 
ministerial to technical – and covering topics as diverse as health, competition policy 
or the development of common internet domains.150 A look at the websites of the 
rotating Mercosur presidencies reveals that many of these committees exist on paper, 
but do not meet regularly (e.g. Presidencia Pro Témpore Uruguay 2016). These 
committees report to three intergovernmental bodies: the Council of the Common 
Market (CMC), the Common Market Group (GMC) and the Mercosur Trade 
Commission (CCM). While the Council is formed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and 
Economics of the Mercosur states, the GMC and the Trade Commission are composed 
of high-ranking officials from national ministries. All three bodies take their decisions 
by consensus. While the Mercosur states are obliged to comply with the decisions 
taken by these bodies, Mercosur does not foresee the supremacy of its law over 
national rules. All decisions do therefore need to be transposed into the national legal 
orders, providing member states with the possibility to selectively adhere to them or 
not. Often enough, governments and parliaments delay the transposition, leading to a 
considerable backlog in the implementation of decisions (Olmos Giupponi 2010: 57–
70; Peña 2002: 286; Malamud 2015: 175; da Motta Veiga 2002: 349–54; Gajate 2013: 
                                                             
150 Mercosur(2014) shows a list. 
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235–7).151 This backlog certainly makes up one to the most important stumbling blocks 
in the further integration of Mercosur – as it prevents the region from having 
foreseeable and unified in rules in many fields. Beyond these bodies, the presidents of 
the Mercosur states meet at least every six months for summits that have gained in 
importance – often being used to take decisions pertaining to the CMC or other bodies. 
 Over the years, and as part of different institutional reforms, further bodies 
have either been created or modified, including the Committee of Permanent 
Representatives of Mercosur (CRPM), the Mercosur Parliament, the Permanent Court 
of Appeals (TPR) or the Fund for Structural Convergence of Mercosur (FOCEM). To 
different extents, these bodies modify the strictly intergovernmental construction of 
Mercosur. In how far these developments were influenced by the EU will be analysed 
in the ensuing case studies. Beyond the modification of several institutional bodies, 
Mercosur has also grown in its membership over the last years: in 2012, Venezuela 
acceded to Mercosur under disputed legal terms after its entry into the organisation 
had been blocked for several years by the Paraguayan parliament’s refusal to ratify the 
accession. While Paraguay’s veto remained, it could be circumvented by the other 
Mercosur member states as they had suspended Paraguay’s voting rights in response 
to the impeachment of President Fernando Lugo. This suspension was judged by most 
observers as the political instrumentalisation of the 1998 Protocol of Ushuaia on 
Democratic Commitment, itself one of the more hailed institutional innovations in 
Mercosur (Ribeiro Hoffmann 2007). Bolivia, Ecuador and Suriname are at different 
stages of planned accession. This development can be seen as part of the stronger 
politicisation of Mercosur, to which especially Brazil’s socialist governments have 
attached strategic importance as a platform to project the country’s leadership in the 
region [#40, senior official, MFA Brazil; #39, Cabinet of Mercosur High Representative, 
#02, expert and former senior official at the Argentinean MFA; Pinheiro Guimarães 
2012].  
In contrast to the EU, where the adoption of the acquis communautaire 
precedes accession, applicant states can join Mercosur first and internalise Mercosur’s 
decision afterwards – increasing the backlog of Mercosur decisions that are not 
uniformly applied across the region.152 This eases the process of accession and has 
                                                             
151 While precise numbers are scarce, a 2001 estimation concluded that only about 45 % of all 
Mercosur decisions had been transposed into national law by all four Mercosur states. A recent 
compilation covering all Mercosur regulations between 1994 and 2008 concludes that around two 
thirds of the decisions have been incorporated by the member states (Arnold 2016). 
152 According to then Brazilian Foreign Minister José Serra, Venezuela had only internalised 45 % of 
the Mercosur acquis in the summer of 2016, almost four years after its accession (Leahy 2016). 
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certainly contributed to a development that has been characterised by territorial 
widening instead of substantive deepening. These and further important events in the 
development are reflected in the chronology below. 
Year	 Development	26	March	1991	 Founding	of	Mercosur	with	the	signature	of	the	Treaty	of	Asunción	between	Argentina,	Brazil,	Paraguay	and	Uruguay	17	December	1991	 Signature	of	an	intergovernmental	dispute	resolution	procedure	–	Protocol	of	Brasília	17	December	1994	 Ouro	Preto	Protocol	signed	(gave	Mercosur	legal	personality)	24	July	1998	 Protocol	of	Ushuaia	on	Democratic	Commitment	(democratic	clause	allows	to	suspend	states	considered	in	breach	of	democratic	terms)	1	July	1999	 Entry	into	force	of	the	EU-Mercosur	interregional	framework	cooperation	agreement	(signed	in	1995)	6	April	2000	 Opening	of	association	negotiations	with	the	EU	(suspended	in	2004)	29	June	2000	 Decision	to	undertake	trade	negotiations	as	a	bloc	(32/00	CMC)	18	February	2002	 Protocol	of	Olivos	on	dispute	resolution	(creates	the	TPR	–	Permanent	Court	of	Appeals)	6	December	2002	 Decision	to	transform	the	Administrative	Secretariat	into	a	‘technical’	Mercosur	Secretariat	6	October	2003	 Committee	of	Permanent	Representatives	of	Mercosur	(CRPM)	is	created	9	December	2005	 Creation	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	2006	 Inauguration	of	FOCEM	(Fund	for	Structural	Convergence	in	Mercosur)	4	May	2010	 Re-opening	of	EU-Mercosur	negotiations	(paused	in	2012,	exchange	of	market	access	offers	in	May	2016)	29	June	2012	 Suspension	of	Paraguay	(readmitted	in	August	2013)	and	accession	of	Venezuela	5	August	2017	 Suspension	of	Venezuela	(democratic	clause)	
   Table 6.1: Key events in Mercosur's development 1991-2017 
Together with those for the Western Balkans region, the scope conditions analysed 
above will be taken up in the cross-case analysis (chapter 8.2) to assess in how far they 
relate to the different causal mechanisms and EU impact on regional cooperation.  
The ensuing section moves to reply to the first of our sub-research questions 
for Mercosur: “What instruments does the EU employ to promote regional 
cooperation in the Mercosur region?” This serves to assess our independent variable 
‘Use of EU instruments to encourage regional cooperation’ using the scheme outlined 
in the operationalisation chapter 4.3. The following section also selects the individual 
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cases that will be analysed to assess the actual impact of the EU’s engagement on 
Mercosur. 
6.2 EU	engagement	and	case-study	selection		
6.2.1 Fostering	institutions	against	all	odds	–	the	EU’s	
strategy	towards	Mercosur	
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, the EU was quick in supporting 
Mercosur on its route to closer regional cooperation. Already a year after the 
formation of the organisation, it propped up the rotating presidencies with a dedicated 
budget for external advice and administrative support [Consejo del Mercado Común 
del Sur, Comisión de las Comunidades Europeas 1995 (1992); Grupo del Mercado 
Común 1993; #13, former Commission official at the Delegation to Uruguay]. In the 
following years, this support was continuously increased and formalised through the 
conclusion of several agreements and technical cooperation programmes 
(Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement 1996 [1999]; Commission 2002; 
2007g; Commission and EEAS 2010; Commission 1994: 9) totalling around 50 million 
euros each for seven-year budgeting periods. Seen over the whole period, the principal 
focus of this technical cooperation lay on institutional strengthening, although this 
element lost importance in budgetary terms from 2007 on and was dropped in 2011 
(Commission 2010b). As shown in the respective strategic documents, in speeches of 
EU actors (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA) 2007 - 2008), and 
confirmed in interviews with EU officials [i.a. #01, former senior EU official; #06, DG 
Devco official], a three-pronged approach characterises the EU’s strategy towards 
Mercosur: strengthening Mercosur as an organisation, increasing its integration and 
cohesion as a trade partner, and contributing to specific policy fields which are 
deemed of strategic or symbolic importance in order to make regional integration 
visible to citizens (e.g. civil society and cultural programmes).  
In the context of the above-mentioned strategy, the EU’s approach to Mercosur has 
evolved over the time period considered in this study. A look at the technical 
assistance projects funded (see table C.3 in the annex) and at the respective EU 
programming documents (Commission 2002; 2007g; Commission and EEAS 2010), 
reveals how the initial focus on Mercosur’s institutions was gradually complemented 
with projects and programmes directly implemented by the individual Mercosur 
states. According to interviews with both EU and Mercosur officials, this gradual shift 
was mainly demanded by the Mercosur states, whose interest in receiving support for 
their joint institutions decreased over time – while the EU continued to stress, both on 
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a technical and political level, that strong institutions were the necessary foundation 
for functioning regional integration [#01, former senior EU official; #06, DG Devco 
official; #52, senior EEAS official; #53, EU official, delegation to Uruguay; #20, former 
senior official, MFA Argentina; #25, Brazilian representative to Mercosur; see also 
Buchet and Rua Boiero 2012: 17, 47]. When questioned on this emphasis, EU officials 
explained that their policy towards Mercosur aimed to strengthen independent actors 
that could develop some degree of autonomy from the often diverging member states, 
propose initiatives to deepen Mercosur, and ensure compliance with Mercosur rules 
[#01, former senior EU official; #37, senior DG Trade official]. This emphasis was also 
presented in EU strategy documents such as the programming documents cited above. 
Taking into account that such publicly available documents tend to be cautious as to 
recommending specific policy choices to sovereign partners, the EU’s outspokenness 
in its 2002 strategy paper on Mercosur is especially striking:  
“the lack of appropriate supranational institutions has impeded progress 
towards deeper integration. The absence of a strong technical body vested 
with the power to propose and implement laws at the Mercosur level has been 
a major obstacle to moving forward with the integration process. This has 
contributed to a weak integration scheme, an imperfect customs union, which 
cannot be deepened without the full commitment of all member countries” 
(Commission 2002: 17). 
 According to an extensive evaluation of EU aid to Mercosur, during the period 1992-
2004 the EU was the only donor specifically supporting the Mercosur institutions 
(Ugarte et al. 2004b: 29). 
On the side of Mercosur, this focus on strengthening the regional institutions 
is shared especially by Uruguay [#47, MFA Uruguay; #17, Uruguayan representative to 
Mercosur; #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina; see also Ons 2014] which as a 
small and trade-oriented country has traditionally suffered most from the 
implementation backlog of the other member states or the repeated Argentinean and 
Brazilian forays to protect national industries. EU officials involved in the 
implementation of the respective cooperation programmes lamented that the 
Mercosur states preferred to split each EU cooperation programme in four national 
parts instead of handing it over to the Mercosur institutions [#53, EU delegation to 
Uruguay; #06, DG Devco official] and even tried to move Mercosur to establish a 
‘community’ institution to implement mutual projects (Comité de Cooperación 
Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2007: 6). In addition to stressing the importance of 
reinforcing the common institutions, EU representatives also stressed the importance 
of contributing to a more coherent market also by addressing the severe economic 
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divergences between the Mercosur states [#01, former senior EU official; #47, MFA 
Uruguay].  
EU actions to encourage cooperation in the Mercosur region took and take 
place in different fields, be it through explicit technical assistance projects or through 
less direct means in the negotiations of the association agreement. In line with our 
operationalisation, this section assesses to what extent the EU used instruments to 
encourage regional cooperation. For this purpose, we assess the EU’s actions in the 
following three policy fields: development cooperation and technical assistance, trade 
and economic relations, and political relations.153 The assessment of EU action in 
different fields is scored and aggregated to produce an overall assessment of our 
independent variable ‘EU instruments to promote regional cooperation’. In doing this, 
we also answer our sub-research question 1 “What instruments does the EU employ 
to promote regional cooperation?” for the EU-Mercosur relationship. 
Direct	support	through	technical	assistance	
The EU’s most direct instruments to support regional cooperation in the Mercosur 
region consist in the provision of technical assistance projects. Table C.3 in the annex 
lists all EU-financed Mercosur cooperation projects from the founding of the 
organisation in 1992 onwards. While the EU no longer foresees a specific cooperation 
programme for Mercosur as a region [#52, EEAS senior official], several projects were 
still being conducted at the time of writing. Although all cooperation projects were 
agreed upon by both the EU and the Mercosur member states, officials involved in the 
respective negotiations on both sides and at different times in our period of analysis 
report that the initiative for projects often came from the EU [#20, former senior 
official, MFA Argentina; #28, former senior official, MFA Argentina; #47, MFA Uruguay, 
#53, EU delegation to Uruguay]154, with a stronger initiative from the Mercosur side 
only developing over the course of the years. A case in point is Mercosur’s outlining of 
cooperation interests in 2014 (CMC 2014). Internal Mercosur documents confirm the 
EU’s initiative, showing that, in at least one case, the EU rejected to finance a project 
that had been proposed by Mercosur (PPTU and Amorín 2005) and that projects were 
                                                             
153 Security matters, otherwise part of our field ‘political relations’, do not play any significant role in 
the relationship and are therefore not assessed. They are limited to the reassurance of mutual 
convictions in the association agreement and are not a matter of substantial dispute in the 
negotiations [#48, senior EEAS official; #40, senior official, Brazilian MFA]. 
154 Two Argentinean negotiators recall a “sometimes paternalistic, even arrogant” [#28, former 
senior official, MFA Argentina] attitude of the EU in the early 2000s, when “they would have this 
arrogant attitude of telling you ‘we’ll help you to do what we did’” [#20, former senior official, MFA 
Argentina]. 
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occasionally proposed – and, in at least one case, granted - by the European 
Commission without consulting Mercosur (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del 
Mercosur (CCT) 2004a: 6; 8–9). This led Mercosur to internally discuss whether 
different EU projects were always in line with Mercosur’s own priorities (CCT 2005a; 
2005c). 
Our overview shows how the EU focused on strengthening Mercosur’s 
institutions and in enabling them to play a stronger role in the organisation. Internal 
correspondence between the Mercosur member states also hints at an EU preference 
for institution-building (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y 
Culto and Sigal 2006). The fact that 87 % of EU commitments (see table C.3 in the 
annex) went to supporting the Mercosur institutions and to aiding the region in further 
integrating its nascent common market, mostly through the development of regional 
norms, provides a clear sign of the EU priorities. In terms of our assessment of the 
independent variable ‘Use of EU instruments to encourage regional integration’, this 
translates into a ‘substantial’ score for our indicator of the absolute and relative 
budgetary relevance of the projects aimed at fostering regional cooperation (all scores 
are summarised in table 6.2 below). 
The list of projects also reveals the nature of the projects supported by the EU 
and how it evolved over time. While the very first years of Mercosur saw the provision 
of largely unearmarked funds [#13, former COM official in Montevideo delegation; 
#41, official at the EU delegation to Brazil] to support the incipient central institutions 
of Mercosur and to increase the capacities of individual states in regional negotiations, 
the focus quickly shifted to projects in which the transmission of EU experiences to 
Mercosur stood at the centre. This was the case most clearly with the financing of staff 
exchanges with the European institutions or the provision of training programmes 
along the European integration experience. But also the establishment of a centre for 
training in regional integration in Montevideo (CEFIR) in 1993 falls in line with this 
approach. Having received a large amount of EU funding, CEFIR provides training and 
analysis on regional integration to officials and experts in the region drawing upon the 
EU experience (e.g. Parlamento del Mercosur and CEFIR 2008), albeit having added a 
focus on civil society and opinion-shapers more recently [#09, CEFIR official]. In 
addition to the projects shown in the table, the EU did also support the elaboration of 
studies to assess the advantages of regional integration for Mercosur and further 
Latin-American sub-regions (Ugarte et al. 2004a: 54–6; Botto and Bianculli 2009: 102) 
and co-funded a Paris-based university chair that analysed the course of the 
negotiations from 1999-2010 (e.g. Chaire Mercosur Sciences Po 2007; DG TRADE 
2003).  
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Interviews with EU actors involved in the formulation, management and 
supervision of cooperation projects at different points in time [#15 and #53, officials 
at EU delegation to Uruguay; #41, official at EU delegation to Brazil, previously at EU 
delegation to Uruguay], with Mercosur and Mercosur member state officials [#20, 
former senior official, MFA Argentina; #19, former official of the Mercosur Joint 
Parliamentary Commission and the Mercosur Parliament], public utterances (e.g. 
Mercopress 2009) and an evaluation of project documentation (e.g. Subgrupo de 
Trabajo 8 "Agricultura" 2001; SPS II Project 2007: 5-7,9; PPTA and Sigal 2006: 2; 
Mercosur Technical Comittee 2 'Customs Issues' 1995: 4–7; Commission 2005a) show 
that the projects devoted to increase Mercosur’s market integration in several fields 
did in most cases explicitly mention and take the EU experience in this field as the point 
of departure, aiming to transpose it to Mercosur. This was also the case in the 
institution-building field, for example by specifically engaging experts “to provide the 
practice and experience of the European Parliament’s rules of procedure”155 
(Asistencia técnica internacional al Parlamento del Mercosur 2008). This shows that 
the emphasis of the EU’s technical assistance was on promoting institutions that would 
strengthen Mercosur – often along the experiences made by the EU itself. While this 
focus has diminished in the last years with the afore-mentioned development of a 
stronger sense of initiative by Mercosur, these observations lead us to assess the 
emphasis of mentions on regional cooperation in speeches and interviews with EU 
policy-makers with a ‘moderate’ score and the emphasis in strategic documents and 
in project documentation with a ‘substantial’ score.  
In order to place these cooperation efforts in a stable framework, the EU and 
Mercosur concluded the afore-mentioned Interregional Framework Co-Operation 
Agreement (IFCA) in 1996. Drafts of the interregional association agreement show 
that, at least up to 2004, both sides had agreed to include an extremely detailed part 
in the agreement that enumerates numerous areas of co-operation, often 
concentrated on the transfer of knowledge and training. In a degree of detail that is 
uncommon to such treaties, the cooperation part of the agreement spells out 
cooperation objectives for dozens of different fields ranging from tourism over 
macroeconomic policy to technical standards (European Union and Mercosur 2004: 
14-37). While this would certainly justify scoring the emphasis field as ‘substantial’, we 
assess the emphasis of these mentions of regional cooperation in treaties as 
‘moderate’ for two reasons: firstly, because some of the cooperation fields do not aim 
at regional but at bilateral cooperation and, secondly, because this emphasis has 
decreased since 2004 [the current draft of the agreement and interviews with 
                                                             
155 Translated from Spanish by the author. 
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negotiators of the current political and cooperation parts of the agreement further 
strengthen this view, #48, EEAS official; #44, official at the Brazilian MFA; European 
External Action Service 2016]. 
It is important to note that the EU’s focus on its own experience was not 
always met with gratitude by the Latin American side: As preparatory notes of the 
Brazilian foreign ministry for its co-ordinator in the GMC show, Brazil expressed its 
opposition to an EU-funded cooperation project on sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures on the grounds that it showed the “EU’s clear interest to influence 
Mercosur’s norm-setting process on the basis of European patterns and Mercosur’s 
lack of freedom to influence the fields of technical cooperation” as well as the 
“manifest European interest to use technical cooperation to push through issues not 
yet agreed upon in the EU-Mercosur negotiations.” (Subsecretaria Geral da América 
do Sul, Central e do Caribe (SGAS) 2011: 23–4).156 This scepticism is further confirmed 
by the utterances of Argentinean157 officials and a senior Uruguayan diplomat [#47] 
interviewed by the author. 
In sum, and including also the observations made as to the EU’s strategy 
towards the region in the beginning of this sub-chapter 6.2158, our empirical analysis 
of the indicators for development cooperation and technical assistance shows a strong 
use of EU instruments to encourage regional cooperation (12 points out of 16). The 
components of the assessment are shown in table 6.2 below. The assessment shows 
that the EU spent considerable technical assistance in encouraging regional 
cooperation in Mercosur, albeit with a decreasing intensity since 2014. In doing so, it 
focused on the promotion of regional institutions and norms – often taking its own 
experience as point of departure or yardstick. The ensuing sub-section moves to 
analyse the EU’s activities in the fields of trade and economic relations as well as 
political relations, where the EU exerted a less explicit, albeit considerable, influence 
on Mercosur’s development. 
                                                             
156 Translated from Portuguese by the author. The notes belong to a set of documents leaked from 
the Brazilian Foreign Ministry in 2013. Although improbable, it cannot be excluded that they have 
been modified before release. 
157 As quoted in footnote 154 above. 
158 The EU’s focus on supporting institutions for regional cooperation mentioned in pages 153f. is 
reflected with a ‘substantial’ score on the emphasis of mentions in strategic documents and the 
specific mention of support for regional cooperation in the interregional framework-agreement 
between the EU and Mercosur (see also p. 153) is scored as ‘moderate’. While Titles IV and V of the 
agreement are specifically dedicated to this field, the agreement covers also other areas of 
cooperation.  
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Use	of	EU	of	development	cooperation	and	technical	assistance:	EU-Mercosur	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 1	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 1	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 1	
absolute	 and	 relative	 budgetary	 relevance	 	 of	 development	
cooperation	projects	aimed	at	fostering	regional	cooperation.	 2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 project	 documentation	 and	
assessments.	
2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 1	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	partners	(officials	present	in	negotiations	and	implementation).	 2	
Use	of	development	cooperation	and	TA	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	middle	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 12		Strong	categorisation	 of	 emphasis,	 relevance,	 number	 and	 amount	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	 moderate	 (1)	 –	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.2: Use of EU development cooperation and technical assistance to encourage regional 
cooperation in Mercosur 
Trade	and	economic	relations:	the	indirect	power	of	the	factual		
Beyond the use of explicit instruments to promote regional cooperation in the 
Mercosur region, the EU did and does also encourage Mercosur through a number of 
less explicit measures that either increase the perceived political value of the region 
or encourage it to create new mechanisms of internal consultation and coordination.  
In the field of trade and economic relations, the negotiations with the EU – 
which has been the only sizeable negotiation partner of the region159 – have influenced 
the development of Mercosur. Especially for the first years of Mercosur’s exposure to 
the EU, Latin-American officials, up to the presidents of the Mercosur states (Sistema 
Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA) 2003), report that negotiating with a 
relatively coherent actor put them under pressure to develop coordination 
mechanisms. Reflecting on the 1999-2004 trade negotiations with the EU, the then 
Foreign Minister of Uruguay, Didier Opertti, openly lamented that the Europeans had 
everything that Mercosur lacked: a clear perception of their goals, their limits and 
leeway, and, above all, formally agreed upon negotiation positions (Opertti Badán 
                                                             
159 Mercosur did also participate in the negotiations on the Free Trade Area of the Americas, but 
these were suspended in 2003. 
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2002: 18).160 In light of these difficulties, Mercosur did in fact introduce coordination 
measures, mostly at the intergovernmental level and most notably through decision 
32/00, in which Mercosur states committed to jointly negotiate any trade agreement 
with external partners (CMC 2000c). Similarly, the negotiations increased the 
perception that the joint institutions of Mercosur had to be enabled to provide 
information, assessment or to coordinate cooperation projects [#20, former senior 
official, MFA Argentina; #78, ambassador to the EU of a Mercosur state; #25, Brazilian 
representative to Mercosur; see also Bouzas 2004: 16-17,21; a divergent view is 
expressed by #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina].161  
While the decision to negotiate with the EU as a bloc was taken by Mercosur 
itself in June 2000, the European side welcomed and to a certain extent incentivised 
this decision – not least through the fact that the Council’s 1999 negotiation mandate 
to the Commission is bound to negotiating with the group as a whole (a decision that 
limited the EU’s later options) [#37, senior DG Trade official; Latin America Working 
Party of the Council (COLAT) 1999]. In fact, most of the (trade-related) technical 
assistance measures reflected above were oriented at supporting Mercosur in 
developing common negotiation positions and in enabling the weaker states of the 
group to actively feed their positions into regional mandates (e.g. the 1992 training for 
Paraguayan and Brazilian officials and the support to the Uruguayan sectorial 
committee for Mercosur from 2000 on). Apart from these early measures aimed at 
strengthening the position of individual states in the organisation, all other trade-
related technical assistance measures sponsored by the EU can be seen as a 
contribution to ensuring that Mercosur is indeed as uniform a market as possible – a 
measure not explainable just by market access considerations.162 The projects 
examined (Subgrupo de Trabajo 8 "Agricultura" 2001; SPS II Project 2007: 5-7,9; PPTA 
and Sigal 2006: 2; Mercosur Technical Comittee 2 'Customs Issues' 1995: 4–7), all aim 
at developing common technical norms for the whole Mercosur market. Drafts from 
the first phase of the negotiations for an association agreement confirm the wish to 
expand trade-related technical assistance (Draft articles on cooperation 2002a). We 
therefore score the emphasis on regional cooperation in trade-related assistance 
                                                             
160 Senior Brazilian and Uruguayan officials working on the trade negotiations with the EU 
express the same views in a book edited by the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to relaunch 
Mercosur (Botafogo Gonçalves 2002: 156–62; Magariños 2002: 225–7).  
161 While it is only consistent for members of a customs union to negotiate trade agreements as a 
bloc, Mercosur states maintained a number of individual trade negotiations before decision 32/00 
was taken. 
162 From a purely quantitative point of view, the EU might have been satisfied with concluding a trade 
agreement with only Brazil or Argentina, which make up approximately 95 % of Mercosur’s market 
size. 
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projects and the share of such projects as ‘substantial’. European and Latin-American 
negotiators that took part in different phases of the trade negotiations repeatedly 
stated in interviews that the EU would routinely stress the importance of concluding 
an agreement with a coherent market [#20, former senior official, MFA Argentina; #01, 
former senior EU official; #37, senior DG Trade official; #02, former Undersecretary of 
State for Foreign Trade of Argentina; #40, senior official, Brazilian MFA]. Documents 
from the negotiations and internal Commission discussions on them reflect the same 
emphasis (Commission 2004c: 1; 2004b; Commission 2010: 4–5).163  
As the negotiations became more complicated and were ultimately 
suspended at the end of 2004 and in view of the economic growth of Brazil and the 
relative decline of the other states, the EU’s emphasis on a bi-regional trade 
agreement has lost weight. Nowadays, senior EU officials admit (albeit not in public) 
or at least do not anymore exclude that they would pursue an individual trade deal if 
Brazil wanted to do so [respectively, #52, senior EEAS official, and #37, ibid.]. Even the 
currently negotiated trade agreement would include specific liberalization 
chronogrammes for each of the Mercosur states [#37, ibid.; also #40, ibid.], 
approximating it to individual agreements under one normative roof. This shows that 
practice is more pragmatic than the EU’s strategic aim to conclude an agreement with 
a (regionally) integrated market reflected in the negotiation mandate, in strategic 
documents and throughout most of the negotiations. In light of this evolution, we 
score the emphasis on a regionally coherent agreement in the planning and strategy 
phase with a ‘substantial’ score and with a ‘moderate’ score in the implementation 
phase. In a similar vein, the emphasis on Mercosur as a coherent market decreased 
over time in speeches and public utterances of EU actors. While this emphasis was 
strong during the mandates of trade commissioners Lamy (1999-2004, e.g. Lamy 2002: 
2–3; 2003b) or even Peter Mandelson (2004-2008, e.g. Commission 2006), it clearly 
decreased in speeches of the last commissioner in our period of analysis, Karel de 
Gucht (albeit the negotiations were taken up again during his term from 2010 on). 
Instead of highlighting the special nature of a bi-regional agreement, speeches focused 
on the virtues of simply concluding an agreement, often highlighting the special role 
of Brazil within Mercosur (de Gucht 2012b; 2012a). In light of this decrease, we rate 
the EU’s emphasis on ensuring an agreement with a unified Mercosur in speeches from 
EU actors as ‘moderate’. No specific emphasis on regional integration can be found in 
                                                             
163 More specifically, the EU repeatedly mentioned that the existence of a double external tariff for 
(EU) importers is problematic. This is a result of the numerous country-specific exceptions to 
Mercosur’s common external tariff, de facto meaning that a product entering Mercosur from the EU 
may be taxed again if transferred to another Mercosur state. 
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the trade-related parts of the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement, the 
only treaty between the EU and Mercosur at the time of writing (IFCA 1996: Title II). 
Therefore this particular indicator is scored with ‘none’. 
The overall picture for the EU’s use of trade and economic instruments to 
promote Mercosur’s further regional integration is more nuanced than in the case of 
development cooperation and technical assistance, where virtually all efforts aimed at 
strengthening regional institutions. Summarised in table 6.3 below, the scores for the 
indicators reflect how EU actors emphasised the role of a coherent and uniform 
market especially in their strategic goals towards the region and in the negotiations, 
but also how this emphasis lost importance in practice and as the negotiations became 
more and more complicated. In line with the observations made for the rest of EU 
technical assistance, also most of the trade-related technical assistance provided by 
the EU focused on strengthening regional integration by supporting the development 
of norms applied in the whole region. 
Use	of	EU	instruments:	trade	and	economic	relations:	EU-Mercosur	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 1	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 2	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 0	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 project	 documentation	 and	
assessments.	
2	
amount	 and	 share	 of	 trade-related	 technical	 assistance	oriented	towards	regional	cooperation	and	integration.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 1	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	partners.	 1	
Use	of	trade	and	economic	relations	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	medium	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 11	Medium	categorisation	of	emphasis	 and	amount	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	moderate	 (1)	 –	 substantial	 (2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.3: Use of EU trade and economic relations to encourage regional cooperation in Mercosur 
Political	relations:	encouragement	by	practice	and	decreasing	insistence	
Moving now to the field of political relations, we observe that the negotiations were 
also used by the EU to actively project institutional templates and proposals for the 
further development of Mercosur as a regional organisation. Officials in charge of 
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different phases of the EU strategy towards Mercosur leave no doubt on the strategic 
interest to encourage regional cooperation with Mercosur [#01, former senior EU 
official; #06, DG DEVCO; #13, former COM official in Montevideo delegation; #48, EEAS 
official; #15, EU delegation to Uruguay]. Especially in the first decade of the 
relationship between both regions, EU strategic documents made clear which 
integration path was the correct or even superior one: "All these [Mercosur] 
institutions are still at an intergovernmental level of development, but Mercosur is 
trying to make an effort on institutionalisation." (emphasis added, Commission 2002: 
13). Despite this strong importance attached by the EU to regional cooperation, the 
decrease of the EU’s emphasis over time, up to the extent of not anymore pursuing a 
specific political strategy towards Mercosur as a region, leads us to score the emphasis 
expressed in strategic documents and in interviews of EU policy-makers tasked with 
the strategy of EU relations as ‘moderate’.  
In the practice of political negotiations, participants from both sides report 
that EU representatives stressed the importance of establishing regional 
compensation mechanisms to bridge, or at least limit, the strong social and economic 
divergences between the individual Mercosur states, naming the EU’s cohesion and 
regional development funds as possible examples [#01, former senior EU official; #28, 
former senior official of the Argentinean MFA; #56, senior official of the Argentinean 
MFA and #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina; #78, ambassador of a Mercosur 
state to the EU, see also quotes in Schünemann 2008: 174–6]. Similar interventions 
are reported as to the development of further regional institutions, such as a regional 
court [#01, former senior EU official]. In contrast to these accounts from previous 
negotiation phases, a Brazilian participant in the current phase of negotiations does 
not recall the EU expressing any proposals as to the further development of Mercosur 
[#40, senior official, Brazilian MFA]. In light of these observations from interviews with 
officials from both sides, we score the EU’s emphasis in this field as ‘moderate’. This 
assessment accounts for the decline in the EU’s emphasis in encouraging Mercosur to 
pursue specific institutional approaches. It remains a difficult task to find an EU 
declaration or statement on a Mercosur state that does not include references to 
Mercosur – also in the case of Brazil, which is singled out as a strategic partner of the 
EU with regular summits and high-level meetings also on issues beyond the biregional 
relationship (e.g. Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA) 2007; 
Council 2013d; Brazil and European Union 2012). We therefore rank the EU’s emphasis 
on regional cooperation as expressed in statements and declarations as ‘substantial’. 
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Beyond the active proposal of institutional templates by the European side, 
also Mercosur representatives themselves looked at the EU’s organisational set-up for 
inspiration on, for example, the creation of a regional spokesperson that would 
represent Mercosur’s positions internationally and in the region, as a former holder of 
the office confirms [#77, former president of the CRPM] or a committee of permanent 
representatives [#78, ambassador of a Mercosur state to the EU]. In such cases, the 
EU was not actively using any instruments but rather serving as a source of inspiration. 
In terms of our analytical framework, this points at possible instances of lesson-
drawing or emulation (for a similar case see Botto 2009: 175). 
Politically seen, the conduct of negotiations with Mercosur as a regional entity 
increases its international presence and reputation but also its standing vis-à-vis its 
own member states. Although this effect may be seen as a mostly symbolic matter, its 
importance is not to be underestimated. Seen conversely, if Mercosur lost its role as 
an instrument for the external relations of its member states, it would imply a loss of 
relevance for most of its member states, which, being relatively small markets, are by 
themselves not necessarily able to command sufficient power of attraction in trade 
terms. Even for the largest and economically most relevant state, Brazil, Mercosur is 
an instrument to shape its regional milieu.164 Over the two decades Mercosur and the 
EU have interacted, several EU-Mercosur summits have taken place, usually at the 
margins of larger bi-regional meetings. According to several participants in such 
meetings, these serve mostly ceremonial purposes but bolster the international 
presence of the region [#01, former senior EU official; #04, EP official]. The signing of 
an interregional framework cooperation agreement between the EU and Mercosur in 
1995 falls into the same category. Taking into account that the matters dealt with in 
the treaty (general reassurances of the mutual commitment to cooperation and 
regional integration and the outline of a support programme in institutional and trade 
matters) are usually agreed upon in less ceremonial documents, mobilising the then 
15 EU foreign ministers to sign this agreement denotes the ambition or, at least, 
                                                             
164 In fact, officials at Itamaraty, the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs, frankly stated this as the main 
reason for not pursuing trade negotiations individually even at times when Argentina blocked their 
progress [#40, senior official, Brazilian MFA; #25, Brazilian representative to Mercosur]. The 
admission of Venezuela into Mercosur, despite its difficult economic situation and its manifest 
inability to comply with membership conditions, can also be interpreted as a mostly political move 
(see the resignation letter of Samuel Pinheiro, former Mercosur High Representative and a strong 
advocate of Venezuelas membership (Pinheiro Guimarães 2012: 13–5), as well as the fact that the 
negotiations were directly conducted by Marco Aurélio Garcia, the foreign policy advisor of then 
Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff and not by the Foreign Ministry]. 
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symbolism the EU wished to attach to this cooperation. In light of the time passed 
since then, we do nonetheless rank the EU’s emphasis in treaties as ‘moderate’.165 
Political engagement was stronger between parliaments. The EP engaged 
with Mercosur’s Joint Parliamentary Commission (CPC in its Spanish and Portuguese 
acronym) already from the early nineties on – from 1997 on through its delegation to 
the Mercosur states [#04, ibid.; see also Dri 2015: 167–9]. The establishment of this 
delegation in the follow-up of the 1995 interregional framework agreement was 
perceived as a sign of support to the CPC (and the later Mercosur Parliament), which 
enjoyed a rather limited public perception and political relevance domestically, by 
Mercosur officials [#55, #57, officials of the Mercosur Parliament] and 
parliamentarians [#19, former official of the CPC and the Mercosur parliament]. 
Beyond the formation of the delegation, the EP’s engagement included regular 
political visits to the CPC and the national parliaments, the participation in training 
courses for parliamentary officials (Figueroa 1997: 84–9) and the signing of a 
declaration on technical and political cooperation (Delegación para las Relaciones con 
los Países de Sudamérica del Parlamento Europeo (PE) and Comisión Parlamentaria 
Conjunta del Mercosur 1997). Taking the executive and the parliamentary relations 
together, we assess the relevance of EU political dialogues with a regional focus as 
‘moderate’. In this general context, speeches and utterances by high-level EU actors 
applaud the decision of Mercosur states to pursue integration and encourage them to 
move on (e.g. Benítez 2014: Interview Leffler; de Gucht 2012a: 2; Sistema Económico 
Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA) 2007: Steinmeier). But, in contrast to the 
utterances in strategic documents and those reported from the negotiations, no 
instances could be found in which EU actors would go beyond establishing a general 
sense of kinship between both regions or even pronounce themselves on what was 
the ‘right’ path to pursue. This particular indicator is therefore scored as ‘moderate’. 
We can conclude that the EU used the political instruments at its disposal to 
encourage regional cooperation between the Mercosur states to a considerable 
degree, ranking in the higher middle rank of our assessment (9 points out of 16). As in 
the trade field, we can observe how the emphasis of the EU on promoting regional 
cooperation among its negotiation partners decreased over time.  
                                                             
165 The agreement was signed during the Spanish Council Presidency in 1995, this may further 
indicate that symbolism played an important role. Santander (2005: 294) argues that, upon request 
of the EU, Mercosur states decided to grant ist organisation legal personality to enable it to sign this 
agreement. 
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Use	of	EU	political	instruments:	EU-Mercosur	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 1	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 1	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 1	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 1	
relevance	of	political	dialogues	with	a	regional	focus.	 1	
emphasis	 of	 statements	 and	 declarations	 mentioning	
regional	cooperation.	 2	
emphasis	 of	mentions	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	 policy-makers	present	in	/	tasked	with	negotiations.	 1	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	partners	present	in	/	tasked	with	negotiations.	 1	
Use	of	political	relations	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	medium	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 9	Medium	categorisation	of	relevance	and	emphasis	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.4: Use of EU political relations to encourage regional cooperation in Mercosur 
The analysis above has served to assess our independent variable ‘EU use of 
instruments to encourage regional cooperation’ for the EU’s relationship with 
Mercosur. We have identified diverging degrees of engagement by the EU in the three 
foreign-policy fields: development cooperation and technical assistance, trade and 
economic relations and political relations. Summing up the overview above, we see 
that the EU employs both direct and indirect instruments to promote (closer) regional 
cooperation in the Mercosur region. While training measures, support to the 
development of common regional norms and to the establishment or reform of 
regional institutions are the most prominent forms of explicit support, implicit support 
or encouragement includes instruments such as actively projecting institutional 
templates or providing Mercosur with a stronger international role by regularly 
interacting with it on a regional level. These interactions reflect the fields where the 
EU has employed its instruments to promote regional cooperation and provide the set 
of potential cases among which individual case studies will be selected to analyse 
whether the EU has been able to influence the emergence and development of 
regional cooperation in Mercosur (SRQ2).   
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6.2.2 Case-study	selection	
The overview of EU activities above confirms the EU’s focus on increased market 
integration and institutionalisation outlined in the methods chapter (cf. 5.2.3, p. 109f.). 
Accordingly, these fields form the basis to select individual cases of institutional 
change that will be analysed to trace the EU’s impact on them.  
For the first field, market integration, we select two cases that meet the 
criteria outlined in section 5.2.3: (1) institutional change has taken place during the 
period of analysis, (2) towards which the EU has applied its instruments to promote 
regional cooperation, (3) they are narrow enough to identify external influences, and 
(4) they are potentially relevant to the overall development of cooperation and 
integration in the studied region. These criteria are met by Mercosur’s creation of a 
regional fund to harmonise market conditions and development levels across the 
region (the so-called FOCEM, Fund for Structural Convergence in Mercosur, Case 1) 
and by Mercosur’s efforts to establish common regional norms and practices in the 
field of governmental statistics (Case 2). In light of Mercosur’s strong (economic) 
heterogeneity, the need to increase cohesion between the member states to facilitate 
a closer integration was regularly mentioned by the EU in its negotiations with 
Mercosur and the EU’s own experiences with its structural and investment funds were 
presented as one possible blueprint [e.g. #1, former EU senior official]. The creation of 
FOCEM represented the first reflection of these imbalances in Mercosur’s political 
practice and the first time it moved away from strict parity in the financing of a regional 
policy. The second case, the establishment of a macroeconomic convergence regime 
and supporting activities to improve statistical data, does also seek to address the 
consequences of Mercosur’s divergences and the regular contagion of economic crises 
between its member states. It was supported by the EU, most notably by means of 
three large technical cooperation projects: Statistical Harmonization (1997-2002), 
Statistical Cooperation II (2005-2011), and Support for Macro-economic Monitoring 
(2007-2011). Beyond these cooperation projects, participants in the negotiations 
between Mercosur and the EU report that increasing macroeconomic convergence in 
the crisis-ridden Mercosur was regularly mentioned in the interaction between both 
regions as part of the EU’s emphasis on concluding an agreement with a coherent and 
stable market [#22, Professor Universidad San Martín and Universidad Buenos Aires 
and consultant; #1, former EU senior official; #20, former senior official, MFA 
Argentina]. Between 1999 and 2011, the Mercosur countries did indeed create and 
then reform a convergence mechanism based on macroeconomic targets similar to 
the EU’s Maastricht criteria. 
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In the second field of EU intervention, the institutionalisation of regional 
cooperation, we select two cases in which specific institutional changes took place in 
areas were EU support happened through direct means – again through technical 
assistance projects: the creation of a Mercosur Parliament out of the Joint 
Parliamentary Commission of Mercosur (Case 3), and the creation of the Permanent 
Court of Appeals (Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, TPR) (Case 4). Both institutions 
have their origin in the early to mid-2000s, albeit the Mercosur Parliament has not yet 
reached its final status envisaged in its reform: a direct election of all parliament 
members.166 
Synthesis	
The previous paragraphs have shown how the EU has spent considerable financial, 
technical and, to a more limited extent, also political resources to encourage and 
support Mercosur to continue its path towards regional integration. This allows us to 
reply to our SRQ 1 ‘What instruments does the EU employ to promote regional 
cooperation?’ for this particular relationship: We observe that the EU used 
instruments from all three policy fields distinguished in our definition of the 
independent variable: trade and economic relations, development cooperation and 
technical assistance, and political relations. Certainly, cooperation and technical 
assistance is the most prominent field, scoring a ‘strong’ intensity in our analysis. Here 
the EU has focused its resources on building the regional market and strengthening 
regional institutions, although this focus has diminished over time. Specifically, 
training measures, the provision of expertise and projects to aid in the development 
of regional norms and their implementation are the tools most used. Beyond this 
explicit support, the EU has also promoted cooperation in the region by stressing the 
importance of certain institutional and policy changes, but also by uncovering the 
region’s need to increase its coordination and by passively providing institutional 
                                                             
166 Beyond the four cases selected, also a number of other cases would have met the above-
mentioned criteria: the installation in 2010 of a permanent High General Representative (Alto 
Representante General) of Mercosur attached to the highest governmental decision-making body 
shows resemblance to the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP created in 1999 and attached to 
the Council of Ministers. In fact, it was created in accordance with the EU’s template, as one of 
holders of the preceding office and a confidential document from the Brazilian MFA confirm [#77, 
former president of the CRPM; Ministério das Relaçoes Exteriores 2012: 42]. Similarly, the 
development of common sanitary and phytosanitary norms on the basis of EU norms, the creation 
of the set of rules that define Mercosur’s common market (like the Mercosur custom’s code) or the 
establishment of a student exchange programme in the region could have been chosen as in-depth 
case studies. 
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templates that were likely to be taken up by Mercosur. Activity in these two fields 
scores as ‘medium’ in our analysis. 
Taking this into account, we have selected four cases to empirically trace 
whether and to what extent the use of these EU instruments to promote regional 
cooperation has been met with success. Beginning with the field of market integration, 
the two following sections will analyse whether EU instruments have had an impact 
on institutional change in Mercosur. 
6.3 Market	integration	
Mercosur’s aspiration to create a common market has always been met with a central 
challenge: confronting – or at least – accommodating the vast divergences between 
its four member states. The ambitious plan to set up a customs union in just three 
years soon encountered different expressions of this challenge: ever since, Mercosur 
states have been perforating their common external tariff with a growing list of 
exceptions to protect those industries they see under threat from competitors inside 
the region (GMC 2000; CMC 2015c; 2010; 2009; 2007c; CMC 2005; 2003; 2000b); 
industrial disputes, reaching from the auto to the paper industries, have been 
retaliated by the states with duties or even outright political boycotts (International 
Court of Justice 2010; Infobae 2015); and economic crises have been exacerbated by 
unilateral decisions – to name just a few prominent examples that show the lack of 
(effective) regional policies and norms and that have rather divided than united the 
common market. 
This section will study two cases of institutional change inside Mercosur that 
aimed to bridge the fundamental divergences between the member states increasing 
the coherence and integration of the regional market: the creation of a regional 
cohesion fund and of a macroeconomic convergence regime. The two case studies 
proceed along the same structure. Firstly, the respective institutional change (i.e. our 
dependent variable) is analysed and its intensity is assessed. Secondly, the context in 
which the reform took place is briefly reflected, focusing on assessing the last and most 
time and situation-specific scope condition: domestic incentives. In light of the context 
and the EU instruments identified for the specific case, the core of each section 
process-traces the impact of those diffusion mechanisms that could have influenced 
the decisions and actions of Mercosur actors. The intensity of each of the hypothesised 
causal mechanisms is assessed and scored, allowing to rank their relevance for each of 
the cases studied. 
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6.3.1 A	Cohesion	Fund	for	Mercosur?	–	the	establishment	of	
Mercosur’s	Fund	for	Structural	Convergence	
Mercosur’s Fund for Structural Convergence (FOCEM) seeks to lessen the extreme 
differences in economic development between the Mercosur states. The importance 
of diminishing these gaps to increase Mercosur’s economic stability, to consolidate it 
as a common market and – not least: to increase its public acceptance, was regularly 
mentioned by the EU in its negotiations with the region [e.g. #1, former senior EU 
official; #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina]. However, the matter did not play 
a role in the regional political practice until the creation of FOCEM. 
Institutional	change	-	moving	from	contribution	to	redistribution	
The inauguration of FOCEM in 2006 marked the public recognition of the strong 
economic imbalance between the Mercosur states – in terms of the very goal of the 
fund but also with regard to its financing: the fund is the first Mercosur instrument 
funded by the member states in accordance with their economic size. Whereas the 
largest contributor, Brazil, pays 70 % into FOCEM’s budget, Paraguay’s share amounts 
to just 1%. The distribution of the funds is the opposite, with 48 % going to Paraguay 
and only 10 % each to Brazil and Argentina.167 The fund examines, approves and 
oversees development projects to reduce the structural divergences between the 
Mercosur states. Despite the large divergences in the region, structural asymmetries 
had not played a significant role in Mercosur’s discussions until 2003 (Terra 2008: 
20).168 Up to this point, Mercosur had been built on the traditional liberal conviction 
that increased trade would gradually allow states to approach economic convergence 
and build an increasingly integrated common market. Mercosur had even rejected the 
‘special and differential treatment’ that was already established practice in other Latin 
American trade agreements (Bouzas 2005: 16). 
 This fundamental change to Mercosur’s tradition meant the addition of a new 
task to Mercosur’s goals: actively reducing the economic divergences between its 
member states through regional redistribution. This new task, a core function in terms 
of our analytical scheme for institutional change, came along with the creation of a 
dedicated regional institution and involves different Mercosur actors: The fund itself 
is managed by a newly created FOCEM secretariat that assesses the projects presented 
                                                             
167 These shares have been adapted as a result of Venezuela’s accession to Mercosur. 
168 It is surprising that Mercosur’s founding treaty did not include any significant provisions for 
differential treatment in trade aspects beyond the granting of exceptions from the common external 
tariff (Asunción 1991b: Art. 6, Anexo I; cf. Secretaría del Mercosur 2005a: 8–10).  
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by member states. At a decision-making level, the fund draws on existing Mercosur 
institutions to decide upon the individual projects (done in the CRPM) and to politically 
approve these decisions (in the CMC) (de Andrade Correa 2010: 401). In terms of 
decision-making rules, FOCEM operates along four thematic programmes, ranging 
from infrastructure to social cohesion. These programmes were defined in two 
ministerial decisions, the second of which also established the shares for the 
contributions of the states and for the share they would be able to receive (CMC 2005: 
Art. 6, 10; 2004c). As to its competences, the fund is mainly tasked to technically 
assess, fund and oversee the projects presented to it. Formally created in December 
2004, the fund started to operate in 2006 and has been prolonged for another ten 
years in 2015 (de Andrade Correa 2010: 399–400; 2015b). The funding for the first 
projects was approved in 2007 (CMC 2007b). Not surprisingly, the addition of a new 
field of activity to Mercosur and the creation of a new institution to take care of it 
involves change along all four dimensions of our dependent variable. The sum of these 
changes leads us to classify the creation of FOCEM as a substantial institutional change. 
The table below sums up this assessment.  
Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 Reduce	structural	divergence	between	the	Mercosur	member	states	 1	Actors	 Creation	of	an	own	institution	to	manage	the	funds	and	administer	projects	Managerial	and	political	decisions	are	taken	by	CRPM	and	CMC	
1	
Decision-making	 Creation	of	rules	that	define:	• Fields	of	activity	for	the	fund	
• Contribution	shares	and	shares	devoted	to	each	country	
1	
Competences	 Assessing	 the	 technical	 viability	 of	 development	projects	Financing	development	projects	 1	
Institutional	change	–	FOCEM	
4		
Substantial	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	dimensions	changed.	The	core	function	represents	a	threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 6.5: Institutional change in the establishment of FOCEM 
As mentioned above, the creation of FOCEM was Mercosur’s first significant incursion 
into a mode of financing that moves away from equal contributions to shares 
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calculated along the economic size of the member states.169 This meant a significant 
break with Mercosur’s tradition, which had so far upheld the equality between all 
member states. The following paragraphs will briefly survey the context and the 
domestic incentives under which these changes became possible.  
Context	and	domestic	incentives	
The creation of FOCEM was preceded by a short but intense discussion between the 
Mercosur states. Whereas Paraguay, the smallest and by far poorest country in the 
group, was obviously in favour of establishing redistribution mechanisms, the 
incentives of the others to agree were less straightforward – even less so if one takes 
into account that Mercosur had so far strictly avoided any discussions on ‘solidarity’ 
between its member states. It is important to highlight that the agreement of Brazil 
and Argentina was only possible as a result of the political and economic climate in 
which Mercosur saw itself from 2003 on – in the aftermath of the most serious 
economic crisis for decades. Emerging from a unilateral Brazilian devaluation in 1999, 
the crisis culminated with Argentina’s default in 2001 and sent all other Mercosur 
states into deep economic trouble. Exposing the contagionness of the economies and 
exacerbating its harsh divergences in development, the crisis had called into question 
the very purpose of Mercosur. 
To boost Mercosur’s reputation after the crisis, the member states agreed on 
a ‘work programme’. This programme aimed to finalise the common market, increase 
the presence of Mercosur institutions and widen its social agenda (CMC 2003d) – a 
path towards “profound integration” as it was termed by its proponents (Bouzas 2005; 
Government of Paraguay 2007: 3). This emphasis on Mercosur’s renewal was further 
propelled by the coming into office in 2003 of Brazilian president Lula da Silva, whose 
government saw a prosperous and stable Mercosur as a decisive instrument for the 
projection of Brazilian influence [#40, senior official, MFA Brazil; #39, Cabinet of 
Mercosur High Representative, #02, expert and former senior official at the 
Argentinean MFA; Pinheiro Guimarães 2012].170 In terms of our scope conditions, the 
aftermath of the crisis represents a ‘critical juncture’ at which a sufficient number of 
relevant political actors saw a need for reforms. Furthermore, this juncture opened an 
                                                             
169 Several institutions created at the time or later on, such as the Mercosur Parliament or Mercosur’s 
High Representative, are also financed according to GDP size. The financial amounts are much smaller 
though. Two further funds were established by Mercosur with similar contribution shares in 2008 
and 2009, one to guarantee loans to SMEs and one to support family-based agriculture (cf. ABC Color 
2015a). 
170 Spektor(2010); Malamud(2011); Genna and Hiroi(2007) discuss Brazil’s evolving role within 
Mercosur. 
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opportunity for external stimuli to influence regional debates and decisions more 
strongly than before. Indeed, decisive political actors and officials report that the crisis 
had opened their mind for reforms [cf. the numerous contributions in Hugueney and 
Cardim(2002), #23, former head of staff to the president of the CRPM]. 
The small and land-locked Paraguay used this spirit of departure to play a role 
beyond its economic and political weight.171 It used its presidency of the bloc during 
the first semester of 2003 to obtain a recognition of the need to establish 
redistribution mechanisms between the Mercosur states (Bouzas 2005: 17; Banco 
Interamericano de Desarrollo - Instituto para la Integración de América Latina 2007: 
63). In February 2003, the Paraguayan government presented a number of proposals 
seeking a differential treatment for its own country based on its lower degree of 
development (INTAL 2006: 75). While the larger states had traditionally blocked such 
initiatives, this time Brazil and Argentina reacted differently. Argentina remained 
sceptical to the establishment of redistribution mechanisms172, but the political, post-
crisis, context did allow neither Argentina nor the more inclined Brazil to block the 
discussions completely [#25, Brazilian representative to Mercosur]. Instead they 
agreed to a general mandate and took the issue head on, with Argentina tabling its 
own proposal in addition to those of Paraguay and Uruguay (CMC 2003b: 1–2). These 
proposals were to pave the way for the ministerial decision “to prepare, in 2004, the 
studies necessary to establish structural funds in Mercosur to aid the competitiveness 
of the smaller countries and less developed regions” (CMC 2003d: 1.6; 2003c: Art. 
1)173. 
In sum, we observe that the agreement on the establishment of structural 
funds for Mercosur was catalysed by the foregoing crisis, a ‘critical juncture’ that 
pushed Mercosur states to reform their ailing regional block, creating room for so far 
taboo-ridden proposals and making it impossible for the more hesitant Argentina and 
Brazil to oppose a redistribution scheme. Even though this ‘critical juncture’ allowed 
to place the topic of structural divergences on Mercosur’s agenda, the bargaining 
situation was far from simple, with the countries having quite diverse interests. While 
Paraguay is certainly Mercosur’s poorest state and Brazil the one with the strongest 
economic clout, internal inequalities inside the different states are large and 
                                                             
171 A role that Paraguayan diplomacy still celebrates, as evidenced in an article published by the 
Paraguayan diplomatic academy (cf. Ruíz Díaz 2016). 
172 This can be seen, for example, in the speech of the Argentinean president to the Mercosur summit 
in June 2003. It lists Mercosur’s challenges at that time but obviates the on-going discussions on 
structural funds (cf. Kirchner 2003). These are taken up in Lula’s speech, who issues a general 
commitment to reduce the ‘asymmetries’ between the Mercosur states (da Silva 2003: 3).  
173 Own translation from Spanish. 
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complicate the interests beyond a simple dichotomy between large and small states. 
The wording of the decision quoted above – “…smaller countries and less developed 
regions” already hints at the solution that was to be found later on: expanding the 
degree of beneficiaries beyond the smaller countries. The negotiations that led to this 
decision and to the set-up of FOCEM will be analysed in the next pages, focusing on 
whether and how EU instruments may have influenced them. 
Negotiating	a	structural	fund	for	Mercosur	–	having	the	ear	of	the	‘technicians’,	
not	of	their	‘masters’	Three	turning	points	in	the	negotiations	
Trace evidence gathered from the accounts of participants in the discussions, from 
Mercosur meeting documents and from reports of close observers shows that the 
negotiations to establish structural funds for Mercosur unfolded in three phases [Ruíz 
Díaz 2016: 51-58; Secretaría del Mercosur 2005a: 9–11; INTAL 2006: 75–6; Secretaría 
del Mercosur 2005c; 2005b; de Andrade Correa 2010: 399–400; #17, Uruguayan 
representative to Mercosur; #25, Brazilian representative to Mercosur]. The first 
phase started with Paraguay’s initiative to bring the fight against structural 
divergences to the table. This phase spanned from February to December 2003 and 
has already been reported above. During this first phase, we observe how Paraguay’s 
initial idea to introduce trade preferences and/or direct transfers to its own benefit 
changed into a proposal to establish structural funds. We also note that the planned 
scheme did not anymore focus on the state level but addressed less-developed regions 
irrespective of the country. 
The December 2003 decision of the Mercosur ministers to prepare different 
studies and options to establish structural funds for the region marked the start for 
the second phase of the negotiations and the go-ahead for the official discussions 
within Mercosur, for which different proposals had already been tabled by Paraguay, 
Uruguay and Argentina. These discussions took place in a ‘high-level group’ convened 
for that purpose.174 The adopted decision created the fund in formal terms and 
                                                             
174 This group consisted of representatives from the ministries of foreign affairs and economics and 
was chaired by the president of the newly-created Committee of Permanent Representatives of 
Mercosur (CRPM), former Argentinean president Eduardo Duhalde. This group met 13 times in total 
and developed the proposal for Mercosur’s FOCEM between July and December 2004, where a final 
decision was expected to be taken by the Mercosur presidents. However, only a preliminary decision 
was approved at this time because the states could not agree on the fund’s finances Ferretti(2013: 
158); INTAL(2006: 76). 
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roughed out its objectives, but left the most contentious issues, such as the size and 
financing of the fund and its governance, open to further discussion (CMC 2004c). 
A third and final phase of negotiations in 2005 was dominated by the 
discussions on the fund’s share to be borne by each Mercosur state and the funds that 
would benefit each of them. This phase led to the approval of a decision in June 2005 
(CMC 2005), once the presidents had found a compromise (Ruíz Díaz 2016: 57). 
The account of the negotiations shows that there were specific turning points 
at which the general goal to establish some sort of compensation for the smaller 
countries matured considerably. Two of these turning points happened during the first 
phase of the negotiations: The first of them, when the Mercosur states agreed on 
setting up a fund, thereby modifying Paraguay’s initial request for individual 
compensation measures but concurring with its push for solidarity. The second, when 
they decided to focus the fund on regions instead of states. A third turning point 
occurred during the final phase of the negotiations, when the arithmetics to replenish 
the fund and to distribute its resources were agreed upon. The process-tracing will 
concentrate on these crucial instances to analyse in how far EU experiences and 
influences may have shaped these decisions. The brief timeline below summarises the 
main steps of the negotiations. 
Time	 Event	 Turning	points	
1st	phase	of	the	negotiations	Feb	‘03	 PGY	proposal	on	asymmetries	 (1)	From	compensation	measures	to	regional	fund	(2)	From	states	to	regions	
June	‘03	 Presidents’	mandate	Oct	‘03	 Special	meetings	of	ministers	(CMC)	and	senior	officials	(	GMC)	Dec	‘03	 Mercosur	summit	/	CMC	creates	requests	studies	on	‘structural	funds’	
2nd	phase	of	the	negotiations	July	‘04	 Studies	from	Mercosur	secretariat	are	presented	 	 	July	‘04	 CMC	creates	‘high-level	group’	Dec	‘04	 Preliminary	decision	CMC	45/04	formally	creates	FOCEM	 	
3rd	phase	of	the	negotiations	Jan	‘05	 GAN	continues	negotiations	on	size	and	funding		 (3)	Agreement	on	size	and	finances	of	the	fund	June	‘05	 Decision	on	size	and	funding	sources	is	passed	to	the	ministers	and	presidents	June	‘05	 CMC	decision	18/05	2006	 FOCEM	starts	working,	first	project	approved	in	2007	
   Table 6.6: Three turning points in the FOCEM negotiations
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A look at the analysis of the EU instruments conducted in chapter 6.2 shows 
that the EU’s most intensively used instrument, technical assistance, did not play a role 
in this particular field.175 There are also no signs, nor does it seem proportionate, that 
the EU would have attached sufficient political relevance to this matter as to use 
conditionality. We will therefore concentrate our analysis on the impact of lesson-
drawing (H2), persuasion (H3) and emulation (H4).  Talking	Mercosur	into	solidarity?	–	The	role	of	EU	persuasion	
Some participants in negotiations and bilateral meetings report that the EU did at 
times highlight the need to establish some sort of solidarity mechanism between the 
Mercosur states. EU interlocutors would mention the EU’s structural funds as an 
example, highlighting the positive role that these had played to narrow the gaps 
between newcomers and old member states [#01, former senior EU official; #28, 
former senior official of the Argentinean MFA; #56, senior official of the Argentinean 
MFA and #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina; #78, ambassador of a Mercosur 
state to the EU, see also quotes in Schünemann 2008: 174–6]. According to one 
interviewee, these mentions never made it into the official agenda of meetings but 
were part of informal exchanges and conversations between the two sides [#28, ibid.]. 
While a participant from the EU recalls stressing the importance of convergence to his 
Latin American interlocutors [#01, ibid.], other participants in the negotiations do not 
recall this as a topic that the EU would have consistently wanted to place on the 
bilateral agenda [#28, ibid; #56, ibid.].  
A look at the further indicators also does not reveal any empirical evidence 
that would support the impact of persuasion, except for two indicators that are also 
consistent with other diffusion mechanisms: Quite clearly, the EU’s experience in 
addressing structural divergences is significantly higher than that of Mercosur. 
Secondly, the fact that FOCEM is effectively working and was prolonged after its first 
10 years (CMC 2015b) could indicate a genuine change of preferences and a long-term 
commitment to this change, but is also no sufficient indicator by itself. We can 
therefore conclude that there is no sufficient evidence that the EU could have talked 
Mercosur into stronger solidarity between its member states. The respective 
                                                             
175 Later on, once the fund was already established, the EU discussed with Mercosur to provide 
technical assistance for FOCEM (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2006: 4). This 
idea was not further pursued, instead best practices on the management of assistance projects were 
included in the programme for Mercosur’s secretariat from 2008 on (Commission 2007g: 31–2). 
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assessments are summarised in the table below. The ensuing section analyses in how 
far Mercosur drew lessons from EU experiences while setting up the fund. 
Impact	of	persuasion	on	the	creation	of	FOCEM	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	of	the	EU	in	setting	items	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	 bilateral	 agenda	 as	 observed	 in	meeting	 agendas	 and	 interviews	with	participants	of	meetings.	 0	
significance	of	EU	support	to	epistemic	communities	that	pursue	an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.	 0	
presence	of	selective	empowerment	of	political	actors	that	pursue	an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.			 0	
duration	of	a	topic	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	bilateral	agenda.	 0	
significance	of	the	difference	in	experience	in	regional	cooperation	/	integration	between	EU	and	target.	 2	
presence	of	interaction	in	relatively	unpoliticised	and	in-camera	settings.	 0	
duration	 of	 behaviour	 by	 the	 target	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 institutional	change,	also	across	different	contexts	as	observed	in	political	decisions	and	commitment	to	the	institutional	change	(e.g.	in	terms	of	funding	and	relevance	in	policy-making).	
1	
absence	 of	 the	 changed	 preferences	 from	 public	 debate,	 coupled	 with	 their	
presence	in	interviews	with	policy-makers.	 0	
Impact	of	persuasion	scores	as	none	(0-6)	–	moderate	(7-11)	–	substantial	(12-13)	 3	None	categorisation	of	presence	and	absence	as	yes	(1)		–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance,	 significance	 and	 duration	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	 moderate	 (1)	 –	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.7: Persuasion in the creation of FOCEM Drawing	lessons	from	EU	experiences?	
On the path towards FOCEM, studies and assessments were commissioned, presented 
and discussed at several points – either to convince more sceptical actors of the need 
to address the structural divergences in the region, to search for suitable instruments 
or to underpin pre-formed preferences with technical expertise. The mandate of the 
Mercosur ministers to “conduct studies for the establishment of [...] structural funds” 
(CMC 2003c) is the clearest indicator. But studies do also seem to have played a role 
in buttressing Paraguay’s initial call for solidarity measures and in providing the 
smallest and economically weakest state in the region a leverage way beyond its own 
weight. In how far did these studies draw lessons from the EU’s decades-long 
experience with structural funds and influence Mercosur’s decisions? Where did EU 
experiences shape the negotiations? 
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 Ahead of its presidency of the bloc in 2003 (i.e. during the first of the three 
negotiation phases described above), Paraguay commissioned a number of studies to 
demonstrate how large economic divergences between member states had a negative 
impact on regional integration processes and on Mercosur in particular (Ruíz Díaz 
2016: 54). One of these studies, which was published in a shortened version, shows 
how Paraguay’s relative income had even decreased since the creation of Mercosur 
and proposes, among other, the establishment of a ‘Mercosur Regional Development 
Fund’ (Masi and Hoste 2002). It draws lessons both from EU as well as from Latin 
American development funds (Masi and Hoste 2002: 21–6). 
Despite these initial ideas, Paraguay’s first proposal to the other Mercosur 
states in February 2003 went a different way. It focused on achieving a differential 
treatment with unilateral benefits for itself and stayed short of proposing any general 
scheme for the whole region (INTAL 2006: 75; Vaillant 2008: 133; Gobierno del 
Paraguay 2003). Why Asunción chose this approach could not be determined.176 
Paraguay’s push opened discussions for a general approach and prompted the other 
states to prepare their own plans (INTAL 2006: 75) – soon backed by a mandate from 
the presidents (Cumbre de Jefes de Estado Mercosur 2003d). 
It was at a later stage when the EU’s experience came into play. Detailed 
discussions took place at special meetings of the Mercosur foreign ministers in 
October 2003 and, a month later, of the GMC senior officials (GMC 2003b; CMC 2003b; 
Secretaría del Mercosur 2003). At this point, Paraguay’s initial requests for unilateral 
privileges were challenged with alternative proposals from Uruguay and especially 
from Argentina. While Uruguay also asked for unilateral benefits for its economy, 
Argentina’s proposal foresaw the establishment of a regional programme – and 
referred to the EU’s structural funds as one possible blueprint [#17, ibid.]. Also 
Paraguay presented now a proposal for the establishment of “structural funds”, largely 
building on the studies it had already prepared in 2002 (Ruíz Díaz 2016: 55). Brazil 
agreed to this approach (GMC 2003b: 4). According to participants in the meeting, the 
experience of the European structural funds played an important role here. It served 
to convince Paraguay and Uruguay that they would also benefit from an approach that 
was not specifically directed at them and that did not foresee any immediate trade 
easements. The two small Mercosur members remained sceptical, aware that such a 
scheme required financial contributions from all member states [#17, ibid.]. Still, Brazil 
and Argentina made clear that they preferred a regional programme instead of 
                                                             
176 Possibly, Paraguay sought to offset non-tariff trade barriers by Argentina and Brazil as directly as 
possible. 
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unilateral benefits and set the course for the further negotiations [#28, senior official, 
Argentinean MFA; #17, ibid.; GMC 2003a]. In sum, we observe that the large Mercosur 
states recurred to the recognised example of the EU structural funds to shape the 
negotiations towards their preferred outcome, avoiding unilateral preferences for 
Paraguay and Uruguay. 
In the further course of the negotiations, Uruguay advocated for regions as 
beneficiaries of a structural fund instead of a distribution between states (GMC 2003b: 
4). This opened the path for an agreement with the large countries, which would now 
also be in a position to profit from the fund. Here as well, the EU’s structural funds 
played an important role as source of inspiration. As reported by participants in the 
negotiations, the EU funds and their orientation along regions as well as their principle 
of co-funding served to move the discussion from its focus on redistribution between 
large and small states to a discourse that emphasised support to less-developed 
regions – the second turning point in the negotiations. This was especially important 
to secure Brazil’s support, which has the largest economy but also some of the poorest 
regions in the bloc [#17, ibid.; #28, ibid.]. 
With these two main parameters – the establishment of a fund and its focus 
on regions – agreed upon, the ministers gave the go-ahead for the second phase of 
discussions. Borrowing an EU term, they requested options for the establishment of 
“structural funds” (CMC 2003c) and soon installed a ‘high-level group’ to elaborate a 
proposal (CMC 2004b). Mercosur’s secretariat undertook the requested studies. These 
looked at how other regional integration processes tried to reduce structural 
asymmetries (CMC 2004a; Secretaría del Mercosur 2004b), on the decision-making 
processes that governed such schemes (Secretaría del Mercosur 2004c) and even on 
the possibility to draw own resources to finance the funds (Secretaría del Mercosur 
2004a). Especially the first two studies spent most effort surveying the EU’s structural 
funds, their setup, their objectives and their functioning, also in terms of how to define 
benefitting regions. In the same vein, the coordinator of the ‘High-level group on 
structural convergence and financing of the integration process’, Eduardo Duhalde, 
reports to the presidents that a fund “like the ones used by the European Union” 
would be an objective for Mercosur together with the long-term goal of a regional 
development bank (Duhalde 2004a: 3). 
Over the course of the negotiations, a split occurred between the smaller 
countries on one side and Argentina and Brazil on the other. While Uruguay and 
Paraguay wanted to agree on the specific programmes and objectives of the fund, the 
large states wanted to discuss its funding first (INTAL 2006: 76). By then, discussions 
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in the ‘high-level group’ had reached almost disruptive heights, with some 
participants, for example Argentina, proposing that Mercosur should start levying own 
resources to finance the fund (Ferretti 2013: 159; INTAL 2006: 76). The statements 
from participants and Duhalde’s report from the negotiations show that the smaller 
countries prevailed. They used the argument that establishing the objectives of the 
fund was a technical matter and recurred to some of the priorities, such as 
infrastructure spending, that were deemed to have helped new EU members narrow 
their gaps to old member states [#25, ibid., #17, ibid.; Duhalde 2004c]. A participant in 
these negotiations recalls that large parts of the talks were of a technical nature, 
characterised by the rational weighting of different alternatives. It was especially in 
these contexts, in which she recalls resorting to foreign examples [#17, ibid.]. 
According to a Brazilian diplomat who took part in this second phase of the 
discussions, negotiators looked at the EU especially at the beginning of the talks. He 
recalls that at specific moments of the negotiations, referring to the EU as a model had 
built confidence among the sceptics, for example while the larger states were pleading 
for a regional scheme instead of granting unilateral preferences to Uruguay and 
Paraguay. Over the course of the negotiations, as discussions became more political 
and less technical, the participants did recur less and less to the EU – or to other 
examples such as those in the region [#25, ibid.]. In line with this development, also 
the name given to the fund changed from the EU-reminiscent term ‘structural funds’ 
to convergence funds.  
It was at this time, at the end of 2004, when the discussions inside the ‘high-
level group’, has reached a point that required political decision-making. While the 
group had come to a proposal for the fund, it could not agree on its size and the shares 
to be borne by each state (Duhalde 2004b: 2). In a short – but symbolically important 
– decision, the ministers agreed to create the FOCEM in formal terms and to decide 
upon the remaining issues over the next months (CMC 2004c), thereby starting the 
third phase of the negotiations. 
In line with the decreasing role of the EU’s blueprint over the course of the 
negotiations, no evidence could be found for an EU influence on the last turning point: 
the size of the fund and the sources for its funding. These decisions were taken by the 
ministers and – ultimately – by the presidents of the Mercosur states (Duhalde 2005: 
4–5). The presidents set the size of the fund at 100 million US$/year and decided that 
Montevideo would become the seat of its small secretariat. Paraguay, which had 
fought for a larger fund and Asunción as its seat, was compensated by increasing its 
share beyond the 36 % planned up to 48% percent – at the expenses of Argentina and 
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Brazil (Ruíz Díaz 2016: 56–7). The contributions to the fund were agreed upon on the 
basis of long-term GDP shares, a proposal that had been made by Paraguay in the 
‘high-level group’ (Ruíz Díaz 2016: 56; Ferretti 2013: 159; Rojas de Cerqueira César, 
Gustavo 2015). These agreements were cast into a decision of the Mercosur Council in 
June 2005 (CMC 2005). 
Summing up the different phases of the negotiation and moving to the assessment of 
the lesson-drawing indicators, we observe that studies and analyses commissioned by 
individual member states (Paraguay and Argentina) or by Mercosur as a whole played 
an important role in the course of the discussions. Accordingly, we score the number 
of analyses commissioned as ‘substantial’. These studies most prominently looked at 
the European structural funds for inspiration, often elaborating which elements of the 
funds could be applicable for the whole region. EU experiences played a traceable role 
in two of the three turning points of the negotiations: the decision to establish a 
regional scheme instead of individual compensations and to address regional 
development instead of whole states. It also seems to have played a role in pushing 
the negotiators to agree on the objectives of the fund before agreeing on its financing. 
In all three instances, participants in the negotiations described the EU’s influence as 
a confidence-building or guiding factor for the talks.  
These influences occurred without any direct incentives from the EU to 
behave in such way; we therefore score this indicator in our assessment as ‘none’. In 
the same vein, the initiative to study the EU’s experience or to refer to it during the 
negotiations or in public statements clearly came from the respective Mercosur actors. 
Despite this, we do not see any salient attempts to specifically study foreign or EU 
experiences in a detailed manner or to involve experts on EU structural funds. Instead, 
the analyses evaluated were rather general and often looked also at other sources of 
inspiration, such as the development banks and programmes of Latin American 
regional organisations (e.g. Masi and Hoste 2002). We therefore score the 
predominance of Mercosur’s initiative as ‘moderate’. Neither our interviews nor the 
documents analysed show specific evidence for an adaptation of an EU template to 
Mercosur’s conditions. The fact that a Mercosur fund would not resemble the EU 
structural funds in terms of size and functioning in any close future was out of question 
and did not play a role in the negotiations. We therefore score the indicator 
‘adaptation of foreign templates to local conditions’ as ‘none’. Finally, the decision to 
create FOCEM was clearly grounded on a functional reasoning: reducing the large 
disparities between the Mercosur states. Several alternatives were discussed to 
address this problem, ranging from unilateral benefits for individual countries, over a 
regional fund to the establishment of a development bank. However, the weighting 
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between these alternatives was motivated by the financial preferences and 
possibilities of the member states rather than by reasonings about their effectiveness. 
We therefore assess the predominance of functional reasons in the justification of 
institutional change as ‘moderate’. 
In conclusion, we observe a substantial impact of lesson-drawing from the EU 
during the negotiations for the set-up of FOCEM. Table 6.8 below sums up the 
assessment of the individual indicators. It is interesting to see that the role of the EU’s 
experience decreased the more political the discussions became – up to the point of 
playing no identifiable role in the bargaining on the size and quotas for the 
beneficiaries of the fund. In conjunction, it seems that the EU’s impact on these 
negotiations resulted mainly from its recognised role as a front-runner on regional 
policy and on the appeal of established terms such as ‘structural funds’. This may 
hardly seem surprising in light of the EU’s track record in this field, but it also shows 
that EU influence was limited to the technical level of the negotiations. 
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	on	the	creation	of	FOCEM	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
relevance	of	EU	incentives	specifically	directed	at	the	observed	institutional	change	as	evidenced	in	documents,	interviews	with	actors	from	the	EU	and	its	counterpart.	 2	
predominance	 of	 initiative	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	documented	or	reported	requests,	public	discussions.	 1	
number	 of	 analyses	 and	 studies	 by	 experts,	 officials	 or	 policy-makers	commissioned	 or	 authored	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	
documents	or	interviews.	 2	
adaptation	of	 foreign	templates	to	 local	conditions	as	a	result	of	 functional	considerations,	manifested	in	technical	documents	or	interviews.	 0	
predominance	 of	 justifications	 of	 the	 institutional	 change	 with	 functional	reasons	 and/or	 weighting	 of	 alternative	 policies	 evidenced	 in	 official	
documents,	public	statements	or	interviews.	 1	
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-9)	 6	Substantial	categorisation	of	adaptation	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	predominance	and	number	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	categorisation	of	relevance	as	none	(2)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(0).	
Table 6.8: Lesson-drawing in the creation of FOCEM The	appeal	of	EU	structural	funds	-	Emulation	
Several pieces of evidence mentioned in the analysis of the lesson-drawing hypothesis 
above diminish the likeliness that the emulation of an EU template played a role in the 
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creation of FOCEM. In line with the decreasing relevance of EU structural funds over 
the course of the negotiations, we also do not observe any prominent references to 
the EU to vindicate the creation of FOCEM. While also other instruments, such as a 
regional development bank, would have been suitable to reduce the asymmetries 
between the Mercosur states, nothing in the negotiations reveals that functionally 
more adequate alternatives had been present and not adopted. Instead, the adoption 
of the fund makes sense as a functionally fitting, more affordable solution that only 
requires small institutions. We therefore score these two first indicators for emulation 
as ‘none’. 
 Following a positive assessment of its first decade, FOCEM has recently been 
prolonged for another ten years until 2026 (CMC 2015a). Despite delayed or even 
lacking contributions from some member states, the fund is active and has financed 
more than 50 projects to date (FOCEM 2017). Consequently, we can also not identify 
a lack of assessment of FOCEM’s effectiveness nor that it had been put into place 
without being used. Furthermore, the assessment of lesson-drawing has shown that 
there was a functional motivation to install this instrument: the large economic 
divergences between Mercosur’s member states. Only one indicator consistent with 
emulation applies to the creation of FOCEM: the lack of clear performance indicators 
for the fund. When the fund was prolonged, the states did not assess whether it had 
actually contributed to reduce their development gaps. All effects of the fund are only 
surveyed on the project level (FOCEM 2017). In sum, all analysed indicators except the 
lack of precise performance indicators point that Mercosur had not sought to emulate 
the EU structural funds. This assessment is summarised in the table below. 
Impact	of	emulation	on	the	creation	of	FOCEM	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	 of	 prominent	 references	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 adopted	institutional	change	elsewhere	 0	
presence	 of	 functionally	 more	 adequate	 and	 known	 alternatives	 to	 the	change	adopted	 0	
adoption	 of	 EU-promoted	 institutional	 change	 without	 its	 application	 in	
practice	
0	
adoption	of	institutions	without	a	thorough	assessment	of	their	effectiveness	 0	
absence	of	a	functional	motivation	for	the	institutional	change	 0	
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Impact	of	emulation	on	the	creation	of	FOCEM	
presence	of	ambiguous	goals	and	performance	indicators	 1	
Impact	of	emulation	scores	as	none	(0-3)	–	moderate	(4-5)	–substantial	(6-7)	 1	None	categorisation	of	adoption,	absence	and	presence	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	moderate	 (1)	 –	 substantial	 (2)	 with	 ‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.9: Emulation in the creation of FOCEM 
Synthesis	
Assuming that solidarity between the member states was necessary to further 
integrate the common market, the creation of FOCEM in 2005 broke with a decade-
long tradition of half-hearted integration within Mercosur. The introduction of a 
proportional burden-sharing for FOCEM’s budget was equally innovative in a region 
that hitherto adhered to the principle of equality between states. This approach was 
later taken over for a number of further Mercosur institutions. In terms of our 
assessment, the creation of FOCEM represents a substantial institutional change. 
Drawing a conclusion across the mechanisms analysed, we can summarise 
that the EU did influence the creation of FOCEM. Its impact worked through lesson-
drawing, i.e. as a result of Mercosur’s own initiative. No sufficient empirical evidence 
could be found for an impact through EU persuasion or as a result of a legitimacy-
seeking emulation from Mercosur. 
 EU experiences and templates were the main source of inspiration Mercosur’s 
experts and negotiators drew upon when sketching out the main features of the fund, 
but not the only one. The EU’s structural funds had a decisive influence on two of the 
three turning points of the negotiations. In most cases this influence came into play 
whenever one of the sides in the negotiations was looking for a reputable example to 
convince the other of its propositions. The EU structural funds worked as a reference 
and confidence-building device. 
However, the EU’s influence was certainly lower than what could have been 
expected in a field in which it doubtlessly is the most experienced regional integration 
scheme worldwide. The reasons for this relatively limited influence may well lie in two 
main factors. On one hand, the EU promoted its own experience in addressing 
European structural divergences, but there is no proof that it had actively sought to 
transfer specific institutional solutions or patterns. It behaved as a benevolent 
observer. Even accounts from settings in which the EU was most active suggest that it 
restrained itself. At most, it highlighted the importance of a certain degree of social 
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cohesion for successful regional integration. There is no evidence that it had either 
pushed for such reforms or actively supported them through assistance, political 
backing or even financially. Secondly, it is remarkable that EU influence was limited to 
mostly technical spheres. In a post crisis-setting in which Mercosur looked for 
innovative approaches to further integrate its markets and reduce the differences 
between its member states, the EU and its structural funds were the standard to look 
at and a reference to which proponents could resort to convince more sceptical actors. 
As long as the negotiations dealt with specific instruments and measures to address 
structural divergences and negotiators looked for examples, the EU’s solutions were 
an almost inescapable blueprint. As soon as the negotiations moved on to a more 
political level, the EU’s influence diminished. 
Beyond their structural divergences, reaching a fairly homogenous market 
within the Mercosur economies was and (and still is) compromised by their strong 
macroeconomic instability. Building a macroeconomic convergence regime was one of 
the attempts to address this issue. The following section will analyse in how far EU 
influence played a role here. 
6.3.2 Building	a	macroeconomic	convergence	regime	for	
Mercosur	–	escaping	a	prisoner’s	dilemma?	
Macroeconomic instability, high inflation and the contagion of virulent economic 
crises from one neighbouring state to the next have characterised the economic 
history of the Southern Cone for decades.177 While all four Mercosur economies are 
highly dependent on external factors such as the fluctuations in commodity and credit 
markets and the economic situation of their largest international trade partners (the 
EU, US and increasingly China), harmful intra-regional dynamics exacerbate these 
dependencies. Despite a relatively small share of intra-regional trade178, the Mercosur 
states have been dragging each other into severe crises with quite some regularity. 
Most frequently, the small and especially trade-dependent Paraguay and Uruguay 
have had to suffer the impact of the crises of their two larger neighbours, but also 
Argentina and Brazil have regularly pulled each other into economic turmoil 
(Rozenwurcel 2014: 14–7). Coordinating their macroeconomic policies would ease this 
burden for all Mercosur states by increasing predictability and the attractiveness of 
the regional market as a place for investments. 
                                                             
177 Roughly the same applies when including Venezuela, albeit its position as an oil-producing country 
and its large imports place it in a special situation. 
178 15-20 % in average over the last 20 years, with a peak of around 25 % in 1997-1998. 
Empirics I: EU-Mercosur 
 
 173 
 In fact, Mercosur states committed to coordinate their macroeconomic 
policies already in the very first article of Mercosur’s founding treaty, setting 
themselves a rather ambitious mandate to align fiscal, monetary, exchange-rate and 
capital policies (Asunción 1991b: Art. 1). Well aware of the relevance of monetary and 
exchange-rate policies, the governments also included representatives of the central 
banks in Mercosur’s decision-making structure (Asunción 1991b: Art. 14). Despite this 
promising start, Mercosur did not implement this commitment or agree on any specific 
measures for almost a decade. And the role of the central bank governors in 
Mercosur’s Common Market Group (GMC in its Spanish and Portuguese acronym) is 
described as “anecdotal at most” by a close observer of the matter [#22, Professor 
Universidad San Martín and Universidad Buenos Aires and consultant]. 
The main reason for this hesitance can be described with an analogy to a 
prisoner’s dilemma. The 1998-2002 crisis is certainly the most prominent case in point: 
Brazil’s unilateral decision to devaluate its currency in 1999 provided its ailing 
economy with a gasp of relief. But this decision had a severe effect on Argentina’s 
competitiveness, whose 2001 default in turn impacted heavily on Brazil and the two 
other states.179 All Mercosur states would have profited from a coordinated approach, 
but each individual state (especially Argentina and Brazil) would have seen reduced its 
options to unilaterally react to future crises.180  
Despite this dilemma, Mercosur did finally agree on several coordination 
measures from the 2000s on. How did this change come about? And in how far did the 
EU play a role in these reforms? The following paragraphs will first assess the degree 
of institutional change (dependent variable) and briefly describe the context and 
domestic incentives at that time before process-tracing to what extent EU instruments 
(independent variable) played a role in these reforms. 
Overcoming	the	prisoner’s	dilemma?	–	Institutional	change	
1999 and 2000 saw the start of a number of initiatives aiming to increase 
macroeconomic coordination. A 1999 decision by the Mercosur ministers to translate 
the general agreement on macroeconomic coordination into (slightly) more specific 
tasks marked the go-ahead (Conselho do Mercado Comum 1999). The years 1999 to 
2002 saw Mercosur moving from no coordination at a relatively advanced level: 
                                                             
179 See the data presented in Rozenwurcel(2014: 11). 
180 Argentina’s decision to manipulate its inflation data from 2007 on is probably the most blatant 
example of a unilateral reaction to a crisis that would become very costly under a functioning regime 
of macroeconomic coordination with harmonised statistical data. 
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mutually agreed macroeconomic goals.181 Even if member states have never 
surrendered their right to take unilateral decisions, this change is remarkable in the 
above-mentioned context. 
What triggered this change? Following a Brazilian and Argentinean initiative, 
the year 2000 saw the first specific agreements in the field of macroeconomic 
convergence. Taking up the input from the economy ministers and central bank 
presidents, the Mercosur governments agreed to harmonise statistical data for the 
most important macroeconomic indicators and created a Macroeconomic Monitoring 
Group (GMM in its Spanish acronym). Consisting of officials from the finance and 
economy ministries and from the central banks, this group meets every three months 
to assess the consistency of statistical data and to keep track of member states’ 
performance (CMC 2000a; El Mercurio 2000). Just a few months later, the presidents 
of the Mercosur states and of the associated Bolivia and Chile spelled out specific 
macroeconomic targets (Mercosur et al. 2000). Similarly to the 1991 Maastricht 
criteria, these defined thresholds for the debt to GDP ratio, inflation and deficit rates. 
While in this first agreement, the correction of deviations relied on self-commitments, 
a 2002 update of the agreement introduced a pre-defined reduction path for inflation 
(Reunião de Ministros da Fazenda 2002e; GMM 2011a: 2). Explicitly referring to an EU 
assistance programme, a 2011 decision further updated the GMM, specifying its 
mandate and adding permanent working groups to monitor fiscal, monetary and 
balance of payments data (CMC 2011). 
Macroeconomic coordination requires comparable statistical data, which was 
not available at that time since the Mercosur states applied different standards and 
definitions. The development of common standards for statistical data was therefore 
closely related to the efforts above. Before and after the instauration of the GMM and 
the agreement on macroeconomic goals, Mercosur states ran different capacity-
building programmes in statistics. On this basis, the GMM began to publish 
macroeconomic indicators from 2008 on (GMC 1997). Experts from the national 
statistics institutes developed common definitions for some of the most important 
macroeconomic variables and regularly meet in a ‘Specialised meeting for Statistics in 
                                                             
181 Different degrees of macroeconomic coordination exist in theory. On a most basic level, policy-
makers may regularly exchange information and thereby contribute to more informed unilateral 
decisions. Going further, states may commit to take certain decisions, like devaluating their currency, 
only after consulting with partners. Numerical macroeconomic goals or corridors, such as keeping 
inflation rates under a specific threshold, are a third step and aim at increasing predictability and 
confidence. Exchange rate agreements, up to the definition of specific parity rates, like in a monetary 
union, are the strongest form of macroeconomic coordination. Each of these steps trades in decision-
making autonomy for the promise of a more stable and predictable macroeconomic environment. 
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Mercosur’ since 2010 (GMC 2010). In 2012, the GMM started a system to monitor 
macroeconomic indicators with a view to identifying fields in which a stronger 
macroeconomic coordination could be achieved (Gasparini 2012: 15–6; MercoPress 
2011). 
In sum, these decisions created new rules to operationalise the so far diffuse 
commitment to macroeconomic coordination and installed a new actor, the GMM, to 
monitor compliance with these rules. We therefore score the two respective 
dimensions of institutional change – actors and decision-making – with ‘1’ each. 
Despite these commitments, the reforms did not increase competences for Mercosur 
institutions or the GMM, leaving it to the member states to assess their own 
performance at regular meetings and to propose measures to meet the convergence 
targets (Mercosur et al. 2000: 2–3; see the meeting records published on the GMM 
website GMM 2002-2016). Accordingly, we score institutional change in this 
dimension as ‘none’.  
The above-mentioned reforms laid the base for a closer macroeconomic 
coordination between the Mercosur states, but Argentina’s manipulated inflation data 
also shows that Mercosur has no handle to influence or sanction the behaviour of its 
member states beyond a hesitant ‘naming and shaming’: during the last years it simply 
stopped publishing Argentina’s data (see the data published on the GMM website). In 
terms of our assessment of the dependent variable, these reforms imply a ‘moderate’ 
institutional change. Although two out of four dimensions of institutional change saw 
considerable change, the core function – macroeconomic coordination – was already 
enshrined in Mercosur’s founding treaty. Table 6.10 below sums up this assessment. 
Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 No	 change,	 commitment	 to	macroeconomic	 coordination	existed	already	in	the	Asunción	Treaty	 0	Actors	 Meeting	of	ministers	and	CB	presidents	created	in	2000,	creation	of	the	GMM	in	2000,	creation	of	a	coordination	meeting	of	statistics	experts	in	2010.	 1	Decision-making	 Creation	of	rules	that	define	
• specific	goals	for	macroeconomic	convergence,		
• deviations	from	these	goals,	
• how	to	react	in	case	of	deviation	and	
• a	reduction	path	for	inflation	(added	in	2002).	
1	
Competences	 Competences	 are	 limited	 to	 the	 publication	 of	macroeconomic	data	(‘naming	and	shaming’)	 0	
Institutional	change	–	macroeconomic	coordination	in	Mercosur	 2		
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Moderate	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	 dimensions	 changed.	The	 core	 function	 represents	 a	 threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 6.10: Institutional change in Mercosur's macroeconomic coordination 
Insufficient as they may have proven in practice, the reforms mentioned above put an 
end to a decade of stagnation in terms of macroeconomic coordination in Mercosur. 
Cooperation sparked in a field in which Mercosur states were trapped in a prisoner’s 
dilemma where not cooperating is the expected outcome. The analogy of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, where access to external information can solve the coordination 
problem, raises the question whether the EU’s intervention may have tipped the 
balance from uncooperative to cooperative behaviour. To find out, the remainder of 
this section first assesses the most immediate context of the institutional change and 
process-traces the effect of the EU’s activities along the causal mechanisms 
hypothesised in our theoretical framework. 
Context	and	domestic	 incentives	–	macroeconomic	 convergence	 in	a	 region	of	
spoilers	
Despite its commitment to macroeconomic coordination in the early nineties, almost 
a decade passed until Mercosur took the first timid steps described above. The reasons 
for this delay may well be seen in the fact that, despite its expected positive returns, 
conditions for macroeconomic coordination are all but inviting. The extreme 
disparities between the Mercosur states already made it difficult to form a relatively 
homogenous economic space in the beginning. In addition, the four initial Mercosur 
members have been growing apart in terms of per capita GDP ever since and also the 
income distribution inside most of the member states has continued to spread (Albrieu 
2009: 83–4). And most importantly, the individual states have regularly used their 
macroeconomic levers to lessen the impact of crises at the expenses of their 
neighbours (Amann and Baer 2014: 330–2 provide several examples beyond the 
already mentioned 1999 Brazilian devaluation) – spoiling any options for a regionally 
harmonised response.182 
Used to being dragged into crises by their larger neighbours, Paraguay and 
Uruguay were always more positive towards a rule-based macroeconomic 
coordination in the region [#22, ibid.; #47, senior official MFA Uruguay; #16, former 
senior official, Paraguayan Ministry of Finance]. This is not surprising, as their capacity 
                                                             
182 In addition to the difficulties mentioned, the parity of the Argentinean peso to the US dollar until 
2002 made a monetary coordination very improbable. 
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to unilaterally react to crises is much more limited than that of Argentina or Brazil. But 
also the larger countries have had a motivation to engage in macroeconomic 
coordination, usually in the aftermath of crises. In fact, accounts of the events in 1999 
indicate that Argentina took the political initiative to push for the reforms that led to 
above-mentioned institutional change. It first sought an agreement with the more 
hesitant Brazil (Graça Lima 1999; Agência Folha 1999; Cortina 1999) and then a 
common understanding with all Mercosur states (Schemo 1999; Illiano 1999; CMC 
1999). The commissioning of several reports by the Argentinean government in 2003 
to assess the feasibility and possible scenarios for macroeconomic coordination 
further testifies for its intellectual leadership in this field (Centro de Economía 
Internacional Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto 
2003).  
Argentina’s motivation to take the initiative and break out of this coordination 
problem may well have been to at least partially shift the blame for its severe 
economic crisis on the regional context and more specifically on Brazil. As Argentina’s 
economic situation kept deteriorating in the end of the 1990s, reminding both the 
electorate and the international public that Brazil’s unilateral devaluation had 
accelerated Argentina’s demise was a plausible strategy for the government in Buenos 
Aires. As a former Argentinean vice-president put it, “the government felt the need to 
contextualise what was happening in Argentina in the broader regional context, to 
learn from these events as a region” [#77, ibid.]. In fact, the size of the Brazilian 
economy – four times as large as the Argentinean around the 2000s – and Argentina’s 
dependency on exports to Brazil (approximately 30 %, Taccone and Nogueira 1999: 43) 
substantiate this claim. 
In any case, the fresh impetus on macroeconomic cooperation coincides with 
a major crisis, supporting our expectation that crises can be important scope 
conditions, representing ‘critical junctures’ at which political stalemates may be 
overcome. In this specific case, the crisis affected Argentina to an extent that it was, 
at least rhetorically, not only willing to give up its hesitance against macroeconomic 
coordination but to advocate for it against Brazil. The following paragraphs will analyse 
in how far this crisis also allowed for external, particularly European, influences to 
stimulate regional debates and decisions more strongly than before.183  
                                                             
183 The renewed emphasis did not take place once the crisis had cooled down, but in its peak. This 
may support the argument that the Argentinean initiative was a mainly political move. 
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When	time	is	ripe	-	EU	influence	on	Mercosur’s	macroeconomic	coordination	
A look at the different EU technical assistance programmes for Mercosur analysed in 
chapter 6.2 and listed in Annex C reveals that the EU and Mercosur cooperated on 
macroeconomic coordination and related fields already before the macroeconomic 
crisis hit the region in the turn of the 2000s. Interviews with EU representatives show 
that at least individual officials used the increased dialogue with Mercosur after the 
signature of the Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement in 1995 to discuss 
this field with their counterparts [#01, former senior EU official] and cooperation in 
statistics was one of the fields highlighted in the agreement (IFCA 1996: Art. 8). Studies 
commissioned by the Argentinean government and statements by prominent 
decision-makers such as Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (Aith 1999; 
Cardoso 2001: 189) provide a hint that Mercosur looked at the EU’s example to guide 
its own efforts. In light of these precedents, the next paragraphs will concentrate on 
tracing the impact of assistance (H1b), lesson-drawing (H2), persuasion (H3) and 
emulation (H4) to analyse the EU’s possible influence on macroeconomic coordination. The	impact	of	EU	assistance	in	statistics	and	macroeconomic	coordination	
EU assistance programmes focused both on a prerequisite for macroeconomic 
coordination, creating comparable statistical data, as on coordination instruments 
themselves. The EU financed two ‘Statistical Harmonization’ projects that spanned 
from 1997 to mid-2003 and from 2007 to 2011 respectively, and a programme on 
‘Assistance to Macroeconomic Monitoring in Mercosur’, running from 2009 to 2011.  
Laying	the	ground	–	statistics	for	Mercosur	
The first of the two statistics programmes focused on transferring technical expertise 
and acquainting the region to the European model of national statistical institutes with 
a coordinating and leading regional institute, Eurostat (see for example Cooperación 
Estadística UE-Mercosur, Codirección Mercosur 2001b; Riestra and Goes 2003). The 
objective was to harmonise statistical data and practices in different fields including 
macroeconomic, trade and financial indicators (CMC 1997: 256–60; Ugarte et al. 
2004b: 1–2). While individual parts of the project were seen as successful both by 
Mercosur representatives [#58, former official at the Argentinean Ministry of Finance; 
Informe 2002b] and by an evaluation commissioned by the EU (Ugarte et al. 2004b: 3–
7), its impact in terms of institutional change was limited. The project connected the 
hitherto dispersed national statistics institutes in the region (Informe 2002b; Convenio 
2003a) and put the creation of a regional statistics institute on the agenda, albeit only 
for a short time [Ugarte et al. 2004b: 4-5; #58, ibid.]. 
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The lack of further results may well be related to the fact that the project was 
not rooted in Mercosur’s own demands but designed by the European Commission 
and Eurostat to spread a knowledge and experience they assumed to be relevant for 
the region. This fitted well in an existing Eurostat policy to disseminate its expertise 
(Eurostat [2009?]). Both Mercosur’s and the EU’s own internal evaluation (Comité de 
Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2005a: 20, 22) as well as interviews with an 
EU official overseeing Mercosur cooperation at that time [#13, former official at the 
Uruguay delegation] and Mercosur representatives [#58, ibid.; #16, ibid.] substantiate 
this, up to the extent of arguing that “statistical harmonization appeared on the co-
operation agenda only because the EC was interested in transferring its experience in 
this field” (Ugarte et al. 2004b: 2). Despite the political commitment expressed by 
Mercosur presidents at their 1998 summit to “work on the harmonisation of 
macroeconomic policies and consider further aspects that might in the future facilitate 
the establishment of a common currency” (CMC 1998: 2), the EU’s evaluation 
concluded that that Mercosur saw “neither the political will nor the need to present 
harmonized statistics” (Ugarte et al. 2004b: 5).184 This contrasts with the very positive 
assessment of the immediate beneficiaries, the national statistics institutes (cf. 
Informe Ejecutivo 2002c), showing indeed that the initiative lacked sufficient political 
support and ownership at the decision-making levels. 
 The second statistical harmonization programme found a more receptive 
political context influenced by the 1999/2000 political decisions to strengthen 
macroeconomic coordination. In fact, Mercosur was eager to initiate the cooperation 
programme as soon as possible and presented different proposals to prolong the 
previous statistics programme (Estadística 2001b) – also as a means to secure funding 
for its national institutes (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2005a: 
18). The EU was more hesitant and wanted to focus on the politically more audacious 
macroeconomic coordination. It argued that Eurostat did not anymore have the 
capacity to assist Mercosur (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 
2004a: 6; 2003b: 4) – possibly a result of a reduced interest of the Commission’s 
statistics office to propagate its accomplishments. Despite Mercosur’s strong interest, 
it took several years for the project to actually start, among other reasons because 
Uruguay lacked sufficient funding to coordinate the programme and passed it on to 
Argentina (Commission delegation to Uruguay and Paraguay and Hanna 2006). The 
programme ran from 2007 to 2011 and focused on harmonising national statistics in 
the social and economic fields. Now, its design took into account the requirements of 
                                                             
184 Mercosur’s own evaluation was more positive, but also highlights that the impact at the regional 
level was limited (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2005a: 5–8, 22). 
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Mercosur’s macroeconomic coordination regime (Commission delegation to Uruguay 
and Paraguay 2003: 4). 
 In contrast to the first programme, this time both Mercosur and the EU saw 
positive results. According to their respective evaluations, the project established a 
regular cooperation between the national statistics offices (Buchet and Rua Boiero 
2012: 18), contributed to reducing the divergence in their capacities (Grupo de 
Cooperación Internacional del Mercosur 2012: 2; Buchet and Rua Boiero 2012: 18, 41-
42) and increased the perception that harmonised statistical data were important to 
advance in Mercosur’s integration (Buchet and Rua Boiero 2012: 49). Unlike the 
previous programme, this project also led to the creation of a permanent institution 
for the regular coordination between the national statistics institutes in 2010. The 
‘Specialised Meeting for Statistics in Mercosur’ still operates nowadays and maintains 
a small permanent secretariat in Argentina (Reunión Especializada de Estadísticas del 
Mercosur 2016; Grupo del Mercado Común [2013b]). Regularly requested by the EU 
as part of the first statistics programme (Ayuda Memoria 2001a: 3; 2002c: 5; 
Cooperación Estadística UE-Mercosur, Codirección Mercosur 2001a: 5), it was finally 
installed as part of the second programme (Buchet and Rua Boiero 2012: 52–3). 
A	technicality	becomes	a	political	priority	-	Macroeconomic	coordination	
Why was this second project more effective in achieving institutional change? Why 
was it considered more successful by both EU and Mercosur? The political priority 
given to macroeconomic coordination from 1999 on, the connection of the second 
project to this priority and Mercosur’s initiative in proposing the continuation of 
statistical cooperation to the EU indicate that regional ownership was higher during 
the second programme. This was confirmed in interviews with involved Mercosur 
actors [#58, ibid., #16, ibid.]. In parallel to the definition of this programme, 
negotiations to involve the EU in Mercosur’s efforts for macroeconomic coordination 
had begun in 2003 (Grupo de Monitoreo Macroeconómico del Mercosur 2011a: 3). All 
this contributed to position a relatively technical matter in a politically relevant 
context.  
Nonetheless, the initiative for a project to enhance Mercosur’s 
macroeconomic coordination and the first ideas were still provided by the European 
Commission. It emphasised this idea during the participation of then Commissioner for 
Economic and Monetary Affairs Pedro Solbes at the meeting of Mercosur Economy 
Ministers and Central Bank Presidents (Faull 2000). The EU was eager to transfer its 
experience in macroeconomic coordination (such as the Excessive Deficit Procedure), 
in developing a currency union, liberalising capital markets and creating a common 
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market of financial and banking products and proposed such programmes already in 
early 2000 (DG ECFIN 2002 [2000]: 2–3).185 A detailed project plan developed by the 
Commission in 2003 took up these headings and highlighted five fields in which the EU 
would support Mercosur: harmonization of macroeconomic statistics (closely related 
to the above-mentioned second statistical harmonization project), defining targets for 
convergence, mechanisms to ensure compliance with these targets, developing fiscal 
indicators, and strengthening central bank independence (along the EU’s experiences 
with the Maastricht Treaty and its protocol on the ECB and the European System of 
Central Banks). While seen as ‘over-ambitious’ at first by Mercosur (Ministerio da 
Fazenda Brasil 2004: 1), most of these more detailed proposals were at least broadly 
aligned with the discussions held at the GMM (Commission delegation to Uruguay and 
Paraguay 2003: 3–9; Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2005b: 2–3). 
Despite the positive political context and the EU’s conviction that its proposal 
“was favourably received” (Faull 2000), Mercosur took some years to agree to the EU 
proposals on macroeconomic coordination, sparking the Commission’s political 
pressure in form of letters to the Brussels-based Mercosur ambassadors (European 
Commission and Cardesa 2003) and repeated warnings that the funds foreseen could 
not be kept forever (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2004b: 3–4; 
2005d: 3–4). During the time between the EU’s first proposals in 2000 and the actual 
start of the project in 2009 (Ministerio de Economía y Producción and Delegación de 
la Unión Europea a Uruguay y Paraguay 2007; Grupo de Monitoreo Macroeconómico 
del Mercosur 2011a: 4) negotiations with Mercosur led to the gradual removal from 
the programme of the more far-reaching ideas of the EU, including central bank 
independence and compliance mechanisms for macroeconomic deviations [Grupo de 
Monitoreo Macroeconómico del Mercosur 2011a: 4; Ministério das Relaçoes 
Exteriores and Subsecretaria Geral da América do Sul, Central e do Caribe (SGAS) 2004; 
PPTP 2005; #22, ibid.]. The final programme concentrated on more modest issues; in 
fact a large part of the project did still consist in improving Mercosur’s statistical 
capacities – in parallel to the second statistics project mentioned above. Courses to 
encourage the transfer of European experiences played a role in all fields (Grupo de 
Monitoreo Macroeconómico del Mercosur 2011a: 4; Termansen 2010: 70–4). 
The EU’s support for macroeconomic cooperation had a lasting impact on 
Mercosur according to the evaluations undertaken by Mercosur itself and by the EU 
and to the impressions of involved officials from the Mercosur countries. Most 
                                                             
185 The EU proposal also led to the inclusion of articles on a regular macroeconomic dialogue and 
cooperation in statistics in the draft association agreement. These articles remain part of the current 
negotiation texts (European External Action Service 2016: Art. 36, 38). 
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importantly, it led to a decision by the Mercosur Council to further institutionalise 
macroeconomic coordination and maintain the different working groups created 
between officials of the Mercosur member states to align their respective statistics 
and macroeconomic policies [#56, ibid; #16, ibid.; #22, ibid.; Buchet and Rua Boiero 
2012: 42, 48–49, 52; Grupo de Cooperación Internacional del Mercosur 2012: 2]. 
Maintaining this structure contributed to keeping the matter on Mercosur’s agenda – 
including on issues on which a dialogue had not been possible before due to mutual 
mistrust (Buchet and Rua Boiero 2012: 48). In an exceptional acknowledgement, 
Mercosur’s ministerial decision explicitly mentions the European cooperation project 
in its recitals (CMC 2011).186 Beyond this, the project produced a number of statistical 
manuals and studies on macroeconomic harmonization, including on drawing lessons 
from European experiences (Grupo de Monitoreo Macroeconómico del Mercosur 
2011b; 2011a: 4–5; Buchet and Rua Boiero 2012: 42). 
Summing up the impact of all assistance projects, we can see that the modest 
degree of institutional change achieved was related to EU assistance. EU support first 
contributed to institutionalise the cooperation between the national statistics offices 
on a technical level and finally to establish a regular coordination between national 
authorities to align their policies in some macroeconomic fields. In the latter case, EU 
assistance surpassed the technical level and also had a political impact – with Mercosur 
ministers even explicitly referring to the EU’s support as a motivation. Such emphasis 
is rare. Together with the statements of interviewed Mercosur officials [#58, ibid.; #16, 
ibid.], this underlines that EU assistance triggered the institutional changes reflected 
above. We therefore assess the indicator ‘explicit mentions of EU assistance’ as 
‘substantial’. Moving to the second indicator, the relevance of EU assistance in shaping 
the design of the observed institutional change was more limited and is scored as 
‘moderate’. While the EU tried to promote ‘European’ institutional patterns, such as a 
regional statistics institute or a convergence path for macroeconomic deviations based 
on its Excessive Deficit Procedure, these more ambitious proposals did not find 
sufficient support among Mercosur states. Instead, Mercosur adopted more 
mainstream solutions, such as an institutionalised network of experts or guides to align 
local statistical practices to international conventions. Those institutional changes still 
operate nowadays – we therefore score the duration of EU-induced institutional 
change as ‘substantial’. The assessment of the different indicators is summarised in 
table 6.11 below. 
                                                             
186 On a side note, it is also interesting that the reference to the EU was made at a time (June 2011) 
when the EU’s track-record in achieving macroeconomic coordination was everything but 
undisputed. 
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We can therefore confirm that the impact of EU assistance on Mercosur’s 
reforms was ‘substantial’. Quite interestingly, and beyond this assessment, we also 
observe a variation between the impact of the three EU-sponsored assistance projects 
in this field. While the very first statistics project did barely reach any significant 
institutional change, the second project and the support to the Mercosur 
Macroeconomic Monitoring Group did not only lead to institutional change, but it also 
achieved political salience. Our analysis indicates that this variation is related to the 
regional ownership enjoyed by the projects. The two later projects ran during a period 
when Mercosur states had agreed on reaching stronger macroeconomic coherence 
and especially the macroeconomic coordination project was subject to a longer 
negotiation that adapted the EU’s proposals to the local agenda. 
Impact	of	assistance	on	Mercosur’s	macroeconomic	coordination	regime	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
emphasis	of	explicit	mentions	of	EU	assistance	as	a	trigger	for	institutional	change	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	counterparts.		 2	
relevance	of	EU	assistance	in	the	design	of	institutional	change	as	reflected	in	
speeches,	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 1	
duration	of	 institutional	change	created	with	EU	assistance	as	reflected	by	
documents	from	and	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 2	
Impact	of	assistance	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-3)	–	substantial	(4-6)	 5	Substantial	categorisation	of	emphasis,	 relevance	and	 duration	 as	none	–	moderate	 –	 substantial	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.11: Assistance in the establishment of Mercosur’s macroeconomic coordination regime Winning	Mercosur	over?	–	EU	persuasion	
Mercosur’s macroeconomic difficulties also played a role in the negotiations and the 
regular political contacts between Mercosur and the EU. While other topics, especially 
trade-related ones, always dominated the bilateral economic agenda, the need to find 
a way that would flatten the recurrent swings in their macroeconomic fundamentals 
was mentioned from time to time by EU representatives [#01, ibid.; #20, former senior 
official, MFA Argentina; #22, ibid.]. We do therefore analyse whether EU persuasion 
played a role in the establishment of Mercosur’s macroeconomic harmonisation 
regime. 
 Our previous analysis of EU assistance in this field already points at several 
factors that would also be consistent with an impact of EU persuasion. Through its 
emphasis on statistical cooperation and macroeconomic coordination, the EU lifted 
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cooperation on macroeconomic issues onto the regional agenda.187 Despite this EU 
predominance, we also observed that Mercosur developed a genuine political interest 
in tackling these matters after the 1999 crisis (see page 180). We therefore rank the 
EU’s predominance in placing institutional change on the bilateral agenda as 
‘moderate’. Through its support for Mercosur’s national statistics institutes (Comité 
de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 2005a: 5–7) and different courses offered 
through CEFIR on macroeconomic coordination in the EU [#09, CEFIR official] the EU 
helped to create a small epistemic community of technical experts in favour of policy 
coordination. It is still difficult though to ascertain an intentional strategy here and 
influence was limited to the expert level, without reaching politics. The significance of 
this EU support is therefore also ranked as ‘moderate’. Quite clearly, the difference in 
experience in this particular integration field between the EU and Mercosur was and 
still is very ‘substantial’. The fact that cooperation on macroeconomic matters remains 
part of the otherwise widely modified draft association agreement between the EU 
and Mercosur (EEAS 2016: Art. 36, 38) may be seen as a sign of a relatively long 
duration of the matter on the bilateral agenda and enters our assessment with a 
‘moderate’ score – moderate because no particular bilateral activity has taken place 
in this field since the end of the EU’s technical assistance project in 2011.  
 No empirical evidence could be found for any of the further persuasion 
indicators. While macroeconomic coordination remains on the bilateral agenda, the 
behaviour expected from such institutional change has not been consistent. 
Argentina’s doctoring of its inflation numbers from 2007 under the contemplative eye 
of Mercosur’s macroeconomic ‘watchdog’ GMM is a clear example for this. In a case 
of persuasion, one would expect no public debate to have taken place on the 
institutional change. Quite to the contrary, Mercosur’s move towards macroeconomic 
coordination was prominently discussed at the time. The respective presidential 
decisions and several press articles from 1999 and 2000 show this (Aith 1999; Cortina 
1999; El Mercurio 2000; Illiano 1999; Schemo 1999). We can therefore conclude that 
EU persuasion did not have any impact on this matter, if it existed at all. The respective 
assessments are summarised below. 
 
 
                                                             
187 A detailed internal study commissioned by the Commission to analyse policy options towards 
Mercosur did also include macroeconomic coordination as one of the fields of special interest to the 
EU (cf. Bouzas et al. 2002: 104-108, 437-453). 
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Impact	of	persuasion	on	Mercosur’s	macroeconomic	coordination	regime	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	of	the	EU	in	setting	items	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	 bilateral	 agenda	 as	 observed	 in	meeting	 agendas	 and	 interviews	with	participants	of	meetings.	 1	
significance	of	EU	support	to	epistemic	communities	that	pursue	an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.	 1	
presence	of	selective	empowerment	of	political	actors	that	pursue	an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.			 0	
duration	of	a	topic	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	bilateral	agenda.	 1	
significance	of	the	difference	in	experience	in	regional	cooperation	/	integration	between	EU	and	target.	 2	
presence	of	interaction	in	relatively	unpoliticised	and	in-camera	settings.	 0	
duration	 of	 behaviour	 by	 the	 target	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 institutional	change,	also	across	different	contexts	as	observed	in	political	decisions	and	commitment	to	the	institutional	change	(e.g.	in	terms	of	funding	and	relevance	in	policy-making).	
0	
absence	 of	 the	 changed	 preferences	 from	 public	 debate,	 coupled	 with	 their	
presence	in	interviews	with	policy-makers.	 0	
Impact	of	persuasion	scores	as	none	(0-6)	–	moderate	(7-11)	–	substantial	(12-13)	 5	None	categorisation	of	presence	and	absence	as	yes	(1)		–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance,	 significance	 and	 duration	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	 moderate	 (1)	 –	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.12: Persuasion in the establishment of Mercosur's macroeconomic coordination regime Learning	from	Maastricht?	–	Lesson-drawing	
The assessment of EU assistance to Mercosur has shown that EU-Mercosur 
cooperation on macroeconomic coordination was mainly driven by the EU in the 
beginning. A strong ownership from Mercosur developed only after the Brazilian 
devaluation in 1999. This growing initiative raises the question whether Mercosur 
actively sought to draw lessons from the EU’s experience in this field and whether it 
developed a sense of initiative.  
Once especially Argentina’s intervention had resuscitated macroeconomic 
coordination on Mercosur’s agenda from 1999 on, the region actively sought to learn 
from the European experience. The Mercosur meeting of Economy Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors exceptionally invited then Commissioner for Economic Affairs 
Pedro Solbes to its October 31st 2000 meeting to present European experiences with 
macroeconomic coordination. This exchange followed on a workshop organised by 
Mercosur on ‘Coordination and Convergence of Macroeconomic Policies: the EU’s 
Experience” (Faull 2000; La Red 21 2000). Years later, similar events took place in 2011 
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and in 2012, now under the impression of the sovereign debt crises in the EU. To 
mention one example, a workshop on ‘Challenges for financial integration – lessons 
from the European experience’ highlighted that macroeconomic coordination as 
pursued in the EU might no longer be the model “along which Latin-Americans orient 
themselves” (Banco Central do Brasil 2012; Grupo de Monitoreo Macroeconómico del 
Mercosur 2011a: 3)188. This changed perception of the EU’s role as a reference is also 
mentioned by several interviewees [#58, former senior official, Argentinean Ministry 
for Economic Affairs; #16, ibid.; #19, former senior official Mercosur Parliamentary 
Commission / Mercosur Parliament] and further sources (Gasparini 2012: 18–9). We 
see that these initiatives denote a significant interest from Mercosur, but also that 
they have to be seen in a specific time context; there is a clear shift between the pre- 
and post-1999 situation in terms of Mercosur’s own initiative. Having this in mind, we 
assess the predominance of Mercosur’s initiative as ‘moderate’. 
The commissioning of studies to assess foreign experiences with 
macroeconomic coordination would also indicate lesson-drawing. While individual 
studies were commissioned by the Argentinean government (e.g. Centro de Economía 
Internacional Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto 
2003), no further assessments could be found (except those produced with EU 
support). We therefore assess this indicator as ‘moderate’. Moving to our next 
indicator, the presence of EU-set incentives for institutional change, we can again rely 
on the results of our previous analysis. As mentioned above, the EU financed three 
projects to assist Mercosur in moving towards macroeconomic harmonisation, 
totalling up to 13 million € (see table C.3). As we have seen throughout the analysis, 
this assistance aimed specifically at establishing permanent institutions that would 
permit a stronger degree of coordination and even surveillance. We therefore rank the 
role of EU incentives as ‘substantial’. When Mercosur agreed to establish a 
macroeconomic coordination regime in 1999, Brazilian president Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso referred to it as a ‘little Maastricht’ (Cardoso 2001: 189; Taccone and 
Nogueira 1999: 43). While the Maastricht convergence criteria were seen as a 
reference by those involved in the creation of Mercosur’s harmonisation targets [#58, 
ibid.; #22, ibid.; Gasparini 2012: 13–4], there are no further signs that the EU’s system 
had been taken as a template and adapted to Mercosur’s needs (except for the very 
general fact that both arrangements define targets and thresholds for macroeconomic 
indicators). Instead, it rather seems that the reference to Maastricht served as a 
positively connoted code to explain the reform to the public, thankfully taken up by 
national and international media (e.g. Aith 1999; Lins da Silva, Carlos Eduardo 1999). 
                                                             
188 Own translation from Portuguese. 
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In addition, it left open the question of a common currency for Mercosur – as Cardoso 
himself conceded (Cardoso 2001: 189).189 We therefore score the indicator referring 
to the adaptation of foreign templates as ‘no’.  
As a last possible indicator for lesson-drawing, we investigated whether the 
introduction of Mercosur’s macroeconomic convergence regime had been justified 
mainly with functional arguments and / or whether alternative policies had been 
assessed. Interestingly, it is difficult to find justifications for the institutional change. 
Those that can be found are relatively sparse, but are indeed functional: they refer to 
the need to increase predictability (Cardoso 2001: 189), create a level playing field for 
competition between Mercosur producers (Consejo del Mercado Común del Sur 1999) 
and increase their integration in world trade (Reunião de Ministros da Fazenda 2002e; 
Consejo del Mercado Común del Sur 2000a). We found no signs for thorough 
discussions neither in documents nor through our interviews. Instead, interviewees 
reported that the need to channel the ‘shock’ of the economic crisis into a productive 
policy was a decisive motivation for both Argentina and Brazil [#16, ibid.; #20, ibid.; 
#22, ibid.; #77, ibid.]. Officials and observers that followed the process closely do not 
recall that other examples than the EU had been considered when looking for models 
of macroeconomic coordination [#16, ibid.; #58, ibid.; #22, ibid.]. The alternatives that 
were discussed aimed at completely different policies and were either unilateral and 
completely incompatible with macroeconomic coordination (dollarizing the 
Argentinean economy, cf. Aith 1999) or more a vision than an immediate policy 
solution (pursuing a common currency, cf. Correa 1999). In sum, we therefore rate the 
last indicator – justification of institutional change with functional reasons - as 
‘moderate’.  
Looking at all indicators together, we can conclude that drawing lessons from 
the EU experience had only a limited impact on the establishment of Mercosur’s 
macroeconomic coordination system. The EU’s model did play a role, but only as far 
as it represented the almost inevitable and natural reference in this field, especially 
when the institutional change had to be explained to a larger public. 
 
 
 
                                                             
189 Argentina and Uruguay regularly called for a common currency at that time (Opertti 2001c). 
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Impact	of	lesson-drawing	on	Mercosur’s	macroeconomic	coordination	regime	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
relevance	 of	 EU	 incentives	 specifically	 directed	 at	 the	 observed	 institutional	change	as	evidenced	in	documents,	interviews	with	actors	from	the	EU	and	its	counterpart.	 0	
predominance	of	initiative	by	the	EU’s	counterpart	as	evidenced	in	documented	or	reported	requests,	public	discussions.	 1	
number	 of	 analyses	 and	 studies	 by	 experts,	 officials	 or	 policy-makers	commissioned	or	authored	by	the	EU’s	counterpart	as	evidenced	in	documents	or	interviews.	 1	
adaptation	 of	 foreign	 templates	 to	 local	 conditions	 as	 a	 result	 of	 functional	considerations,	manifested	in	technical	documents	or	interviews.	 0	
predominance	 of	 justifications	 of	 the	 institutional	 change	 with	 functional	reasons	 and/or	 weighting	 of	 alternative	 policies	 evidenced	 in	 official	
documents,	public	statements	or	interviews.	 1	
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-9)	 3	Moderate	categorisation	of	adaptation	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	predominance	and	number	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	categorisation	of	relevance	as	none	(2)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(0).	
Table 6.13: Lesson-drawing in the establishment of Mercosur's macroeconomic coordination 
regime Calming	the	markets	with	toothless	coordination?	–	Emulation	
At first sight, several factors may indicate that Mercosur tried to emulate the EU’s 
experience with macroeconomic coordination: Mercosur’s prominent mention of EU 
assistance when adopting a set of reforms for macroeconomic coordination (CMC 
2011) or the Brazilian president’s allusion to a ‘small Maastricht’ (Cardoso 2001: 189) 
to explain macroeconomic coordination seem to indicate a legitimacy-seeking 
behaviour consistent with emulation. We also observe a discrepancy between the 
once-set goals and the lack of macroeconomic coordination in practice. 
While such emulation would have made a lot of sense to placate investors and 
international observers in times of economic turmoil, all other evidence indicates that 
emulation was not a driving force behind the creation of the macroeconomic 
coordination regime – and that Mercosur actors genuinely wanted to bring their 
institutional innovation to fruition. First of all, the functional need for macroeconomic 
coordination is out of question in light of the repeated contagions between the 
different states in the region. The goals of Mercosur’s macroeconomic monitoring are 
as unambiguous as possible, enumerating specific indicators for macroeconomic 
fundamentals (Mercosur et al. 2000; Reunião de Ministros da Fazenda 2002e: 2). 
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While macroeconomic monitoring is not effective in practice, it is applied with the 
GMM meeting regularly to report on (the lack of) macroeconomic convergence (Grupo 
de Monitoreo Macroeconómico del Mercosur 2002-2016). As mentioned above during 
the analysis of lesson-drawing, individual studies were undertaken to assess 
alternative policies to increase macroeconomic convergence, although only few. In 
addition, Mercosur has assessed (Grupo del Mercado Común 2013a) and revised at 
least once the effectiveness of its macroeconomic coordination regime since its 
creation (CMC 2011). Furthermore, and as mentioned above, Mercosur governments 
discussed alternatives to macroeconomic coordination, ranging from the complete 
dollarization of the Argentinean economy to a common currency (for which some 
degree of macroeconomic convergence would have been a prerequisite, though). In 
sum, all analysed indicators except the occasional references to EU support and ‘little 
Maastricht’, dispel the notion that Mercosur might have tried to emulate the EU’s 
experience in macroeconomic coordination. This assessment is summarised in the 
table below. 
Impact	of	emulation	on	Mercosur’s	macroeconomic	coordination	regime	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	 of	 prominent	 references	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 adopted	institutional	change	elsewhere	 1	
presence	 of	 functionally	 more	 adequate	 and	 known	 alternatives	 to	 the	change	adopted	 0	
adoption	 of	 EU-promoted	 institutional	 change	 without	 its	 application	 in	
practice	
0	
adoption	of	institutions	without	a	thorough	assessment	of	their	effectiveness	 0	
absence	of	a	functional	motivation	for	the	institutional	change	 0	
presence	of	ambiguous	goals	and	performance	indicators	 0	
Impact	of	emulation	scores	as	none	(0-3)	–	moderate	(4-5)	–substantial	(6-7)	 1	None	categorisation	of	adoption,	absence	and	presence	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	moderate	 (1)	 –	 substantial	 (2)	 with	 ‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.14: Emulation in the establishment of Mercosur's macroeconomic coordination regime 
Synthesis	
Summing up the analysis, we can conclude that the EU had an influence on the creation 
of a macroeconomic coordination regime in Mercosur. The creation of this regime 
consisted in a set of steps that operationalised and put into practice a political 
commitment made by the Mercosur governments already during the creation of the 
organisation. This moderate institutional change was especially influenced by EU 
assistance, which had a substantial impact. While lesson-drawing played a role, its 
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impact was moderate. No evidence could be found for an impact of persuasion or 
emulation. 
 The creation of Mercosur’s macroeconomic coordination regime went 
through a set of consecutive steps, ranging from efforts to produce comparable 
statistics, over the agreement on a set of convergence criteria, to the establishment of 
the Macroeconomic Monitoring Group (GMM), an intergovernmental board of 
officials to monitor whether member states complied with those criteria. These steps 
unfolded between 1997 and 2011, with the core of the institutional change taking 
place between 1999 and 2008. 
An interesting trait emerges when comparing the impact of the individual EU 
assistance projects. Out of the three projects analysed here, the two most successful 
ones correlate with the political salience that the matter had achieved after 1999, after 
the crisis and ‘critical juncture’ of Brazil’s devaluation, and with Mercosur’s increased 
role and ownership in the definition of the projects. This is especially striking when 
comparing the two similar statistics projects. While it is impossible to exclude further 
influences, this suggests a correlation between local (political) ownership and the 
impact of such assistance projects. Conversely, it may also indicate that lack of such 
ownership limits EU impact. 
Returning to the question posed at the beginning of this case study: did 
Mercosur escape its macroeconomic prisoner’s dilemma? Convergence data 
(Rozenwurcel 2014; Gasparini 2012: 7–11), Argentina’s manipulation of inflation 
numbers and the different crises that occurred since the mid-2000s provide a clear 
answer: no, it did not. This exemplifies that institutional change and the EU’s influence 
do not automatically translate into an impact on political practice. Taking into account 
the limited degree of institutional change that we have witnessed here, further case-
studies may show a stronger impact on political practice. The following sub-chapter 
will analyse whether and how the EU had an impact on creating more solid institutions 
for regional cooperation in Mercosur. 
6.4 Institutions	for	regional	cooperation	
Mercosur’s ‘light’ institutionalisation and intergovernmental decision-making is 
deeply rooted in the attachment of its member states to their national sovereignty, as 
has been shown before. By implication, its goal to become a ‘Common Market of the 
South’ was to be achieved through negative integration, i.e. the progressive 
elimination of trade barriers. The harmonisation of legal norms was to be agreed upon 
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between the member states and not to be set by any kind of supranational institution. 
Despite this deeply entrenched conviction, the number of Mercosur institutions has 
increased over time and also their competences have grown – at least on paper and 
especially so from the 2000s on. At the same time, our analysis has shown how the EU 
highlighted the need for stronger Mercosur institutions. In how far did the EU 
influence the creation of new Mercosur institutions?  
This section studies two cases of institutional change inside Mercosur that 
created two institutions with own decision-making power and competences in the 
otherwise intergovernmental setup of the organisation: the Mercosur Parliament and 
the Permanent Court of Appeals. The analysis proceeds along the structure used in the 
previous sub-chapter: after assessing variation on our dependent variable 
(institutional change) and studying the respective context and domestic incentives, we 
assess the impact of the different diffusion mechanisms that could have played a role 
and score them according to their intensity. 
6.4.1 The	establishment	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	
From its creation in 1992, Mercosur included a parliamentary component in its 
otherwise heavily intergovernmental set-up. In its last article, Mercosur’s founding 
Treaty of Asunción mentions the creation of a ‘Joint Parliamentary Commission’ (CPC) 
(Treaty of Asunción 1991b: 24), formed in 1994. Without taking into account the 
strong disproportions in population, this modest parliamentary component was 
formed by the same number of deputies despatched by each of the four national 
legislatures and enjoyed only limited competences inside the Mercosur system. A 
regular participant in the sessions of the CPC went as far as describing them as “dull 
and boring, without any practical relevance” [#19, former senior official CPC/Mercosur 
Parliament]. Limited to issuing recommendations to the decision-making organs of 
Mercosur, the main tasks of the CPC were seen in contributing to a timely and 
harmonised incorporation of Mercosur acts into the national legal orders (Ouro Preto 
Protocol 1994: Section IV).190 
Calls to overcome this state played a role in local discussions and a stronger 
parliamentarisation was the declared objective of the CPC itself (CPC 1997: Art. 3(b)). 
The aims of such calls were to form a permanent, directly elected parliament with 
stronger powers and a proportional representation of the populations. Nonetheless, 
                                                             
190 The limited relevance given to the CPC at the founding of Mercosur is further reflected by the fact 
that the parliamentary commission is not mentioned among the organs of Mercosur in the Treaty of 
Asunción. 
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these objectives were seldom taken up by the executives nor even by the national 
parliaments – with the exception of individual deputies especially committed to the 
integration process [#19, ibid.,; #21, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Uruguay]. 
From	a	parliamentary	commission	to	a	directly	elected	parliament	–	
Institutional	change	in	the	Mercosur	Parliament	
In 2007, thirteen years after the creation of the CPC, the Mercosur Parliament was 
inaugurated in a solemn ceremony in Montevideo (Seitz 2007). The Mercosur 
Parliament does not only reflect its stronger ambition through its name, but also 
through a number of notable changes. Had the CPC consisted of the same number of 
deputies from each of the member states, clearly reflecting an intergovernmental 
understanding, the composition of the new parliament echoes the vast differences in 
population through a mechanism of ‘attenuated proportionality’. It foresees 75 
members for Brazil and 18 deputies for Uruguay and Paraguay. While the CPC only had 
the competence to deliberate about decisions already taken by Mercosur’s decision-
making bodies, the Parliament made some gains in this field, adding the right not only 
to request information as before, but also to receive written answers from the 
decision-making bodies of Mercosur within a set timeframe (Parlamento del Mercosur 
2005: Art. 4(4)). Above all, the Parliament is to be formed by directly elected members 
who shall be fully dedicated to their functions as regional parliamentarians, while the 
CPC members just assembled in addition to their national mandates. 
This fundamental change is also reflected in the mission given to the two 
bodies by their respective founding documents: while the CPC was conceived as a 
“representation of the parliaments of the states’ parties” (Ouro Preto 1994: Art. 22), 
the Mercosur Parliament is called to represent “the peoples of Mercosur” (Parlamento 
del Mercosur 2005: Art. 2(1)). Whereas the CPC was a purely deliberative assembly, 
the Mercosur Parliament aspires to be a parliament with representative functions and 
rights of scrutiny and proposal. In addition, the competences of the Mercosur 
parliament foresee a fast-track procedure to address the afore-mentioned 
implementation backlog in Mercosur laws by accelerating their incorporation into the 
national legal orders (Parlamento del Mercosur 2005: Art. 4 (12)). In terms of our 
assessment of the dependent variable, the reform of the Mercosur parliament 
therefore implies change in all four dimensions of institutional change and qualifies as 
substantial institutional change. Table 6.15 below sums up this assessment. 
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Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 From	a	parliamentary	assembly	to	a	directly	elected	parliament	 1	Actors	 From	dispatched	members	of	national	parliaments	to	directly	elected	MPs	with	an	incompatibility	with	national	offices	 1	Decision-making	 From	an	equal	representation	(16	MPs	from	each	state)	to	attenuated	proportionality.	From	a	consensus	rule	for	national	delegations	to	a	majority	rule.	
1	
Competences	 From	competences	to	deliberate,	issue	opinions	and	request	information	to	the	inclusion	of	a	(limited)	right	of	proposal	and	increased	scrutiny	with	reporting	obligations	from	Mercosur’s	decision-making	organs.	
1	
Institutional	change	–	from	the	CPC	to	the	Mercosur	Parliament	 4	
Substantial	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	dimensions	changed.	The	core	function	represents	a	threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 6.15: Institutional change in the establishment of the Mercosur Parliament 
In how far was this strong institutional change – described as the result of a “political 
planetary alignment” by a closely involved official [#19, ibid.] – influenced by the EU? 
In order to find out, the following paragraphs assess the most immediate context of 
the institutional change and process-trace the effect of the applied EU instruments 
along the causal mechanisms hypothesised in our theoretical framework.  
Context	 and	 domestic	 incentives	 –	 the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 Brazilian	 and	
Argentinean	crises 
The aforementioned “political planetary alignment” occurred when the Brazilian and 
Argentinian presidents Lula da Silva and Eduardo Duhalde agreed to push forward the 
reform of the CPC – a project that had so far lacked the necessary resonance on highest 
political levels [#19, ibid.; Rodríguez Yebra 2003; Duhalde and da Silva 2006[2003]].191 
This “planetary alignment” was nonetheless not just a matter of political opportunity, 
but can be placed in the context of the reforms that were pursued from 2003/4 in 
reaction to the crisis-ridden years before. 
                                                             
191 The two smaller countries in the block, most vocally Uruguay, have always advocated stronger 
institutions as these would reduce the ability of the two larger neighbours to engage in solo runs. 
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In terms of our scope conditions, and as analysed before (cf. p. 159f.), the 
aftermath of the crisis represents a ‘critical juncture’ at which the need for institutional 
reforms was seen by a sufficient number of relevant political actors, creating an 
opportunity for external stimuli to influence regional debates and decisions more 
strongly than before.   
A	tale	of	assisted	lesson-drawing	–	the	EU	as	an	enabler	of	institutional	
change192	
In the context described above, the CPC was tasked by the Mercosur member states 
to prepare a draft founding protocol for a directly elected parliament (Consejo del 
Mercado Común del Sur 2004d), starting the process to transform the CPC into the 
Mercosur Parliament. This section will assess in how far the EU influenced this process. 
Based on the analysis of the instruments used by the EU conducted in chapter 6.2, we 
can already exclude that it had applied any conditionality towards Mercosur in this 
field. Therefore we will concentrate our analysis on tracing the impact of assistance 
(H1b), lesson-drawing (H2), persuasion (H3) and emulation (H4). 
Setting	the	stage	–	EU	assistance	to	the	CPC	
EU assistance played an enabling role from the very beginning, even before the idea 
of establishing a directly elected parliament had gained political track in the region. As 
listed in Annex C, over the years the EU supported the parliamentarisation of Mercosur 
with three dedicated technical assistance projects to which it devoted slightly more 
than two million euros. With this contribution, the EU was practically the only donor 
supporting this particular area.193 While the amount of financing is certainly limited 
compared to other cooperation projects – “peanuts” according to a senior EEAS official 
involved [#52] – and the third project could not be implemented completely 
(Commission and EEAS 2010: 16), these projects had a decisive significance for the CPC 
                                                             
192 Preliminary versions of the following case study were presented and discussed at the 2013 ISA 
Annual Convention and the 2013 EUSA Biennial Conference. 
193 Beyond the EU, the establishment of a Mercosur parliament was also supported by the 
Organisation of American States (OAS) and by the German Konrad Adenauer (KAS) and Friedrich 
Ebert (FES) foundations. While the first was described as “useful, but not decisive”, support from the 
FES was seen as decisive because it allowed organising meetings that couldn’t be paid for with 
national or donor funds [#19, ibid.; #54, FES representative]. The KAS edited two books with 
documents from the discussions on the parliament which are also used as sources here (Fundación 
Konrad Adenauer and Comisión Parlamentaria Conjunta del Mercosur 2006; 2004). 
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and the parliament according to Mercosur officials [#19, ibid.; #26, official, Mercosur 
Parliament].194  
The first project on ‘Parliamentary Cooperation’ laid the ground for the 
creation of the Mercosur Parliament. To provide assistance to the CPC, the EU 
requested that a permanent secretariat be installed to manage the cooperation 
programmes. In doing so, it created what later became the main actor and hub in 
pushing forward the technical work on the draft protocol. Interviewees emphasised 
that this was the first and enabling step towards the subsequent creation of the 
parliament [#02, member of the working group preparing the draft protocol; #19, 
ibid.]. When the CPC decided to create the permanent secretariat at the end of 1997 
(CPC 1997: Art. 30, 34, 35), this ended the previous practice by which officials of the 
rotating presidencies would coordinate administrative work every semester and pass 
on the baton to the next presidency. This change provided the institution with a certain 
degree of continuity and technical expertise. Following this decision, the European 
Commission signed the financing agreement with the CPC secretariat in 1999 and 
began the work to contract the project, which included the provision of expertise but 
also technical equipment and hiring of staff (DG DEVE 2001). The project began in 
2002. During the following years, EU funding covered most of the expenses and 
running costs for the secretariat [#19, ibid.; #55, head of the Mercosur Parliament 
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to pay its employees before (CPC 2003). In terms of our assessment of the causal 
mechanisms, this indicates the role of EU assistance in triggering institutional change, 
as it played an enabling role by putting the decisive actors on track. As emphasised by 
several senior officials involved, the CPC would not have been able to create the 
secretariat at that time without EU support [#19, ibid.; #55, ibid.] 
Beyond the establishment of the secretariat, the most important contribution 
of the EU’s assistance to the CPC was the design of a consultation procedure for the 
parliamentary commission. This procedure was an important step towards the 
creation of the parliament and was later incorporated into its protocol. Inspired by the 
EP’s consultation procedure (TFEU 2010: Art. 289), the procedure aims to address two 
problems: the long duration of the transposition of Mercosur acts into national law 
and the lack of legislative power of the CPC/Mercosur Parliament. It foresees that 
Mercosur decisions be forwarded to the Parliament before they are agreed by the 
                                                             
194 These and further officials of the Mercosur parliament did also criticise that EU administrative 
requirements had made the implementation of the projects very difficult. It is therefore fair to 
assume that their positive assessment of the decisiveness of the EU support is not biased towards an 
interviewer stemming from the EU. 
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Mercosur Council (CMC). If approved by the Parliament, they shall be transposed 
through a fast-track procedure in national parliaments. If rejected, the usual 
transposition procedure would apply (Protocolo Constitutivo 2005: 4.12).   
This procedure was developed in 2003 by a Spanish professor in 
Administrative and European law hired as a consultant under the EU assistance project 
for the CPC [#19 ibid., #26, ibid.; Fresnedo de Aguirre 2003?: 5–6].195 At that time, the 
procedure was cast into an interinstitutional agreement, in which the Mercosur 
Council (CMC) committed itself to consult the CPC in any legislative matter that 
required transposition into national legal orders. In return, the CPC promised to 
accelerate the procedures in national parliaments (CMC, CPC [2003]2006). The 
procedure sought to increase the CPC’s role while knowing that a direct legislative 
competence was beyond the scope of what the sovereignty-protective Mercosur 
states would grant. In this context, the hired consultant regularly mentioned how the 
EP had been able to gradually expand its decision-making competences beyond the 
respective state of the treaty law by recurring to inter-institutional agreements with 
the Commission or the Council [#19, ibid.].196 The members of the drafting committee 
welcomed the “decisive” input by the consultant and included it also in their draft 
protocol for the new parliament – expecting that it would mobilise considerable 
political power if used accordingly by Mercosur and national parliamentarians. In light 
of the decisiveness of EU assistance reported by Mercosur actors, we score the 
relevance of this assistance in shaping the design of the future Mercosur parliament 
as ‘substantial’. As reflected here and in the above-cited statements on the creation 
of the Mercosur secretariat, Mercosur actors involved did also perceive the EU as the 
‘trigger’ of the institutional change that occurred at the CPC. We score this as 
‘moderate’, taking into account that it is impossible to proof that the secretariat would 
have not been created without EU support. 
Moving to our third indicator for the impact of assistance, permanence of the 
institutional change, both the secretariat and the procedure to increase the 
Parliament’s legislative role still exist today. Therefore the duration of the institutional 
change can be qualified as long. Despite this, we score this indicator as ‘moderate’ 
                                                             
195 Namely, Ricardo Alonso García, see http://derecho.ucm.es/data/cont/docs/23-2016-05-03-
CV_Ricardo%20Alonso%20Garcia%20(esp).pdf (last accessed September 5th 2016). An internal study 
commissioned by the European Commission in 2002 to propose policy options towards Mercosur 
also includes ‘fast track’ procedures as a possible EU contribution to strengthen Mercosur’s rule of 
law (Bouzas et al. 2002: 171–172, 183-184). 
196 This process resembles what has been described as a ‘feedback spiral of EU governance’ for the 
emergence of new modes of governance in the EU (Diedrichs et al. 2011: 24–8). 
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since the consultation procedure has never been used so far (Parlamento del Mercosur 
2016). 
In sum, assistance from the EU had an enabling impact on the creation of the 
Mercosur Parliament as it laid the technical and material foundations for the drafting 
of the constitutive protocol and provided for one of its strongest institutional 
innovations. The ‘substantial’ (4) score for the impact of EU assistance reflects this. At 
the same time, the analysis also shows that this impact could only turn into reality at 
the moment when the local political conditions – i.e. political initiative from two 
presidents – allowed for it – much like in the previously studied case of the 
macroeconomic convergence regime. 
Impact	of	assistance	on	the	establishment	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
emphasis	of	explicit	mentions	of	EU	assistance	as	a	trigger	for	 institutional	change	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	counterparts.		 1	
relevance	of	EU	assistance	in	the	design	of	institutional	change	as	reflected	in	
speeches,	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 2	
duration	of	 institutional	change	created	with	EU	assistance	as	 reflected	by	
documents	from	and	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 1	
Impact	of	assistance	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-3)	–	substantial	(4-6)	 4	Substantial	categorisation	of	emphasis,	relevance	and	duration	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 6.16: Assistance in the establishment of the Mercosur Parliament 
Preaching	to	the	converted	–	EU	persuasion	
EU assistance to the CPC was based on the discussions and visits (Figueroa 1997: 84–
9) that had taken place with the EP delegation to South America in 1996. It took up the 
general concern EU negotiators had on the poor implementation record of Mercosur 
norms. The EU’s regular advocacy for a more prominent role for the regional 
institutions in the integration process has already been mentioned above (see p. 
149f.). In this general setting, and according to two participants in bi-regional 
meetings, EU actors also suggested that a regional parliament could contribute to 
increasing Mercosur’s perception in society and the legal consistency and 
implementation record of Mercosur norms [#01, former senior EU official; #28, former 
senior official, Argentinian MFA]. Despite such mentions, the emphasis is certainly 
lower than that placed on ensuring legal consistency across Mercosur or other 
institutional innovations advocated for by the European side, like the establishment of 
a regional solidarity mechanism (cf. 6.3.1 above). Similarly, EU policy-makers 
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interviewed by the author did not mention the issue when asked for a judgement of 
Mercosur’s most important institutional advancements and / or needs. Whenever 
support to Mercosur’s parliamentary development is mentioned in EU strategic 
documents, it is presented as a request from Mercosur rather than an EU conviction 
or proposal (Commission 2002: 27).197 The fact that the rules of procedure of the CPC 
already mentioned the creation of a parliament as a goal in 1997 (CPC 1997) further 
reduces the probability that the EU had persuaded Mercosur actors to further 
‘parlamentarise’ their organisation. At most, it created a positive sounding board that 
became useful for those advocating a regional parliament. 
This impression is substantiated by the reports on the influence of the 
activities of the EP. A former official of the CPC went as far as saying that “the interest 
[in a Mercosur Parliament] was stronger in Europe than within our own national 
congresses” [#19, ibid.]. Taking into account that the CPC had no other partners 
outside the region, the EP’s activities were perceived as an important “moral and 
political support” to those advocating a stronger role for the CPC [#19, ibid.]. Especially 
the regular meetings between the CPC and the EP delegation served to increase the 
reputation of the CPC within Mercosur [#19, ibid.; #04, EP official], but did certainly 
only have a limited impact beyond the parliamentary field.198  
While these observations indicate a certain influence of EU persuasion on 
Mercosur actors through support to specific (epistemic) communities and political 
actors, it becomes clear that this impact was limited to a reduced group of individuals 
who already advocated a stronger parliament. In this field, the EU was preaching to 
the converted. These observations are also far away from constituting a pattern of 
evidence that would suffice to confirm the impact of EU persuasion on Mercosur.199 
Drafting	a	protocol	for	the	Mercosur	Parliament	–	drawing	from	EU	lessons	
At the time when presidents Lula and Duhalde lifted the creation of a Mercosur 
parliament onto the political agenda in 2002, the secretariat of the CPC was well placed 
to become the hub for the preparatory activities and could mobilise financial resources 
                                                             
197 Taking into account that such public documents tend to follow a diplomatic tone, this would not 
be a surprise if it wasn’t for the outspoken recommendations the document issues on other internal 
Mercosur developments (see the quotes on p. 154). 
198 This is substantiated by the fact that none of the interviewed actors from Mercosur states’ 
governments mentioned this interaction when asked about the parliament. 
199 Due to the elusiveness of persuasion, we had set a higher threshold for the assessment of this 
causal mechanism in our operationalisation (see section 4.4.4 above). Therefore, we also refrain from 
presenting the results in a table. The score would be 4 out of 13 (indicators: EU support to epistemic 
communities, to political actors and difference of experience in regional cooperation). 
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and expertise to influence the process – along the priorities agreed upon with the EU, 
which foresaw the provision of technical assistance for the “transfer of EU experience, 
especially from the EP” (DG DEVE 2001). The cornerstone of the establishment of the 
parliament consisted in drafting a founding protocol. Work on the protocol started in 
February 2005, with the corresponding mandate to the CPC demanding that this work 
be finished by the end of 2006. As the following paragraphs show, this drafting process 
was heavily influenced by the EU and its experiences. 
The drafting of the protocol for the Mercosur parliament proceeded in two 
phases. First, the draft protocol itself was prepared in the first semester of 2005 by a 
‘high-level technical group’ (Grupo Técnico de Alto Nivel, GTAN). This group was 
formed by the head of the CPC secretariat and senior experts from the member states 
[#02, ibid.; #19, ibid.; #55, member of the working group; CPC (2005b)]. Second, a 
political accord was agreed upon. It changed the proposed number of deputies for 
each member state and connected the changes in the parliament to other institutional 
innovations in a package deal designed to gain approval by all governments [#19, ibid.; 
#55, ibid.; Parlamento del Mercosur 2009b]. Two issues were the most relevant in this 
process because of their practical relevance and political implications: the agreement 
on an ‘attenuated proportionality’ for the parliament’s composition and the 
consultation mechanism for its involvement in Mercosur legislation. While the 
consultation mechanism merely adapted to the new context the procedure developed 
for the CPC under EU assistance, agreeing on the setup of the parliament took more 
time. 
The search for a formula for the composition of the Mercosur Parliament can 
be seen as a clear case of drawing lessons from the EP’s experiences. As members of 
the high-level group report, the idea of pursuing an ‘attenuated proportionality’ 
analogous to the ‘degressive proportionality’ of the EP was discussed by the group 
from the very beginning [#02, ibid.; #19, ibid.]. The EP served as a “guidance” as it was 
an experience that many of the involved experts “knew very well” [#19, ibid.]. In the 
notes of the working group, individual articles of the EP rules of procedure are 
mentioned to justify specific institutional choices (CPC 2005: 14). Nonetheless, the EP-
inspired proportionality rule was not just taken over without a thorough assessment, 
but was part of a “deductive” process as described by one of the involved experts. As 
notes from the working group and interviews with its members show, this deductive 
process began with the premise of not having a too large parliament while on the other 
side being able to have small enough constituencies in the most-populated state, Brazil 
[CPC 2005: 19–22; #19 ibid.]. While in other cases, the documents of the working group 
mention regional parliaments – including the EP – as the main reason to justify 
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proposed competences200, in the case of composition of the parliament, the EP is not 
directly mentioned to justify the proposed solution. In line with the expectations of 
lesson-drawing mentioned in section 3.3.1, instead the process combined a 
functionally valid foreign solution with adaptations and justifications applicable to the 
local context. This can be seen in the thorough discussion (and rejection) of other 
solutions and the calculation of the attenuated proportionality undertaken by the 
members of the high-level group [CPC 2005a: 19–22, #19, ibid.]. The fact that Paraguay 
expressed its reservations to the solution found and rejected that representatives 
from one state could be outvoted, also shows that a reasoned discussion and 
functional trade-off had taken place (instead of a blunt carbon-copy of a template) 
(CPC 2005: 22).201 We therefore score the predominance of functional reasoning in the 
justification of the institutional change as ‘substantial’.  
Further observations also point at a case of lesson-drawing. To mention one 
example, when work for the drafting of the protocol was about to begin, the initiative 
to draw from the EU’s experience came from Mercosur officials. At the end of 2004, 
the head of the CPC secretariat inquired to the respective DG Relex official whether 
the process about to start could be supported with EU technical assistance [#19, ibid.; 
#55, ibid.]. This was not possible because the request came in the midst of an already 
running programming period. Since the national Mercosur parliaments also declined 
to fund the process, support was provided by the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
(FES), which financed meetings and public outreach activities [#19, ibid.; #54, FES 
Buenos Aires; #21, FES Montevideo]. We therefore score the predominance of 
Mercosur’s initiative as ‘substantial’ in the assessment below. No specific studies were 
conducted to prepare the Parliament’s protocol, but the drafting group included a 
majority of academics, among whom many had studied the EU’s (parliamentary) 
experience.202 Also, the coordinator of the working group visited Brussels and spoke 
with officials and members of the EP to incorporate their experiences in the draft 
protocol. Financed by the FES, the main lesson from these conversations had been to 
keep the protocol as simple as possible and to bank on later expanding the 
                                                             
200 Such as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (CPC 2005a: 12) or the parliament 
of the Central American Integration System (SICA) (CPC 2005a: 27). 
201 In fact, Paraguay only accepted the solution found under the condition of a package deal that 
connected the attenuated proportionality and transition periods for the parliament’s composition 
with Paraguay’s request for the establishment of a permanent Mercosur court. This deal was 
formulated in a 2009 and accepted by the Mercosur foreign ministers in 2010 (Parlamento del 
Mercosur 2009a; Página 12 2010). 
202 A list of the members is available here: (CPC 2005b: 4–5). 
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competences of the parliament, the coordinator recalls [#19, ibid.].203 This indicator is 
therefore ranked as ‘moderate’. As mentioned in the beginning of this assessment, EU 
technical cooperation was decisive to create the CPC secretariat that conducted the 
technical work on the Mercosur Parliament and it did incentivise the creation of a 
stronger parliament, but no signs of influences aimed at convincing specific actors to 
behave in a certain way were found. We therefore rank the relevance of EU incentives 
a ‘moderate’.  
Table 6.17 below sums up the assessment of the individual indicators for 
lesson-drawing. In sum, we observe a substantial impact of lesson-drawing from the 
EU in the drafting of the protocol for the Mercosur Parliament. The fact that the 
transfer of institutional models from the EU involved functional considerations and 
reasoned adaptations to local circumstances also indicates that we are not witnessing 
a case of emulation. 
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	on	the	creation	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
relevance	of	EU	incentives	specifically	directed	at	the	observed	institutional	change	as	evidenced	in	documents,	interviews	with	actors	from	the	EU	and	its	counterpart.	 1	
predominance	 of	 initiative	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	documented	or	reported	requests,	public	discussions.	 2	
number	 of	 analyses	 and	 studies	 by	 experts,	 officials	 or	 policy-makers	commissioned	 or	 authored	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	
documents	or	interviews.	 1	
adaptation	of	foreign	templates	to	local	conditions	as	a	result	of	functional	considerations,	manifested	in	technical	documents	or	interviews.	 1	
predominance	 of	 justifications	 of	 the	 institutional	 change	 with	 functional	reasons	 and/or	 weighting	 of	 alternative	 policies	 evidenced	 in	 official	
documents,	public	statements	or	interviews.	 2	
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-9)	 7	Substantial	categorisation	of	adaptation	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	predominance	and	number	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	categorisation	of	relevance	as	none	(2)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(0).	
Table 6.17: Lesson-drawing in the creation of the Mercosur Parliament 
                                                             
203 In fact, the notes from the working group discuss examples of ‘competence creep’ based on the 
EU (e.g. CPC 2005: 27). 
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Synthesis	
Summing up the analysis of the causal mechanisms, we can conclude that the EU did 
decisively influence the creation of the Mercosur parliament, a ‘substantial’ 
institutional change in terms of our assessment. Its influence worked through a 
combination of assistance and lesson-drawing. It is interesting to note that this lesson-
drawing was made possible, or at least eased, by EU technical assistance. This created 
a situation that could be termed ‘assisted lesson-drawing’. EU support can be 
described as a necessary, yet not sufficient condition for the observed institutional 
change. Only the local reaction to a major crisis created the necessary political impulse 
for a change that had already been on the ‘to do list’ of the more pro-integrationist. 
At this point in time, EU engagement was decisive in making the change possible – also 
because it was the only actor supporting the CPC from the beginning. Once the 
conditions for change were present, EU action oriented the choice of the involved 
actors towards specific institutional templates and influenced the later design of the 
Parliament. In one case (attenuated proportionality), the EU template was adapted to 
local requirements, while in the other (consultation procedure) a more direct 
incorporation was chosen. It is fair to assume, and was confirmed by Mercosur 
officials, that the Parliament wouldn’t have been created at that point without EU 
support. No (sufficient) indications were found for the presence and impact of EU 
conditionality, persuasion or emulation.  
While this assessment confirms the influence of EU instruments on the 
Parliament’s institutional design, the fact that the Parliament has in practice not yet 
reached its status foreseen for 2015 – with parliamentarians directly elected on a 
single election day in all Mercosur states – shows once more that an influence on 
institutional design does not automatically translate into an influence on political 
practice. 
As part of the same attempt to ‘relaunch’ Mercosur and to increase legal 
certainty in the region, also the regional dispute settlement system was transformed 
in the first decade of the 2000s. The ensuing section analyses this reform and whether 
and how the EU had an influence on its results. 
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6.4.2 The	Permanent	Court	of	Appeals	of	Mercosur	–	on	the	
path	from	inter-governmental	to	supranational	dispute	
resolution	
Dispute resolution mechanisms, i.e. procedures to settle legal quarrels between 
governments, economic operators, or even individuals in different states on the basis 
of a consistent and accepted interpretation, belong to the core elements of trade and 
regional integration agreements. These mechanisms range from the obligation to 
engage in structured diplomatic negotiations as soon as a dispute arises to the 
establishment of international courts with own jurisdiction. Over the course of its 
lifespan, Mercosur has gone through a whole range of mechanisms, beginning with 
the mere recommendation to engage in diplomatic consultations to the establishment 
of the Permanent Court of Appeals (Tribunal Permanente de Revisión, TPR in its 
Spanish and Portuguese acronym) in 2004 as the peak of a multi-layer dispute 
resolution system (Klumpp 2013: 33–42). In light of the afore-mentioned difficulties of 
the Mercosur states to (uniformly) apply Mercosur acts, providing a central and 
recognised resolution of disputes as well as a homogenous interpretation of regional 
law could be a decisive step towards increasing implementation rates and the 
consistency of the Mercosur legal order. Seen as one of its key achievements, the 
existence of a largely uniform, supranationally interpreted European legal order, 
places the EU in a position to contribute to Mercosur reforms in this field.  
The following paragraphs will first assess the degree of institutional change 
incurred with the creation of the TPR, briefly illuminate the context and domestic 
incentives against which this change took place and then process-trace to what extent 
EU instruments influenced the reform.  
Institutional	change	–	the	creation	of	the	Asunción	Tribunal	
The inauguration of the Permanent Court of Appeals (TPR) in 2004 marks the most 
important overhaul of Mercosur’s dispute resolution system. In a region traditionally 
more prone to negotiated, diplomatic dispute settlement than to judicial approaches 
(Susani 2010: 74–5), this represents a significant milestone. Earlier reforms had only 
adapted details of the system (Klumpp 2013: 33–9) while maintaining its nature as a 
quasi-diplomatic arbitration process between states. Whereas the previous system, 
governed by the Protocol of Brasília since 1993 (1991a), foresaw ad hoc-arbitration 
panels with specifically nominated arbitrators if the disputing parties were note able 
to find an agreement in direct negotiations, the Protocol of Olivos (2002d) created the 
TPR as a permanent institution composed by five judges. The TPR can act as a court of 
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appeals if a party disagrees with the arbitration of an ad hoc-panel, but it can also be 
addressed directly instead of arbitration panels and act as a single instance (2002d: 
Art. 19, 23). In addition to the settlement of disputes between the Mercosur member 
states, a further core function was assigned to the TPR: the interpretation of the law 
of Mercosur through legal opinions (2002d: Art. 3). 
The fact that all cases brought before the court are decided upon by the same 
set of permanent judges increases the credibility of the judgements compared to the 
arbitration through ad hoc panels. Quite importantly, legal opinions can also interpret 
whether national decisions are in line with Mercosur legislation, provided that this 
question is part of a dispute before a national court (Klumpp 2013: 289; CMC 2007a: 
Art. 4). The establishment of a court of appeals and the competence to issue legal 
opinions allow for the development of jurisprudence at the Mercosur level, possibly 
opening a path to harmonising the application of Mercosur law. It is important to note 
though that the legal opinions issued by the TPR are not binding. Despite this, 
Mercosur took five further years to agree on the procedure and scope of the legal 
opinions (CMC 2007a). This shows that legal opinions were considered an influential 
tool and that their introduction challenged the established patterns of sovereignty-
protective integration.  
The Protocol of Olivos opened up dispute resolution and legal interpretation 
to actors beyond the sphere of the national governments. In the strictly 
intergovernmental system of Mercosur this represents a considerable innovation. All 
Mercosur decision-making institutions and national supreme courts gained the right 
to request legal opinions from the TPR (CMC 2003a: Art. 2). This permits an indirect 
access of individuals to the interpretation of Mercosur law.204 In addition, legal and 
natural persons can now access dispute resolution as well (Olivos 2002d: Art. 39-44). 
While this reform is seen as an important contribution to ensuring a certain degree of 
uniformity in the application of Mercosur rules (Klumpp 2013: 340), two important 
limitations restrict the autonomy of the system. First, the Mercosur Secretariat is not 
allowed to request legal opinions. Since almost all other Mercosur institutions act 
upon unanimity of the member states, this implies that national governments retain a 
strong role as gate-keepers to the system. Only the Parliament could potentially 
exploit its autonomy to request legal opinions to foster stronger (legal) integration. In 
view of the limited sources of input, the risk of an ‘activist’ court being in favour of 
deeper integration is therefore small. Secondly, the access of individuals to dispute 
                                                             
204 Unlike in the case of the EU, where at least supreme courts are obliged to request preliminary 
rulings (TFEU 2012b: Art. 267), requests are completely voluntary in the Mercosur system. 
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settlement must first be approved by the government of the plaintiff (Olivos 2002d: 
Art. 40).205 
 While these measures limit the ability of the TPR to develop too strong 
autonomy without the acquiescence of the governments, others strengthen the 
independence of the court. Most importantly, the judges now serve fixed terms 
instead of being appointed for individual cases, thereby reducing their dependence on 
national governments. Four judges (one by each member state) are appointed for two 
years. Their terms can be prolonged twice. A fifth judge is appointed for three years 
and presides over the court.206 This reinforces the position of the judges vis-à-vis the 
national governments and the continuity of legal interpretation. Unlike the previous 
dispute resolution mechanisms where individual states could block the set-up of 
specific arbitration panels by withholding the funds, the TPR draws from a permanent 
budget (Klumpp 2013: 272–3). Resolutions on disputes between Mercosur states are 
usually taken by three judges. Two of them must be nationals of the states involved 
and the third, presiding judge must be a citizen of a different member state (Olivos 
2002d: Art. 10). Whenever the TPR acts as a single instance though, be it to solve a 
dispute or to issue a legal opinion, it sits with all five judges (CMC 2003a: Art. 6.1).  
 Decision-making rules for the resolution of disputes did not change when 
comparing the TPR to the previous system. Like before, both the ad hoc-panels and 
the TPR decide by simple majority. Dissenting votes are not published. This rule 
protects the judges from lobbying and privileges conflict resolution and clarity over 
legal development. Different rules apply to legal opinions, where dissenting opinions 
are published (CMC 2003a: Art. 9.1). This approach nurtures legal discussions but does 
not necessarily contribute to increasing the uniform application of Mercosur law.  
In sum, the Protocol of Olivos and the creation of the TPR transformed the 
strictly intergovernmental and negotiation-based dispute resolution system of 
Mercosur into a more permanent, more autonomous and more judicial system. Adding 
a new function to its original purpose, the system does now also serve to interpret 
Mercosur law. As a result of the reforms, Mercosur now has a dispute settlement 
system that falls in between the WTO-like procedure based on direct negotiations and 
ad hoc-arbitration panels and the establishment of a permanent court that also has 
the competence to interpret common law, which bears some resemblance to the EU 
                                                             
205 In practice, this prevents citizens from challenging the laws of their own state and limits the 
system to disputes between states. 
206 If the member states cannot agree on the fifth judge, the Mercosur Secretariat draws a lot from 
all proposals received (CMC 2003a: Art. 31.4). 
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system. In terms of our assessment of the dependent variable, this reform implies 
change in three out of four dimensions of institutional change and qualifies as 
substantial institutional change. Table 6.18 below sums up this assessment on the 
basis of the respective indicators. 
Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 Adds	interpretation	of	Mercosur	law	to	dispute	settlement	 1	Actors	 • From	arbitrators	designated	for	each	case	to	five	permanent	judges	
• Access	to	dispute	settlement	now	also	granted	to	legal	and	natural	persons	(passing	through	national	governments)	
• Indirect	access	for	individuals	to	legal	interpretation	through	national	courts	
1	
Decision-making	 Dispute	resolution:		
• Remains	simple	majority,	diverging	votes	are	not	published	
• appeals:	three	judges	decide,	single-instance	dispute	settlement:	all	judges	decide	(new	competence)	Legal	opinions:		
• simple	majority,	diverging	votes	are	published	(new	competence)	
0	
Competences	 Dispute	resolution:		
• Decides	upon	appeals	on	panel	decisions	
• Settles	disputes	as	a	single-instance	court	Legal	opinions:	
• Gained	competence	to	issue	legal	opinions	upon	request	of	a	Mercosur	decision-making	organ,	all	national	governments	or	a	supreme	court	of	a	member	state	
1	
Institutional	change	–	dispute	settlement	 3	
Substantial	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	dimensions	changed.	The	core	function	represents	a	threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 6.18: Institutional change in the creation of the TPR 
While still far away from evolving into a an ‘own legal order’ as the one proclaimed by 
the ECJ, the 2002-04 reform of Mercosur’s dispute settlement system puts the region 
closer to the supranational system of the EU. This raises the question in how far EU 
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influence shaped this reform. In order to find out, the following paragraphs assess the 
most immediate context of the institutional change and process-trace the effect of the 
applied EU instruments along the causal mechanisms hypothesised in our theoretical 
framework. 
Context	and	domestic	incentives		
As in the case of the Mercosur Parliament, the severe economic crisis that hit the 
region at the end of the nineties and early 2000s provided the “critical juncture” for 
the creation of a permanent Mercosur tribunal. An overhaul of the dispute resolution 
system was included in the same ambitious programme to ‘relaunch’ Mercosur as the 
parliament. 
Unlike in the case of the Mercosur Parliament, where proponents of an 
institutional reform were evenly distributed among the four member states207, the 
reform of dispute resolution was clearly spearheaded by the two smaller states of the 
block against the scepticism of Brazil and Argentina [Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 99, 
112-113; #47, MFA Uruguay; #17, Uruguayan representative to Mercosur; #58, former 
senior official, Argentinean Ministry for Economic Affairs; #25, Brazilian delegation to 
Mercosur].208 In the case of Uruguay, the preferences went as far as advocating for a 
supranational court before which individual states would have been able to challenge 
the legislation of other members as to their compliance with Mercosur rules (Dreyzin 
de Klor 2004a: 4; Opertti Badán 2002: 22).209 This constellation of interests is not 
surprising, since the existing dispute resolution system allowed the larger states to foil 
the system by refusing to pay their share of the arbitration costs or by exerting 
diplomatic pressure in the closed negotiations. In addition, the nomination of 
individual arbitrators for each case provided all member states with a strong hold over 
the process. With a relatively tooth-less dispute resolution system, the larger states 
could bring their strong economic and bargaining power to fruition most easily – for 
example by threatening to retaliate with unilateral trade measures that would hurt 
their smaller partners much more than themselves. The fact that the court’s budget is 
borne in equal shares by all states (Klumpp 2013: 272) may also be seen as a sign of 
the smaller states’ willingness to incur a larger sacrifice to have a more reliable and 
                                                             
207 With the exception of Paraguay’s scepticism to agree to the ‘attenuated proportionality’ at the 
end of the reform process (see p. 182f.) 
208 I.e., here we observe a similar split between the large and small states as in the case of 
macroeconomic coordination studied above. 
209 Interestingly, Uruguay, despite being the staunchest supporter of strong institutions for Mercosur 
is also the state with the worst incorporation rate of Mercosur decisions. According to data collected 
for the period 1994-2008, Uruguay has incorporated inly 63% of all Mercosur laws (Arnold 2016: 11). 
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independent dispute resolution system. According to government officials from both 
states, Argentina and Brazil agreed to reform Mercosur’s dispute resolution because 
they expected that this would increase the confidence of international and regional 
investors (#77, former Argentinean Vice-President; see also Arnold and Rittberger 
2013: 114–5). According to one account of the negotiation process, the fact that 
Argentina had previously lost several arbitration cases also made it more open to a 
reform that would include an instance to appeal to (Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 115). 
In sum, we observe that, like in the case of the Mercosur Parliament, the 
catalyst or ‘critical juncture’ for the reform of Mercosur’s dispute settlement came 
with the crisis in Brazil and Argentina. Unlike in the previous case though, the 
incentives of the individual states differed and split along the cleavage between large 
and small states. While the smaller states were more open to a reform and even aimed 
for a supranational system, Argentina and Brazil remained hesitant - and consequently 
also less open to ‘integrationist’ influences and templates.  
Pick	and	choose	-	Learning	from	different	sources	
In the aforementioned context, the member states began to negotiate a reform of 
Mercosur’s dispute settlement system in a process that ran from mid-2000 to the end 
of 2001. Asking for a mere “improvement of the Protocol of Brasília”, the modest title 
of the mandate the states agreed upon reflects their discord as to the extent of the 
reform. It enumerates some goals of the reform, such as increasing compliance with 
the arbitrations or setting up criteria for the appointment of panel members. While it 
also includes a reference to “discussing alternatives for a more uniform interpretation 
of Mercosur acts”, the mandate mentions the establishment of a permanent 
institution nowhere. The narrow time frame of just six months given to the 
intergovernmental working group tasked to develop a reform proposal can also be 
seen as a sign of the wish to avoid any in-depth discussions (CMC 2000b). In fact, that 
time frame had to be extended for another six months in a further decision – which 
now included the explicit requirement to create a permanent tribunal (CMC 2000a).  
What led to this apparent change in mind and the sudden aim for a more 
ambitious solution? What does this change tell us about the negotiation process and 
possible EU influences? Criticising its lack of ambition, Uruguay had vetoed the reform 
proposal and pushed for the creation of a permanent court (Perotti 2001: 2–3). This 
dispute and the divergence of interests between the Mercosur states points at the 
existence of substantial debates around the adequacy of the proposals tabled. Hence, 
they speak in favour of a context in which functional considerations drove the design 
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of a new dispute settlement system for Mercosur. Indeed, interviews with several 
actors either present at or closely following the negotiations confirm that the talks 
were challenging and characterised by the weighting of competing functional 
arguments [Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 116–9; Perotti 2001: 13; #77, former Vice-
President of Argentina; #57, former coordinator Mercosur affairs, Argentinean 
Ministry for Economic Affairs]. While we did not find any indications for the 
commissioning of studies among the few documents that could be accessed from the 
rather secretive negotiations nor in the statements of the involved interviewees, the 
statements strengthen the perception that the negotiations were eminently technical, 
conducted among experts and therefore less political than in the case of the 
Parliament. Despite not finding any analyses or studies, we score the respective 
indicator210 as ‘moderate’ since the above-mentioned evidence shows that the 
negotiations were mainly led by functional considerations in which the involved actors 
acted according to their interests and rational calculations. 
Three	lines	of	conflict	–	what,	for	whom	and	how	far?	
The fact that the states followed their divergent interests rather strictly led to 
numerous conflict lines during the negotiations. The first and most important one was 
whether to install a court or not. Whereas Argentina and Brazil were in favour of 
maintaining a system based on negotiations and ad hoc-panels but sought to increase 
its speed and trustworthiness, Uruguay instead advocated the establishment of a 
permanent tribunal (see for example Uruguayan FM Opertti Badán 2002: 22).211 
Paraguay supported this stance [#30, Argentinean representative to Mercosur; Arnold 
and Rittberger 2013: 118]. In its push for a permanent court, Uruguay referred to the 
example of the ECJ, highlighting how the European court had helped to solve trade 
disputes between EU member states [#17, Uruguayan representative to Mercosur; 
#47, MFA Uruguay] and how it had increased confidence in the EU market, precisely 
because it was independent from member states [#30, ibid.].  
Discussions erupted also on whether individual citizens should be allowed to 
address the dispute resolution system directly – a rule that would have provided the 
system and the court with a degree of supranational independence from member 
states. Whereas Uruguay and – to a lesser extent – Paraguay insisted on this (Feldstein 
de Cárdenas et al. 2006: 8), Argentina and Brazil only agreed to an indirect access, 
either through the respective government (Olivos 2002d: Art. 39-44) or through the 
                                                             
210 i.e. “number of analyses and studies by experts, officials or policy-makers commissioned or 
authored by the EU’s counterpart as evidenced in documents or interviews”. 
211 According to Arnold and Rittberger (2013: 117–8) it was actually a proposal from Opertti Badán 
himself. 
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referral from a supreme court. Both paths left it to the discretion of governments or 
national legislation how easy an access would be in the end. In fact, each Mercosur 
state has now established different thresholds for the access to the Mercosur dispute 
settlement and court (Klumpp 2013: 301–39). 
The third main conflict line erupted around the extent to which the dispute 
settlement system – and its court – should be allowed to interfere with national legal 
systems. Keeping in mind that legal uncertainty had also been one of the motives of 
the reform debate and that both the lack of incorporation of Mercosur legislation as 
well as its different interpretation in the member states were reasons for this, Uruguay 
(and to a smaller extent Paraguay) advocated for the court to have the competence to 
judge on whether national legislation was in line with Mercosur norms [#47, ibid.; #17, 
ibid.]. Also on this matter, Uruguay referred to the EU’s example and how the 
interweaving of national and European legal orders increased legal certainty [#47, 
ibid.]. As a compromise, negotiators agreed on the legal opinions procedure, which 
would allow the court to develop certain standards on the implementation of 
Mercosur norms, albeit only in a non-binding form. Having in mind the EU’s example, 
where the Commission initiates the vast majority of court proceedings, the larger 
states refused to grant the Mercosur secretariat any access to the court. According to 
a senior Uruguayan official responsible for Mercosur in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
“there was some fear among the larger states that the Secretariat could become 
something like the [European] Commission” [#47, ibid.]. 
Stirred,	not	shaken	–	mixing	a	dispute	resolution	system	for	Mercosur		
As a result of these conflict lines, the negotiations led Mercosur to a dispute resolution 
system that is a mixture of an arbitration-based system along the WTO’s model and a 
judicial system with traits of the EU’s legal system. Whereas the use of ad hoc-panels 
and the step-by-step approach starting with bilateral negotiations resemble the WTO 
approach (and build on the previous Mercosur system) (Klumpp 2013: 339f.), the 
creation of a permanent tribunal with the power to act as a last instance and create 
jurisprudence, (some) possibilities to interpret Mercosur legislation and (some degree 
of) access for non-state actors approximate it to the EU. The option for the claimants 
to choose whether they want their case to be directly decided upon by the standing 
tribunal (i.e. by-passing the panel phase) or prefer to go through the more sovereignty-
protective arbitration system (cf. Klumpp 2013: 279) is an example for this mixture. As 
participants in the negotiations and involved officials and politicians report, 
incorporating this option was the only feasible way to accommodate both Uruguay’s 
and Paraguay’s insistence on having a quasi-supranational court-based system and the 
reluctance of Argentina and Brazil to any such solution [see the interview quotes in 
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Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 118–9; #77, ibid.; #17, ibid.] Since all parties to a dispute 
have to agree to bypass the panel phase, this ‘middle path’ does not harm the 
sovereignty-protective larger states.  
The same ‘mixing’ approach was chosen for further institutional elements of 
the system. For example, whenever the court decides as a unique instance (i.e. instead 
of a panel), all five judges vote the sentence. Together with the anonymity of their 
votes, this approach protects the individual judges from pressures of the involved 
parties and provides certain continuity in legal interpretation. This was introduced as 
a concession to the advocates of an integrated court system, who again referred to 
the ECJ’s example, where dissenting votes are not allowed [#47, #17, ibid.]. But 
whenever the court decides as court of appeals, only three judges vote: one from each 
of the disputing parties and a presiding judge assigned by lottery (Olivos 2002d: Art. 
20.1). This maintains the sovereignty-protective character of the arbitration system. 
As a result, the TPR does again lie in between the WTO system, where dissent from 
individual arbitrators is allowed albeit rarely used (Lewis 2006) and the EU’s system, 
designed to deliver a uniform interpretation of law. Indeed, representatives from 
Brazil and Argentina tended to refer to the WTO when asked for a model they drew 
from for their proposals, whereas the representatives from Uruguay and Paraguay 
mentioned the EU and its ECJ as their role model [Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 122; 
#47, ibid., #25, ibid.]. Such mixture of two already existing foreign templates and their 
adaptation to the local context (in this case to the local bargaining situation) is a 
further indicator for lesson-drawing and considered accordingly in table 6.19 below. 
Reflecting the rather technical discussions on the matter, also the 
justifications brought forward by representatives of the Mercosur states were mostly 
based on functional arguments and a trade-off between different possible solutions. 
Arguments used referred to increasing legal certainty and thereby also the confidence 
of investors [#77, ibid.; #25, ibid.], solving disputes faster (Arnold and Rittberger 2013: 
115) and improving the enforcement of the decisions [#17, ibid.]. Just one interviewee 
mentioned that the general wish to revamp Mercosur and to show that it was 
recovering from the crisis, i.e. a more political argument, had been the main goal of 
this reform [#47, ibid.]. We therefore score the predominance of functional reasoning 
in the justification of the institutional change as ‘substantial’. 
While the EU did occasionally highlight in its negotiations with Mercosur that 
achieving a uniform interpretation of Mercosur norms, either through a standing 
dispute settlement system or even by developing a Mercosur legal order with direct 
effect on national legislation, would improve the poor implementation record of 
Empirics I: EU-Mercosur 
 
  212 
regional norms [#01, former EU senior official; #15, senior EEAS official EU delegation 
to Uruguay; #20, former senior official, MFA Argentina; Commission 2007g: 30–1], we 
can find no indicators that it had offered any incentives directed at this particular 
reform. The projects financed by the EU in this field took place before the reform 
process started or after the reform process but were not known at that point in time 
(see the next section for more details). We therefore score the relevance of EU 
incentives directed to this particular reform as ‘moderate’. 
In a similar vein, the EU did not hide its preferences for an integrated or at 
least harmonised legal system [#01, ibid.; #20, ibid.]. But the initiative for the particular 
reform clearly came from the Mercosur member states. Again, the two smaller states 
did certainly champion this initiative, but all four took the decision in the context of 
the relaunch of Mercosur. Nonetheless, no indications could be found that Mercosur 
actors had actively requested support from the EU. On the basis of this assessment, 
we score the predominance of Mercosur’s initiative as ‘moderate’. 
Table 6.19 below summarises the assessment of the individual lesson-drawing 
indicators. In sum, we observe a substantial impact of lesson-drawing in the design of 
Mercosur’s revamped dispute resolution system. Unlike in the case of the Parliament 
though, lessons were drawn not just from the EU but also from the WTO’s arbitration-
based system. This dualism is a result of the divergent interests of the four negotiating 
states. In consequence the EU’s impact was selective and especially strong on the two 
smaller states, which referred to the European example when advocating for an 
integrated legal system and a permanent court. Argentina and Brazil, however, only 
drew from the EU as a precautionary example for the activism that a supranational 
court could develop in combination with an independent secretariat and, at most, 
referred to the WTO to support their preference for an arbitration system. 
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	on	the	reform	of	Mercosur’s	dispute	settlement	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
relevance	of	EU	incentives	specifically	directed	at	the	observed	institutional	change	as	evidenced	in	documents,	interviews	with	actors	from	the	EU	and	its	counterpart.	 1	
predominance	 of	 initiative	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	documented	or	reported	requests,	public	discussions.	 1	
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number	 of	 analyses	 and	 studies	 by	 experts,	 officials	 or	 policy-makers	commissioned	 or	 authored	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	
documents	or	interviews.	 2	
presence	of	adaptation	of	foreign	templates	to	local	conditions	as	a	result	of	functional	considerations,	manifested	in	technical	documents	or	interviews.	 1	
predominance	 of	 justifications	 of	 the	 institutional	 change	 with	 functional	reasons	 and/or	 weighting	 of	 alternative	 policies	 evidenced	 in	 official	
documents,	public	statements	or	interviews.	 2	
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-9)	 7	Substantial	categorisation	of	presence	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	predominance	and	number	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	categorisation	of	relevance	as	none	(2)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(0).	
Table 6.19: Lesson-drawing in the reform of Mercosur’s dispute settlement  
Exploring	alternative	explanations	–	EU	assistance,	conditionality	and	
persuasion	
As part of its engagement with Mercosur and with its dispute settlement system, the 
EU used also further instruments to promote regional cooperation. Several EU 
assistance projects preceded and followed the reform analysed above and participants 
in the negotiations report that the EU regularly mentioned that Mercosur would profit 
from increased legal certainty. The possible impact of these instruments is analysed 
below to increase the robustness of our findings. 
 As part of its technical assistance to Mercosur, the EU financed three 
cooperation projects with a focus on Mercosur’s legal and dispute settlement system. 
Two of these projects, which took place in 1997 and 1999 respectively and were 
undertaken by the same European university consortium, aimed at acquainting judges 
with the EU legal system through exposure visits to Luxembourg and Brussels and 
seminars in the region (Comisión 2003: 123–6; cf. list of projects in annex C). With the 
participation of almost 500 judges from the Mercosur states and Chile, the courses 
aimed more at breadth than at addressing selected decision- and opinion-makers.212 
In addition, the fact that these activities took place years before the reform process 
had started makes it improbable that they had a direct influence on the reforms. In 
fact, several officials with responsibility over Mercosur’s institutional development at 
that time only recall that “with its projects, the EU took influence on a discourse that 
                                                             
212 An exception to this is the participation of the president of the highest Argentinean court in the 
1997 courses. 
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was already taking place in Mercosur, but it never pushed anything in particular” [#47, 
MFA Uruguay; similarly #20, MFA Argentina]. 
The third, and financially more relevant, project started in the summer of 
2003 – one year after the reform had been agreed upon by Mercosur states, and 
before the inauguration of the court in 2004. The project established a group of legal 
experts. Academics from the EU and the region as well as representatives from the 
supreme courts of the Mercosur states were asked to produce proposals to further 
improve the just agreed-upon system. These proposals were to emanate from 
European experiences (Comisión 2003: 107-108 [3-4}). Since the project started once 
the key points of the reform had been agreed upon, its influence was limited. The most 
important proposal made by the group addressed the consultative opinions, for which 
the detailed process was only spelled out years later, in 2007 (CMC 2007a). Without 
success, the group proposed that any court should be able to request an opinion from 
the TPR, much like in the case of ECJ preliminary rulings (Klumpp 2013: 303–5; Dreyzin 
de Klor 2004b). 
The project was requested in September 2002 (Comisión 2003: 135), just half 
a year after the Protocol of Olivos had been signed off by the four Mercosur states. In 
principle, this could leave room for a situation in which the EU would have conditioned 
its support to the inclusion of specific details in the reform (i.e. that the EU would have 
exerted conditionality on Mercosur). An evaluation of the project documentation 
allows discarding this hypothesis because the project only involved experts, did not 
provide any kind of institutional support to the TPR or any other Mercosur institution 
that could have served as an incentive, and was clearly set up upon the EU’s own 
initiative – to the extent that Mercosur authorities complained about not having been 
informed about this initiative (Comité de Cooperación Técnica del Mercosur (CCT) 
2003a: 6; 2004a: 8–9). 
 In a similar vein, while we find evidence that the EU argued for a strengthening 
of Mercosur’s legal system and dispute resolution as a path to improve the low 
implementation rate of Mercosur norms [#01, ibid.; #15, ibid.] none of the involved 
Mercosur officials recalls that the EU had exerted any particular influence to persuade 
local actors towards any direction [#47, ibid.; #17, ibid.; #25, ibid.]. Quite to the 
contrary, the EU’s example was used by the Paraguayan and Uruguayan proponents 
of a more legalised and more institutionalised system to add weight to their proposals 
and to explain to a larger public why these reforms were necessary [#02, expert and 
former senior official at Argentinean MFA]. 
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Synthesis	
Summing up the analysis of the different causal mechanisms that could have conveyed 
an EU influence on the creation of Mercosur tribunal (a substantial institutional change 
in terms of our assessment), we observe that there is strong evidence for a high impact 
of lesson-drawing and no sufficient evidence for an impact of the causal mechanisms 
associated with the EU’s provision of technical assistance (assistance and 
conditionality) or its political relations (persuasion). 
While we observe a strong impact of lesson-drawing, our case study also 
exemplifies how lesson-drawing can work in a highly selective way. Both the sources 
from which the lessons were drawn as well as those who drew the lessons are select. 
In a context in which Mercosur was split in two camps, the EU’s example was referred 
to by the smaller states, who advocated a more integrationist approach. For them, the 
EU served to substantiate their argument. The other camp, led by the two larger and 
powerful states Brazil and Argentina, acted similarly. It used the WTO’s example to 
make the case that a less intrusive system would also increase legal certainty in 
Mercosur. In this context, the EU’s example served to empower those who were 
already in favour of a more legalised and supranational approach. Be it deliberate or a 
matter of coincidence, the EU’s technical assistance also concentrated on the 
community of expert practitioners (judges, lawyers, etc.), of whom we can assume that 
they were mostly in favour of stronger legalisation of Mercosur – much like in the 
previously analysed case of FOCEM. 
Under Mercosur’s consensus system, this ‘selective lesson-drawing’ 
culminated in a situation in which local conditions, constraints and inspiration from 
the EU and the WTO came together to produce a hybrid system that combines 
elements from an EU-inspired court-based system and from an arbitration system 
based on the WTO’s Dispute Settlement and the previous Mercosur system (itself 
adapted from the NAFTA agreement, Klumpp 2013: 34). After Uruguay had made clear 
that it would not accept an agreement without a permanent court, and as the reform 
of Mercosur’s dispute settlement was a less politicised issue than the creation of the 
Mercosur Parliament, the negotiations were mostly conducted by experts. This and 
the technicality of the issue probably helped in reaching a compromise based on 
mixing two systems that – a priori – belong to two different traditions. Much like in 
the case of the Parliament, EU influence could only come to fruition after a “critical 
juncture” had opened up a window of opportunity and local actors started looking for 
foreign institutional templates. 
Empirics I: EU-Mercosur 
 
  216 
This analysis confirms the influence of the EU’s example on the design of 
Mercosur’s dispute settlement. While the court began its existence quite actively up 
to declaring itself competent in cases where this was disputed (Klumpp 2013: 275–7), 
its later record places it quite far away from being an ‘activist court’ in the line of the 
ECJ’s tradition. At the time of writing, the court has issued three legal opinions (two 
are underway) and six rulings (Tribunal Permanente de Revisión 2018). Paraguay keeps 
demanding the installation of a “real court of justice” (cf. Perotti 2015; Ele-Ve 2015b) 
Conclusion	
The analysis of the EU’s region-building activities towards Mercosur and the 
assessment of their impact allow us to answer our first and second sub-research 
questions with regard to this region. In addition, the conjunction of the results of the 
four case studies contributes to a broader picture on the interrelation between 
institutional change, EU instruments and the impact of different paths of EU influence. 
We already drew a conclusion as to the EU’s use of instruments to promote 
regional cooperation, our independent variable, at the end of sub-chapter 6.2. At that 
point we concluded that the EU used instruments from all three policy fields 
distinguished in our definition of the independent variable: trade and economic 
relations, development cooperation and technical assistance, and political relations. 
Certainly, cooperation and technical assistance is the most prominent field. The scores 
for the individual instruments are shown below, ranked according to the intensity of 
their use: 
IV:	Use	of	EU	instruments	/	Mercosur	Technical	assistance	and	cooperation	 Strong		(12/16)	Trade	and	economic	relations	 Medium		(11/16)	Political	relations	 Medium		(9/16)	
                  Table 6.20: Overview EU instruments towards Mercosur 
With a view to the four case studies, we can now also reply to our second sub-research 
question ‘To what extent is the EU able to influence the emergence and development 
of regional cooperation?’ for the EU-Mercosur relationship. The table below sums up 
all the assessments for each of the case studies. 
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Case	study	
DV:	institutional	
change	
CM:	Paths	of	EU	influence	
(in	grey:	not	significant	scores)	
FOCEM	 4	
Substantial	
Lesson-drawing:	substantial	(6/9)	
Persuasion:	none	(3)	
Emulation:	none	(1/7)	
Macroeconomic	
coordination	 2		
Moderate	
Assistance:	substantial	(5/6)	
Lesson-drawing:	moderate	(5)	
Persuasion:	none	(5)	
Emulation:	none	(1/7)	
Parliament	 4	
Substantial	
Lesson-drawing:	substantial	(7/9)	
Assistance:	substantial	(4/6)	
TPR	
3	
Substantial	
Lesson-drawing:	substantial	(7/9)	
Persuasion	
Emulation	
Conditionality	
      Table 6.21: Overview of the case study results EU-Mercosur  
EU	influence	on	regional	cooperation	in	Mercosur	–	SRQ2	
First of all, we observe that all four cases of institutional change have been influenced 
by the EU. This implies that the EU’s attempts to influence the emergence and / or 
further development of regional cooperation can be considered successful. The 
picture is the same for the two fields market integration and institutions for regional 
cooperation, with no significant differences emerging as to the EU’s influence. Institutional	change	cannot	be	ordered	
Beyond this general assessment, several conclusions can be drawn from the causal 
mechanisms at play, allowing us to dig deeper into SRQ2. First of all, we observe that 
none of the legitimacy-driven mechanisms (persuasion and emulation) has had an 
impact on any of the cases studied. This may seem quite surprising: after all, one could 
expect that a regional organisation such as Mercosur might be eager to profit from EU 
recognition or be especially accessible to persuasion from a ‘fellow’ organisation – 
even more so in times of crisis as witnessed in all four case studies. On the other hand, 
the lack of impact of these mechanisms may also be related to Mercosur’s relatively 
limited dependence on legitimation by the EU, as diagnosed in the analysis of the 
scope conditions. Lastly, the limited role of these mechanisms is consistent with an 
analysis of the EU instruments in which we witnessed repeated attempts of the EU to 
convince Mercosur actors of specific policy choices, but these attempts were never 
described as especially strong. Matching our expectations, we also saw that delegation 
of power to regional bodies was limited and always bound to ‘critical junctures’ that 
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justified a conduct that otherwise would have gone counter to the strong attachment 
to national sovereignty. Own-initiative	and	ownership	are	key	
In light of the fact that we have three cases of ‘substantial’ institutional change and 
one case in which change was only ‘moderate’, it is also worth discussing how this 
variation relates with the paths of EU influence. All three cases of ‘substantial’ change 
were accompanied by a significant impact of lesson-drawing (FOCEM, the Mercosur 
Parliament, and the Court). Like no other of the mechanisms hypothesised, lesson-
drawing requires a significant degree of own-initiative and investment (in terms of 
time, political engagement, technical expertise, etc.) from the EU’s counterpart. It 
seems therefore that proactive initiative from Mercosur is a decisive factor in 
explaining EU influence. The ‘selective lesson-drawing’, where Mercosur actors 
actively chose from different systems and adapted the templates to the local needs 
for their Permanent Court of Appeals, is paradigmatic for the importance of own-
initiative. The fact that EU experiences and proposals were always adapted to local 
conditions further substantiates this observation. 
EU assistance, a path of influence mainly driven by the EU both in terms of 
initiative and investment, only plays an important role in one of the cases of 
substantial institutional change, namely in the set-up of the Mercosur Parliament. In 
this specific case, EU assistance was a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for EU 
influence. In a process that we termed ‘assisted lesson-drawing’, the EU enabled 
Mercosur actors to – once again: on their own initiative - draw lessons from the 
European experience. EU assistance played a similar role in the creation of a 
macroeconomic coordination regime for Mercosur (albeit we only had a ‘moderate’ 
institutional change in this case). The EU’s technical assistance project connected the 
different Mercosur actors with each other. But this platform of technicians only played 
a significant role in shaping Mercosur’s institutions once macroeconomic coordination 
and, by implication, statistical cooperation, became politically relevant. While the EU 
remained at the helm and kept providing the ideas and funds, Mercosur’s grown 
initiative and political support became visible as it adapted the EU proposals to its own 
agenda. At this point, and only at this point, EU technical assistance had an impact on 
institutional change. These results suggest that EU assistance does only have a 
supportive role. These patterns may well be different in a case in which the EU does 
have a stronger influence on its counterpart, such as in the Western Balkans. We now 
turn to assess the EU’s impact on regional cooperation there. 
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7 Empirics	II:	EU-Western	Balkans	
 “I came to say that Bosnia and Herzegovina has a true friend in Serbia. We show 
that friendship through respect for the territorial integrity of Bosnia, and through 
strengthening economic and political bonds” (Serbian president Vučić, as quoted 
in Rudic 2017) 
When Serbian president Aleksandar Vučić pronounced these words during a state visit 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 2017, this was not just a considerable twist 
for a politician that had once been a loyal aide to ultranationalist leader Vojislav Šešelj 
and who had served under Slobodan Milošević. It was also a considerable twist in 
relations within the region. Whether these words were just the lip service of a man 
with a pronounced sense for political opportunity or an honest sign for normalisation 
of regional relations is not essential at this point. What matters is that such words 
would have been unpronounceable only years before, putting the Serbian president 
under harsh criticism back home. At least on surface, relations between the once 
confronted neighbours in the Western Balkans have reached a degree of political 
normalcy that resembles transactions between average neighbours. Long before 
bilateral relations had reached such a degree, contacts between the states in the 
region began through externally induced regional cooperation. 
Region-building in the Western Balkans stood and still stands under a 
completely different sign than in Mercosur. In the Western Balkans, the objective is to 
unite a region whose components had actually decided to break up, leading to the 
bloodiest wars that Europe had seen in seven decades. The implosion of Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s left every regional endeavour under suspicion. Regional cooperation was 
certainly not a voluntary endeavour in the Western Balkans, rather a necessity 
imposed by the international community. 
Promoting regional cooperation in the Western Balkans became an important 
part of the EU’s strategy towards the region especially after the end of the Kosovo War 
in 1999 and with the accession to power of pro-EU governments in the at that time FR 
Yugoslavia and in Croatia in 2000. It is tightly connected to the promise that “the future 
of the Balkans is within the European Union”, which the EU spelled out in 2003 as part 
of the ‘Thessaloniki Agenda’ (EU-Western Balkans summit 2003b). Together with ‘good 
neighbourly relations’, regional cooperation represents one of the political criterions 
set up for the EU accession of the Western Balkans states. This connection provides 
the EU with powerful incentives and levers, but it also places EU promotion of regional 
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cooperation in a delicate balance with the eminently bilateral accession process, based 
on the regular assessment of the individual merits of each country. 
This chapter is devoted to answering our two first sub-research questions for 
the EU’s relationship with the Western Balkans: ‘what instruments does the EU employ 
to promote regional cooperation?’ and ‘to what extent is the EU able to influence the 
emergence and development of regional cooperation?’213 The chapter follows the 
same structure as the preceding empirical chapter. It first analysises the context of the 
EU-Western Balkans relationship and assesses the first two scope conditions: degrees 
of statehood and power asymmetries (7.1). Sub-chapter 7.2 answers ‘What 
instruments does the EU employ to promote regional cooperation?’ for the Western 
Balkans. Much like in the case of Mercosur, it demonstrates that the focus of the EU’s 
efforts in encouraging integration in the region lay in two fields: market integration 
and in building a dense web of regional institutions to open up and encourage room 
for often issue-specific regional cooperation. On this basis, three case studies are 
selected. These are analysed in sub-chapters 7.3 and 7.4. The final sub-chapter draws 
conclusions across the cases studied in this chapter. The structure of the chapter is 
reflected in the figure below. 
 
Figure 7.1: Overview of the study EU-Western Balkans 
                                                             
213 The third sub-question is answered in the cross-case analysis. It draws from variation in the scope 
conditions, which are depending on each region. 
Context and scope conditions (Chapter 7.1) 
 
EU instruments to promote regional integration (Chapter 7.2) 
Field I: Market integration (Chapter 7.3) 
• Case study 1: Regional Free Trade in the WB 
(CEFTA2006) 
Field II: Institutionalisation of regional cooperation  
(Chapter 7.4) 
• Case study 2: The Stability Pact 
• Case study 3: The Regional Cooperation Council 
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7.1 Context	and	scope	conditions	
Despite most of its states having been united in a federation for decades, the Western 
Balkans has never been a homogenous region. The wars in the nineties contributed to 
exacerbate the differences in development and to encapsulate most of the states in 
ethnically or nationally defined units suspicious of each other – often eager to place 
differences over commonalities. Peace could only be achieved at the expenses of 
political arrangements that installed delicate and often politically cumbersome checks 
and balances, the paramount example being the constitution of BiH. This context will 
be analysed in the following pages, with a special focus on assessing two of the scope 
conditions presumed to influence our causal mechanisms: the degree of statehood in 
the region and the power asymmetries between the EU and the Western Balkans. 
7.1.1 No	love	affair:	regional	cooperation	as	a	matter	of	
circumstances	-	degrees	of	statehood	
The Western Balkans is certainly a case in point when arguing that regions in a political 
sense are not natural givens, but man-made constructs. As highlighted especially by 
Dimitar Bechev, the term – and together with it the region – ‘Western Balkans’ is the 
product of a threefold semantic and political challenge that the EU confronted towards 
the end of the 1990s.  
With its increased emphasis on regional cooperation policies, the EU needed 
a term to ‘bundle’ the region. At the same time, it had to avoid any impression that it 
was promoting the re-instauration of the former Yugoslavia against which most of the 
states in the region had risen. The second challenge consisted in accommodating two 
outliers: Albania, on one hand; Slovenia, on the other. Albania had never been a part 
of Yugoslavia, but its interdependence with the rest of region advised for its inclusion 
in any regional endeavours. At the northern end of the region, Slovenia had managed 
to largely separate itself from the fate of the other states in the region through its early 
declaration of independence in 1991 and resisted to be seen as part of the so-called 
‘Yugosphere’. More often than not, the ‘Western Balkans’ are interpreted without 
Slovenia.214 The third and last challenge arose from the EU’s accession dynamics. As 
much as Slovenia rejected to be perceived as part of the troubled region, Bulgaria and 
Romania – seeing themselves on a steady path towards EU membership – fought any 
attempt to be pigeonholed with the negatively connoted ‘Balkans’. The term ‘Western 
Balkans’ clarified the boundaries and allowed the two countries to present themselves 
                                                             
214 See for example The Economist (2003c). 
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as part of Central and Eastern Europe (cf. Bechev 2006b: 21–2). Tellingly enough, 
neither ‘Balkans’ nor ‘Eastern Balkans’ are regularly used in EU vocabulary. Later on, 
with Kosovo’s 2008 declaration of independence, the term allowed to (slowly) 
accommodate Kosovo in regional gatherings without having to unanimously settle the 
question of recognition. 
Coined by the EU, and with the firm support of most of the international 
community, ‘Western Balkans’ became the term to define the region. It is a fluid term, 
as shown by the fact that states ‘cease’ to be part of the Western Balkans as they 
accede to the EU – leading to formulations such as the currently used ‘Western Balkans 
6’ (e.g. Commission 2017).215 This fluidity does not only relate to the political nature 
of the definition, but it is also coherent with a region that is heterogeneous in many 
aspects. 
This heterogeneity becomes obvious with a look at both population and GDP 
numbers (see below), but does also span further when we look at the social aspects of 
our scope condition ‘degrees of statehood’. 
 
Figure 7.2: Population of the Western Balkans 8 states 
Source: International Monetary Fund(2016) 
                                                             
215 The term allows highlighting the different status of EU members Slovenia and Croatia and also 
avoids defining Kosovo as a state, allowing for Serbian participation and reflecting the sensibilities of 
those EU states that have not recognised Kosovo’s independence. 
Empirics II: EU-Western Balkans 
 
 223 
 
 
Figure 7.3: GDP of the Western Balkans 8 states 
Source: World Bank(2016). 
As a result of the break-up of Yugoslavia, the Western Balkans is by no means a region 
in which regional cooperation is positively connoted. Quite differently to Mercosur, 
regional cooperation is not perceived as something positive by itself, but interpreted 
and promoted in a rational way. It is seen as an effort that makes sense for a number 
of functional reasons (i.e. economic development, transport, security, etc.) and as a 
prerequisite for EU accession [#34, former Commission official in Kosovo EU Office; 
#31, member of the cabinet of Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle; #61, former 
Croatian assistant minister for European Integration; #49, senior official, Serbian MFA; 
#66 and #67, officials, Serbian EU Integration Office, #51, EEAS official].216 The 
attachment to national sovereignty differs across the states of the region, but can be 
seen as generally strong – with the exception especially of BiH, where opposition to 
the constitution developed as part of the Dayton Peace Agreement is sturdy and 
loyalties are stronger towards ethnically defined entities and groups than towards the 
state (Office of the UN Resident Coordinator in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Prism 
                                                             
216 A thought often repeated by officials from the Western Balkans states was “regional cooperation 
is a good training to prepare us for membership” [i.a. #61, ibid.; #73, senior official at the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade of BiH; #76, former assistant foreign minister of Serbia and Montenegro]. 
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Research 2015: 26-29, 44). In the rest of the region, polls reveal a consistently high 
attachment to the preservation of an often ethnically-defined national sovereignty (cf. 
Nordman 2016; and the poll data quoted in Biermann 2014: 491).217 In the specific 
regional context, this situation is – a priori - likely to exacerbate opposition to regional 
cooperation endeavours if these involve a delegation of power to institutions above 
the states. At the same time, public support for EU accession is generally high in the 
eight states (Regional Cooperation Council 2017: 55; 2015: 45) and regional 
cooperation is clearly accepted as a prerequisite for EU (and NATO) accession. This 
situation again shows the eminently rational, or even transactional, nature of most of 
the support to regional cooperation. 
These circumstances lead us to expect that regional cooperation will often be 
connected to external pushes, specific incentives or practical considerations, but never 
free from difficulties arising from historical, political or other tensions. This context 
may make impulses in regional cooperation less dependent on ‘critical junctures’ 
(Collier and Collier 1991: 29–31) than in the previously studied cases with Mercosur. 
In light of the historical burdens, every step towards closer cooperation in the Western 
Balkans will always be fraught with meaning and heavy on symbolism, but symbolism 
is unlikely to be the driver – ‘managerial politics’ (Hoffmann 1966) are more likely to 
be relevant. This assessment has focused on the elements of statehood that pertain 
to a social ontology. Beyond this, statehood in a more traditional, material, 
understanding – defined as the degree to which the state is able to “adopt, implement, 
and enforce decisions” (Börzel and Risse 2012a: 11) – may also have a strong influence 
on the ability and willingness of governments to react to external influences to 
encourage regional cooperation and integration. 
Like in the analysis of the Mercosur region, we focus on the administrative 
capacity of the states that engage in regional cooperation and resort to data from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project for that purpose. In particular, we 
again use the WGI indicators for two components of governance that are important in 
our analysis: government effectiveness and rule of law. 
When scrutinising this data for the six to eight218 states for the time period 
under analysis (1999-2012), a number of traits become apparent. First and most 
                                                             
217 This does also include significant degrees of adherence to ethnically-defined pan-national 
projects, such as ‘Greater Albania’. 
218 Both Montenegro (2006) and Kosovo (2008) declared independence during the timeframe of 
analysis. Montenegro did so after holding a referendum foreseen in the constitution of Serbia and 
Montenegro, while Kosovo’s independence is not recognised by Serbia.  
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prominently, Slovenia’s detachment from the region becomes obvious both in terms 
of its government effectiveness and its rule of law. It clearly outnumbers all other 
states in the region, with a rank that places it among the world’s best-performing 
quintile. Secondly, we see that the the region falls apart in three groups, both in terms 
of government effectiveness and rule of law. Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro belong 
to a ‘top group’, showing scores comparable to lower-ranking EU member states, while 
those of Albania, BiH and Kosovo clearly place them in a group of laggards. Serbia and 
Macedonia rank in between, being very close to the ‘top three’ in terms of government 
effectiveness, but clearly behind when it comes to the rule of law. Furthermore, BiH’s 
poor record in government effectiveness places the country among the world’s lowest 
quarter and widely behind the rest of the region. It is also the only country in the region 
that does not show a relatively constant positive trend. In general terms, we also 
observe that government effectiveness fares considerably better all across the region 
than rule of law. This is often seen as the result of relatively wide-spread political 
patronage and growing challenges to the separation of powers (cf. Brusis 2016; 
Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012a; 2012b; Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012c and earlier reports). 
The data is reported in the two figures below, with the full scores available in annex C. 
 
Figure 7.4: Government effectiveness in the Western Balkans 8 states (1998-2012) 
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Figure 7.5: Rule of law in the Western Balkans 8 states (1998-2012) 
Source: Own figures with WGI scores on government effectiveness (GE) and rule of law (RL). The 
number shows the relative position in percentage among all countries analysed, with 0 being the 
lowest and 100 the highest possible score. The median for the years 1998-2012 is reported on the 
right. 
Taken together, the analysis of statehood in the Western Balkans draws the picture of 
a region that shares a numbers of characteristics, but where differences and to some 
extent also centrifugal forces are a prominent pattern. Circumstances and shared 
challenges, rather than fundamentals and convictions, draw the region together. The 
most prominent of these circumstances is the incentive of EU accession, which casts 
forth into the specific field of regional cooperation. The strong attachment to national 
sovereignty in the majority of the states is only overlaid by an eminently functional 
support for regional cooperation. The fragility of this situation became obvious with 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence and Serbia’s initial boycott to regional 
cooperation formats with a presence of its former province (e.g. Lehne 2012). Over 
time, and possibly as a consequence of the normative power of the shared 
circumstances, Serbia accepted different imaginative solutions to accommodate 
Kosovo (of which the afore-mentioned denomination ‘Western Balkans 6’ is just one 
way to avoid defining Kosovo as a state in regional gatherings). 
The differences between a top, middle and low tier of states in the capacity 
to enforce decisions exemplifies the heterogeneity in the region, in line with the GDP 
and population data. In practical terms, statehood in a material sense seems to be high 
enough in all states of the region not to be a hindrance for regional cooperation – with 
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the marked exception of BiH. Much like in the Mercosur region, albeit for completely 
different reasons, the main difficulty seems to stem from the strong attachment to 
national sovereignty. 
7.1.2 Power	asymmetries	–	EU	leverage	on	the	Western	
Balkans	
EU leverage on the Western Balkans is extremely strong across all the fields considered 
in our scope condition ‘power asymmetries’: economic dependence, provision of 
political legitimacy and even provision of security. 
We again approximate economic dependence through indicators for trade, 
foreign direct investment and development assistance flows. In terms of trade flows, 
the EU’s position vis-à-vis the Western Balkans is not just strong but almost 
hegemonic. It goes as far as being much more important than any trade flows between 
the neighbouring states. The EU has been the region’s most important trade partner 
in terms of volume over the whole period of study (1998-2012). In 2012 the EU 
accounted for 70 % the region’s trade in goods, a share largely consistent with the 
previous years. The region’s trade relationship with the EU is extremely asymmetric, 
with the Western Balkans accounting for less than 1 % of the EU’s exports and imports 
in 2012 and before. This is true despite exports from the region to the EU having 
continuously grown since the EU granted autonomous trade preferences to most of 
the countries from 2000 on as these concluded so-called Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements (SAAs) with the EU (DG TRADE 2013 and previous). 
The EU is also the largest investor in the region, albeit with a diminishing share 
over the last years and with the single exception of Montenegro, where Russian FDI 
has risen to the first position over the last years (Estrin and Uvalic 2014: 296–7). In a 
similar vein, the EU and its member states are the largest suppliers of ODA to the states 
in the region – and the EU is the largest donor to regional cooperation initiatives in the 
Western Balkans by far, albeit the US, Canada and Switzerland do also play a role in 
this particular field.219 In sum, it becomes clear that the EU has a very strong economic 
leverage over the Western Balkans – probably the largest it has over any other region 
in the world. 
Power asymmetries between the EU and the Western Balkans are not limited 
to economic matters. The EU does also play a decisive role as a provider of security in 
                                                             
219 Calculated for aid commitments in the years 2005-2015 (latest data available) using data from the 
OECD Creditor Reporting System for development assistance.  
Empirics II: EU-Western Balkans 
 
  228 
the region. European provision or assurance of security in the region becomes obvious 
when looking at the two CSDP missions still operating in the region: the military 
mission Eufor Althea in BiH (since 2004) and the civilian rule of law mission Eulex 
Kosovo. Three further CSDP missions of different sizes operated in Macedonia 
between 2003 and 2006. Despite this important role of the EU, security is not a one-
way street in the Western Balkans. The region is an important factor in European 
security as a whole. The Yugoslav wars in the 1990s made clear how conflicts in the 
region can affect the whole continent through forced migration. Instability and the 
poor rule of law have made the region a safe harbour for different types of organised 
crime, together with its geographical position they have also contributed to make the 
region an entry path for irregular migration into the EU. It is therefore appropriate to 
say that the Western Balkans’ dependence on external provision of security is nuanced 
by the fact that regional insecurity can irradiate into the rest of Europe. 
Finally, the Western Balkans quite clearly depend on the provision of 
international legitimacy and recognition by the EU. In its most technical expression, 
this dependence becomes visible as part of the accession process in which all countries 
in the region have been involved since 2003. An asymmetric relationship par 
excellence, the qualification of the countries in the region to climb further steps in the 
accession ladder depends on regular assessment reports from the European 
Commission and on their endorsement by the Council of Ministers. Essential by 
themselves, these reports do furthermore impact on the activities of further 
international actors, spanning from the International Financial Institutions to foreign 
investors or the WTO. From the point of view of a social ontology, the perceived 
degree of ‘Europeanness’ is an essential element in the self-esteem of most countries 
in the region and perceived as a criterion for modernity and much-sought normality 
(cf. the Balkan Barometer data RCC 2015: 45–6; 2017: 55–6). 
Summing up, we observe extreme power asymmetries between the two 
regions in favour of the EU. These asymmetries are based on the very important role 
of the EU as an export market for the Western Balkans, as the region’s most important 
foreign investor and as its most important contributor of ODA – all these figures 
coupled with an almost neglectable relevance of the Western Balkans for the EU in the 
same fields. In addition, the countries in the region rely on the EU for the provision 
and assurance of security, especially in BiH and Kosovo. Quite clearly, the region does 
also depend on the EU for the provision and recognition of international legitimacy. 
Most obvious in the context of European integration, this effect can also be 
interpreted in connection with the aforementioned ‘transactionality’ of support for 
EU-sponsored regional cooperation. It remains to be seen in how far conviction trumps 
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functional considerations once the incentive of EU accession is no longer there. In 
general terms, and with the exception of those states that have been acceding to the 
EU220, the large asymmetries between the Western Balkans and the EU have remained 
stable over time even if they have been gradually diminishing. These stark 
asymmetries are likely to leverage EU influence on the regional cooperation and will 
be taken into account during the analysis of the EU’s impact in the following sections 
and for the cross-case comparison in chapter 0. 
7.2 EU	engagement	and	case-study	selection	
The Western Balkans plays a constitutive role for EU external action. It was the 
traumatic experience of the EU’s inability to prevent or even to adequately react to 
the wars that accompanied the breakup of Yugoslavia that led the EU to sketch out a 
‘European Security and Defence Policy’ and to install a ‘High Representative for the 
Common and Foreign Security Policy’ in 1999, two of the so far strongest affirmations 
towards a common European foreign policy. Even nowadays, the region is often 
described as the EU’s “number 1 geopolitical challenge” (Fouéré & Blockmans 2017).  
In line with this paramount importance, the EU has been deploying all its tools 
and instruments to stabilise and integrate the region, spanning from diplomatic 
relations, over cooperation even in military terms up to the offer of EU accession to all 
the Western Balkans states – with all the financial and political implications this entails. 
In contrast to the previous enlargement round, Western Balkan states do not only have 
to show that they are fit for accession individually but also collectively. 
Ever since, fostering regional cooperation has been high on the EU’s agenda 
towards the region. It pursues a strategy that tries to strike a balance between the 
eminently bilateral accession process and the criterion that the states in the region will 
only be accepted as EU members if they achieve a sufficient degree of regional 
cooperation. While this junctim provides the EU with considerable levers, it also has 
to confront the accusation that it ties the fate of individual states to that of their 
neighbours. Above all, this strategy shows that regional cooperation is externally 
driven rather than internally motivated. The following section will sketch out the EU’s 
strategy in promoting regional cooperation in the Western Balkans and the main 
instruments used. 
                                                             
220 Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013, after our time frame of analysis. 
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7.2.1 	Building	a	region	that	doesn’t	want	to	become	a	
region	–	the	EU’s	strategy	towards	the	Western	Balkans	
From	the	Regional	Approach	to	the	SAP	–	striking	the	balance	between	regional	
objectives	and	bilateral	incentives	
Support to regional cooperation in the Western Balkans played a role in the EU’s 
strategy well before the change of governments in Croatia and Serbia in 1999 and 2000 
allowed it to offer an accession perspective to the whole region. 
 From 1996 on, shortly after the Dayton Peace Agreement had been signed, 
the Commission pursued what it called the ‘Regional Approach’. Upon the conditions 
of political and economic reforms, reconciliation measures and regional cooperation, 
it offered the states in the region (except FR Yugoslavia and Croatia) a number of 
incentives. Easier access to the European market through autonomous trade 
measures, reconstruction aid, trade and cooperation agreements as well as financial 
assistance similar to that provided to the Central and Eastern European states were 
the main stimuli (Bechev 2011: 45–6; 2006a: 32; Altmann 1998: 504–5; Commission 
1996). While the ‘Regional Approach’ emphasised regional cooperation as a criterion 
to improve relations with the EU, it was built on bilateral measures and incentives – 
mirroring the experiences made with the accession process. Driven by the 
Commission, the Regional Approach stood in a certain competition to regional policies 
initiated by the Council and individual member states. These policies, beginning with 
the French-sponsored Royaumont process launched in 1996, built on regional 
instruments such as parliamentary and senior officials meetings, but did not use the 
considerable resources and (trade) competences that the Commission could bring into 
its Regional Approach.  
For several years, this competition became characteristic for EU policies 
towards the region. Occasionally it was accompanied by caginess between the 
politically-minded Council and the Commission, reputed as being too “technical” or 
even ”square-minded” [#14, former senior Council official; also #72, former Stability 
Pact official, Rotta 2008]. As a result, the story of post-conflict EU engagement in the 
Western Balkans is as much a tale of bringing together all EU instruments as it is one 
of coordinating the different regional initiatives and bilateral incentives. This 
coordination did only develop over time, with the policy mix devised in 1999 being the 
most important step into that direction. 
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1999 saw the creation of a policy framework still in place today. In June, the 
Cologne European Council endorsed the Stability Pact for South-East Europe 
(European Council 1999: 63–77). A German initiative, the Stability Pact emphasised 
the role of regional cooperation and also included the neighbouring states of the 
Western Balkans. It resembled the OSCE’s (Organisation for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe) three baskets, focusing on three ‘working tables’ around which it brought 
together the states in the region: democracy and human rights, economic 
reconstruction and development, and security (Stability Pact 1999b: 14; Bechev 2011: 
50–4). The main agenda of the Pact was to build trust among the countries in the 
region and to encourage them to find agreements on specific policy fields. These 
agreements would then be reciprocated by aid commitments from the international 
community. 
On the Commission side of things, 1999 saw the creation of the Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP). Modelled after the accession process, the SAP sets out 
a ladder of conditions and incentives for the rapprochement of the Western Balkan 
states to the EU. In this ladder, the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral agreements 
between the EU and the states are the most decisive steps. These Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements (SAA) offer improved access to the EU market and 
considerable technical and financial assistance to the countries in the region. Unlike 
with the Regional Approach, which rested on unilateral concessions, the trade 
preferences and further EU commitments under the SAP are contractually fixed for 
longer periods of time. The SAP places a strong emphasis on facilitating regional 
cooperation. For example, the SAAs and the negotiations to conclude them require 
the Western Balkans states to dismantle tariffs inside the region and to grant their 
neighbours the same rights of establishment and employment than their own 
businesses and citizens. These and further conditions for regional cooperation are 
enshrined in the individual SAAs (Bechev 2011: 58–9; Commission 1999). The SAP can 
therefore be seen as the first meaningful attempt to bridge the division between 
regional and bilateral approaches. 
With the election of reformist governments in Croatia and the FR Yugoslavia 
in 1999 and 2000, the SAP was opened up to these two countries as well. An EU-
Western Balkans summit in Zagreb in November 2000 served to celebrate the pro-
European commitment of all the states in the region, a commitment that was met by 
the EU with the "prospect of accession [..] offered on [...] the progress made in 
implementing the stabilisation and association agreements, in particular on regional 
cooperation." (Zagreb Summit 2000: 4; emphasis added). The 2003 Thessaloniki 
European Council and the ensuing EU-Western Balkans Summit added further political 
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impetus to this objective and established a certain hierarchy, declaring the Stability 
Pact “complementary” to the SAP (EU-Western Balkans summit 2003b: 9).221 Still, the 
balance between regional objectives and bilateral incentives and the individual 
assessment of each country remained a difficult one.222 
A plethora of regional cooperation initiatives were and are still pursued in the 
context of these two frameworks, ranging from individual projects financed through 
technical assistance, over sector-specific cooperation initiatives (e.g. on corruption 
prevention or military cooperation, to mention just two) to the negotiation of large 
regional agreements on trade or energy. In line with our operationalisation, this 
section assesses to what extent the EU used instruments from the following three 
policy fields to encourage regional cooperation: development cooperation and 
technical assistance, trade and economic relations, and political relations. This 
assessment allows us to evaluate our independent variable ‘Use of EU instruments to 
promote regional cooperation’ and reply to our sub-research question 1 “What 
instruments does the EU employ to promote regional cooperation?” for the EU-
Western Balkans relationship. 
Technical	assistance:	reconstructing	a	region	and	building	its	institutions	
No other region comparable in size has received the amount of EU technical assistance 
and development cooperation resources that has been channelled into the Western 
Balkans since the end of the Bosnia war in 1996. The sheer amount makes it impossible 
to produce a comprehensive list of individual projects and resources devoted to 
regional cooperation. It may suffice to say though that the EU has consistently 
foreseen around 10 % of the funding in its last two multi-year assistance envelopes to 
so-called regional and multi-beneficiary programmes for the region. Spanning the 
time-period between 2000 and 2013, these instruments – CARDS and IPA223 – have 
included specific programmes to  encourage regional and cross-border cooperation 
(i.e. bilateral or trilateral cooperation in border regions) (Commission 2005b: 9; Rotta 
                                                             
221 To a certain extent, the relatively recent ‘Berlin process’ of regional summits between selected 
EU member states, different EU actors and the Western Balkans can be seen as an effort to provide 
new political impetus to EU-Western Balkans relations. Initiated by Germany, the Berlin Process 
started in 2014 and consists of a series of yearly summits and high-level meetings focusing on 
increasing ‘connectivity’ in fields from energy over migration to trade. It has superseded the EU-
Western Balkans summits, of which the last one took place in 2013 (cf. Fouéré and Blockmans 2017: 
1–3). 
222 For some examples see Rotta(2008: 61–3) or the EP’s plea for dissolving the Stability Pact in 2001 
(Gack 2001). 
223 CARDS is the acronym for Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation, IPA for Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance. 
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2008: 60; Commission 2010c: 3; Bechev and Andreev 2005: 14). The preceding 
programme, PHARE224, did support individual regional or bilateral projects, but 
focused mostly on alleviating immediate consequences of the wars (Commission 1998: 
18-19, 37-39). The current programme, IPA II, has even increased the share of funds 
devoted to multi-country programmes to 25 % of the overall 11.7 billion € budgeted 
(Commission - DG NEAR 2017).225  
Over time, funds for regional cooperation have been subject to the general 
trends underlying development assistance, for example an increase of the funding 
devoted to leveraging private or public-sector investments through blending 
(European Commission 2014b: 29). Also the individual foci or projects have evolved as 
the states developed, often from reconciliation and reconstruction (e.g. funding for 
resettlement and basic infrastructure) to economic and social development (e.g. 
environment, private sector development, cultural heritage; European Commission - 
DG ELARG 2010b; 2010c; 2010a; European Commission 2013f: 115–21). In terms of 
our assessment of the independent variable ‘Use of EU instruments to encourage 
regional integration’, these 10 % of overall funding with a regional focus translate into 
a ‘substantial’ score for our indicator of the absolute and relative budgetary relevance 
of the projects aimed at fostering regional cooperation (all scores are summarised in 
table 7.1 below).226 
 This budgetary relevance is very much in line with the unparalleled emphasis 
that EU actors placed on regional cooperation when planning the different assistance 
instruments for the Western Balkans. It is almost difficult to find a speech of a senior 
                                                             
224 PHARE stands for ‘Pologne, Hongrie Assistance à la Reconstruction Economique’ and was set up 
in 1989. It later became one of the instruments to support countries during pre-accession and 
accession. 
225 ‘Multi-country’ programmes require several countries to apply together. It is important to note, 
though, that the numbers for IPA and IPA II include the considerable shares of funds allocated to 
Turkey and that the multi-country budget also includes programmes to which all countries can apply 
but which have an eminently national impact (like membership fees to participate in EU agencies or 
programmes for public sector reform) (see for example Commission 2014b: 12–7). 
226 A comparison to the assessment for the EU-Mercosur case may create the impression that this 
‘substantial’ assessment is overstated since there EU funds with a regional focus amounted to almost 
90 % (cf. p. 153). This apparent imbalance is related to the different design of the financial 
instruments used by the EU. In the Western Balkans, regional cooperation funds were always part of 
the overall budget devoted to the region – i.e. bilateral and regional programmes – leading to the 10 
% mentioned above. In the case of Mercosur, the regional organisation as such had a dedicated 
budget in which regional cooperation objectives played the most important role. In addition to this 
budget, bilateral aid to Latin America is channelled through different instruments in the overall 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the previous ALA Instrument (Amérique Latine, 
Asie). 
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EU policy-maker that does not emphasise how important regional cooperation is for 
the region and in the EU’s assistance. (e.g. Füle 2012: 1; Rehn 2007; 2008). In the same 
vein, regional cooperation is highlighted in each and every strategic or planning 
document related to the region (e.g. European Commission - DG RELEX 2001; 
Commission 2006b: 7-8, 11, 16, 26, 30, 34, 38, 43, 47, 51; European Commission 
2011b: 7-8, passim) and also plays a prominent role in the conclusions that the Council 
traditionally releases every December on the progress made towards accession or 
within the SAP (e.g. Council 2009a: 30, 41, 42; Council 2012f: 7, 12, 30, 35, 43, 44; 
2006: 8). Based on the progress reports from the Commission, the Council conclusions 
emphasise the political weight placed on regional cooperation. In the particular case 
of Serbia, this emphasis went as far as to conditioning the opening of accession 
negotiations on a constructive engagement in regional cooperation (Council 2011b: 
53, 54). Interviews with senior EU officials and policy-makers in the Commission and 
the Council further confirm the weight put on regional cooperation [#31, member of 
the cabinet of Enlargement Commissioner Štefan Füle, #32, senior official DG ELARG; 
#51, EEAS official; #14, former senior Council official]. In sum, there is no doubt that 
the emphasis of mentions on regional cooperation in strategic documents, speeches 
and in interviews with EU policy-makers can all be assessed with a ‘substantial’ score. 
 The SAP is a process based on contractual agreements between the individual 
countries and the EU. All the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) are 
modelled on the same pattern and include a large number of references and specific 
commitments to regional cooperation, especially on trade and economics.227 In the 
area of technical assistance, the SAA enshrines EU assistance for regional cooperation 
in general terms and in numerous specific policy fields like transport or combatting 
crime (European Communities and Republic of Serbia 2013 [2008]: Art. 82, 86, 88, 94, 
108, 109; Protocol 4, Art. 4). While the largest part of the agreements regulates 
bilateral relations, the texts seek to connect these to regional and bilateral objectives 
(European Communities and Republic of Serbia 2013 [2008]: Art. 1(2), 6, 8, 10(2)). 
Laying the ground for conditionality, these objectives and steps to achieve them are 
specified in the regularly updated criteria catalogues set up by the Council for each of 
the countries concerned – the European Partnerships (e.g., for Bosnia Council 2008a). 
                                                             
227 Because of their similarities, the following analysis only quotes references from the EU-Serbia 
SAA. Between 2001 and 2015 the EU has signed seven SAA with the Western Balkans states, six of 
them in the timeframe of analysis of this study (1999-2012). Only the SAA with Kosovo includes 
significant differences to previous SAAs. These stem from the fact that not all EU states have 
recognised Kosovo (cf. Elsuwege 2017: 400–8). 
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Taking these two instruments together, the emphasis placed on regional cooperation 
in treaties can therefore also be assessed as “substantial”. 
An examination of project documentation and of the regular assessments 
made by the Enlargement directorate of the European Commission shows that the EU 
places a strong emphasis on the regional repercussions of its technical assistance 
projects and on making sure that a sufficient number of them address regional 
concerns directly (e.g. Commission 2013e: 10–1; Deloitte Consulting 2008; 
Commission 2002; Commission 2011b: 7-8, passim). This observation was further 
confirmed in interviews with EU actors involved in the formulation, management and 
the political assessment of cooperation projects [#31, ibid. #32, ibid. and #33, DG 
ELARG official, all Commission; #51, ibid.; #14, former senior official, Council], with 
officials of the Western Balkans states [#59, official, Croatian MFA; #64, official, 
Serbian EU Integration Office, #73, senior official at the Ministry of Foreign Trade of 
BiH] and regional organisations [#75, senior official, Regional Cooperation Council; 
#38, former official Working Table II of the Stability Pact]. In sum, these observations 
lead us to assess the emphasis of mentions on regional cooperation in project 
documentation and assessments and in interviews with EU policy-makers and officials 
from the Western Balkans states all with a ‘substantial’ score. 
In sum, our empirical analysis of the indicators for development cooperation 
and technical assistance shows a very strong use of EU instruments to encourage 
regional cooperation (16 points out of 16). The components of the assessment are 
shown in table 7.1 below. The assessment shows that the EU spent considerable 
technical assistance in encouraging regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, even 
with an increasing budget share as the focus moved from reconstruction to 
development and accession. The ensuing sub-section moves to analyse the EU’s 
activities in the fields of trade and economic relations. 
Use	of	EU	of	development	cooperation	and	technical	assistance:	EU-Western	
Balkans	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 2	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 2	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 2	
absolute	 and	 relative	 budgetary	 relevance	 	 of	 development	
cooperation	projects	aimed	at	fostering	regional	cooperation.	 2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 project	 documentation	 and	
assessments.	
2	
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emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	 in	 interviews	with	policy-makers	 from	EU	 partners	 (officials	 present	 in	 negotiations	 and	implementation).	 2	
Use	of	development	cooperation	and	TA	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	middle	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 16	Strong	categorisation	 of	 emphasis,	 relevance,	 number	 and	 amount	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	 moderate	 (1)	 –	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.1: Use of EU development cooperation and technical assistance to encourage regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans 
Trade	and	economic	relations:	drawing	together	the	spokes	
As a result of the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, regional trade in the Western Balkans 
contracted sharply (Handjiski et al. 2010: 7). In 2001, trade between the neighbours 
that hat once belonged to same economy accounted for just 7% of their whole trade 
volume (Commission 2002: 5).228 In contrast, trade with the EU made up the bulk of 
total trade, leading to what has been termed as a ‘hub-and-spoke’ pattern between 
the EU and the individual countries (Gropas 2006: 35–7). Despite the fact that its own 
trade preferences to the states in the region may have accentuated this dependence, 
the EU was quick to identify the lack of intra-regional trade and economic connections 
as one of the obstacles the Western Balkans would have to surmount to prosper – and 
to grow together as a region. Quite clearly, this field is also one in which the EU was 
able to build on its own experience to provide advice and tested policy receipts. Early 
on, it took up the stewardship of the region in terms of trade in the informal division 
of labour that developed between different actors of the international community.229 
Consequently, boosting regional trade became a priority in the EU’s strategy towards 
the Western Balkans and was regularly highlighted in its respective strategic 
documents (Rat der Europäischen Union 1997: 12–4; Commission 1999: 3–7; 2006a: 
5–7; 2008: 15). Speeches from EU Commissioners and decision-makers as well as in 
interviews conducted with officials in charge of drawing up EU policies for the region 
[e.g. Commission 2005c; Lamy 2003a; Ashton 2010b; #14, former Council senior 
official, #32, senior official DG ELARG] reflect the relevance placed on trade integration 
and how it is understood as a means to unite the region and to “bring people together 
on something with a clear pay-out first” [#33, official DG ELARG]. In light of these 
                                                             
228 This comparison comes with a slight, but neglectable, inaccuracy since Albania is included in the 
7% of regional trade in 2001, but was not part of Yugoslavia. 
229 Roughly speaking, this ‘division of labour’ saw the World Bank and other IFIs coordinating 
reconstruction of infrastructure, NATO and the US in lead of security matters and the UN and the 
OECD in charge of civilian monitoring and administrative reforms.     
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observations, we score the EU’s strategic emphasis on encouraging trade integration 
as ‘substantial’.230  
 Both the Regional Approach and the SAP included and include an important 
focus on trade. While the Regional Approach did ‘only’ grant unilateral trade 
preferences to the Western Balkans states to enter the EU market (e.g. for Albania: 
Council 1999), the SAP also spurs the countries to foster trade integration within the 
region itself. It made trade agreements with the EU conditional on the countries’ 
“readiness to engage in regional cooperation with other countries concerned by the 
EU’s SAP, in particular through the establishment of regional trade areas” (Council 
2000b: Art. 2(2)). The individual SAAs put teeth into this condition by committing the 
states to conclude agreements with each other before specific dates and making “such 
conventions [...] a condition for the further development of the relations between 
Serbia and the European Union." (in the example of Serbia, European Communities 
and Republic of Serbia 2013 [2008]: Art. 15). Accordingly, we assess the emphasis 
made in treaties as ‘substantial’. 
 With these incentives in place, the Stability Pact became the main instrument 
of the EU and the international community to coach the region towards regional trade 
integration. Through its Working Table II on Economic Reconstruction, Co-operation 
and Development and, more specifically, its Trade Working Group, the Stability Pact 
sat senior officials from the Western Balkans around one table and brought them 
together with experts, potential funders and representatives of the international 
community (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2006). The UK and the US financed 
the bulk of the operating costs for the Working Table and the Commission most of the 
technical work undertaken by the countries to prepare and conduct their trade 
negotiations [O'Mahony 2010: 138, 146; #38, former official, Working Table II of the 
Stability Pact]. While these efforts are relatively small compared to the vast EU 
spending on technical assistance and also other funders (e.g. Switzerland) provided 
funds, the EU’s trade-related technical assistance made and still makes up the most 
important share of international contributions in this field [WTO 2018; #32, ibid.].231 
We therefore assess both its share and its emphasis on regional cooperation as 
‘substantial’. According to experts involved in the Trade Working Group, coordination 
between the negotiators of the regional trade process and those of the SAAs worked 
                                                             
230 All scores are summarised in table 7.2 below. 
231 TRTA data is difficult to obtain because such activities are not always reported as an own category 
of development assistance. The quoted ‘Global Trade-Related Technical Assistance Database’ from 
the WTO offers an approximation as it shows that the EU sponsored the vast majority of activities in 
this field in the Western Balkans. It does not quote the amounts spent for such activities. 
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well and was essential to convey to the Western Balkan governments that their 
regional track was taken into account for their rapprochement to the EU [O'Mahony 
2010: 145; #72, former senior official, Working Table II of the SP]. Representatives of 
the Western Balkans in the negotiations confirm that this connection was a credible 
one [#73, representative for BiH at the Trade WG; #65, representative of Serbia-
Montenegro / Serbia at the Trade WGI]. In light of this evidence from both sides of the 
negotiating table, we assess the emphasis on regional trade relations as mentioned by 
policy-makers in interviews as ‘substantial’. 
 While trade concentrated the main efforts of its engagement, the EU 
influenced and stewarded a large number of regional economic cooperation 
initiatives. Most of them were channelled through the Stability Pact, like the Energy 
Community (aiming to increase connectivity in energy markets) or different activities 
to improve transport infrastructure or energy markets, to name just a few. In the same 
vein, the SAAs contain general commitments of the Western Balkans states to 
approximate their legislation in a number of economic sectors to the respective EU 
rules and to cooperate with each other in doing so. While these commitments are of 
uncertain operational meaning232, they also serve to justify the important EU’s 
technical and financial assistance in many policy fields.  
 In sum, the overall assessment shows that the EU used its trade and economic 
instruments to promote its policy of regional cooperation in the Western Balkans to a 
very strong degree (16 points out of 16 in our score, see table 7.2 below). This result 
is in line with the previously analysed field of technical assistance and reflects the EU’s 
very strong effort to coach, but also to push, the Western Balkan governments into 
regional trade and economic cooperation. The ensuing paragraphs analyse how the EU 
used political instruments to encourage regional cooperation. 
Use	of	EU	instruments:	trade	and	economic	relations:	EU-Western	Balkans	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 2	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 2	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 2	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 in	 project	 documentation	 and	
assessments.	
2	
                                                             
232 For a succinct assessment of the bindingness of different types of EU agreements with third 
countries see Emerson et al.(2017: 22–7).  
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amount	 and	 share	 of	 trade-related	 technical	 assistance	oriented	towards	regional	cooperation	and	integration.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	partners.	 2	
Use	of	trade	and	economic	relations	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	medium	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 16	Strong	categorisation	of	emphasis	and	amount	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.2: Use of EU trade and economic relations to encourage regional cooperation in the 
Western Balkans 
Political	relations:	weaving	the	countries	together	
Once the EU had struck a certain balance between the SAP and its regional cooperation 
initiatives by placing the latter under the umbrella of the stabilisation and accession 
logic, the EU’s strategy has consistently emphasised the importance of regional 
cooperation for its approach to the Western Balkans. As already shown above, regional 
cooperation found its way into all relevant strategy documents for the region and its 
individual states (see p. 283f. above, Commission 1999: 1,3-8), building upon the 
emphasis already present in the Regional Approach. At times, the EU even recurred to 
its own experience as "a model for overcoming conflict and promoting reconciliation 
through close co-operation” (Commission 1999: 6; similarly Commission - RELEX 2001: 
5) to substantiate the virtues of regional cooperation.  
In line with this agenda, the EU’s political engagement for regional 
cooperation sought first to support ‘technical’ cooperation on individual issues that 
would pay off for the states before moving into cooperation schemes with a broader 
and more political mandate. This does not mean that issues at stake were 
uncontroversial, resettlement of refugees being one of the first matters approached 
(Council 1996: 7). But attention was paid that all the issues pushed for could be placed 
in a discourse of practical ‘things that need to be done’ [#14, former senior Council 
official]. Creating issue-based institutions to foster and maintain these cooperations 
played an important role from the beginning, slowly giving way to the creation of 
regional institutions with a broader mandate, such as the Stability Pact. From Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence in 2008 on, the EU’s political engagement was 
characterised by the efforts to integrate the new state into the regional cooperation 
structures against Serbia’s resistance [#14, ibid.; #31, member of the Cabinet of 
Commissioner Füle]. The direct provision and guaranty of security through 
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international and EU missions such as SFOR, Althea or Eupol Proxima233 was 
complemented by the encouragement of regional police and even military confidence-
building, for example through regular meetings on arms control or the fight against 
organised crime (for examples, see Sterie and Brunhart 2010; Dimov 2010; Mergel 
2010). 
Speeches and utterances of high-level EU actors stress the relevance of 
regional cooperation as a necessary approach to shared problems and opportunities 
in the Western Balkans and as a tool to overcome bilateral disputes, but also as a 
means of preparing for EU membership (e.g. Füle 2012: 1; Council 2012a: 10; Ashton 
2010a; van Rompuy 2011; Patten 2002). Prominent mentions of the kind of "We 
expect Belgrade to implement the agreements it has entered into in the dialogue with 
Pristina, in particular on regional cooperation and crossing points. […] This will be a 
good opportunity to demonstrate Serbia’s active contribution to regional cooperation. 
[...] Maintaining the spirit of reconciliation is essential for stability in the region and I 
expect Serbia to play a positive and constructive role in words and deeds.” (van 
Rompuy 2012: 2) are just one of many examples. Officials in charge of or closely 
involved in the EU’s strategy towards the Western Balkans confirm the strategic 
emphasis on regional cooperation that becomes apparent in policy documents and 
speeches. They leave no doubt as to the vigour with which regional cooperation was 
streamlined into virtually every policy field related to the Western Balkans [#14, ibid.; 
#31, ibid.; #51, EEAS official; #70, senior official, EU delegation to Serbia]. As a result 
of this consistent strategic emphasis, political relations and the overall objective to 
encourage regional cooperation only collided with each other seldomly.234 In light of 
these observations in documents, interviews and speeches we assess the emphasis on 
regional cooperation expressed in the EU’s political strategy towards the region as 
‘substantial’. 
In the practice of political negotiations, participants from both sides report 
the strong emphasis that EU representatives placed on regional cooperation both as a 
general political principle as on specific issues at stake at different stages of the 
negotiations. EU negotiators are reported to have used the Stabilisation and 
                                                             
233 Respectively: the NATO-led Stabilisation Force Bosnia and Herzegovina, its succeeding EU Military 
Operation EUFOR Althea and the EU Police Mission in Macedonia. 
234 One such case may have been the EU’s emphasis in 2002 to keep Serbia and Montenegro united 
to prevent any bandwagon effects in the region. The state union, which lasted between 2003 and 
2006, had difficulties to unify its own market rules, to mention just one example. Observers at the 
time argued that this slowed down the speed for regional agreements as well (Bechev 2004: 10–1). 
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Association Councils (e.g. Council 2013e: 2; 2009b: 3)235 and bilateral meetings along 
the course of the SAP to stress the importance of regional cooperation as a yardstick 
to advance in bilateral relations [#14, senior Council official; #61, former assistant 
minister, Croatia; #51, EEAS official]. Regional cooperation came onto the agenda at 
several levels: by bringing in policies from the Stability Pact or other regional initiatives, 
through the progressive involvement of the states in community policies and related 
institutions and, most prominently from 2008 on, regarding the involvement of Kosovo 
in regional institutions. Asked how they would rank regional cooperation when 
compared to other issues on the agenda, most interviewees replied that the issue had 
a status comparable to prominent political issues such as resettlement or the rights of 
minorities [#14, ibid.; #31, ibid.; #33, official, DG ELARG; #51, ibid.]. They conceded 
though that it was a “soft” criterion, difficult to assess in isolation from other issues 
[#31, ibid.; #32, senior official, DG ELARG.; #51, ibid.]. Despite this, regional 
cooperation was the subject of specific conditionality or high-level political 
interventions several times throughout the time period analysed in this study. 
Croatia’s refusal to allow the inclusion Serbia in the regional trade regime in 2006 is 
one case in point (see the case study in 7.3.1 below for more detail), Bosnia’s 
impediments to foreign and internal trade another (Commission 2003). The 
connection between regional objectives and bilateral instruments becomes clear also 
in the regular assessments that the EU undertakes of each Western Balkan state. All 
the individual steps in the rather complex assessment system pay attention to regional 
cooperation: the aforementioned ministerial Councils between the EU and the 
individual partners, the yearly progress reports and the December Council conclusions 
in which all these steps culminate (e.g. Council 2012c: 7, 12, 30, 34, 35, 43, 44; 
Commission 2010e: 19–22). While being a political criterion, and therefore more 
difficult to assess than other areas, evidence on the political prioritisation of accession 
and SAP criteria reveals that regional cooperation plays a decisive role in the 
assessment of the countries by the EU and member states in the Council [#31, ibid., 
#32, ibid.; #33, ibid.; #49, Serbian diplomat, #51, ibid.] In light of these observations 
from interviews with negotiators and involved persons from both sides, we score the 
EU’s emphasis in this field as ‘substantial’. 
This strong stance does also become obvious when examining the vast 
number of EU statements pertaining to the countries of the region and to the region 
itself. It is difficult not to find regional cooperation mentioned as a frame for the EU’s 
policy towards the Western Balkans and as an expectation placed on the individual 
                                                             
235 Stabilisation and Association Councils are the regular ministerial meetings between the EU, its 
member states, and the respective Western Balkan state foreseen in the SAAs. 
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countries. The politically most relevant statements of this type are the already 
mentioned Council conclusions. These statements systematically assess the respective 
country’s engagement in cooperating with its neighbours bilaterally and regionally. 
Statements such as “the Council encourages Croatia to continue addressing all 
outstanding bilateral and regional issues” (Council 2012c: 12) are typical in this 
context. In especially problematic cases, they are explicitly connected to conditions (as 
regarding Serbia’s stance towards Kosovo’s participation in regional cooperation, see 
Council 2010: 8). We therefore rank the EU’s emphasis on regional cooperation as 
expressed in statements and declarations as ‘substantial’. 
Creating a public perception about regional cooperation also among the 
populations of the countries was central to the EU’s approach. For that purpose, the 
EU and other international actors placed a special emphasis on creating occasions in 
which the leaders of the countries would publicly commit themselves to regional 
cooperation. Regional summits with the presidents or prime ministers are still the 
preferred way to create such visibility, starting with the historical 2003 Thessaloniki 
Summit to the series of Western Balkan summits and EU-Western Balkan Summits that 
have taken place over the last 15 years (EU-Western Balkans Summit 2003b; N.N. 
2013). Except the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP) launched by 
Bulgaria in 1996, virtually all regional dialogues have been initiated by actors outside 
the region.236 Below this degree of visibility, also parliamentarians are engaged in 
political dialogues initiated by the EU and/or with the European Parliament and 
numerous fora have been organised at technical and administrative levels for 
individual policy fields (for an overview on parliamentary cooperation see Bläss and 
Boati 2010). The latter are often seen as a cornerstone in building confidence between 
elites in the countries and nurturing an issue-based demand for regional cooperation 
and mutual learning [#14, ibid.; #33, ibid, #41, ibid.]. Emphasis on such regional 
encounters has remained strong all over the process of EU engagement with the 
region, sometimes in open contrast to local preferences for a bilateral approach. 
During Serbia’s boycott to Kosovo’s participation in regional meetings, these claimed 
a special political attention from the EU. In sum, we also assess the relevance of 
political dialogues with a regional focus as ‘substantial’. 
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the EU’s main policy towards 
the region, the SAP, is based on the negotiation and conclusion of bilateral 
agreements, the SAAs. These agreements set an important focus on encouraging 
regional cooperation, as described in the assessment of the EU’s trade policy towards 
                                                             
236 Bechev(2011: 44–50) gives an overview of the different initiatives. 
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the region. In a similar way, the SAAs require the countries to engage in regional 
political cooperation (e.g. European Communities and Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008 
[2015]: Art. 14-16). But unlike for trade, the agreements do not reinforces this 
requirement with a specific timeframe upon which political cooperation is supposed 
to take up steam. This falls in line with the above-described issue-based approach to 
regional cooperation. “[P]roven readiness to enter into […] cooperative relations with 
its neighbours” (Council 1997: 16–21) was set as a condition to open negotiations on 
SAAs with the countries, signalling the priority given to regional cooperation – but also 
the difficulty to tie this “loose” or “not quantifiable” criterion to any specific indicators 
[respectively, #32, ibid., and #33, ibid.]. In light of the fact that the emphasis placed on 
regional cooperation was often stronger on specific issues than on political relations 
in general terms, we assess this indicator as “moderate”. 
Use	of	EU	political	instruments:	EU-Western	Balkans	
Policy-making	
levels	 Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	Planning	and	strategy	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	speeches.	 2	emphasis	of	mentions	in	strategic	documents.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	EU	policy-makers.	 2	Implementation	 emphasis	of	mentions	in	treaties.	 1	
relevance	of	political	dialogues	with	a	regional	focus.	 2	
emphasis	 of	 statements	 and	 declarations	 mentioning	
regional	cooperation.	 2	
emphasis	 of	mentions	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	 policy-makers	present	in	/	tasked	with	negotiations.	 2	
emphasis	of	mentions	in	interviews	with	policy-makers	from	EU	partners	present	in	/	tasked	with	negotiations.	 2	
Use	of	political	relations	to	promote	regional	cooperation	scores	as	none	(0)	–	low	(1-5)	–	medium	(6-11)	–	strong	(12-16)	 15	Strong	categorisation	of	relevance	and	emphasis	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.3: Use of EU political relations to encourage regional cooperation in the Western Balkans 
The analysis above has served to assess our independent variable ‘EU use of 
instruments to encourage regional cooperation’ for the EU’s relationship with the 
Western Balkans. We have identified a consistently strong engagement of the EU in 
the three foreign-policy fields analysed. Summing up the analysis above, we see that 
the EU engaged very directly in the promotion of regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans. Dedicating more than 10 % of its technical assistance to this purpose, the EU 
sought to show that cooperation serves to solve practical problems and to create 
welfare. In the same line, it has tutored the region into regional trade and economic 
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integration, using the Western Balkan’s dependence on the European market and 
bilateral incentives to leverage its agenda. This issue-based approach has created a 
web of political relations, initiatives, institutions and summits that seek to create 
visibility for the regional cooperation agenda and to connect administrations and 
experts in dense networks. Whenever necessary, the EU has used its political clout and 
the conditionality of the SAP and the accession process to spur and pressure hesitant 
governments into cooperation. These interactions reflect the fields where the EU has 
employed its instruments to promote regional cooperation and provide the set of 
potential cases among which individual case studies will be selected to analyse 
whether the EU has been able to influence the emergence and development of 
regional cooperation in the region (SRQ2).   
7.2.2 Case-study	selection	
The overview in the previous section has shown that the EU’s engagement to 
encourage regional cooperation in the Western Balkans is among the broadest and 
strongest towards any region – if not the strongest of all. Despite the fact that the EU 
has used virtually every instrument at its hand, we can still see a focus on the 
construction of regional markets and the creation of new institutions that would bind 
together the region and help it to tackle regional challenges. We will therefore select 
our case-studies from these two fields – as outlined in the methods chapter (cf. 5.2.3, 
p. 109f.) 
For the first field, market integration, we choose one case that meets our 
selection criteria237: the creation of the regional free trade area CEFTA2006 (Central 
European FTA 2006, Case 1). The creation of CEFTA2006 is a case in point in the EU’s 
efforts to spur the region into trade integration. The agreement sought to restore the 
once close trade ties in the Western Balkans. Seen as a restoration of the former 
Yugoslavia, this EU initiative was heavily debated – and even resisted to – by the 
countries in the region. 
In the second field of EU engagement, the institutionalisation of regional 
cooperation, we choose two cases that also exemplify how the EU’s policy evolved 
along the timeframe analysed: from externally imposing regional cooperation to 
stimulating the countries to embrace cooperation out of their own impulse. Our 
                                                             
237  As outlined in section 5.2.3: (1) institutional change has taken place during the period of analysis, 
(2) towards which the EU has applied its instruments to promote regional cooperation, (3) they are 
narrow enough to identify external influences, and (4) they are potentially relevant to the overall 
development of cooperation and integration in the studied region 
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analysis will try to shed light on whether regional cooperation has been embraced as 
a priority also by the governments of the region. As a first case, we analyse the creation 
of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe (SP, Case 2) from 1999 onwards. As a second 
case, we focus on how the SP was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council 
(RCC, Case 3) from 2005 on, seeking to transform it into a ‘regionally owned’  
instrument for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. 
Synthesis	
The previous paragraphs have shown how the EU has used all instruments at its 
disposal to encourage regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, allowing us to 
answer our SRQ1 ‘What instruments does the EU employ to promote regional 
cooperation?’ for this particular relationship. 
Accompanied by a strong political pressure on the countries of the region and 
the ultimate incentive of EU membership, the EU dedicated a large amount of the vast 
technical assistance it provided to the Western Balkans to encourage, support and 
finance regional cooperation initiatives. So called ‘multi-country programmes’, which 
now make up almost a quarter of the EU’s technical assistance to the region, require 
the countries to develop projects together to even receive the funds. A considerable 
part of this funding is also devoted to financing regional cooperation schemes, such as 
the RCC. Using its power of attraction as the region’s by far most important market, 
the EU pushed the Western Balkans states into concluding trade agreements with each 
other and reducing barriers to trade and economic exchanges in the region. Certainly, 
the concise use of political instruments and conditionality to incentivise regional 
cooperation stands out in the EU-Western Balkans relationship. Through the SAP, the 
EU conditioned bilateral incentives to improvements in regional cooperation, setting 
deadlines and regularly reviewing and politically assessing specific progress. Across all 
the three policy fields analysed - technical assistance, trade and economic relations 
and political relations – the EU’s engagement scores as ‘strong’.  
Taking into account the EU’s focus on market integration and the creation of 
regional institutions, we have selected three cases to empirically trace whether and to 
what extent the use of these EU instruments to promote regional cooperation has 
been successful. Beginning with the field of market integration, the two following 
sections will analyse whether EU instruments have had an impact on institutional 
change in the Western Balkans. 
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7.3 Market	integration	
In a region impoverished by war, bringing together the split national markets seemed 
not just a necessity but also one of the best options to build a case for regional 
cooperation. Technical in nature and far from political headlines, cooperation in 
economic terms promises to attract investment to the states involved, to create 
markets for regional exporters and lower prices for consumers. 
This section will study a case of institutional change in the Western Balkans 
that aimed to contribute to building a regional market: the EU-sponsored creation of 
regional free trade area. The analysis follows the same structure as in the cases studies 
for Mercosur. After assessing the respective institutional change (i.e. our dependent 
variable), we briefly reflect the context in which the change took place and assess the 
scope condition ‘domestic incentives’. In light of the context and the EU instruments 
identified for the specific case, we process-trace the impact of those diffusion 
mechanisms that could have influenced the decisions and actions of Western Balkan 
actors. The intensity of each of the hypothesised causal mechanisms is assessed and 
scored to rank their relevance against each other. 
7.3.1 Regional	Free	Trade	in	the	Western	Balkans	–	the	
bumpy	road	to	CEFTA2006		
A somehow odd ceremony took place in Bucharest in December 2006. Just a few days 
before acceding to the EU, the Romanian and Bulgarian prime ministers joined their 
colleagues from the Western Balkans in signing the CEFTA2006 agreement: the Central 
European Free Trade Agreement 2006. Commissioners Peter Mandelson, Olli Rehn and 
the Co-ordinator of the Stability Pact, Erhard Busek, all held momentous speeches to 
mark the occasion (Rehn 2006; Busek 2006). With their signatures, Romania and 
Bulgaria had just become part of a regional trade agreement that they would leave 
only ten days later to join the world’s largest common market.  
Institutional	change	–	taking	a	detour	to	regional	integration	
This singular moment was the culmination of the Western Balkan’s bumpy road to 
regional trade integration. It took seven years and several detours to create the 
regional trade agreement that the EU had set out as an objective already in 1999 
(Commission 1999a: 37) and to which the states in the region had committed in 2000 
(Zagreb Summit 2000: 3). In a rather tortuous process, the Western Balkans states and 
some of their neighbours which were not (yet) EU members (Romania, Bulgaria, and 
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Moldova) first negotiated 32 bilateral trade agreements between them only to 
substitute them with a single regional pact just before the last of the 32 agreements 
had been signed. 
 In terms of our scheme of institutional change, the creation of CEFTA2006 
clearly added a new function to the Western Balkans system of regional cooperation: 
liberalising trade in the region and creating a joint legal framework. In terms of actors, 
the CEFTA2006 agreement brought together the states of the Western Balkans and 
the afore-mentioned neighbours in a regular joint committee and in a number of 
technical bodies to manage different aspects of the agreement (Albania et al. 2006b: 
Art. 40). Furthermore, a small secretariat was created in Brussels to provide data, 
technical advice and assist with the acquisition of donor funds. The European 
Commission agreed to finance the bulk of its operating costs for the first years (CEFTA 
Joint Committee 2007). Unlike other regional cooperation initiatives in the Balkans, 
CEFTA2006 foresees no active role for the Commission or any other EU institution. 
The alignment of the agreement to the EU becomes clear though in the 
decision-making aspects of CEFTA. For example, the agreement’s rules on state aid are 
inspired by the EU’s rules and even point to the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community (TEC) for further reference (Albania et al. 2006b: Art. 21). Beyond this 
particular aspect, the CEFTA agreement creates regional rules for investment, 
competition policy and trade in goods and services (Albania et al. 2006b). Decisions of 
the joint committee are taken by consensus, reflecting not only common practice in 
regional trade agreements but also the still limited trust between the parties [#38, 
former official, Trade WG of the Stability Pact; #73 and #50, officials involved in the 
CEFTA2006 negotiations, BiH Ministry for Foreign Trade and Serbian Trade Ministry, 
respectively]. With a view to Serbia’s policy on Kosovo, an exemption clause allows the 
parties not to apply a decision they have reservations on without blocking decision-
making for the whole group (Albania et al. 2006b: Art. 41). 
An intergovernmental trade treaty, CEFTA does not take up any competences. 
An ad-hoc arbitration tribunal is to be set up whenever a dispute arises between 
parties to the agreement with the aim to find a solution but no competences to 
enforce its decisions (Albania et al. 2006b: Art. 43 and Annex 9). We do therefore rate 
this particular dimension of institutional change as ‘none’. 
In sum, we can conclude that the creation of the CEFTA2006 agreement was 
a ‘substantial’ institutional change in terms of our assessment scheme (score 3 out of 
4). It involved the addition of a very important core function to the regional setup and 
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foresaw new decision-making rules for the involved actors, often with a close 
alignment to the relevant EU rules. Table 7.4 below sums up this assessment. 
Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 Liberalising	barriers	to	trade	and	creating	a	joint	legal	framework	for	trade	in	goods	and	services,	investment	and	competition.	 1	Actors	 Creation	of	a	joint	committee	of	the	parties	and	different	technical	bodies	Creation	of	a	secretariat,	initially	financed	by	the	EU	(no	EU	membership	in	CEFTA	bodies)	
1	
Decision-making	 Creation	of	rules	on	trade,	investment,	competition	policy,	often	aligned	on	respective	EU	rules	and	referring	to	EU	procedures	Decision-making	by	consensus	
1	
Competences	 No	 own	 competences	 placed	 upon	 the	 bodies	 of	 the	agreement	(joint	committee,	secretariat)	 0	
Institutional	change	–	CEFTA	
3		
Substantial	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	dimensions	changed.	The	core	function	represents	a	threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 7.4: Institutional change in the creation of CEFTA2006 
Context	and	domestic	incentives	
Even if economic logic painted a clear case in favour of establishing a regional trade 
area, the incentives of the Western Balkans countries to pursue such an approach were 
far from obvious. The initial commitment to finding a regional deal soon diluted for all 
sorts of obstacles. The obstacles typical to any trade deal, like the protective interests 
of individual industries, were exacerbated by ones inherent to the region. For example, 
Serbia and Montenegro (until mid-2006) and Bosnia and Herzegovina had difficulties 
in agreeing on a trade deal due to internal governance struggles [#38, former official, 
Trade WG of the Stability Pact; #76, former national coordinator for the SP, Serbia-
Montenegro; #73, official, BiH Ministry of Foreign Trade]. All the states in the region 
found it difficult to agree to a trade zone that would – at least economically – rebuild 
part of the former Yugoslav links they had sought to get rid of [#38, ibid.; #76, ibid.; 
#61, former Croatian assistant minister for European Integration]. In addition, they 
were afraid that the Western Balkan trade area would become a placebo or waiting 
room for their integration into the EU market. The term of a “trade ghetto” did the 
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rounds [#35, former expert working for the Trade WG; #36, former senior official at 
the Bulgarian MFA; #61, ibid.; Bechev 2011: 88]. In sum, the incentives of the states in 
the region to enter into a regional trade deal were far from clear. While economic logic 
and the external pressure exerted by the wish to approach the EU spoke in favour of 
such an agreement, internal pressures in each of the states and the burden of the all 
too recent history appeared almost unsurmountable. 
 Quite clearly, the end of the Yugoslav wars in the mid-nineties and of the 
Kosovo war in 1999 were a ‘critical juncture’ in terms of our analytical model. It put 
the region in the position to approach and be approached by the EU, creating an 
opportunity for external stimuli to influence decisions in the region more than ever 
before. Only in this context did the idea of a regional trade zone gain track. The 
government change in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia) in October 
2000 was certainly a second ‘critical juncture’. The toppling of Milošević opened the 
door for the country to join regional cooperation initiatives and closed the large hole 
in a future regional trade zone. The following paragraphs will analyse the process by 
which trade integration gained root in the region and how the initial European 
templates were transformed in the course of the negotiations. 
Disagreeing	to	agree	-	Conditionality	and	assistance238	
The negotiations to create a regional trade regime for the Western Balkans can be 
divided into two phases. A first one took place between 2000 and 2004 and led to a 
set of bilateral trade agreements. The second (2005-2006) saw how these bilateral 
agreements were fused into one regional trade agreement: CEFTA2006. The talks took 
place in the Trade Working Group of the Stability Pact. Established in January 2000, 
this group consisted of senior trade policy officials from the Western Balkan states, 
some neighbouring states (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Turkey), different 
representatives from the international community (the Commission, the World Bank 
and the WTO, among other) and some interested donors like Switzerland, the US, the 
UK, or Germany. Moldova and UNMIK/Kosovo joined the working group over the 
course of the years (O'Mahony 2010: 137–8; Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 
2006).  
The ensuing paragraphs process-trace the two phases of the negotiations, 
showing how the countries in the region managed to oppose to and dilute the EU’s 
                                                             
238 Preliminary versions of the following case-study were presented and discussed at the 2013 ISA 
Annual Convention and the 2013 EUSA Biennial Conference. 
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initial goal of establishing a regional agreement and how the region did nonetheless 
end up agreeing to a regional FTA. History	trumps	conditionality	–	the	limits	of	EU	influence	
While agreement on the functional need to increase intra-regional trade was 
widespread (O'Mahony 2010: 137), disagreement prevailed both on the regional scope 
of trade liberalisation as on the means to achieve it [Bechev 2011: 89; #36, senior 
official at the RCC formerly at the Bulgarian MFA; #38 and #72, former officials, Trade 
WG of the Stability Pact]. The European Commission, following the EU’s own example, 
advocated for a single regional free trade agreement to encompass the whole Western 
Balkans [O'Mahony 2010: 139; #36, ibid.;, #38, ibid.; #63, Croatian trade official] and 
at first even made this a condition to open negotiations in the SAP (Commission 1999a: 
37). Furthermore, the trade concessions granted by the EU to several countries in the 
Western Balkans in September 2000 were also conditioned on the establishment of 
“free trade areas” between them (Council 2000b)239. Several SAAs would later 
reinforce this requirement with specific deadlines up to which the free trade zones 
should be in place (e.g. European Communities and Republic of Serbia 2013 [2008]: 
Art. 15). In line with the EU’s requirements, the countries in the region expressed their 
commitment to create “a regional free trade area” at the EU-Western Balkans summit 
in late 2000 (Zagreb Summit 2000: 3). Accordingly, the Stability Pact’s Trade WG 
commissioned a UK-sponsored report with the clear goal of creating a single free trade 
area for the Western Balkans (Maur and Messerlin 2001). 
Interviews with officials from the Western Balkans that participated in the 
Trade WG reveal that they clearly perceived that the EU conditioned its further 
political and economic engagement on their willingness to pursue regional trade 
integration [#65 and #63, Serbian and Croatian representatives in the Trade WG]. One 
representative from Croatia, at times possibly the most reluctant country to engage in 
regional cooperation, went as far as perceiving pressure “on all political and expert 
levels” [#62, Croatian trade official]. EU and Stability Pact officials confirm this: 
together with representatives from the WTO they coordinated to convey a unified 
message to the region that regional trade integration was a must to advance towards 
the EU [#72, ibid.; #14, senior Council official]. This leads us to assess the EU 
counterparts’ emphasis on mentions of the connection of EU actions with regional 
trade integration as ‘substantial’. At the same time, a number of other issues, such as 
refugee resettlement or cooperation with the ICTY, clearly enjoyed a higher priority 
                                                             
239 The use of the plural form “free trade areas” may be seen as a pure coincidence or an intended 
ambiguity to accommodate the growing resistance of the countries in the region to a single FTA. 
Empirics II: EU-Western Balkans 
 
 251 
[#61, former Croatian assistant minister for European Integration; #76, former 
assistant foreign minister of Serbia and Montenegro]. Most probably because of this, 
we did not find any prominent mentions of EU conditionality in speeches, statements 
and documents related to the trade negotiations or in interviews with officials or 
representatives of the Western Balkans states. We therefore assess this indicator as 
‘none’. 
Despite the EU’s conditionality, in the months following the Zagreb summit 
the countries in the region rejected the regional approach championed by Brussels. 
They did so in light of the aforementioned fears of a regional trade ‘ghetto’ [Bechev 
2011: 89; #35, former expert working for the Trade WG; #36, ibid.; #61, ibid.] and – 
once the FR Yugoslavia had joined the discussions – worried also of a revival of the 
former Yugoslavia in economic terms [#38, ibid.; #65, ibid.; #50, Serbian official 
involved in the CEFTA2006 negotiations; #61, ibid.; #76, former Serbian SP 
coordinator]. In a nutshell, the countries in the region were keen to protect their 
recently gained sovereignty.240  
Difficult negotiations took place between November 2000 and June 2001, 
most of them in the Trade WG of the Stability Pact [#38, ibid.; O'Mahony 2010: 139]. 
In January 2001, the Trade WG agreed to negotiate a Memorandum of Understanding 
that would set out the principles of trade integration in the region [#38, ibid.; Wijkman 
2004]. According to several participants in the negotiations, the Commission was very 
reluctant to depart from its proposal that the region should enter into a single regional 
trade agreement [#63, ibid.; #65, ibid.]. At the same time, Romania and Bulgaria were 
rather unwilling to become part of an agreement that they perceived might throw 
them back on their path to EU accession [#72, ibid., #36, ibid.].241 According to a 
Stability Pact official and to a Croatian official, the Commission assured the Western 
Balkan countries that their agreement to the SP-brokered deal would be taken into 
account for the progress of the SAA negotiations. Bulgaria and Romania were assured 
that cooperating with the conflict-ridden region would not throw them back in their 
accession [#72, ibid.; #36, ibid.; #61, ibid.; in the same line O'Mahony 2010: 145]. In 
doing so, the Commission conditioned the bilateral progress of the countries to their 
agreement on the regional arena. In fact, the 2003 SAP report would later praise the 
agreement as a significant progress in a short time (Commission 2003: 11). A Croatian 
                                                             
240 In the case of Croatia, president Franjo Tuđman had even introduced a provision in the 
constitution in 1997 that required an approval by referendum or even forbid to enter into an 
association with countries in the region [#61, ibid.; Verfassung N.N.(2017)]. 
241 Unlike the interviewees referenced, a Croatian official also involved in the negotiations [#63, ibid.] 
didn’t recall any Bulgarian or Romanian resistance to a regional agreement. 
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official interviewed mentioned that these assurances from the EU and the connection 
to the on-going SAA negotiations pushed them to agree: “the EU insisted and we 
conceded” [#63, ibid.]. Another recalls the SAA and the regional negotiations as a 
“two-track approach” [#61, ibid.]. We therefore assess this as a substantial emphasis 
in justifying a specific institutional change with expected improvements in a different 
field – a further indicator for the impact of conditionality. 
Over the course of these negotiations, the countries of the region managed 
to introduce two changes to the approach envisaged by the European Commission 
(and preferred by the Stability Pact). First, trade liberalisation would not be pursued 
through one single trade area but with a set of bilateral agreements, thereby 
increasing the influence of each individual state in the negotiation process. And 
second, these agreements would not only cover the Western Balkans, but also 
Romania and Bulgaria (O'Mahony 2010: 139; Bechev 2011: 90). The first change 
addressed the fears of a return to the times of old Yugoslavia, the second those of a 
Western Balkans trade ‘ghetto’.  
This approach involved 21 (later 32) bilateral agreements and was therefore 
much more complicated to negotiate. Despite this and despite the strong 
conditionality it had previously exerted, the Commission ended up accepting this 
compromise. In order to ensure a degree of consistency, the Commission financed the 
bulk of the technical work on the drafts of the FTA and demanded that the individual 
bilateral agreements followed certain requirements, also to ensure their conformity 
with WTO and EU rules [#38, ibid.; #62 and #50, Croatian and Serbian officials taking 
part in the CEFTA negotiations]. Several representatives of the Western Balkan states 
mentioned that this technical assistance was ‘key’ or ‘decisive’ to allow them to 
negotiate the agreements. Coming from socialist economic systems and stripped from 
much of the technical expertise by the years of war, the governments lacked the 
capacity to engage in several trade negotiations at the same time – often in parallel to 
their WTO accession and SAA negotiations with the EU [#65, ibid; #73, representative 
for BiH at the Trade WG; #63, ibid.; #72, ibid.].242 Accordingly, we assess the emphasis 
on mentions of EU assistance as ‘substantial’, while it is important to note that it 
played an enabling role rather than being a trigger by its own.243 The already 
mentioned fact that the bilateral agreements were transformed into a regional just a 
                                                             
242 A Serbian representative recalls that there were “at most ten persons in our administration that 
knew about trade agreements” [#65, ibid.]. 
243 This is a similar case as with ‘assisted lesson-drawing’ in the previously analysed Mercosur 
Parliament (cf. p.216 above). 
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few years later, allows us to assess a second indicator for the impact of assistance as 
‘none’: the duration of the institutional change. 
These requirements to ensure consistency became the main content of the 
Memorandum of Understanding signed in June 2001 by the five Western Balkan 
countries and their two Eastern neighbours. In this MoU the countries committed to 
negotiate all the necessary FTAs by the end of 2002, in just one and half years (Stability 
Pact Working Group on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation 2001).244 
 Quite expectably, the bilateral approach led to considerable difficulties in 
negotiating and ratifying the agreements. On one hand, because of the limited 
resources available for these tasks in all states involved (O'Mahony 2010: 140), on the 
other because it allowed to bring bilateral disputes into the bargain [#72, ibid.; #65, 
ibid.; Wijkman 2004]. Political interventions both by the Trade Commissioner Pascal 
Lamy and by the SP Coordinator Erhard Busek became necessary to encourage 
individual countries to unblock the negotiations or to ratify the agreements [#72, ibid.; 
#61, ibid.]. In addition, the SP tried to create a certain degree of peer-pressure by 
regularly publishing a matrix with the state of negotiation/ratification of the 
agreements. The Commission did the same by bringing in the state of affairs at the 
regional level into the bilateral negotiations in the SAP context – conveying the 
message that progress on regional affairs was necessary to advance on EU association 
[#72, ibid..; #61, ibid.]. A SP “emergency meeting” (Wijkman 2004) in December 2002 
also served to convey the same message and to accelerate the negotiations (O'Mahony 
2010: 140). As a result of this concerted action and as confirmed by several 
interviewees, the countries in the region came to perceive that the EU would assess 
their regional performance as part of its bilateral negotiations. Taking into account 
that some interviewees assessed this connection with EU assessment procedures as 
“implicit” [#61, ibid.] and others as “manifest” or “very clear” [#50, ibid.; #65, ibid.; 
#36, ibid.], we assess the respective indicator for conditionality as ‘moderate’. The EU’s 
technical assistance to the individual countries to aid them in drafting the agreements 
and conducting the negotiations had a certain influence on the design of the 
agreements in so far as it contributed to approximating these to EU rules and to 
relevant WTO provisions [#65, ibid.; #63, ibid.; #38, ibid.]. Taking into account that 
these aspirations can be considered standard or unambitious – certainly below the 
                                                             
244 Whether these criteria were met or not was regularly assessed by the Stability Pact Stability Pact 
Working Group on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation(2003: 2–4). In a separate agreement, 
Moldova expressed its will to join the process as well. 
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EU’s original interest of achieving regional agreements – we assess the relevance of 
EU assistance on the design of the agreements as ‘moderate’. 
Summing up, despite the strong leverage of the EU on the countries of the 
Western Balkans, the conditionality it applied and the confirmed impact of this 
conditionality, the countries in the region managed to resist the EU’s original proposal 
and modified it according to their preferences. As a compromise between the EU’s 
preferred approach of a single regional agreement and the reluctance of most 
countries in the region to enter into any agreements at all, EU conditionality only 
achieved a ‘second-best’ solution: a complicated web of bilateral FTAs held together 
by a set of common conditions. Despite their unparalleled dependence on the EU, the 
countries’ adherence to their recently-gained sovereignty and the burden of history 
had trumped European conditionality. When	Central	Europe	shifts	south	–	from	32	agreements	to	one		
In a second phase, taking place in 2005-2006, the set of bilateral FTAs evolved into the 
common regional free trade area that had previously been rejected by the states in 
the Western Balkans. By mid-2004, all new FTAs – except those involving the late-
comer Moldova - had been ratified in what could be termed as a tour de force. Quickly 
after ratifying the agreements, states in the region realised that the ‘spaghetti bowl’ 
of individual FTAs was too complicated and intransparent to be promoted as a 
promising chance among investors and business [O'Mahony 2010: 140–1; #38, former 
official Working Table II of the Stability Pact; #65, Serbian representative to the Trade 
WG]. Over time, the political relations between the individual states had improved, 
leading to the establishment of working relations between the administrations [#38, 
ibid;  #73, ibid.]. In addition, the foreseeable accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the 
EU in 2007 left just the Western Balkans (and Moldova) remaining and therefore no 
other opportunity on the table than a Western Balkans trade area. It therefore lost 
part of its negative connotation (Bechev 2011: 91–2). Furthermore, as repeated by 
several interviewees, “once the EU confirmed their willingness to accept us all [in the 
EU, M.H.S.] after meeting the conditions, we realised that it [a regional agreement, 
M.H.S.] was easier to implement and that we should sign it.” [#65, ibid.; in the same 
vein: #73, ibid.] 
 In this context in which material and technical considerations gained room 
against historical arguments, the EU and the international community in general 
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renewed its impulse to establish a single regional trade agreement.245 A study 
commissioned by the SP already in mid-2003 gained new importance. It monitored in 
how far the existing agreements met the conditions of the 2001 MoU and analysed 
different paths to harmonise them. Quite unsurprisingly, it recommended that they 
should be fused into a single FTA (Messerlin and Miroudot 2003). A follow-up study 
prepared by the same authors in September 2004, once most of the bilateral 
agreements had been ratified, went even further. It outlined specific options for a 
single regional agreement and proposed a South-East European Free Trade Area 
(SEEFTA) as the best option (Messerlin and Miroudot 2004: 5). 
 This idea was met by resistance from several of the countries in the region – 
most vocally by Croatia, but also by Macedonia and other countries [#38, ibid.; #75, 
former Macedonian SP coordinator; #63, Croatian representative in the Trade WG; 
#73, ibid.; #65, ibid.]. As the only country in the region that had been granted candidate 
status already, Croatia feared to be thrown back into the Western Balkans. In addition 
Croatia had recently joined Bulgaria and Romania in the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA), a trade agreement originally formed by the Central European 
candidate countries and which was widely perceived as a stepping stone towards EU 
membership. In this particular context, providing the candidate status to Croatia did 
not incentivise but rather diminish its willingness to engage in regional cooperation – 
a common problem to several Stability Pact initiatives, as described by a senior official 
of the SP (O'Mahony 2010: 140). Macedonia and others were afraid that the regional 
trade agreement might serve as a placebo for EU membership (O'Mahony 2010: 145). 
 Despite this opposition, the EU made clear that a regional agreement was high 
on its list of priorities for the region. According to participants in the negotiations, EU 
insistence was considerable [#72, ibid.; #73, ibid.; #62, ibid.]. To justify its renewed 
emphasis, the EU referred to the technical superiority of a single agreement and to the 
commitment that all countries had made in Thessaloniki in 2003 (echoed also by the 
SP, see Stability Pact Working Group on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation 2005: 3). 
It also stressed that the agreement was not a substitute but a preparation for eventual 
EU membership [#72, ibid.; #62, ibid.] and some of the countries took it as a chance to 
demonstrate a positive track record with their neighbours [#65, ibid.; #74, trade 
official, BiH]. Despite their lack of appetite for a regional agreement, most countries in 
the region knew that they had no alternative [#73, ibid.], and the EU made sure to use 
the parallel bilateral negotiations (SAA negotiations in most cases) to connect regional 
                                                             
245 Interviews with members of the Trade Working Group confirm the initiative stemmed from the 
EU [#73, ibid.; #65, ibid.; #62, Croatian representative to the Trade WG]. 
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to bilateral progress [#76, former Stability Pact coordinator for Serbia and 
Montenegro; #61, former Croatian assistant minister for European Integration; #65, 
ibid., #72, former senior official of the SP], also through the simple fact that individual 
Commission officials participated both in the Trade WG and the bilateral SAA talks 
[#73, ibid.]. Furthermore, the SP and the Commission representatives in the Trade WG 
worked to ensure that the regional FTA and its later implementation would become 
part of the progress report in the SAP and accession processes [#72, ibid.]. At this point 
we again observe how the Western Balkan representatives saw the EU connecting a 
specific regional cooperation objective with its bilateral actions, further confirming our 
assessment of this indicator for conditionality.  
 Despite this conditionality, despite the improved trust between the countries 
and despite the growing realisation that a single agreement made most sense, several 
countries in the region – with Croatia at the forefront -  continued to reject a ‘SEEFTA’ 
as championed by the EU [O'Mahony 2010: 141 #72, ibid.; #63, ibid.; #65, ibid.].246 The 
EU found an imaginative solution to counter the political concerns of most Western 
Balkans states: instead of creating a new trade agreement with a name and (Yugoslav) 
shape the region could not agree to, the countries in the region would take over the 
already existing Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) [#65, ibid.; #73, 
ibid.]. This proposal was inferior in technical terms – CEFTA was considered an 
outdated agreement because it lacked any provisions on services or competition 
(O'Mahony 2010: 141; Messerlin and Miroudot 2004: 4,6) – but politically attractive: 
well known as a stepping stone towards accession it debunked the fears of being a 
placebo for accession and its name came with a flavour of modernity and ‘Central-
Europeanness’ to cover any reminiscences of former Yugoslavia. The approach chosen 
to orchestrate this ‘take-over’ was to amend and at the same time expand CEFTA 
(O'Mahony 2010: 141–2). This required the agreement of the existing CEFTA members: 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. 
 A SP progress report from May 2005 shows that the idea remained under 
dispute (Stability Pact Working Group on Trade Liberalisation and Facilitation 2005: 2–
4). It took “extensive discussions” and “considerable political interventions” at the 
highest political levels from the Trade Commissioner and the Stability Pact coordinator 
[#72, Stability Pact official; #62, Croatian trade official] to convince Croatia to loosen 
the entry conditions for the other countries in the region to become CEFTA members 
                                                             
246 In the words of a SP official closely involved in the negotiations, “Croatia made clear that a SEEFTA 
would only exist over its dead body” [#72, ibid.] 
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as well (cf. Vranković 2005: 3; Bechev 2011: 92).247 In order to underline – especially 
towards Croatia - that the agreement was not just a ‘Western Balkan’ affair, the EU 
pressured the two candidate countries in the Stability Pact, Romania and Bulgaria, to 
also participate in the refurbishment of CEFTA and pushed the parties to agree on the 
only deadline that would make this possible: the end of 2006, just before the two 
countries would have to leave CEFTA because of their accession to the EU (Berisha et 
al. 2006b). According to a senior official from Bulgaria and to an SP representative, the 
incentive of EU membership and the fact that the accession date for Romania and 
Bulgaria could still have been postponed were decisive here [#72, ibid; #36, former 
senior official at the Bulgarian MFA]. Again, we observe that the actors in the region 
perceived that the EU’s bilateral actions were connected to their agreement to the 
CEFTA solution. This further confirms our assessment of a ‘substantial’ emphasis on 
connections established by the EU between its financial or political actions and this 
regional objective. 
Four intense rounds of negotiations in just five months between June and 
October 2006 led to the signing of the renewed CEFTA2006 and to the odd ceremony 
described in the introduction to this case study, in which Romania and Bulgaria 
subscribed to a trade agreement that they would leave just ten days later [Berisha et 
al. 2006a; Albania et al. 2006a; #72, ibid.; #65, ibid.; #73, ibid.]. Over the course of 
these negotiations, several political interventions were again necessary and a number 
of participants in the round recall that EU conditionality was a decisive driver for their 
governments to speed up the talks and to agree on some of the most disputed points 
[#65, ibid.; #61, ibid.; #73, ibid.]. In sum, we observe here a consistent and prominent 
mention of EU requirements – not in public utterances but certainly in interviews with 
EU counterparts. We therefore assess the respective indicator for conditionality in 
table 7.5 as ‘substantial’. 
Summarising the impact of EU influence on the two phases of the 
negotiations, we see that conditionality had a ‘substantial’ impact on the decisions of 
the countries (7 out of 10 points), while assistance did only have a ‘moderate’ impact 
(3 out of 6) that was also concentrated on the first phase of the negotiations between 
2000 and 2004. The respective assessments are summarised in the tables below. Much 
like in one of the previously studied cases for Mercosur, we see that assistance played 
                                                             
247 Originally, CEFTA required WTO membership and a Europe Agreement / SAA as pre-conditions to 
become members. The accounts of an involved SP official recall an especially difficult moment when 
the Commission mentioned a regional FTA in its January 2006 communication on the Western 
Balkans as a quasi-fact (Commission 2006a: 6-7;15-16; O'Mahony 2010: 145). In this context, Croatia 
threatened to suspend the negotiations, showing how tense the situation was [#72, ibid.]. 
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a supporting influence rather than being a trigger for chance on its own. Once the 
countries in the region had agreed to negotiate free trade agreements between them, 
EU assistance allowed them to surpass their own technical limitations. For the impact 
of conditionality we observe two interesting traits. First of all we see that 
conditionality had an impact but also that this impact was not the regional agreement 
that the EU had hoped for, but rather a complicated ‘second-best’ solution: the 
objective of conditionality changed over the course of the negotiations. Secondly, this 
is even more surprising since it reflects that the countries in the region were able to 
modify the EU’s proposals according to their local preferences – despite the huge 
leverage that the EU had and still has on the region. 
Impact	of	conditionality	on	Regional	free	trade	in	the	Western	Balkans	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
prominence	of	mentions	 of	 EU	 conditionality	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	
documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	
emphasis	of	mentions	of	 connections	established	by	 the	EU	between	 its	financial	 or	 political	 actions	 and	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	 specific	 regional	cooperation	objective	in	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	
2	
emphasis	of	justifications	of	a	specific	institutional	change	with	expected	improvements	 in	 a	 functionally	 different	 area	 voiced	 in	 speeches,	
statements,	official	documents	and	 in	 interviews	with	policy-makers	from	the	EU’s	counterpart.	
2	
emphasis	 of	 justifications	 of	 a	 specific	 institutional	 change	 with	 an	 EU	assessment	 procedure	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	
interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 1	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 to	 EU	 requirements	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	
documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 2	
Impact	of	conditionality	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-10)	 7	Substantial	categorisation	of	prominence	and	emphasis	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.5: Conditionality and regional free trade in the Western Balkans 
Impact	of	assistance	on	Regional	free	trade	in	the	Western	Balkans	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
emphasis	of	explicit	mentions	of	EU	assistance	as	a	trigger	for	institutional	change	in	speeches,	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.		 2	
relevance	of	EU	assistance	in	the	design	of	institutional	change	as	reflected	in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	counterparts.	 1	
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duration	of	institutional	change	created	with	EU	assistance	as	reflected	by	
documents	from	and	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	
Impact	of	assistance	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-3)	–	substantial	(4-6)	 3	Moderate	categorisation	of	emphasis,	relevance	and	duration	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.6: Assistance and regional free trade in the Western Balkans 
Synthesis	
The creation of CEFTA2006 concludes the relatively quick but still complicated path of 
the Western Balkans to a regional free trade area. A ‘substantial’ institutional change 
in terms of our model, CEFTA2006 required a detour that involved 32 bilateral free 
trade agreements that only lasted for a few years and the two-week membership of 
Bulgaria and Romania, which acted as Cicerones to their Western Balkan neighbours. 
 The negotiations leading to the bilateral agreements and later to CEFTA2006 
show a ‘substantial’ impact of EU conditionality and a ‘moderate’ impact of EU 
assistance. This is consistent with the leverage of the EU towards the region in terms 
of economic dependence and reliance on the provision of security, international 
legitimacy and recognition. Nonetheless, the EU’s almost hegemonic leverage over the 
region makes some of our results regarding conditionality quite intriguing. First of all, 
in the region where the EU’s leverage is likely to be the highest worldwide, one would 
have expected a stronger impact of conditionality than a score of 7 out of 10. Secondly, 
it is astonishing that the countries in the region managed to confront and modify the 
EU’s conditionality in the first phase of the negotiations between 2000 and 2004. 
When confronted with an almost unanimous opposition to its recipe for regional trade 
integration, the EU reacted to the realities on the ground. It did not drop conditionality 
altogether, but adapted it to achieve a second-best objective (the bilateral 
agreements) rather than the ‘gold standard’ of an EU-inspired regional FTA. These two 
results point at the relevance of social scope conditions: in the aftermath of the 
Yugoslav breakup wars, the strong attachment to national sovereignty did not only 
trump EU conditionality but also the notion of what everyone considered a technically 
superior agreement. In the same vein, the inclusion of Romania and Bulgaria in the 
new CEFTA shows in how far political symbolism went over rational considerations. In 
this context, EU assistance played only a secondary role. It allowed the countries in the 
region to overcome their limitations in negotiating the bilateral agreements but it did 
not spur them. The following sub-chapter will now analyse whether and how the EU 
had an impact on creating institutions for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. 
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7.4 Institutions	for	regional	cooperation	
The break-up of Yugoslavia washed away a whole institutional set-up that connected 
the republics to each other in many policy fields, ranging from telecommunications 
over industry to the military, to name just a few examples. While the restauration of 
this framework was out of question, it soon became clear - to the international 
community, not to the region itself – that the Western Balkans needed some sort of 
institutional underpinning to deal with common challenges. In this context, the EU 
promoted the creation of institutions that would form a stable framework for regional 
cooperation and regular exchange. In line with the strategy outlined in chapter 7.2.1 
above, such institutions would deal with practical and pressing issues first, but aimed 
to nourish a culture of regional cooperation that would span into further policy fields 
and build confidence between the governments in the Western Balkans.  
This section studies two cases of institutional change in the Western Balkans 
related to the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, the EU-sponsored framework 
that became the hub for most of the regional cooperation initiatives in the Western 
Balkans and a channel for international support to the region. The first case-study 
analyses the creation of the Stability Pact in 1999 and focuses on how the Western 
Balkan states (and some of their neighbours) were induced to participate in a 
framework that pushed them to cooperate with the neighbours they had been 
confronting in wars just a few years before. The second case study explores the EU’s 
activities to transform this externally imposed framework for regional cooperation into 
an institution under “regional ownership”.  
7.4.1 An	externally	imposed	framework	for	regional	
cooperation	–	the	Stability	Pact	
In 1998-99, the Kosovo War brought to the fore once more that regional linkages 
played a decisive role in the post-Yugoslav setting. Within a few months, the conflict 
had developed ramifications towards Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro – beyond 
the effect that the conflict itself and the Western reaction had on the FR Yugoslavia. 
The war did not only put into question whether the Regional Approach and the 
numerous bilateral approaches championed by the EU and the international 
community had been successful, but it also created a need to react to what once more 
looked like European incapacity to prevent and manage conflicts in its most immediate 
neighbourhood. In this context, the German government – holding the Council 
Presidency and under considerable internal criticism after participating in its first 
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military intervention since World War II – proposed the establishment of the Stability 
Pact as a regional framework for the Balkans.248   
The following paragraphs begin the case study by briefly assessing the 
creation of the Stability Pact from the perspective of our model for institutional 
change. The ensuing section assesses the context in which this change took place and 
the domestic incentives of the Western Balkans countries to participate. The process-
tracing will analyse whether and to what extent different paths of EU influence played 
a role in bringing the countries in the region into the Stability Pact, a system of mutual 
commitments that bound them to the region many had been trying to escape from. 
Institutional	change	–	Building	a	system	of	mutual	commitments	
Launched right after the end of the Kosovo war at the June 1999 European Council in 
Cologne, the Stability Pact (SP) had a double objective. Towards the region itself, it 
sought to encourage democracy and human rights, economic development and 
security through regional cooperation – the core function of the SP in terms of our 
assessment model. From an EU point of view, it tried to demonstrate the Union’s 
ability to take responsibility and display international leadership for the region. Its 
main mechanism of action consisted in tying the regional cooperation objectives to 
two incentives. On one hand, the SP tried to bring all significant international donors 
and actors around the same table to channel their support towards commonly agreed 
objectives. On the other, it connected these objectives to the powerful incentive of 
Euro-Atlantic integration (Friis and Murphy 2000: 769; Biermann 1999: 34). It was the 
first time that this incentive was spelled out in relatively bold terms – something that 
Germany achieved only against significant scepticism and opposition from France and 
other EU member states (Biermann 1999: 14, 16; Friis and Murphy 2000: 771). 
Representatives from the region confirm that the accession perspective was what gave 
the SP a significant value (Friis and Murphy 2000: 770) [#59, senior official, Croatian 
MFA; #61, former Croatian assistant foreign minister; also: #36, former senior official 
at the Bulgarian MFA], even in the clumsy and watered-down version that was 
ultimately included in the SP founding declaration: “The EU will draw the region closer 
to the perspective of full integration of these countries into its structures” (Stability 
Pact 1999b: 20). 
Initiated by the EU and endorsed by most of the international community, the 
SP drew together a vast number of actors. Grouping them in categories did little to 
                                                             
248 Biermann(1999: 12) and Friis and Murphy(2000: 768–9) describe the different interests and 
motivations that shaped the proposal of the Stability Pact. 
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increase clarity: participating states (the SEE countries, including Romania and 
Bulgaria)249, the EU member states and the European Commission, facilitating states 
(including the US and Russia), international organisations (including the OSCE under 
which/whose ‘auspices’ the SP was placed), international financial institutions and 
regional initiatives made for up to 50 actors that sustained the SP. The FR Yugoslavia 
was invited to participate once it met the conditions (Stability Pact 1999b: 11).250 A 
‘Special Co-ordinator’ was appointed by the EU and endorsed by the Chairman in 
Office of the OSCE (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2005a; 1999b: 1, 13, 17-
40). Paid by the EU, this role and a relatively small team of up to 30 officials and experts 
were the only dedicated resources of an organisation that was meant to work by 
drawing together means and political support from all the actors involved. In fact, and 
according to officials and close observers involved in the SP, the EU was the most 
important actor in the SP, but it could seldom act without securing support from other 
significant actors [#38, #72, senior officials at the SP; #36, ibid.; #75, 76, former 
national coordinators for the SP, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro respectively]. 
Which actors were significant varied with the issue at hand (security, development, 
etc.). The working tables were led by a chair from outside the region appointed by the 
Regional Table and a co-chair that rotated among the countries in the region (Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe 1999). 
The special co-ordinator chaired the Regional Table, the main decision-making 
body of the SP. Meeting twice a year at ministerial level, the Regional Table served to 
mobilise political support for regional initiatives and regularly received reports from 
the three thematic ‘working tables’. Bimonthly meetings between the chairs of the 
three working tables and the SP co-ordinator sought to ensure a certain degree of 
coherence and served to elevate contentious issues to higher political levels (Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010d: 34; Bechev 2011: 51–3). The three working 
tables facilitated regional agreements on issues included in regularly updated working 
plans, for example on education in the case of the WT on democracy, on transport 
networks for the WT on economic development or on small arms in the security WT 
(Ministers of Education and Higher Education of SEE 2010[2003]; Albania et al. 
2010[2004]; Regional Arms Control Verification Implementation Assistance Centre 
2010[2001]). Inspired by the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(CSCE) and the later OSCE, the Stability Pact was sparse on rules or procedures and 
                                                             
249 Montenegro – still a part of the FR Yugoslavia – was invited to take part in meetings as “guest of 
the chair” (Biermann 1999: 16), further emphasising Serbia’s isolation. 
250 The Sarajevo Summit that further endorsed the SP a few months later included an almost unveiled 
encouragement for regime change in the FR Yugoslavia, calling upon its people to “embrace 
democratic change” Sarajevo Summit (1999a: 4). 
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banked on the positive effect of regular meetings and the incentives of Euro-Atlantic 
integration and aid. Both the Regional Table and the working tables would usually 
finish their meetings with ‘Conclusions from the Chair’, requiring a broad agreement 
but no formal vote.  
 In the same vein, and now moving to the fourth dimension of institutional 
change, the Stability Pact did not have any competences in a classical sense. Instead, 
it functioned by creating issue-specific ‘coalitions of the willing’ and by conveying 
unified messages and financial support to the countries in the region. Over the course 
of time, its appraisal of the countries’ performance in regional cooperation became 
more and more important and a powerful mechanism of action. Its assessment was 
taken into account especially by the EU but also by other international actors [#38, 
former senior official of the SP; #51, EEAS official; #32, senior official, DG ELARG; #36, 
senior official, Bulgarian MFA]. The fact that the SP found its role over time and 
evolved in its tasks is only natural for an institution that was born out of the pressure 
to act quickly and often seen as “a mere idea, with no strategic thinking behind it” 
[#14, former Council senior official; in the same vein: #59, senior official, Croatian MFA, 
Busek(2010: 257–8)]. 
In sum, the creation of the Stability Pact as a new institution for regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans and the rest of SEE came with change on three of 
the four dimensions of our assessment model (core function, actors and decision-
making). It therefore qualifies as a ‘substantial’ institutional change: with the goal of 
encouraging democracy and human rights, economic development and security 
through regional cooperation, it brought together a broad coalition of regional and 
international actors and established light decision-making and reporting mechanisms. 
All these elements were geared towards bringing on board all players relevant to the 
region to direct their engagement and that of the countries in the region to the central 
incentives of approximation to the EU and NATO. Coming into an already crowded 
scenery in which every actor had its own means and preferences, the Stability Pact 
had no competences of its own. Instead it relied upon the effect of socialisation 
between the countries in the region and on the power of a unified message to the 
region. Table 7.7 below sums up this assessment on the basis of the indicators 
identified in the analysis. 
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Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 Promoting	regional	cooperation	on	democracy	and	human	rights,	economic	development	and	security.	 1	Actors	 Up	to	50	participating	states	and	institutions,	ranging	from	the	countries	in	SEE	over	facilitating	parties	to	IFIs	Special	Co-ordinator	appointed	and	financed	by	the	EU	and	endorsed	by	the	OSCE	Secretariat	of	up	to	30	officials	and	experts,	financed	mostly	by	the	EU	
1	
Decision-making	 No	formal	rules	for	decision-making		A	Regional	Table	at	ministerial	level	formed	by	all	actors	takes	decisions	by	broad	agreement,	without	formal	votes	
1	
Competences	 No	competences	in	a	formal	sense	 0	
Institutional	change	–	Stability	Pact	 3		
Substantial	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	 the	number	of	dimensions	 changed.	The	 core	 function	 represents	 a	 threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 7.7: Institutional change in the creation of the Stability Pact 
Context	and	domestic	incentives	–	Optimists	and	sceptics	
From the point of view of the Western Balkan states participating in the SP, the context 
was that of a situation of weakness and dependence on external support. In 1999, 
when the SP was launched, all states in the region had just begun to recover from the 
previous wars. Most of them were subject to different degrees of international 
tutelage.251 The Kosovo War and its regional ramifications had suddenly shown that 
stability in the region was still precarious. It had also called into question the recipes 
that had been followed to pacify the region. While this context can certainly be 
characterised as a ‘critical juncture’ that opened a window of opportunity for new 
ideas and approaches, it is also quite obvious that increased regional cooperation was 
not put on the agenda by the Western Balkan countries themselves but as an external 
push. 
                                                             
251 Except the FR Yugoslavia, which had just suffered a NATO-led intervention and was subject to a 
number of international sanctions, all countries in the region had a strong involvement of either 
civilian or military international missions, of International Financial Institutions or other actors – up 
to the extent of Bosnia’s oversight through the High Representative created in the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. 
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Against this background, the varying openness of the different Western 
Balkan countries to European or international proposals and influence is more 
interesting for the assessment of the EU’s impact in ‘selling’ the SP to the region. 
Indeed, most of the region greeted the new initiative with optimism or at least with 
cautious indifference (Bechev 2011: 53; Friis and Murphy 2000: 769). Albania, 
Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina cared less about the promised coordinated 
provision of international aid and funds than about the accession perspective that the 
SP contained [#75, former Macedonian national coordinator for the SP; Bechev 2011: 
53]. Montenegro, led by a reformist government and included in the SP as a ‘guest of 
the chair’ but still a part of the FR Yugoslavia, found itself in a similar situation (cf. 
Biermann 1999: 38–40). On the opposite side, the idea of the SP was met with 
profound scepticism by the FR Yugoslavia – more specifically, by Serbia – and also by 
Croatia, albeit for different reasons. Yugoslavia was not invited to participate in the SP 
in light of its lack of “respect [to] the principles and objectives of this pact.” (Sarajevo 
Summit 1999a: 4). The set-up of the Pact, including all states in the region except 
Yugoslavia and more than opening the door for the participation of a constituent part 
of Yugoslavia (Montenegro), was seen as an “alliance of the West against us” in the 
country that still claimed regional primacy [#69, senior official in charge of regional 
cooperation policies, Serbian MFA, recalling official views at that time; in the same 
vein: #76, former national coordinator for the SP, Serbia and Montenegro]. For 
Croatia’s conservative government, the SP was once more an attempt to draw it back 
to the region from which it tried to detach itself and in comparison to which it had 
achieved a relative progress.252 Finally, Bulgaria and Romania were torn between their 
wish not to be thrown into the same pot as the Western Balkans and an interest to 
present themselves as constructive brokers in the EU’s strategy for the region (Bechev 
2011: 55). 
In sum, we observe that, like in the previously analysed case of trade 
integration, the end of the Kosovo War in 1999 can be considered a ‘critical juncture’ 
that opened up the region to new international proposals and interventions. At the 
same time, the whole inception of the SP took place outside the region with only 
limited say for the Western Balkan countries. The domestic incentives to accept the 
EU’s initiative of the Pact differed from one Western Balkan territory to the next. To 
the east of the Western Balkans, Romania and Bulgaria remained hesitant to being 
                                                             
252 As a sign for this stance, recall the constitutional provision introduced by Tuđman in 1997 that 
virtually forbid regional agreements with former Yugoslav states (see footnote 240 on p. 270 above). 
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included in a regional endeavour whose European perspective was spelled out but far 
from becoming a reality anytime soon.  
In light of this context the ensuing process-tracing will concentrate on the 
sceptics and on whether and how the EU managed to draw them into the Stability 
Pact. Since the focus of this study lies on the Western Balkans itself, the following 
paragraphs will concentrate on Croatia and leave aside Romania and Bulgaria.253 
Drawing	Croatia	on	board	–	From	‘Mitteleuropa’	back	to	the	Balkans	
The split between the countries in the region and the fact that the SP was a clearly 
externally induced initiative that came upon the Western Balkans in a very short time 
puts the focus of our analysis on those mechanisms where the thick of the action lies 
on the EU’s initiative. This section will therefore assess whether and to what extent EU 
conditionality (H1a), assistance (H1b) or persuasion (H3) played a role in bringing 
Zagreb on board the SP.254 
 Accounts of the negotiations reveal that the proposal for the SP was first 
presented to the region at a meeting in the beginning of April 1999 to which the 
German EU Council presidency invited the foreign ministers of eight countries affected 
by the Kosovo crisis: Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary (Friis and Murphy 2000: 783). 
During the inception of the SP, Croatia did not hide its strong scepticism 
towards the project. The nationalist government refused at first to become part of a 
project seen as “regressive” and that would tie its fate to that of the of the other 
former Yugoslav republics (Vucetic 2001: 124–5; Biermann 1999: 10). This stance was 
grounded in a discourse that interpreted the mostly catholic country as a part of 
‘Mitteleuropa’ as opposed to the Balkans (see for example, Vaulasvirta 2017: 32–6). 
Since these were fundamental and not material concerns, we can exclude that EU 
assistance (implying material judgements) tipped the balance in favour of Croatia’s 
participation in the SP. Moreover, the short time span in which the SP’s initial idea was 
launched in the German Foreign Ministry, discussed and promoted among the 
international community (approximately five months between January and June 1999, 
                                                             
253 Different accounts in the literature and from our interviewees indicate that Romania and Bulgaria 
only joined the SP with reluctance and after considerable EU pressure [Bechev 2011: 55, 106–107; 
#36, former senior political official, Bulgarian MFA; #38, former SP official]. 
254 While the SP was modelled after the CSCE and the later OSCE, we will not analyse lesson-drawing 
here because the inspiration for this institutional design did not come from the Western Balkan states 
themselves, but from the German government. 
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see Biermann 1999: 13–20) makes an EU influence through persuasion highly unlikely. 
After all, persuasion requires the change of preferences over time and out of 
conviction, not as a tactical adaptation to external stimuli. Furthermore, the Croatian 
scepticism towards the SP remained even after it had become a partner in the 
endeavour. Even after the December 1999 elections and the advent to power of a 
reformist government, Croatia maintained its scepticism towards any initiatives that 
placed it in the context of the Balkans (Cvijetić and Granić 2000). 
Out of all these reasons, an EU influence through conditionality seems much 
more likely at the outset. If we look at the EU’s relation with Croatia at the time (1999), 
we can see which levers the EU had at its disposal to influence Zagreb. In the first half 
of 1999, Croatia already enjoyed the unilateral trade preferences granted by the EU to 
most countries in the Western Balkans, but it was still excluded from the most relevant 
EU technical assistance programmes and, like the FR Yugoslavia, only received 
humanitarian assistance (Commission 1999b) Furthermore, in parallel to the inception 
of the SP, the EU launched its SAP and offered all the countries in the region the 
conclusion of Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs). As described in chapter 
7.2 above, this process opened up a new ladder of conditionality. Among the first steps 
in the ladder, a so-called feasibility study was to precede the opening of SAA 
negotiations. When the EU launched the SAP in May 1999, Croatia was excluded from 
the opening of such a study because “the relevant conditions have not yet been 
fulfilled” (Commission 1999: 5). These conditions referred mostly to democratization, 
minorities and refugees, but also included the improvement of regional cooperation 
(Commission 1999: 14).  
Indeed, Croatian officials recall that the “international community and the EU 
pressured the [conservative, M.H.S.] government” [#59, senior official at the Croatian 
MFA; similarly #61, former Croatian assistant minister for European Integration] to join 
the SP. For the Croatian government, the only positive side to the SP seemed to be the 
fact that Milošević’s Yugoslavia was excluded, as a senior official recalls [#59, ibid.]. At 
the same time it is quite clear that other issues, like cooperation with the ICTY and 
easing the resettlement of refugees, were more important and more specific 
conditions than participation in the SP [as recalled by #61, ibid.] and that these were 
the conditions that would determine the fate of EU-Croatia relations. In light of these 
accounts we assess the EU counterparts’ emphasis in mentions of the connection of 
EU actions with Croatia’s participation in the SP as ‘moderate’. Most probably because 
of the higher importance of other issues, we did not find any prominent mentions of 
EU conditionality related to the SP in speeches, documents and interviews from/with 
Croatian officials and politicians. We therefore assess this indicator as ‘none’.  
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Since the SP also included some of the most controversial political issues in its 
agenda – like the afore-mentioned refugee issue – taking part in it allowed the Croatian 
government to demonstrate its good will in principle. In addition, Croatia used the 
context of the 1999 Sarajevo Summit that inaugurated the SP to bilaterally settle a 
border issue with BiH (Klemenčić 2000). These demonstrations of sympathy at a 
relatively low cost and the risk of finding oneself isolated like Yugoslavia may have 
been compelling arguments to participate in the SP. As part of the EU’s redefined 
policy to the region (cf. 7.2.1 above), Croatia was subject to a regular assessment to 
decide upon its inclusion in aid programmes or its ‘graduation’ into the SAP. This 
assessment included its willingness for good neighbourly relations and regional 
cooperation. This was already part of the Regional Approach and became even more 
prominent in the SAP launched in May 1999. Indeed, in its very first formalised 
interaction with Croatia, the EU stressed the importance of regional cooperation and 
participation in the SP in the meetings of the so-called EU-Croatia Joint Consultative 
Task Force (Council 2000a). In its May 2000 feasibility study, the European Commission 
noted positively the participation of Croatia in the SP (Commission 2000: 10, 19, 21). 
This contributed to the Commission’s recommendation to start the negotiations on a 
SAA, although the positive impetus brought by the newly-elected reformist 
government was certainly the main argument (Commission 2000: 21–2). Despite these 
clues and the reasonable assumption that Croatia could foresee that a participation in 
the SP would pay off for its ‘ranking’, it remains difficult to find any specific evidence 
that the Croatian government justified its participation because of the EU assessment 
procedures. Instead, we find diffuse justifications of the like that the “it was clear even 
to the previous government that EU governments would judge us on this” or “we could 
show that we are not blocking anything” [respectively, #61, ibid., and #59, ibid.]. We 
therefore assess the indicator for the role of EU assessment procedures as ‘none’. 
Beyond these diffuse justifications of its participation in the SP with the 
expectation that disobedience would damage Croatia’s reputation and track-record 
towards European integration, we only found sparse evidence that the specific action 
of joining the SP would have been justified with expected improvements in a 
functionally different field. A senior official in the Croatian MFA that started his/her 
career at the time, recalls that the “SP was hot water, but it allowed us to get to know 
the structure of accession negotiations” [#59, ibid.]. We therefore assess this particular 
indicator as ‘moderate’. Whenever Croatian interlocutors and politicians justified the 
country’s participation in the SP, EU requirements (or the international community in 
general) were the main argument used [#59, ibid.; #61, ibid.; #63, senior Croatian 
official], only in few situations did we find justifications that resorted to intrinsic 
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reasonings related to the cooperation issue at hand. This distance to regional 
cooperation remained the case even once the new, reformist and pro-European, 
government was in office. For example, at its first major regional meeting the new 
Croatian government emphasised that the SAA and the SP were two separate issues, 
with Prime Minister Račan countering the Commission’s emphasis that “we want to 
see the countries weave a web of bilateral and regional relationships between 
themselves” with a statement meant to appease criticism back home: “Croatia could 
accept regional cooperation, but not regional fate” (as quoted by Gallagher 2001; see 
also Bechev 2011: 90–1; Grubiša 2000: 120–1; Vucetic 2001: 124). We therefore assess 
the emphasis on EU requirements in speeches, statements, documents or interviews 
with Croatian EU counterparts as ‘substantial’.  
Summing up all the indicators analysed, we can conclude that EU 
conditionality had just a ‘moderate’ impact (4 out of a possible score of 10) on Croatia’s 
decision to join the Stability Pact - despite Croatia’s strong aversion against being 
placed in the same boat as the other former Yugoslav republics. In fact, EU 
conditionality was perceived as diffuse on this particular issue, possibly also because 
it was in Croatia’s very own rational interest to join the SP – while publicly maintaining 
a tough stance towards the region. Table 7.8 below presents the scores along the 
individual indicators. 
Impact	of	conditionality	on	Croatia’s	participation	in	the	SP	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
prominence	 of	mentions	 of	 EU	 conditionality	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	
documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	
emphasis	of	mentions	of	 connections	established	by	 the	EU	between	 its	financial	 or	 political	 actions	 and	 the	 achievement	 of	 a	 specific	 regional	cooperation	objective	 in	statements,	documents	or	 in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	
1	
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emphasis	of	justifications	of	a	specific	institutional	change	with	expected	improvements	 in	 a	 functionally	 different	 area	 voiced	 in	 speeches,	
statements,	 official	documents	and	 in	 interviews	with	policy-makers	from	the	EU’s	counterpart.	
1	
emphasis	 of	 justifications	 of	 a	 specific	 institutional	 change	 with	 an	 EU	assessment	 procedure	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	
interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	
emphasis	 of	 mentions	 to	 EU	 requirements	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	
documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 2	
Impact	of	conditionality	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-10)	 4	Moderate	categorisation	of	prominence	and	emphasis	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.8: Conditionality and Croatia's participation in the SP 
Synthesis	
Rushed through in just a few months, the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was 
the EU’s attempt to redraw its strategy for the region after the Kosovo war had shown 
that the Western Balkans continued to produce instability and violent conflicts. As 
expressed by then German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, the SP sought to 
overcome two deficits of previous policies:  
“The previous policy of the international community vis-a-vis former 
Yugoslavia had two severe deficits: It concentrated on the consequences 
instead of on the sources of conflict, and it tackled the problems of the region 
individually and separately from the ones in other parts of Europe.” (Speech 
of Joschka Fischer at the Conference on the Stability Pact for Southeastern 
Europe, Cologne, 10 June 1999, as quoted in Biermann 1999: 6).  
Designed to encourage democracy and human rights, economic development and 
security through regional cooperation, the SP tied these objectives to two main 
incentives. On one side, it tried to commit all international donors and their resources 
to these objectives, on the other it promised Euro-Atlantic integration. A ‘substantial’ 
institutional change in terms of our assessment, the SP adapted the structure of the 
CSCE. It relied on a light institutional structure financed by the EU and on taking 
decisions by broad agreement.  
With an implicit ‘take it or leave’ message attached to it, the Pact came upon 
the region unexpectedly and as an externally conceived idea. The role of the countries 
in the region was not to shape and design this institution but just to decide whether 
to take part in it. For most of the countries, the accession perspective attached to the 
SP was an incentive important enough to overcome the worries of finding themselves 
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entrenched in the region. The exclusion of most of the FR Yugoslavia made it easier for 
them to participate. For Montenegro, its informal involvement in the SP meant an 
important international backing for its reform policies. For Croatia in turn, the SP went 
counter to all its attempts to detach itself from the conflict-ridden region and against 
the nationalist rhetoric of the conservative government.  
 Despite its initially harsh opposition to the SP, Croatia ended up joining it in 
June 1999. The “moderate” impact of conditionality is relatively surprising in view of 
the EU’s strong leverage on the region.255 Possibly, this can be explained with a 
pseudo-opposition of Croatia to the SP towards the public. In need to maintain its 
discourse of Central European identity and rejection of the Balkans, the Croatian 
government may have well decided to oppose the SP in public while being aware that 
political and economic rationality pointed in favour of joining. While this explanation 
seems plausible, it remains surprising that none of the Croatian officials interviewed 
mentioned such a double-discourse strategy. Years after the events, admitting this 
strategy in an interview to a researcher would not have implied any cost. Another 
explanation may lie – as in the previously studied case of trade integration – in the 
relevance of social scope conditions: it seems that even EU conditionality may not have 
been sufficient to overcome the Croatian identity struggle. The fact that the reformist 
Croatian government from 2000 on maintained its scepticism to regional endeavours 
way above that of other states in the region may point in this direction. 
As the SP was brought to the Western Balkans without any meaningful 
involvement of the region in its design, staffing or purpose, soon criticism arose that it 
lacked “regional ownership” (Kühne 2010: 245–8). As the region showed signs of 
becoming more stable and the international community and the EU sensed that it was 
shifting away from a post-conflict setting, plans to transform the SP into a “regionally 
owned” process gained prominence. The following case study will analyse how the SP 
was transformed into the Regional Cooperation Council. 
7.4.2 From	the	Stability	Pact	to	the	Regional	Cooperation	
Council	–	moving	from	paternalism	to	regional	ownership?	
As the Kosovo war receded into the distance and the Western Balkans stopped to 
produce regular headlines on violent outbursts, the debate on how to increase the 
region’s responsibility in its own affairs gained momentum. Especially from 2005 on, 
these discussions were propelled by an increasing ‘donor fatigue’ among those 
                                                             
255 Similarly to the results in trade case study in section 7.3.1 above. 
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international SP partners less affected by the burdens of the region, mostly the US 
(Kühne 2010: 247; Bechev 2011: 145–6). For the SP, the ownership discussion started 
the search for an institutional solution that would increase the region’s say in its 
regional fate but at the same time guarantee that the international community 
remained engaged and influential. The Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) stood at 
the end of this process, succeeding the SP. 
The following paragraphs begin the case study by briefly assessing the 
transformation of the SP into the RCC. The ensuing section assesses the context in 
which this change took place and the domestic incentives of the Western Balkans 
countries. The process-tracing will analyse in how far the different paths of EU 
influence played a role in moving the countries of the region to accept the reformed 
institution or whether it was their interests that shaped the process – being a first sign 
of the so often recurred to ‘ownership’. 
Institutional	change	–	regional	ownership,	but	not	too	much	
When the SP handed over its role to the RCC in 2008 at the last meeting of its Regional 
Table in Sofia, it gave way to a ‘regionally owned’ institution whose fate was to be 
steered by the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). Founded in 1996, 
the SEECP is often labelled as the only regional initiative that was launched from within 
the region, without any external pressure.256 
 The transformation of the SP into the RCC came also with a redrafted mission 
for the organisation, which was now meant to support the countries in the region in 
collaborating on six main objectives: economic and social development, infrastructure, 
justice and home affairs, security co-operation, building human capital and 
parliamentary cooperation (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010e: 5). While 
these objectives meant a certain specification and selection among the numerous 
regional initiatives sponsored by the SP, the main task of the RCC remained to promote 
regional cooperation on all these themes (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 
2010e: 3). We do therefore not appreciate any significant variation in the first of our 
dimensions of institutional change: the core function. 
 The most relevant changes came in the fields of the involved actors and the 
decision-making. Putting the RCC under the command of the heads of state and 
government of the region through the SEECP was the most visible and relevant change 
(Heads of State and Government of the SEECP 2007; Regional Cooperation Council 
                                                             
256 On the SEECP and its development see Bechev(2011: 131–51). and Altmann(2003: 135–7). 
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2010[2008]). This change meant that the EU and the international community stepped 
back in terms of their public visibility. For most of the involved donors, this change did 
indeed reduce their involvement. Not so for the EU, which remained at the helm of 
the RCC through its involvement in the Board and as the main sponsor of the RCC’s 
secretariat and of most of its activities. Despite the reform, contributions from the 
region to the RCC, these account for just a third of the overall budget, with the EU 
remaining the single largest contributor.257 RCC and involved EU officials confirm that 
the EU’s role – while much less visible at a political level – remains decisive in steering 
the RCC [#33, Commission official; #51, EEAS official; #75, senior RCC official; #49, 
Serbian diplomat working on regional cooperation initiatives].  
 A closer look at the decision-making structures and the roles of the different 
actors shows though that the SEECP is less in charge than it might seem at first sight. 
While it is meant to provide a broad mandate to the RCC and to choose its Secretary-
General (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010e: 14), strategic decisions – such 
as the adoption of the RCC’s yearly programme and the acceptance of the Secretary-
General’s report – are all in the hands of the RCC Board (Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe 2010e: 10), i.e. with an at least equal say for the EU and further donors 
from outside the Western Balkans.258 Accounts from persons involved in the 
negotiations reveal that this degree of extra-regional oversight was not just a wish of 
the international community. Also the states in the region sought to prevent a 
disengagement of the EU [#75, former national coordinator for the SP; Kühne 2010: 
248–9]. Whereas the SP did not foresee any specific decision-making rules, the RCC 
codified the existing custom and foresees decisions by consensus, understood as the 
absence of an objection (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010e: 12). In sum, 
we see that both the decision-making structures and the actors involved changed 
considerably in the transition from the SP to the RCC. 
Much like its predecessor, the RCC does not have any clearly spelled-out 
competences. Its tasks are formulated more specifically than for the SP and it is meant 
to become the ‘operational arm’ of the SEECP, which had so far only consisted of 
                                                             
257 During the creation of the RCC, it was decided that the EU would bear one third of the operating 
costs of the RCC’s secretariat, international donors another third and the region would contribute 
the rest (Rotta 2008: 67; Bechev 2011: 145). Actually, the EU is the only member of the RCC Board 
expressly mentioned in the RCC statute, while all other members qualify for membership through 
their contributions to the budget (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010e: 10). Similarly, co-
operating closely with the EU is one of the tasks explicitly given to the RCC’s Secretary-General 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe(2010e: 13i). 
258 The appointment of the Secretary-General of the RCC can also be vetoed by the EU and external 
donors, since it must be approved by the RCC Board. 
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regular summits and meetings at different political levels. Despite this, the tasks of the 
RCC remain rather vague – sustain regional co-operation, provide guidance, receive 
input, promote European integration, etc. - and it does not have any capacities of its 
own to attain its objectives, except for the expertise of its staff and the good offices of 
its Secretary-General (Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010e: 3). We therefore 
assess that there is no significant change in this last dimension of our institutional 
change model.  
In sum, our assessment of the dependent variable institutional change shows 
that a ‘moderate’ institutional change took place in the transition from the SP to the 
RCC, especially in terms of the actors involved, their roles and the decision-making 
rules. All of these changes sought to gradually increase the involvement of the region 
in its own matters, while at the same time retaining a large degree of influence and 
discretion for the international community and especially for the EU. Table 7.9 below 
sums up this result and the individual indicators for institutional change. 
Dimensions	of	
institutional	
change	
Change	indicators	
	
Score	
	Core	function	 From	promoting	regional	cooperation	on	democracy	and	human	rights,	economic	development	and	security	to	promoting	regional	cooperation	on	six	broad	thematic	fields,	partly	overlapping	with	the	previous	ones.	
0	
Actors	 From	up	to	50	participating	states	and	institutions	to	SEECP	participating	states,	UNMIK/Kosovo,	EU,	IFIs,	and	individual	donor	countries	(incl.	US,	Switzerland	and	a	number	of	EU	member	states).	Newly	formed	RCC	Board	in	charge	of	decision-making	formed	by	SEECP	members,	EU,	US,	and	individual	EU	member	states	contributing	to	the	RCC	budget.	From	an	external	Special	Co-ordinator	appointed	and	financed	by	the	EU	to	a	Secretary-General	from	the	region	appointed	by	the	SEECP.	Secretariat	of	up	to	30	officials	and	experts,	financed	in	shares	of	1/3	by	the	EU,	the	states	in	the	region	and	by	further	donors.	
1	
Decision-making	 From	no	formal	decision-making	rules	to	consensus	(i.e.	lack	of	objection).	SEECP	summits	provide	broad	directions,	strategic	and	operational	decisions	taken	at	the	RCC	Board.	
1	
Competences	 No	competences	in	a	formal	sense	 0	
Institutional	change	–	From	the	SP	to	the	RCC	 2	
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Moderate	Categorisation	of	the	variable	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-2)	–	substantial	(3-4)	depending	on	the	number	of	dimensions	changed.	The	core	function	represents	a	threshold	below	which	institutional	change	is	always	considered	moderate.	
Table 7.9: Institutional change from the SP to the Regional Cooperation Council 
In how far was this transition oriented along institutional models promoted by the EU? 
In how far did the strong European leverage limit the region’s freedom in choosing its 
paths towards stronger ‘ownership’? In light of the declared will of several countries 
in the region to separate themselves from the fate of the Balkans, why did they agree 
to take over a stronger degree of responsibility for regional co-operation? These 
questions will lead the ensuing analysis of the domestic incentives and the most 
immediate context for the transition from the SP to the RCC and the process-tracing 
of the negotiations that led to the inauguration of the RCC in 2008. 
Context	and	domestic	incentives	–	reform	rather	than	revolution	
The transformation of the SP into the RCC was not accompanied by any 
obvious ‘critical juncture’ that had suddenly opened room for debate on the future of 
(externally-induced) regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. Calls – and outright 
pressure – to reform the SP had been mounting almost since its very creation. In most 
cases, these calls did not come from within the region, but rather from the 
international community. Criticism began already at the very start of the SP with the 
EU’s own difficulties to accommodate the Pact in its toolbox for the Western Balkans259 
and continued in 2002, when it became obvious that its “quick start projects” – large 
investments, mostly in infrastructure – lacked a strategic vision for the region [Koessler 
2010: 19–20; Kühne 2010: 245; #14, former senior official, Council; #38, former senior 
official, Stability Pact]. From this moment on, the SP was asked to produce reports on 
its “complementarity to the SAP” (e.g. Special Co-Ordinator of the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe 2010b) and its yearly reports began to list the “state of 
regionalisation” of the numerous initiatives launched under its auspices (e.g. Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010a: 544–9; 2010c: 582–90). 
Such discussions gained further momentum as the Western Balkans became 
less virulent and a certain “donor fatigue” set in from 2004 on (Kühne 2010: 246; 
Altmann 2007: 113). Especially large donors outside the EU, namely the US [#38, 
former senior official, Stability Pact], indicated their will to play a less prominent and 
                                                             
259 See pages 248ff. on section 7.2.1. 
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less costly role in Western Balkan affairs.260 This restraint kicked off a rather lengthy 
debate on how to increase the region’s say and its responsibility for its own affairs. 
This debate started at the Regional Table in Sofia in May 2005 and went on for 
approximately two years. According to Stability Pact officials involved in the process, 
the main intention behind increasing ‘regional ownership’ was to secure the 
commitment of international donors and to ensure that the countries in the region 
maintained what had been achieved by the SP so far [Kühne 2010: 247–8; #38, ibid.]. 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 sent shockwaves 
through the region, but it was certainly not a ‘critical juncture’ for the reform of the SP 
– a process that had been almost completed by then. 
 Much like the lack of an igniting ‘critical juncture’ also the countries in the 
region did not see any clear incentive to take up a more active role in regional affairs. 
While a general openness to play a stronger role was voiced by the governments in 
the region, for example at SEECP meetings (Bechev 2011: 140–1), things became more 
complicated the more specific they turned. Some of the countries remained hesitant 
to regional cooperation processes at all and had difficulties to sell a stronger 
engagement to their populations, Croatia being once more the case in point [#59, 
senior official, Croatian MFA; #38, former senior official of the SP].261 All of them feared 
that the EU and the international community would disengage itself from the region, 
in some cases the suspicions of a ‘placebo’ for EU accession mentioned already in the 
CEFTA case study made the rounds.262 Once these worries had been countered by the 
EU politically by reasserting the connection of Balkan cooperation and EU accession 
and also by showing its continued financial commitment to regional cooperation, 
several states in the region fought to host the seat of the RCC or even to increase their 
contribution to the budget in order to show their commitment (Kühne 2010: 251). 
Summing up our assessment of the context and domestic incentives, we can 
see that the reform of the SP was accompanied by a gradual debate that went on for 
years rather than by any sudden critical juncture. As most matters in Western Balkan 
co-operation, even its transfer to a stronger regional ownership was launched from 
outside. None of the countries felt a special urge to shoulder a stronger responsibility, 
some were even openly opposed. This scepticism was rooted in fears that the 
                                                             
260 One senior official of the SP interviewed went as far as saying that it was the Commission’s 
rejection of the SP as a CFSP instrument that was not under “their control” that drove the discussions 
to transform the SP [#72, former senior official, SP]. 
261 Croatia had only participated in a SEECP meeting for the first time in 2002, marking a considerable 
step in its rapprochement with the region Bechev(2011: 141). 
262 See pages 268ff. above. 
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international community and especially the EU would abandon the region to its fate. 
As soon as these fears were largely dispelled, the Western Balkan states saw ‘regional 
ownership’ as a way to position themselves as front-runners of regional cooperation. 
In light of this context, the ensuing process-tracing will concentrate on how 
the EU managed to overcome this initial scepticism in the region. It will analyse the 
negotiations that began in mid-2005 and ran until early 2008, surveying which models 
and ideas shaped the discussions. The provenance and authorship of these ideas will 
also show who played the leading role in the transformation of the SP into the RCC. 
From	Sofia	to	Brussels	and	back	
The formal debate to increase Western Balkan responsibility for regional cooperation 
started at the SP’s Regional Table in Sofia in May 2005 (Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe 2005b) and went on for approximately two years, until the Heads of State and 
Government of the SEECP endorsed the statute of the RCC in May 2007 (Heads of State 
and Government of the SEECP 2007: 2). A final meeting of the Regional Table in 
February 2008, again in Sofia, marked the formal inauguration of the RCC. Over the 
course of the two years of substantive negotiations, different models and ideas were 
discussed in the region, among participants of the SP and between the region and the 
EU. This section will analyse who shaped these models, where the ideas came from 
and whether and how these were adapted to the local needs and interests. 
In light of the fact that the discussions were initiated from outside the region, 
we expect that those diffusion mechanisms in which the thick of the initiative lies with 
the EU are most likely to have played a role. We will therefore assess the likeliness of 
assistance (H1b), conditionality (H1a), and persuasion (H3) before having a closer look 
at lesson-drawing (H2) and emulation (H4). Calming	the	nerves	–	EU	assistance	as	a	sign	of	commitment		
Reports of the negotiations and interviews conducted with officials participating in 
them reveal the suspicion of many in the region that increased ‘regional ownership’ 
was just code for a diminished engagement of the international community and the 
EU in particular in Western Balkan affairs. For several governments in the region, the 
continued assurance of EU support for regional cooperation became important to 
dispel the fears that Brussels was preparing to disengage from the region [#59, senior 
official, Croatian MFA; Rotta 2008: 67; Kühne 2010: 248; Altmann 2007: 113]. It is also 
notable that, in the negotiations, the financial commitment from the EU and the 
international community preceded that of the region itself (European Commission and 
Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2006: 3). While this commitment was an 
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important factor to enable and support the transformation of the SP into the RCC, EU 
assistance was never reported as a trigger for institutional change. This assurance does 
therefore not qualify as an indicator for the impact of EU assistance on institutional 
change. If we move to the second possible indicator for assistance – the relevance 
ascribed to EU assistance when it comes to the design of the institution – we indeed 
find evidence that highlights that EU patterns and proposals played a decisive role in 
the discussions regarding the future of the SP (Rotta 2008: 67; Kühne 2010: 250; 
Altmann 2007: 114), but there is no indication that this influence was related to EU 
assistance in terms of funding or the provision of any other kind of support and only 
individual participants in the discussions mention that the Commission provided 
technical expertise (Altmann 2007: 113). In light of this evidence we assess this second 
indicator as ‘moderate’. In fact, the evidence collected from the negotiations rather 
points at a pondering of different options more consistent with lesson-drawing than 
with assistance.263 The RCC is still in place nowadays, but it is difficult to assess this 
duration of institutional change as the result of “EU assistance” as required by our 
third indicator. We therefore assess this indicator as ‘none’. In sum, and as reflected 
in table 7.10 below, we see that EU assistance had a moderate impact on the actual 
institutional change from the SP to the RCC. Instead of being a trigger for institutional 
change, EU assistance acted rather as foundation for the whole process – or as put by 
a senior official involved in the reform: “if the EU had reduced its funding, this would 
have had a severe impact” [#76, senior official, Serbian MFA]. While this qualifies as a 
moderate impact in terms of our assessment model, it is also obvious that such a 
situation granted the EU a large degree of potential influence that it could command 
if needed. 
Impact	of	assistance	on	the	transformation	of	the	SP	into	the	RCC	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
emphasis	 of	 explicit	 mentions	 of	 EU	 assistance	 as	 a	 trigger	 for	 institutional	change	 in	 speeches,	 statements,	 documents	 or	 in	 interviews	 with	 EU	counterparts.		 0	
relevance	of	EU	assistance	in	the	design	of	institutional	change	as	reflected	in	
speeches,	statements,	documents	or	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 1	
duration	 of	 institutional	 change	 created	 with	 EU	 assistance	 as	 reflected	 by	
documents	from	and	in	interviews	with	EU	counterparts.	 0	
Impact	of	assistance	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-3)	–	substantial	(4-6)	 1	Moderate	
                                                             
263 The influence of lesson-drawing is analysed below from p. 303 on.  
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categorisation	 of	 emphasis,	 relevance	 and	 duration	 as	 none	 –	moderate	 –	 substantial	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.10: Assistance in the transformation of the SP into the RCC Conditionality	
In its aim to steadily transfer ownership and responsibility for the SP and its activities 
to the region, the EU may have used conditionality to overcome the initial scepticism 
of the local governments. Interestingly enough, while it was clear to every participant 
in the region that no result of the reform could be successful that was completely 
against the interests of the EU, we couldn’t find any evidence supporting an impact of 
EU conditionality on the process, such as for instance references to EU assessments or 
to expected improvements in functionally different areas. We therefore assess the 
impact of conditionality as ‘none’. Instead, our evidence suggests that the EU 
influenced the reform process more indirectly, by feeding its own views into the 
discussions through non-papers (European Commission and Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe 2006), by liaising with the members of the Senior Review Group that 
the Stability Pact established to develop a proposal for its reform [#72, senior official, 
SP; Altmann 2007: 114] and not least by having a role in the appointment of this Group 
(Kühne 2010: 248–9). Talking	to	a	small	audience	–	EU	persuasion	
The time the SP and its donors dedicated to discussing, finding and agreeing to a new 
institution for the Western Balkans would be consistent with a persuasion process as 
a result of which the countries in the region would have given up their scepticism to 
‘regional ownership’. The transformation of the SP remained on the bilateral agenda 
between the EU and the countries in the region for more than two years, from the 
beginning of 2005 to the agreement on the future statute of the RCC in May 2007 
(Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2010e). In the same vein, our previous 
assessment has already shown that this transformation was clearly put on the mutual 
agenda by the EU (itself reacting to the aforementioned ‘donor fatigue’) and not by 
the region. Quite obviously, the EU’s experience in regional cooperation was also much 
richer than that of the Western Balkans. We therefore assess these three indicators 
for persuasion – EU predominance in putting the reform on the agenda, its duration 
there and the significance of the difference in experience – as ‘substantial’. 
 In light of these first confirmative hints at persuasion, it makes sense to have 
a closer look at the negotiations that shaped the reform of the SP. Once this process 
had been launched in May 2005 with a first ‘food-for-thought paper” from the Special 
Co-Ordinator and a debate at the Regional Table in Sofia, it was decided to appoint a 
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Senior Review Group of experts that would develop specific proposals on how to 
increase ‘regional ownership’ (Kühne 2010: 248–9). The appointment of this group 
took place in close coordination with EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, as the 
SP repeatedly mentioned in any document and at any occasion possible (Rusi et al. 
2010: 637; Stability Pact 2010b: 528[8][2005]). According to an official involved in the 
process, this insistence was meant to show the countries in the region that the EU 
remained committed to the process [#72, senior SP official], even at the cost of 
devaluating the intended ownership signal. A member of the Review Group recalls that 
having the EU’s support upfront also made it easier to later ensure the support of the 
rest of the international community (Altmann 2007: 113). The group consisted of four 
experts from the region and from outside, all known for their openness and support 
for regional cooperation and reconciliation.264 In terms of our assessment of 
persuasion, the appointment of this group could be termed as EU support for an 
epistemic community or as a selective empowerment of political actors that are in 
favour of institutional change. A closer look though calls this into question: neither was 
the political influence of the two persons from the region strong enough to change the 
preferences of their governments nor could this small, externally nominated group be 
seen as a locally rooted epistemic community. We therefore rank both indicators as 
‘none’. It seems much more plausible that Serbian and Croatian senior officials were 
included in the group to publicly show that the region was involved and to have the 
two largest governments on board. 
While the ‘food-for-thought’-paper from Special Co-Ordinator Busek had 
hinted at creating a decentralised network of regional centres that would take care of 
one initiative each (Special Co-Ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 
2010a: 2–4), discussions in the Review Group were broader and looked at different 
possible solutions. Among the options discussed were the aforementioned network of 
regional centres, sectoral cooperation agreements, or a fully-fledged regional 
organisation for the Western Balkans [Altmann 2008: 114, Kühne 2010: 249, #72, 
ibid.]. 
These discussions took place among experts, in a confidential and relatively 
unpoliticised setting. This is even more the case for the negotiations between the SP, 
the EU and individual governments in region. These became necessary on some 
features of the design that were disputed, e.g. on the seat of the future organisation 
                                                             
264 Its members were Alpo Rusi, Finnish diplomat and former Deputy Special Coordinator of the SP, 
former Foreign Minister of the FR Yugoslavia Goran Svilanović, Croatia’s Negotiator for the EU 
accession Vladimir Drobnjak and Franz-Lothar Altmann from the German think tank Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik. 
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or the involvement of UNMIK/Kosovo [#72, ibid.]. The Regional Table, the highest and 
arguably most public forum of the SP, was only presented with carefully pre-agreed 
concepts that therefore sparked only limited discussions.  We therefore assess 
interaction in unpoliticised settings as ‘yes’.  
The RCC was soon put to a test with Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of 
independence in February 2008, just a few weeks before the RCC was officially 
inaugurated. In addition to Serbia, also other RCC participants declined to recognise 
Kosovo as an independent state, Albania recognised it immediately, while Montenegro 
and Macedonia followed at the end of 2008. Bosnia-Herzegovina failed to agree on a 
common position (Bechev 2011: 146–7). While the Kosovo dispute blocked a number 
of bilateral relations and significantly slowed down regional cooperation, it never 
brought the RCC to a complete halt [#34, former official, EU Office in Kosovo; #33, 
Commission official; #69, senior official, Serbian MFA]. According to several officials 
from the region, the incentives to participate in the RCC – both in political and in 
financial terms – were higher than the political effect that could have been achieved 
by effectively blocking its work [#69, ibid.; #49, official, Serbian MFA]. This sign of 
enduring commitment to the RCC was maintained until a diplomatic solution was 
found to allow Kosovo to participate in the RCC as a member.265 This assurance to the 
RCC does also become clear in the firm financial pledge of the region to its operation, 
with the members from the Western Balkans having regularly paid their contributions 
almost without any exceptions. Still, this commitment has never reached the level 
once aimed at, as the RCC remains an organisation largely financed by the EU.266 The 
once agreed-upon gradual take-over of the contributions by the countries in the region 
remains open [#33, official, DG ELARG; Rotta 2008: 67]. This is even more significant if 
one takes into account that the RCC is an instrument to tap significant sources of EU 
funding for the region. It lies in the eye of the beholder, whether this low financial 
‘ownership’ is interpreted as a normal consequence of the economic crisis in the 
region or a sign for the transactional understanding of regional cooperation mentioned 
in chapter 7.1. In light of this evidence, we assess the duration of behaviour consistent 
with the institutional change as ‘moderate’.  
                                                             
265 Kosovo’s participation as a full member of the RCC was agreed in 2013 as a result of the EU-
mediated Belgrade-Pristina dialogue for a normalisation of relations. Up to then, it continued to be 
represented by UNMIK (Regional Cooperation Council 2013). 
266 In 2017, the share of the RCC’s budget coming from the Western Balkans amounted to 10 % and 
that provided by the European Commission and bilateral EU donors to 70 % (Regional Cooperation 
Council 2018: 34). 
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Finally, the transformation of the SP into the RCC and the discussion on 
increased ‘regional ownership’ did enter public debates in the region, albeit often in 
connection to the issue of Kosovo’s participation in regional meetings [#34, ibid.; #35, 
former official, SP; #69, senior official, Serbian MFA]. This particular indicator is 
therefore rated as ‘no’. In sum, we can conclude that EU persuasion had a ‘moderate’ 
impact on the region’s willingness to embrace the motto of ‘regional ownership’ and 
the transformation of the SP into the RCC. The respective assessments are summarised 
below. 
Impact	of	persuasion	on	the	transformation	of	the	SP	into	the	RCC	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	of	the	EU	in	setting	items	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	bilateral	agenda	as	observed	 in	meeting	agendas	 and	 interviews	with	participants	of	meetings.	 2	
significance	of	EU	support	to	epistemic	communities	that	pursue	an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.	 0	
presence	 of	 selective	 empowerment	 of	 political	 actors	 that	 pursue	 an	agenda	oriented	towards	institutional	change.			 0	
duration	of	a	topic	related	to	institutional	change	on	the	bilateral	agenda.	 2	
significance	 of	 the	 difference	 in	 experience	 in	 regional	 cooperation	 /	integration	between	EU	and	target.	 2	
presence	of	interaction	in	relatively	unpoliticised	and	in-camera	settings.	 1	
duration	 of	 behaviour	by	 the	 target	 that	 is	 consistent	with	 the	 institutional	change,	also	across	different	contexts	as	observed	in	political	decisions	and	commitment	to	the	institutional	change	(e.g.	in	terms	of	funding	and	relevance	in	policy-making).	
1	
absence	 of	 the	 changed	 preferences	 from	public	 debate,	 coupled	with	 their	
presence	in	interviews	with	policy-makers.	 0	
Impact	of	persuasion	scores	as	none	(0-6)	–	moderate	(7-11)	–	substantial	(12-13)	 8	Moderate	categorisation	of	presence	and	absence	as	yes	(1)		–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance,	 significance	 and	 duration	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	 moderate	 (1)	 –	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.11: Persuasion in the transformation of the SP into the RCC Serious	thinking,	but	no	initiative	–lesson-drawing	
While the push for institutional reform clearly came from outside the region, accounts 
of the discussions and negotiations in the Senior Review Group and among the 
governments of the Western Balkans and the EU do also point at a possible lesson-
drawing process. In this process, the regional actors would have tried to shape the 
outcome of a reform that they could not avert. 
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 As mentioned in the analysis of persuasion above, substantive discussions 
took place in the Senior Review Group. These were followed by consultations of the 
group with the European Commission, the governments of the region, selected EU 
governments and the US between September 2005 and March 2006 (Kühne 2010: 
249). Several persons involved or closely following the group describe its work as being 
characterised by “serious debates” [#76, senior official, Serbian MFA; in the same vein: 
#72, senior official, SP; Kühne 2010: 248–51; Altmann 2007: 114–5]. These discussions 
circled around the geographic scope of the group, the inclusion of Turkey, the role of 
the SEECP and about different institutional blueprints [#76, ibid.; #72, ibid.; Rusi et al. 
2010: 639–640; 642-643]. The debate on institutional models included the EU-
Western Balkans Forum (a regular ministerial meeting established by the Thessaloniki 
Summit in 2003), SEECP and the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) among the possible 
templates (Altmann 2007: 114; Rusi et al. 2006: 10; 2010: 635). We can deduct from 
these discussions that a well-founded analysis from experts took place, even if only 
within the Review Group and not as a sign of a widespread search for different options 
and solutions. Accordingly, we assess the number of analyses conducted by experts as 
‘moderate’.  
The accounts of the discussions and the proposals included in the ‘food-for-
thought paper’ of the Special Co-Ordinator, the reports of the Review Group and an 
April 2006 non-paper from the SP and the Commission also show that the group and 
the different stakeholders it engaged with discussed a number of institutional options 
and the adaptation of foreign templates to the needs of the Western Balkans (Special 
Co-Ordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe 2010a; European 
Commission and Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe 2006; Rusi et al. 2010[2005]; 
Rusi et al. 2006). While one interviewee from the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
highlighted the role of the regional governments in shaping these discussions [#76, 
ibid.], several accounts from the members of the Review Group and SP officials also 
show that the EU and namely the Commission intervened in the discussions at decisive 
points – sometimes dismissing proposals made by the group [Altmann 2007: 114; 
Kühne 2010: 249; #33, official, DG ELARG]. While EU-related templates played a 
significant role as a reference for further discussions, the final result of these 
discussions – the RCC – cannot be seen as the adaptation of any of those templates. In 
light of this, we assess the adaptation of foreign templates as ‘no’. 
Analysing the further indicators for lesson-drawing, we find that EU incentives 
connected to the transformation of the SP were clearly very relevant in the process. 
The accounts reflected in the paragraphs above show that the process was not only 
driven from outside the region, but also that governments in the region were aware 
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that the reform was connected to the continued provision of funding for regional 
cooperation and to the bilateral SAP (and hence, to substantial funding and political 
recognition). We therefore assess this particular indicator as ‘substantial’, further 
diminishing the likeliness of lesson-drawing. It also becomes apparent that the degree 
of initiative of the Western Balkans was limited in the process to reform the SP. 
Participants in the discussions highlight that most substantive proposals came from 
the EU and the European Commission, which “participated fully in the definition of the 
new structure, supporting the process” and highlighting “their need to have a single 
interlocutor in SEE [South-Eastern Europe, M.H.S.] on all regional cooperation 
matters.” [Rotta 2008: 67, in the same vein: Altmann 2007: 113; Kühne 2010: 248–9; 
#72, senior official, SP]. A stronger degree of initiative from within the region emerged 
only later, when it came to decide upon the contributions to the RCC’s secretariat, 
when individual governments sought to overtake their neighbours by paying more 
(Kühne 2010: 251). We therefore assess the predominance of initiative by the Western 
Balkans as ‚none‘. 
As a last possible indicator for lesson-drawing, we investigated whether the 
transformation of the SP had been justified mainly with functional arguments. Indeed, 
governments from the Western Balkans resorted to functional reasoning when it came 
to explaining the reform and the region’s increased role in the newly-created RCC – 
much along the expectations of a lesson-drawing process. Two constraints apply 
though: firstly, the resonance of the SP’s transformation was limited to well-informed 
circles of policy-makers and experts and justifications are relatively difficult to find. 
Rather, the impression dominated that the region had accompanied a process that had 
come upon it [#76, ibid.; #72, ibid.; #69, senior official in charge of regional cooperation 
policies, Serbian MFA]. Secondly, justifications of the change were always connected 
to the region’s European integration [#69, ibid.; #59, senior official, Croatian MFA; #75, 
former Macedonian national coordinator for the SP]. In light of this evidence, we 
assess the predominance of functional justifications for the reform as ‘moderate’. 
Looking at all indicators together, we can conclude that drawing lessons from 
the EU’s experience had a limited impact on the transformation of the SP into the RCC, 
with our overall assessment scoring two out of nine possible points. Different 
institutional templates related to the EU played a role in the discussions, but not as 
proposals coming from within the region. The initiative in the discussions remained 
with the external actors – and most prominently with the EU.  
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	on	the	transformation	of	the	SP	into	the	RCC	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
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relevance	 of	 EU	 incentives	 specifically	directed	 at	 the	observed	 institutional	change	as	evidenced	in	documents,	interviews	with	actors	from	the	EU	and	its	counterpart.	 0	
predominance	of	initiative	by	the	EU’s	counterpart	as	evidenced	in	documented	or	reported	requests,	public	discussions.	 0	
number	 of	 analyses	 and	 studies	 by	 experts,	 officials	 or	 policy-makers	commissioned	 or	 authored	 by	 the	 EU’s	 counterpart	 as	 evidenced	 in	
documents	or	interviews.	 1	
adaptation	 of	 foreign	 templates	 to	 local	 conditions	 as	 a	 result	 of	 functional	considerations,	manifested	in	technical	documents	or	interviews.	 0	
predominance	 of	 justifications	 of	 the	 institutional	 change	 with	 functional	reasons	 and/or	 weighting	 of	 alternative	 policies	 evidenced	 in	 official	
documents,	public	statements	or	interviews.	 1	
Impact	of	lesson-drawing	scores	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1-5)	–	substantial	(6-9)	 2	Moderate	categorisation	of	adaptation	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	of	predominance	and	number	as	none	(0)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(2)	with	‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	categorisation	of	relevance	as	none	(2)	–	moderate	(1)	–	substantial	(0).	
Table 7.12: Lesson-drawing in the transformation of the SP into the RCC Faking	acquiescence	to	the	imposition?	-	Emulation	
The considerable external pressure resting on the Western Balkans and the region’s 
limited interest in taking over a stronger role for regional cooperation make it plausible 
that emulation may have played a role in the evolution of the SP into the RCC. In line 
with the expectations of a legitimacy-seeking behaviour, emulating their support to a 
reform and following the institutional recipe promoted by the EU could have increased 
the reputation and credibility of the governments in the region while limiting the costs 
attached to it in terms of responsibility, popularity, funding, etc. 
Even if such emulation seems possible at first sight, most evidence indicates 
that it was not a driving force behind the region’s acquiescence to the reform. First 
and most importantly, we do not find that the Western Balkan governments referred 
to the success of an RCC-like institution elsewhere. While the EU context is almost 
always mentioned when praising the RCC, this discourse is of a mostly instrumental 
nature – i.e. highlighting the RCC as an EU requirement or a stepping stone towards 
membership – rather than trying to profit from an appeal of modernity or 
Europeanness. Neither are any comparisons drawn to other cases of regional 
cooperation in a context of EU accession or approximation – the Visegrád Group or 
others might come to mind here. The lack of such references already hints at the lack 
of an element central to emulation: the imitation of EU examples. Consequently, we 
rate this particular indicator as ‘no’.   
Empirics II: EU-Western Balkans 
 
  286 
The now ten years since the reform of the SP provide us with many examples 
to assess that the RCC is being applied in practice and used by the countries of the 
region [e.g. RCC 2012; Commission 2010e: 19–20; #32, senior official, DG ELARG; #33, 
official, DG ELARG; #60, senior official, Croatian Ministry of Regional Development and 
EU Funds]. Quite clearly, the significance of this assessment is limited by a number of 
factors: the majority of the funds for the RCC come from the EU, it remains an 
important channel for technical assistance and the engagement of the countries in the 
RCC is regularly assessed to judge the countries’ fitness for accession. Still, it is clear 
that we do not observe the adoption of an EU-promoted institutional change without 
its application in practice. It is also out of question that there is a functional need for 
regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, with fields such as transport, 
communication or energy transmission being just the most obvious ones. But was 
there a functional need for the institutional change from the SP to the RCC? Our 
analysis of the context and the interests of the different actors showed that the 
impulse came from outside. This is certainly not a functional reason in the sense 
implied by our hypothesis, which focuses on whether an institutional change is fit for 
its purpose. And the SP might well have continued to perform its function of fostering 
regional cooperation if it had continued to receive external support. We therefore rate 
the indicator ‘absence of a functional motivation for the institutional change ‘as ‘yes’. 
As mentioned above during the analysis of lesson-drawing, the discussion and 
negotiation process that led to the RCC considered different institutional options and 
templates to reform the SP.267 These discussions did not reveal any more adequate 
alternative to the model proposed nor does it seems plausible that any such model 
existed and was overlooked for the sake of gaining external appraisal. In addition, the 
accounts of the discussions show that the potential effectiveness of the RCC was at 
least assessed ex-ante [#72, senior official, SP; #33, official, DG ELARG; Altmann 2007: 
114–5]. In light of this evidence, we assess the two respective indicators as ‘no’. Finally, 
we can observe that the goals agreed upon for the RCC during its creation were indeed 
relatively ambiguous, with the statute of the organisation laying out six broad fields of 
engagement268 and its first work programme remaining rather unspecific, full of 
coordination, liaison, review and preparation tasks (RCC 2008). While these goals and 
performance indicators have become more specific over time, they can be assessed as 
‘ambiguous’ for these first years of the RCC. 
                                                             
267 See p. 303f. 
268 Economic and Social Development, Infrastructure, Justice and Home Affairs, Security Co-
operation, Building Human Capital, Parliamentary Cooperation (Stability Pact for South-Eastern 
Europe 2010e [2007]: 663). 
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In sum, all analysed indicators except the absence of a clear functional 
motivation for the specific institutional design of the RCC and its ambiguous goals at 
its beginning dispel the notion that the Western Balkan governments might have 
simulated their acquiescence to the reform of the SP. It is also important to highlight 
though that the reform process was not driven from within the region – as our previous 
analyses have shown – and that the region’s options to oppose to it were limited in 
any case. The overall assessment for the emulation hypothesis is summarised in the 
table below.  
Impact	of	emulation	on	the	transformation	of	the	SP	into	the	RCC	
Indicators	(units	of	assessment	in	italics)	 Score	
predominance	 of	 prominent	 references	 to	 the	 success	 of	 the	 adopted	institutional	change	elsewhere	 0	
presence	 of	 functionally	 more	 adequate	 and	 known	 alternatives	 to	 the	change	adopted	 0	
adoption	 of	 EU-promoted	 institutional	 change	 without	 its	 application	 in	
practice	
0	
adoption	of	institutions	without	a	thorough	assessment	of	their	effectiveness	 0	
absence	of	a	functional	motivation	for	the	institutional	change	 1	
presence	of	ambiguous	goals	and	performance	indicators	 1	
Impact	of	emulation	scores	as	none	(0-3)	–	moderate	(4-5)	–substantial	(6-7)	 2	None	categorisation	of	adoption,	absence	and	presence	as	yes	(1)	–	no	(0).	categorisation	 of	 predominance	 as	 none	 (0)	 –	moderate	 (1)	 –	 substantial	 (2)	 with	 ‘none’	implying	that	no	manifestation	was	found.	
Table 7.13: Emulation in the transformation of the SP into the RCC 
Synthesis	
The creation of the RCC in 2008 tried to transform an externally imposed framework 
for regional cooperation into an institution ‘owned’ by the Western Balkans. The push 
for this transformation clearly came from Brussels and Washington rather than from 
Zagreb or Belgrade. The region itself looked at the reform with a mixture of scepticism 
and concern, afraid that the end of the SP was just the beginning of a retreat of the 
international community or even a placebo for European integration. The analysis 
above assessed in how far different paths of EU influence played a role in moving the 
region towards acceptance, where the ideas for the reform came from and whether 
these were adapted to local needs and interests. 
 A ‘moderate’ institutional chance in terms of our assessment, the SP’s 
transformation into the RCC saw changes in the involvement of the Western Balkan 
governments and placed the institution under the political leadership of the SEECP. 
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While the governments of the region gained in decision-making power, the EU 
retained considerable veto rights, a large degree of initiative and continued to provide 
the vast majority of the funds for the institution and for its projects. It is interesting to 
see that institutional change was not preceded by any significant critical juncture – 
unlike in all previous cases. The fact that the impulse came from outside may hold one 
explanation for this. The countries in the region had no other need to reform the SP 
but the wish of the international community. 
An overall look at our process-tracing and at the mechanisms analysed shows 
that the EU had a just moderate impact on moving the governments of the region to 
accept and participate in the transformation of the RCC. This is quite surprising, since 
we also saw that the countries had no local incentives or motivation to pursue the 
reform. But, as expected, we see that the mechanisms with the strongest impact are 
those that are externally driven – persuasion and assistance. Overall, we found 
evidence for an impact of assistance, persuasion and lesson-drawing and no evidence 
for conditionality and emulation. Out of all the mechanisms analysed, persuasion was 
the strongest. 
The (lack of a) role of conditionality is certainly especially intriguing. While we 
found no specific evidence for any of our conditionality indicators, the analysis of the 
context and the lack of motivation of the governments in the region indicate that they 
only followed the EU’s will to reform the SP to avoid the costs imposed by the EU (and 
possibly by others as well) – a situation that comes very close to our conditionality 
hypothesis269. 
In sum, this analysis ascribes an only moderate direct impact of the EU on the 
willingness of the Western Balkan states to accept the transformation of the SP into 
the RCC. Externally driven as the process was, it remains nonetheless clear that the 
states would not have participated in the process without an impulse from Brussels. 
Conclusion	
Our analysis of the EU’s region-building activities towards the Western Balkans and 
the assessment of their impact allow us to answer our first and second sub-research 
questions with regard to this region. In addition, an overall look at the results of the 
                                                             
269 I.e. “H1a: if the EU applies its instruments to promote regional cooperation, the EU’s interlocutor 
pursues institutional change to avoid the EU-imposed costs of not doing so.” 
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three case studies contributes to a broader picture on the interrelation between 
institutional change, EU instruments and the impact of different paths of EU influence. 
The assessment of our independent variable, use of EU instruments to 
promote regional cooperation, in sub-chapter 7.2 led us to answer our first sub-
research question – What instruments does the EU employ to promote regional 
cooperation? - with the conclusion that the EU used all instruments at its disposal to 
encourage regional cooperation in the Western Balkans. Furthermore, we saw that the 
EU’s engagement is very strong across all three policy fields distinguished in our 
independent variable: technical assistance and cooperation, trade and economic 
relations, and political relations. The scores for the individual instruments are 
summarised in the table below, arranged according to the intensity of their use: 
IV:	Use	of	EU	instruments	/	Western	Balkans	Technical	assistance	and	cooperation	 Strong		(16/16)	Trade	and	economic	relations	 Strong	(16/16)	Political	relations	 Strong		(15/16)	
             Table 7.14: Overview EU instruments towards the Western Balkans 
Looking at the results of our three case studies allows us to reply to our second sub-
research question ‘To what extent is the EU able to influence the emergence and 
development of regional cooperation?’ for the relationship between the Western 
Balkans and the EU. The table below sums up all the assessments for the dependent 
variable ‘institutional change’ and for the causal mechanisms of all the case studies. 
Case	study	
DV:	institutional	
change	
CM:	Paths	of	EU	influence	
(in	grey:	not	significant	scores)	
CEFTA	2006	 3	
Substantial	
Conditionality:		substantial	(7/10)	
Assistance:	moderate	(3/6)	
Stability	Pact	 3	
Substantial	
Conditionality:	moderate	(4/10)	
	
RCC	
2	
Moderate	
Persuasion:	moderate	(8/13)	
Lesson-drawing:	moderate	(2/9)	
Assistance:	moderate	(1/6)	
Emulation:	none	(1/7)	
Conditionality:	none	
   Table 7.15: Overview of the case study results EU-Western Balkans 
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EU	influence	on	regional	cooperation	in	the	Western	Balkans	–	SRQ2	
First of all, we observe that all three cases of institutional change have been influenced 
by the EU. This implies that the EU’s attempts to promote and shape regional 
cooperation in the Western Balkans can be seen as broadly successful. There are no 
significant differences across the two fields – market integration and institutions for 
regional cooperation – analysed, although it is important to note that we only analysed 
one case in the first field. Utility	and	legitimacy	–	the	role	of	different	paths	of	EU	influence	
If we look closer at the different paths of EU influence we see that the utility-driven 
mechanisms (conditionality, assistance and lesson-drawing) are predominant. There is 
only one case in which a legitimacy-driven mechanism plays any role at all. 
Interestingly, in that particular case (the transformation of the SP into the RCC) the 
legitimacy-driven mechanism – persuasion – is the most relevant of the various 
mechanisms at play. Whether this predominant role of utility-driven mechanisms is 
surprising or not remains a matter for discussion. On one hand, the analysis of the 
scope conditions showed that the Western Balkans are highly dependent on external 
(and mainly European) legitimisation – even more so in the context of accession. This 
makes the limited role of legitimacy-driven mechanisms seem strange at first sight. On 
the other hand, a strong role for utility-driven mechanisms is only consistent with the 
extreme power asymmetries between the EU and the Western Balkans in its economic 
links. In the same line, the discourse of instrumentality that prevails in the Western 
Balkans when it comes to regional cooperation is also consistent with a stronger role 
for utility-driven paths of EU influence. As mentioned in the analysis of the regional 
context and scope conditions, the Western Balkans are a region that is drawn together 
by circumstances and shared challenges rather than by fundamentals and convictions. 
In this setting, it may seem only natural that the legitimating appeal of cooperating 
within the region is only limited, regardless of its ‘Europeanness’. 
The case study in which persuasion plays a relatively prominent role can also 
be seen as a singular case in the sense that the region could not take any binary ‘yes 
or no’ decision but could only influence its degree of acceptance or acquiescence to a 
process largely driven from outside. Such an ‘accommodation strategy’ may be much 
more open for discussion and conviction processes – that always come with 
modifications of original ideas - than a binary decision whether or not to create a 
specific institution. 
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The	reach	and	limits	of	conditionality	
Taking into account that we have two cases in which we see a ‘substantial’ institutional 
change and one in which that change is only ‘moderate’, it is worth discussing whether 
this variation somehow relates to the different mechanisms of EU influence at play. 
Unlike in the Mercosur cases studied before, those cases with a higher degree of 
institutional change are not characterised by a higher degree of own initiative from 
the region. Quite to the opposite, conditionality – the mechanism where the sender is 
most active – is the most relevant here. It has an impact in both cases of ‘substantial’ 
institutional change (CEFTA, SP) and does not play any role in the ‘moderate’ case 
(RCC). This observation is in line with the relatively low motivation of the countries in 
the region and also suggests that EU initiative and its strong leverage upon the region 
were decisive here.  
Looking more closely into the impact of conditionality, further interesting 
traits emerge. Despite being the region in the world where EU leverage is arguably the 
strongest, especially the CEFTA2006 case shows that EU conditionality was modified 
by local pressures. The original objective of the EU (a Western Balkans Free Trade Area) 
had to be modified to accommodate the strong opposition of the region to anything 
that resembled former Yugoslavia. Similarly, the impact of conditionality in pushing 
Croatia to join the SP was lower than we would have initially expected. We see that 
even under the possibly best framework conditions, the impact of EU conditionality is 
limited and that it may be difficult even to overcome opposing social scope conditions 
- such as the Croatian identity struggle between Mitteleuropa and the Balkans.  
In addition to the surprisingly low impact of conditionality in our first two 
cases, our third case – the transformation of the SP into the RCC - raises a further issue. 
In this case, conditionality does not have any measurable impact at all. At the same 
time, the regional context and the lack of motivation of the local governments to 
follow the EU’s proposals indicate that they only followed them to avoid the costs 
imposed by the EU (and possibly by others as well). This might hint at the role of a 
“shadow of conditionality”. Adapting a term coined by Adrianne Héritier and Dirk 
Lehmkuhl in the analysis of EU governance (Héritier and Lehmkuhl 2008; cf. Panke and 
Haubrich-Seco 2016: 502), a “shadow of conditionality” would describe a situation in 
which all actors are aware that EU could apply conditionality to ensure compliance – 
and this knowledge makes it unnecessary to actually do so. This and further 
conclusions of our case-study analyses will now be examined from a cross-case 
perspective in the ensuing chapter eight and discussed for theoretical and practical 
implications in chapter nine. 
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8 Cross-case	analysis	
This chapter conducts an analysis across the seven cases studied for the EU’s 
relationships with Mercosur and the Western Balkans. This cross-case perspective 
adds a second layer of analysis above the individual case studies and across the two 
regions. It takes two different angles. In the following section of this chapter (8.1), the 
results of the case studies are firstly aggregated and compared. This synthesis will 
contribute to replying to SRQ1 and SRQ2 beyond the two regions. In the ensuing 
section 8.2, we survey whether and how variation in the scope conditions and the 
regional context affects the EU’s impact on regional cooperation beyond its borders. 
Drawing from this variation, the cross-case analysis contributes to answer the ‘under 
what conditions’ part of our research question, namely: ‘how does EU leverage 
influence its success in promoting regional cooperation?’ (SRQ3). Taking this cross-
case perspective allows us to investigate three kinds of potential relationships. It will 
allow us to relate institutional change in the target regions to the manifestations of 
the independent variable, and the causal chain in between to the prevalence of 
specific causal mechanisms and to the scope conditions encountered. Beyond its 
empirical relevance, this cross-case perspective also carries a theoretical importance 
as it contributes to clarify the conditions under which our hypotheses tested in the 
process-tracing analysis are generalizable (cf. Bennett and Checkel 2015: 16). 
8.1 Cross-case	comparison		
8.1.1 EU	instruments	–	a	cross-case	perspective	on	SRQ1	
Use	of	EU	instruments	–	Variation	across	the	regions	
A look at our seven case studies gives us a more comprehensive and informative view 
at the instruments employed by the EU to promote regional cooperation beyond its 
borders. If we draw together the evidence from the analysis of the EU’s engagement 
towards the two regions, we see that encouraging regional cooperation runs through 
most policy fields and that the EU uses numerous instruments to promote its objective. 
We observe a stronger propensity to use instruments in the fields of technical 
assistance and development cooperation (with an average score of 14/16 for the two 
regions) and trade (13,5/16) than political relations (12/16).270 In light of the EU’s 
                                                             
270 It is important to note here that the aggregation of the values of our IV serves just as a heuristic 
device to compare the results of the case studies. Our diverse-case selection of two relationships 
with most variation along the independent variable gives us a high degree of confidence that we 
cover the widest range of values possible along the IV ‘use of EU instruments to promote regional 
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competences, this emphasis on ‘technical’ over traditionally ‘political’ instruments is 
very plausible. It reflects fields where the EU has exclusive or parallel competences 
and therefore higher degrees of autonomy from its member states and also a 
comparative advantage against almost any other global actor. 
 The EU’s competences – but certainly more its different exposure to the 
Southern Cone and the Western Balkans - are also explanations for the use of different 
instruments towards the two regions. While the EU did employ political instruments 
(e.g. bilateral negotiations, bi-regional dialogues, etc.) towards Mercosur only to a 
‘medium’ degree (9/16), its political engagement towards the Western Balkans has 
been (16/16) and continues to be strong. In the Western Balkans, the EU’s activities to 
encourage regional cooperation are backed by the arguably strongest incentive it can 
offer: membership. Despite these differences, we observe that in both regions the EU’s 
focus lies on creating regional markets and building regional institutions to sustain 
regional cooperation and integration over time – even if the thematic scope of 
institution-building is much broader in the Western Balkans, ranging from refugee 
resettlement to arms control. This focus may also be explained by the EU’s 
competences and its comparative advantage as a regional market and institution. On 
the basis of this variation in the IV, the following paragraphs assess to what extent the 
degree of institutional change is associated with the use of EU instruments. 
On	the	correlation	between	institutional	change	and	EU	instruments	
If its impact on regional cooperation beyond its borders is to be something that the EU 
can discretely influence or even manage, we would expect that a higher value for our 
IV correlates linearly with higher degrees of institutional change. In that case, the EU 
would just need to increase the use of its instruments to have a stronger impact on 
institutional change elsewhere. Admittedly, this would paint a rather simplistic picture 
of EU external action, leaving aside local circumstances, different starting conditions 
and the role of our scope conditions. 
To examine this particular expectation we aggregate the values for the IV and 
the DV in our two regions. This serves as an approximation to quickly assess if there is 
a linear relationship between the two. For the EU-Mercosur relationship the 
aggregation of our three scores for the IV leads to an average of 10,6 (out of 16 
maximum points). If we average all the scores for institutional change, we obtain a 
value of 3,25 for our DVs (out of 4). For the EU-Western Balkans relationship, our IV 
                                                             
cooperation’, but it may also distort the averages formed above because we do not cover the whole 
internal variation. 
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averages 15,6 reflecting the very high intensity across all three policy fields analysed. 
Institutional change, though, averages only 2,6 – a considerably lower score than for 
the EU-Mercosur cases. We thus see that there is no linear relationship between the 
IV and the DV that would be stable at a cross-case level. Despite a considerably higher 
manifestation of our IV in the Western Balkans cases, institutional change is lower than 
in the Mercosur cases. 
Relationship IV DV 
EU-Mercosur (N=4) 10,6 3,25 
EU-Western 
Balkans (N=3) 
15,6 2,6 
      Table 8.1: Average IV and DV scores for EU-Mercosur and EU-Western  
                        Balkans 
This result answers one question and poses a few new ones. It first shows that there 
is no automatic lever that would allow the EU to have a stronger impact just by 
increasing the use of its instruments. While this relationship may hold within a specific 
biregional relationship (EU - XY) it does certainly not hold in general. In terms of new 
questions, the result points at the relevance of further factors. These may be an 
unobserved degree of specificity or boundedness to each region, a strong relevance of 
the local conditions (e.g. critical junctures, degrees of statehood, etc.) or the 
importance of variation in the power asymmetries between the EU and the respective 
regions. While the first of these factors could only be assessed in a larger-N study271, 
the two others will be part of our assessment of the scope conditions in the following 
sub-chapter 8.2. 
8.1.2 EU	influence	–	cross-case	perspectives	on	SRQ2	
Paths	of	EU	influence	–	Variation	across	the	regions	
To gain a bird’s view on the EU’s influence on the emergence and development of 
regional cooperation outside the EU we need to focus on the paths of EU influence. 
These paths cover the causal chain between the EU’s action and its effect and 
therefore allow us to assess “to what extent the EU is able to influence the emergence 
and development of regional cooperation outside the EU” (SRQ2) also on a cross-case 
perspective. To confront the incidence of the different causal mechanisms in an ordinal 
comparison, the tables below rank the mechanisms for the two bi-regional 
relationships. The first two tables show the ranking for the EU-Mercosur and the EU-
                                                             
271 A study covering a sufficient number of EU relationships with other regions might average-out 
region-specific factors. 
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Western Balkans relationships, the third one brings this together across regions. They 
list how often a mechanism was the 1st, 2nd or 3rd most important within its respective 
case study. EU	–	Mercosur:	own	initiative	and	utility-driven	
CM: path of EU influence ranked 1st ranked 2nd ranked 3rd 
Lesson-drawing 3x 1x  
Assistance 1x 1x  
Other mechanisms not significant 
N= 6 significant causal mechanisms in four case studies 
Table 8.2: EU-Mercosur | Ranking of causal mechanisms  
We observe that in the EU-Mercosur relationship, lesson-drawing is the most 
prominent causal mechanism, playing a role in all four case studies analysed. 
Assistance is the second-most and also the only other relevant path of EU influence in 
this region. This distribution suggests a strong role for Mercosur since lesson-drawing 
is clearly a mechanism led by the receiver of EU influence. At the same time, we saw 
in our analysis that EU assistance was a necessary and enabling condition in the 
creation of the Mercosur Parliament - in a synergistic combination that we termed 
‘assisted lesson-drawing’. This shows that, at least in that particular case, EU action 
and predisposition to support regional integration in Mercosur sparked the initiative 
to draw lessons from the EU. A clear picture emerges also with regard to the underlying 
logic of EU influence: all significant mechanisms are utility-driven. EU	–	Western	Balkans:	reluctant	and	utility-driven	
CM: path of EU influence ranked 1st ranked 2nd ranked 3rd 
Conditionality 2x   
Persuasion 1x   
Assistance  1x 1x 
Lesson-drawing  1x  
Emulation not significant 
N= 6 significant causal mechanisms in three case studies 
Table 8.3: EU-Western Balkans | Ranking of causal mechanisms 
A more diverse picture emerges from the EU-Western Balkans relationship. 
Conditionality is the most prominent causal mechanism here, while the further ranks 
are quite evenly divided among three other mechanisms: persuasion, assistance and 
lesson-drawing. This more varied distribution is not only consistent with a relationship 
in which the EU can draw upon all its external action instruments. It is also consistent 
with a more proactive role for the EU and the understandable scepticism or even 
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rejection of the states to cooperate with their recent enemies. Quite clearly, five out 
of the six paths of EU influence that we found are sender-led (conditionality, 
persuasion and assistance). In the single case in which a mechanism led by the receiver 
plays a role, its intensity is rather modest (2 out of 9) and it appears in conjunction 
with a mechanism led clearly by the EU: persuasion. In a similar vein, all significant 
mechanisms but one (persuasion) are utility-driven ones. This seems consistent with 
the mentioned transactionality of regional cooperation in the region, but it also raises 
the question why legitimacy-driven mechanisms do not play a more important role in 
a region so dependent on external recognition and legitimacy.  Cross-regional	
CM: path of EU influence ranked 1st ranked 2nd ranked 3rd 
Lesson-drawing 3x 2x  
Conditionality 2x   
Assistance 1x 2x 1x 
Persuasion 1x   
Other mechanisms not significant 
N= 12 significant causal mechanisms in seven case studies 
Table 8.4: Cross-regional ranking of causal mechanisms 
We now broaden our perspective to the cross-regional level and look at all seven cases 
in the Western Balkans and Mercosur. Here we observe that utility-driven mechanisms 
are by far the most relevant ones also at a cross-regional level: eleven out of twelve 
significant causal mechanisms are utility-driven. Lesson-drawing is the most important 
mechanism of all.272 The general pattern is consistent with the EU’s characterisation 
as an international actor that works with technical rather than political or military 
means; the strong relevance of lesson-drawing points at the EU’s role as a front-runner 
and at its reputation for regional cooperation. While it is not the most prominent 
mechanism in the ordinal ranking, the frequency with which assistance plays a role 
(four out of twelve mechanisms) may point once more at the importance of the EU’s 
proactive initiative in promoting regional cooperation. 
The	different	impact	of	paths	of	EU	influence	
To analyse whether institutional change relates to specific paths of EU influence, we 
first assess the intensity at which the significant mechanism are at work in each of the 
cases. We then survey if there are any patterns of causal mechanisms that are 
                                                             
272 This holds true even if we factor in that the larger number of EU-Mercosur cases may exacerbate 
this count because lesson-drawing has an especially prominent role there. 
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especially prominent for substantial and for moderate institutional change. Finally, we 
assess whether individual mechanisms stand out as being especially relevant and in 
how far there are any differences between sender- and receiver-led mechanisms. The	varying	intensity	of	paths	of	EU	influence	
Our process-tracing found evidence for 12 significant paths of EU influence in the 
seven cases analysed. To see in how far these mechanisms worked to their maximum 
extent, we assess and compare their intensity across cases and regions. This will allow 
us to see if there is any significant variation as to their impact in different cases and 
regions. 
While the mechanisms have different assessment scores, it is possible to 
compare their intensity by transforming their scores into a percentage based on the 
maximum score possible for each mechanism.273 Building on this we can calculate an 
average score that reflects the intensity of all significant causal mechanisms for one 
case-study and compare these scores.   Table 8.5 below shows these numbers for the 
seven case studies. 
Case 
Average intensity of the  
significant mechanisms 
Focem 66,6 % 
Macroeconomic convergence 58,3 % 
Mercosur Parliament 72,2 % 
TPR 77,7% 
Average Mercosur 68,7 % 
CEFTA 2006 60 % 
Stability Pact 40 % 
RCC 33,4 % 
Average Western Balkans 37,8 % 
           Table 8.5: Average intensities of the paths of EU influence  
It strikes the eye that the average intensities are much higher for the Mercosur cases 
(almost 70 %) than for the Western Balkans (below 40 %) with relatively consistent 
values for all cases in each region. Two reasons may account for this regional variation. 
On one hand we might be just witnessing a spurious correlation since the two regions 
are also characterised by different mechanisms and the intensity may correlate with 
                                                             
273 For example, lesson-drawing scores 6 out of 9 possible points in the Focem case, i.e. 66,6 % of its 
maximum impact. 
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the mechanisms rather than with the regions. It seems plausible though that it is 
precisely the different instruments applied by the EU or local conditions that make the 
mechanisms vary between the regions. This would lead us to the second possible 
argument: a significant role for region-specific factors. This will be further elucidated 
in sub-chapter 8.2 below.  Variation	and	patterns	among	substantial	and	moderate	institutional	change	
Out of the seven cases analysed, five are characterised by substantial institutional 
change (scores 3 and 4).274 In four of these five cases, we have at least one path of EU 
influence that connects the institutional change to EU actions and has a substantial 
impact. For the remaining case, the decisive mechanism scores as ‘moderate’. In three 
of the four cases for which we see a substantial impact of a causal mechanism, lesson-
drawing is the decisive mechanism, the remaining case is influenced by conditionality. 
The three lesson-drawing cases are all located in the Mercosur region whereas the 
conditionality case belongs to the Western Balkans. Hence there is no pattern that 
would hold across regions to a 100%. The only trait close to a pattern that emerges 
across regions is that cases of substantial institutional change are generally 
characterised by the substantial impact of at least one path of EU influence.275 
There is also no common pattern of EU influence for the two remaining cases 
for which institutional change is just moderate. In the first case – the creation of a 
macroeconomic convergence regime for Mercosur – a substantial impact of EU 
assistance went hand in hand with a moderate impact of lesson-drawing. In the second 
– the transformation of the RCC into the SP – a potpourri of mechanisms had a 
combined impact on the process, each with a moderate influence: persuasion, lesson-
drawing, assistance and emulation. Which	path	of	influence	is	the	strongest?		
If we now set the individual causal mechanisms in relation with the degrees of 
institutional change in our cases, we observe that three out of five cases with the 
highest degree of institutional change (“substantial” institutional change – scores 3 
and 4) are characterised by a ‘substantial’ role for lesson-drawing, i.e. for a mechanism 
in which the receiver of EU influence shows a considerable degree of own-initiative. 
To the contrary, the only case with an only moderate impact of lesson-drawing is the 
one where we also see a just ‘moderate’ institutional change. While this pattern is very 
clear for the Mercosur region, it does not apply at all to the Western Balkans. Here 
                                                             
274 Namely: Focem, Mercosur Parliament, Mercosur Court, CEFTA, and the SP. 
275 The creation of the SP is the exception to this, with the impact of conditionality scoring moderate.  
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higher degrees of institutional change are only associated to a role for conditionality – 
and the single case in which institutional change is just moderate is also the only one 
in which conditionality does not play a role. This pattern is therefore not consistent 
across regions and/or possibly related to the scope conditions. What we can 
summarise at a cross-case level is that lesson-drawing and conditionality go along with 
substantial degrees of institutional change and therefore seem to be the most 
effective paths of EU influence. 
 It is not possible to say in general terms whether sender- or receiver-led 
mechanisms are more common. We observe that receiver-led mechanisms appear five 
times against seven sender-led ones. It is significant though that all the instances of 
receiver-led mechanisms pertain to lesson-drawing. Sender-led mechanisms appear 
more diversely: assistance (4 times), conditionality (twice) and persuasion (once). 
Is	it	all	in	the	mix?	–	Interaction	between	paths	of	EU	influence		
In most of the cases analysed we found several causal mechanisms at play at the same 
time – a situation that our theoretical framework takes into account and that seems 
only logical in light of the different instruments available to the EU. This raises the 
question whether specific combinations of causal mechanisms interact with each 
other and / or have a stronger effect than individually. Our assessment of an “assisted 
lesson-drawing” in the Mercosur Parliament provided evidence for such a 
phenomenon already on the within-case level and this section will assess whether such 
patterns can be seen also across cases. 
If we look at our seven case-studies, we see indeed that assistance always 
appears in conjunction with other mechanisms – a pattern that is consistent across the 
regions, with two cases each in the Western Balkans and the Mercosur region.276 In all 
four cases we can observe that assistance does not simply work in parallel to other 
paths of EU influence but in interaction with them. In the aforementioned case of the 
Mercosur Parliament, the impact of EU assistance is a clear and necessary precondition 
for lesson-drawing to have an impact at all. In the three other cases, assistance is 
complementary to lesson-drawing, conditionality or persuasion and lesson-drawing. 
In the creation of the CEFTA2006 trade agreement, assistance enables the Western 
Balkan states to deliver on the commitments that EU conditionality had pushed them 
to agree to. During the creation of Mercosur’s macroeconomic convergence regime, 
EU assistance only gained track in real practice once the topic became politically 
salient. At that point, the governments in the region developed an ownership for the 
                                                             
276 Namely: CEFTA2006, RCC, Macroeconomic convergence and the Mercosur Parliament. 
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issue, which also translated into lesson-drawing. In the case of the SP’s transformation 
into the RCC, assistance played a supporting role signalling to the states in the region 
that the EU’s support was there to stay despite the push for ‘regional ownership’. In 
sum we see that EU assistance supports and reinforces other causal mechanisms and 
increases their impact. 
Lesson-drawing appears both on its own (Focem, TPR) and in interaction with 
other paths of EU influence (Macroeconomic convergence, Mercosur Parliament and 
RCC). The fact that lesson-drawing suffices to shape two cases of substantial 
institutional change has already been discussed above, it underlines the effectiveness 
of this mechanism. Similarly, also the interaction with assistance in the case of the 
Mercosur Parliament has been mentioned above. In the remaining case, the 
transformation of the SP into the RCC, lesson-drawing had a very moderate impact and 
we observe no interaction with the other mechanisms involved (persuasion, assistance 
and emulation). Finally, no general pattern can be seen as to the interaction of 
conditionality with other mechanisms. Out of the two cases in which it is the decisive 
mechanism, conditionality only appears in conjunction with assistance in the 
CEFTA2006 case. As mentioned above, assistance enabled the states in the region to 
honour their commitment to negotiate trade agreements, but it did not trigger 
institutional change. 
In sum, we observe that assistance is the mechanism that interacts with other 
mechanisms most often, enabling lesson-drawing and reinforcing the role of 
conditionality and persuasion. We do not find any similar patterns neither for lesson-
drawing nor for conditionality, the two other most frequent mechanisms. 
Synthesis	
This cross-case comparison has assessed different aspects related to our SRQs 1 and 2 
and has revealed a potentially decisive role for our scope conditions and the local 
contexts in which EU influence on regional cooperation unfolds.  
At the level of our IV, the use of EU instruments to promote regional 
cooperation, the cross-case comparison shows that there is no linear relationship 
between the IV and our DV ‘institutional change modelled according to EU aims’ that 
would hold also across the two regions studied, hinting at a role for those factors that 
vary across the two regions such as power asymmetries and degrees of statehood.  
At the level of our causal mechanisms and our SRQ2 ‘To what extent is the EU 
able to influence the emergence and development of regional cooperation outside the 
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EU?’ our cross-case perspective shows that there is a connection between EU 
instruments and institutional change in all cases analysed, with a strong nexus in at 
least five out of the seven cases surveyed. We can therefore conclude that the EU is 
indeed able to influence the emergence and development of regional cooperation 
beyond its borders.  
Having a closer look, two patterns become apparent at a cross-case and cross-
regional level. First of all we see that utility-driven mechanisms are the most relevant 
ones by far. Secondly, we observe that ownership and own-initiative are an important 
factor in almost all the cases studied. Not only is lesson-drawing, a mechanism clearly 
dependent on local initiative, among the most effective ones, but even EU 
conditionality in the Western Balkans was modified and adapted to local conditions 
following resistance from within the region. The complementarity of EU assistance 
with other – more locally driven – mechanisms further substantiates the relevance of 
local initiative. 
Other results, however, show a greater variation and again point at the 
potential relevance of our scope conditions. For example, we see that two causal 
mechanisms stand out in terms of their effectiveness: lesson-drawing and 
conditionality are associated with cases of substantial institutional change. But these 
mechanisms are also evenly split between Mercosur (lesson-drawing) and the Western 
Balkans (conditionality). In a similar vein, we saw that the intensity of the mechanisms 
varies strongly between the two regions. This region-specific variation seems to 
indicate that scope conditions such as statehood and power asymmetries as well as 
the local context play an important role in modulating and influencing the EU’s impact 
on regional cooperation beyond its borders. The following sub-chapter will therefore 
focus on the role of the scope conditions. 
8.2 Relationship	with	the	scope	conditions	
Throughout this study, we have hypothesised that regionally and locally diverging 
scope conditions are likely to have an influence on the EU’s ability to promote regional 
cooperation beyond its borders. Our empirical analysis has indeed confirmed that 
there is significant variation between individual cases (for example regarding the role 
of domestic incentives) and between regions (e.g. as to the most effective causal 
mechanisms). Finally, the lack of a cross-regional linear correlation between our IV and 
our DV points to a strong degree of regional specificity. Following from those empirical 
results, this section will survey whether and to what extent variation in the scope 
conditions and the regional context may stand behind these differences in EU impact. 
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The analysis of power asymmetries will contribute to answering our SRQ3 ‘How does 
EU leverage influence its success in promoting regional integration?’. 
 In chapter 3.4 of our analytical framework, we hypothesised how the scope 
conditions are likely to influence the impact of our causal mechanisms. In a nutshell, 
we expect that those scope conditions pertaining to a material ontology will interact 
with the utility-driven mechanisms (conditionality, assistance and lesson-drawing), 
while those with a focus on social perceptions would influence persuasion and 
emulation, our two legitimacy-driven mechanisms. Taking these expectations as a 
starting point, the following sections will discuss whether variations in the scope 
conditions relate to the cross-case and cross-regional variation that we have found in 
the analysis above.  
8.2.1 Push	or	pull?	–	on	the	role	of	domestic	incentives	and	
critical	junctures	
Domestic	incentives	on	a	cross-case	perspective	–	evidence	and	variation	
In our theoretical expectations, we characterised domestic incentives in the EU’s 
partner region as an almost necessary condition for EU instruments and the 
corresponding causal mechanisms to work at all. More specifically, we argued that the 
demand for new institutions or policies as sparked by a crisis or a critical juncture 
would stand at the beginning of diffusion processes. Table 8.6 below summarises the 
evidence from the seven case studies. 
Case 
Critical juncture 
present? Pursuit of legitimacy? 
Causal 
mechanisms  
Focem 2001 Argentinean 
default, 2002 South 
American economic crisis 
(cf. p. 159f.) 
Paraguay used EU 
experiences to buttress 
its demands (cf. p. 159f, 
164f.) 
Lesson-drawing 
Macroeconomic 
convergence 
2001 Argentinean 
default, 2002 South 
American economic crisis 
(cf. p. 173f.) 
- 
Assistance,  
Lesson-drawing 
Mercosur 
Parliament 
2003 Mercosur relaunch 
following the 2002 crisis 
(cf. p.  
- 
Lesson-drawing, 
assistance 
TPR 2003 Mercosur relaunch 
following the 2002 crisis 
(cf. p. 207)  
Uruguay uses ECJ 
example to buttress its 
Lesson-drawing 
Cross-case analysis 
 
  304 
call for supranationalism 
(cf. p. 209f., 215f.) 
Mercosur 4/4 2/4  
CEFTA 2006 1999 end of Kosovo war 
2000 government change 
in FR Yugoslavia (cf. p. 
248f.) 
- 
Conditionality 
Stability Pact 1999 end of Kosovo war 
(cf. p. 264ff.) 
 
- Conditionality 
RCC - - Persuasion, 
lesson-drawing, 
assistance 
Western Balkans 2/3 0/3  
Table 8.6: Domestic incentives | Cross-case and cross-regional variation 
If we now look at this evidence, we see that almost all case studies are characterised 
by significant critical junctures that opened up room for debate and new solutions. But 
we also see that this is not the case everywhere and that there is a significant variation 
between the Mercosur cases and those in the Western Balkans. Whereas the four 
Mercosur cases are characterised by critical junctures that incentivised the region to 
look for new institutional solutions on its own, the two cases in the Western Balkans 
in which we see a critical juncture are somehow different (and therefore shown in 
italics): here, the critical junctures are obvious but they did not necessarily spark any 
own-initiative from within the region. They rather motivated external players to 
intervene in the region and reduced the region’s options to oppose to such foreign 
influence. These two cases are therefore shown in italics in the table above. In the 
third case from the Western Balkans, we found no critical junctures at all. If we 
consider these two special cases, then variation between the two regions is clear: 
while critical junctures play a decisive role in Mercosur, they are almost negligible in 
the Western Balkans. Seek for legitimacy, i.e. the use of EU influence or patterns by 
local actors to make the case for their own agenda, only plays a role in two the 
Mercosur cases. 
The	interplay	between	domestic	incentives	and	paths	of	EU	influence	
In how far does this variation in the domestic incentives challenge our theoretical 
assumptions on the interplay between scope conditions and causal mechanisms?277 
                                                             
277 It is important to take into account that the cross-case analysis can only reflect correlations 
between scope conditions and causal mechanisms and not any causation. We can therefore 
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First of all, we can largely confirm a number of expectations. As hypothesised, the 
functional demand for new solutions following a critical juncture seems to have an 
enabling effect on lesson-drawing. We see from the table above that all cases in which 
lesson-drawing had a substantial impact are characterised by a critical juncture 
(Focem, Mercosur Parliament and TPR) and our case studies confirm that it was the 
critical juncture that sparked the search for new solutions. We can also confirm a 
positive relationship between critical junctures and the impact of EU assistance. In the 
two cases in which assistance had a substantial impact (Macroeconomic convergence 
and the Mercosur Parliament), the impact of assistance was increased by a critical 
juncture. In the Macroeconomic convergence case, the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in 2002 rescued the different EU-sponsored projects from political oblivion. In the case 
of the parliament, the enabling impact of EU assistance only came fully intro fruition 
once the political initiative of the Brazilian and Argentinean presidents put the 
Mercosur parliament in the spotlight. 
On the other hand, a number of our expectations cannot be confirmed in light 
of the evidence presented in table 8.6 above. In view of its almost negligible or unclear 
role in the Western Balkans cases, we can neither confirm nor disconfirm a positive 
relationship between conditionality and critical junctures. The same occurs with their 
relationship with emulation, where we have no case in which this mechanism had been 
significant. We can though disconfirm a positive relationship between critical junctures 
and persuasion since the case in which persuasion had a significant impact (RCC) is 
precisely the one without a critical juncture. In the same logic, the RCC case also allows 
us to disconfirm a necessary (enabling) relationship between the pursuit of legitimacy 
and persuasion. 
Critical	junctures	as	catalysts	of	EU	influence	
In the previous section of this chapter, we found that there is no linear relationship 
between the IV and the DV that would hold also at a cross-regional level. While the 
use of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation is stronger in the Western 
Balkans (15,6 vs. 10,6), institutional change is still lower than in Mercosur (2,6 vs 3,25). 
We also saw a considerably higher impact of the causal mechanisms at play in the 
Mercosur region (69 %) than in the Western Balkans (38 %). 
Could the stronger role of domestic incentives in the Mercosur region explain 
this variation? In principle: yes. While it is clear that the pursuit of legitimacy does not 
                                                             
disconfirm certain causalities, but not confirm them unless we have appropriate evidence from our 
case studies. 
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correlate with cross-regional variation, our evidence shows that stronger effectiveness 
of the EU in the Mercosur cases goes hand in hand with the existence of critical 
junctures that motivated the governments of the region to actively look for external 
templates and solutions to their regional problems. In all four cases, they did so by 
drawing lessons from the offers that the EU was glad and willing to provide. Further 
adding evidence to this claim, our assessment above confirms that there is a positive 
relation between critical junctures and lesson-drawing. Since clear-cut critical 
junctures are missing in the Western Balkans, this variation could well be one 
explanation for the EU’s stronger effectiveness in Latin America. The analysis of the 
further scope conditions in the next sections will further contribute to narrow down 
their effect as catalysts or mediators of EU influence. 
8.2.2 EU	leverage	–	on	the	role	of	power	asymmetries	
Power	asymmetries	on	a	cross-case	perspective	–	evidence	and	variation	
A look at our case studies reveals a considerable cross-regional variation for the power 
asymmetries between the EU and the two regions under analysis. Quite unsurprisingly, 
this variation leans towards a much stronger asymmetry between the Western Balkans 
and the EU than between Mercosur and the EU. While the Western Balkans has a very 
strong economic dependence on the EU and in terms of the provision of legitimacy 
and security, Mercosur is only dependent in economic terms. And even though this 
dependence is strong, it is comparable to the EU’s asymmetry to many other regions 
in the world. Table 8.7 below summarises this variation, distinguishing between 
material and social categories of dependence. 
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Table 8.7: Power asymmetries | Cross-regional variation 
The	interplay	between	power	asymmetries	and	paths	of	EU	influence	
Like in the previous section we set this variation in relation to the causal mechanisms 
at play – this time from a cross-regional perspective since that is the one where we 
find variation on power asymmetries. For that purpose, table 8.7 above also lists the 
causal mechanisms at play in each region according to the ordinal ranking. Chapter 3.4 
enumerated expectations for an enabling or positive relationship between power 
asymmetries and the conditionality, assistance, persuasion and emulation 
mechanisms. 
We can confirm in principle our expectation that economic and security 
dependence has an enabling role for conditionality. As mentioned earlier on, 
conditionality only appears in the EU-Western Balkans relationship, which is 
characterised by very high material power asymmetries. This result is rather 
unsurprising, since the logic of conditionality requires incentives on which to condition 
something. Much speaks in favour of confirming the theoretical expectation that 
conditionality will not have any impact if there are no power asymmetries at all. The 
lack of conditionality in the EU-Mercosur relationship, where asymmetries are smaller, 
is consistent with this. However, testing whether material asymmetries are also a 
catalyst for conditionality is not possible with the research design used here.278 Since 
we did not find any emulation process with significant impact in any of our seven case 
                                                             
278 This would require a research design that compares two or more extremely similar conditionality 
processes under different power asymmetries. 
Relationship 
Economic / security 
dependence 
Legitimacy 
dependence 
Causal 
mechanisms 
(ordinal ranking) 
EU-Mercosur  
 
Strong to average 
(high trade asymmetry, 
largest foreign investor, 
largest provider of ODA, no 
security dependence, cf. p. 
135f.) 
Negligible 
(cf. p. 135f.) 
Lesson-drawing, 
assistance 
EU-Western 
Balkans 
 
Very strong 
(extreme trade asymmetry, 
largest foreign investor, 
largest provider of ODA, EU 
security missions, cf. p. 227ff.) 
Very strong 
(dependence on EU 
assessments, cf. p. 
227ff.) 
Conditionality, 
Persuasion, 
Assistance, 
Lesson-drawing 
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studies, we can neither confirm nor disconfirm whether social power asymmetries – 
i.e. dependence on EU legitimacy – have an enabling influence on emulation. Since we 
only have one case of persuasion it is impossible to assess whether this particular 
mechanism is positively influenced by the dependence of the target region on EU 
legitimisation. 
 We expected that larger power asymmetries would go hand in hand with a 
stronger impact for assistance. Our evidence disconfirms this expectation since 
variation in the impact of assistance runs opposite to that of the power asymmetries. 
Assistance plays a more prominent role in Mercosur, the region with smaller power 
asymmetries (twice with a substantial impact), than in the Western Balkans (twice with 
a moderate impact).  
Power	asymmetries	as	catalysts	of	EU	influence?	
Could the cross-regional variation in power asymmetries explain the diverging 
effectiveness of the European efforts to promote regional cooperation in the Western 
Balkans and in Mercosur? At first sight, such an explanation would certainly seem 
counter-intuitive. After all, the region where we see strongest frictional loss between 
the IV and the DV – the Western Balkans - is also the region on which the EU enjoys 
the strongest leverage. Hence, to explain cross-regional variation power asymmetries 
would need to have a negative effect on the EU’s impact instead of a positive.  
 At most, power asymmetries could have an indirect effect on the cross-
regional variation between IV and DV. Our cross-case results and our process-tracing 
both indicate that conditionality is less effective than lesson-drawing. Across all cases 
we see that lesson-drawing has an average intensity of 64 %, whereas conditionality 
only reaches 55 %279 and we have seen, most clearly in the CEFTA2006 case study, that 
even under strongest conditionality and leverage the EU may need to opt for a second-
best solution because it is not able to overcome local resistance. This may not only 
contribute to explaining the variation between the two regions, but it also advances a 
reply to our SRQ3 ‘How does EU leverage influence its success in promoting regional 
cooperation?’ 
 As an enabling factor, stronger EU leverage allows for the use of 
conditionality, but conditionality seems to be a less effective path of EU influence than 
lesson-drawing. At the same time, relying on lesson-drawing may often not be an 
                                                             
279 Calculated from the average intensities (actual score in relation to maximum score possible) of all 
lesson-drawing and conditionality instances. 
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option in situations in which the EU opts for conditionality. For example, it seems 
difficult to imagine that the Western Balkan states would have agreed on a regional 
FTA or on the Stability Pact out of the mere conviction that regional cooperation 
worked well for the EU. According to this line of thought, EU leverage does not 
necessarily have a positive influence on the EU’s success in promoting regional 
cooperation. From the point of view of political practice, however, this distinction may 
be trivial, since lesson-drawing may not be available when conditionality needs to be 
used. We can therefore conclude that EU leverage does not have a direct positive 
effect on the EU’s success in promoting regional cooperation.280 
8.2.3 	Coping	with	EU	influence	–	on	the	role	of	statehood	
Statehood	on	a	cross-case	perspective	–	evidence	and	variation	
While statehood in a material and also in a social sense varies between our two 
regions, the variation does not seem to be high enough to contribute to explaining 
cross-regional differences in EU impact. Instead, it is more likely that the different 
degrees of statehood and the regional specificities it comes with have a more nuanced 
effect.  
We observe that both regions have a sufficiently high material statehood, i.e. 
state capacity to enforce decisions, to cope with the implications of regional 
cooperation. Even if there are exceptions in both regions, their relevance does not 
seem sufficient to compromise this overall assessment. Statehood from a social 
perspective, i.e. the attachment to the preservation of national sovereignty, is also 
very high in both regions, albeit for different reasons and with different connotations. 
Whereas we find a strong attachment to national sovereignty but a positive symbolism 
for regional cooperation in Mercosur, in the Western Balkans this strong national 
attachment comes with a transactional understanding of regional endeavours. Table 
8.8 below summarises this variation, distinguishing between material and social 
categories of dependence. 
Relationship Capacity to enforce 
decisions 
Attachment to 
national sovereignty 
Causal mechanisms 
(ordinal ranking) 
                                                             
280 To assess an effect of power asymmetries on the EU’s influence more precisely, we would require 
a research design that isolates the role of power asymmetries by comparing two or more otherwise 
identical cases of lesson-drawing or conditionality under different power asymmetries. While this is 
unattainable under real-life conditions, the conclusion will discuss how an approximation could look 
like. 
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EU-Mercosur  
 
Reasonably high 
(with the partial exception 
of PGY, state capacity 
should be no impediment 
for RC, cf. p. 134) 
Very high 
(cf. p. 131) 
Lesson-drawing, 
assistance 
EU-Western 
Balkans 
 
High enough 
(statehood high enough 
not to be a hindrance for 
RC – with partial exception 
of BiH, cf. p. 227) 
Very high 
(with the exception of 
BiH, cf. p. 224) 
Conditionality, 
Persuasion, 
Assistance, 
Lesson-drawing 
Table 8.8: Degrees of statehood | Cross-regional variation 
The	interplay	between	statehood	and	paths	of	EU	influence	
Our theoretical expectations from chapter 3.4 hypothesised a positive influence of 
material statehood on assistance and a negative influence on conditionality, lesson-
drawing and emulation. For the attachment to national sovereignty, we hypothesised 
a negative interaction with conditionality and a positive one with emulation. As in the 
previous cases we cannot assess the interaction with emulation as this mechanism 
does not have any significant impact in this study. Regarding the interaction with the 
other mechanisms, it is difficult to draw any conclusions due to the limited cross-
regional variation of statehood. At most, we can substantiate our expectations 
through individual case-study evidence. 
In that sense, the CEFTA2006 case impressively supports the assumption that 
a strong attachment to national sovereignty can limit conditionality – after all, the 
region had to take a significant detour to regional trade integration and the EU to 
content itself with a second-best solution. Evidence from our Mercosur case studies 
and from the CEFTA2006 case in the Western Balkans supports the expectation that 
there is a negative relationship between state capacity and lesson-drawing, albeit a 
nuanced one. As we saw in the analysis of these cases, the EU’s role as a front-runner 
of regional cooperation resonates well with technical and administrative elites in the 
regions analysed. These groups see EU institutions and policies as technically superior 
and worth striving for. We can expect that this perception decreases with the growing 
capacity of their own administrations and as the gap to the EU becomes narrower. In 
fact, our macroeconomic convergence case study in the Mercosur region provides a 
hint for this development: as soon as the EU fell into a financial crisis itself, its 
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reputation was also harmed.281 Regarding the positive relationship between material 
statehood and assistance, our case-study evidence suggests that there is a threshold 
of state capacity to enforce decisions up to which assistance has a positive influence 
on the EU’s impact on regional cooperation. This is well in line with the complementary 
role that assistance has in relation to other causal mechanisms.282 The cases of the 
Mercosur Parliament and of CEFTA2006 illustrate this threshold influence well. Had 
the predecessor of the Mercosur Parliament already had a certain administrative 
capacity, EU assistance wouldn’t have had an enabling impact on the subsequent 
lesson-drawing. Similarly, achieving the results of EU conditionality in the CEFTA2006 
case, was only possible because assistance supported the states in the region in 
negotiating the bilateral trade treaties they had committed to. 
Statehood	as	a	catalyst	of	EU	influence?	
In light of its limited cross-regional variation, we cannot ascribe statehood a significant 
role in explaining the diverging effectiveness of the EU in Mercosur and the Western 
Balkans when it comes to translating the use of its instruments into a stronger 
influence on institutional change. 
 An indirect explanation could follow from the previously discussed limiting 
role that a strong attachment to national sovereignty seems to have on the impact of 
conditionality. Since the EU seems to be less effective in the region in which it relies 
on conditionality most, this indirect effect could explain why a higher use of EU 
instruments translates into a lower impact on institutional change there. Again, 
studying this potential effect in detail would require a research design that isolates 
statehood against other variables. 
Synthesis	
This section has analysed whether and how variation in the scope conditions and the 
regional context affects the EU’s impact on regional cooperation beyond its borders. 
To do so, it has focused on variation in the three groups of scope conditions – domestic 
incentives, power asymmetries and degrees of statehood – and has set this variation 
into relation with the paths of EU influence at play. In a third step, we surveyed 
whether the respective scope condition could contribute to explaining the diverging 
effectiveness of the EU in the Western Balkans and Mercosur. 
                                                             
281 See p. 195f. above. 
282 See p. 318 above. 
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 We find that there is cross-regional variation as to the role of domestic 
incentives and power asymmetries, but no major variation when it comes to degrees 
of statehood. Building on these results, we test the hypotheses that we had developed 
regarding the interaction between the scope conditions and the individual causal 
mechanisms. While our research design does not allow to confirm claims of causality 
at this level of analysis our assessment allows us to review and disconfirm a number 
of the hypotheses. An updated version of the expectations developed in chapter 3.4 is 
presented in table 8.9 below and reflects the results.283 ‘?’ stands for a relationship 
that cannot be confirmed empirically, ‘+’ for positive interaction, ‘-‘ for a negative and 
‘none’ for no interaction. ‘Enabling’ reflects that the scope condition is pre-condition 
for the mechanism to work and ‘treshold’ that the role of assistance is only increased 
by low state capacity up to a certain level. 
Scope 
condition 
Causal mechanism 
 H1a: 
conditionality 
H1b: 
assistance 
H2: lesson-
drawing 
H3: 
persuasion 
H4: 
emulation 
Domestic incentives 
Functional 
demand 
? + enabling none ? 
Seek for 
legitimacy 
   none ? 
Power asymmetries 
Economic / 
security 
dependence 
enabling none   ? 
Dependence on 
legitimation 
none none  ? ? 
Degrees of statehood 
Capacity  -, threshold  -  ? 
Attachment to 
sovereignty 
?    ? 
Table 8.9: Cross-case analysis | Scope conditions in relation to causal mechanisms 
Finally, we see that critical junctures and a strong attachment to national sovereignty 
could in principle explain the different effectiveness of the EU in the Western Balkans 
and Mercosur. The effect of national sovereignty would work through its limiting 
influence on the impact of conditionality, whereas critical junctures correlate with the 
most effective of our causal mechanisms: lesson-drawing. The results for power 
asymmetries and hence for our SRQ3 are quite surprising as we find that EU leverage 
                                                             
283 Table 3.4 on p. 73 shows our theoretical expectations. 
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does not have a direct positive effect on the EU’s impact in promoting regional 
cooperation. This is likely a result of the EU’s propensity to use conditionality in regions 
where it has strong leverage, which in turn happens to be a less effective mechanism 
than others. While this result is theoretically interesting, its relevance for political 
practice is limited since the EU will seldom have a free choice between lesson-drawing 
and conditionality. Due to our research design, all these results are only 
approximations that would need a causal analysis to be confirmed. 
Conclusion	
This cross-case analysis has served to aggregate the results of our analysis beyond the 
individual cases and to assess the role and interactions of our scope conditions. 
Chapter 8.1 opened up cross-case perspectives on our SRQ1 and 2 and found that 
there is no linear correlation between our IV and DV that would also be stable across 
the regions analysed. Together with the variation in the impact and role of the causal 
mechanisms in the two regions, this result points at the relevance of further, regionally 
varying, factors.  
Chapter 8.2 took up this variation to survey in how far it is related to the scope 
conditions included in our analytical framework: domestic incentives, power 
asymmetries and degrees of statehood. While a concluding, causal analysis would 
require a different research design, we could exclude some influences and 
substantiate the possible role of others. First of all, the analysis confirmed a strong role 
for local conditions and allowed us to empirically test most of the theoretical 
expectations on the relationship between scope conditions and causal mechanisms. 
Among the different scope conditions, we saw that critical junctures and the 
attachment to national sovereignty could explain the EU’s different effectiveness in 
Mercosur and the Western Balkans through their mediating role lesson-drawing and 
conditionality. Finally, our analysis has advanced a rather counter-intuitive reply to 
SRQ3, showing that EU leverage has no direct positive effect on its impact on regional 
cooperation beyond its borders. 
On the basis of these results and of those of the case-studies, the following 
chapter 9 will reply to our research questions and reflect on the implications of our 
results for the academic discussions and for political practice. 
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Part	IV Conclusions	and	Implications	9 Conclusion	
This thesis set out to answer ‘how, to what extent and under what conditions does the 
EU succeed in promoting regional cooperation beyond its borders’. This last chapter 
discusses the conclusions of the thesis regarding those questions, reflects on the 
implications of its findings for academic discussions and for political practice and 
provides an outlook on possible paths for future research. After sub-chapter 9.1 
summarised the answers to our research questions, sub-chapters 9.2 and 9.3 
respectively focus on possible implications for academic analyses devoted to the EU’s 
influence on regional cooperation and for the policy and its impact in practice. 
9.1 Does	the	EU	succeed	in	promoting	regional	
cooperation?	
‘How, to what extent and under what conditions does the EU succeed in promoting 
regional cooperation beyond its borders?’ is the research question leading this thesis. 
The ‘how’ part of our research question was addressed through our first sub-research 
question ‘what instruments does the EU employ to promote regional cooperation?’ 
Here, our analysis found that encouraging regional cooperation runs through most of 
the EU’s external policy fields and that the EU uses numerous instruments to promote 
its objective. It has a somewhat stronger propensity to use instruments in the fields of 
technical assistance and development cooperation and trade than political relations. 
In practice this means that the EU promotes regional cooperation for example by 
providing technical and development assistance projects to interested parties, by 
designing and negotiating trade agreements that seek to bind together the markets of 
its counterparts and, especially in the Western Balkans, also by pushing for 
reconciliation and cooperation in political negotiations. 
 The ‘to what extent’ portion of our research question was the focus of our 
second sub-research question ‘to what extent is the EU able to influence the 
emergence and development of regional cooperation outside the EU?’ In this 
particular field, our analysis found that there is a connection between EU instruments 
and institutional change in all cases analysed, with a strong nexus in at least five out 
of the seven cases surveyed. We can therefore conclude that the EU is indeed able to 
influence the emergence and development of regional cooperation beyond its 
borders, but also that this extent varies across the different cases analysed. In 
particular, we found that the EU was – on average – more effective in the Mercosur 
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region than in the Western Balkans, that drawing lessons from previous EU 
experiences with specific regional cooperation problems and institutions was the most 
effective path for EU influence to impact local decisions on regional cooperation and 
that own initiative by the recipient of EU influence and local conditions shape the EU’s 
impact to a large extent. 
 As to ‘under what conditions’ the EU is successful in promoting regional 
cooperation our third sub-research question focused on finding out ‘how EU leverage 
influences its success in promoting regional cooperation’. Our result here is certainly 
counter-intuitive as we found that EU leverage does not have a direct positive effect 
on the EU’s success in promoting regional cooperation. While this cannot be concluded 
with certainty from our research design, it seems feasible that this counter-intuitive 
result is related to the diverging effectiveness of lesson-drawing and conditionality. 
Where the EU resorts to conditionality, lesson-drawing is unlikely to play a (significant) 
role due to local resistance. In our setup, this applies to the Western Balkans. Together 
with the fact that lesson-drawing is on average more effective than conditionality, this 
may explain the a priori negative link between EU leverage and EU impact on regional 
cooperation. 
 In sum, we can conclude that: yes, the EU succeeds in promoting regional 
cooperation beyond its borders. But it does so with a number of limitations and 
implications that carry significant repercussions both for the academic analysis of this 
phenomenon as for the policy as such.  
9.2 Implications	for	the	academic	discussion	
Three main motives guided the academic research interest behind this thesis. First of 
all, we sought to place a stronger focus on the impact of EU external action than on its 
processes and governance. Secondly, we wanted to develop an analytical framework 
that allows studying the role of external factors in fostering regional cooperation from 
a micro-perspective, i.e. by focusing on the behaviour and decision-making of those 
who are confronted with the EU’s influence and thereby allowing for an empirical 
analysis of causality. Finally, our approach sought to expand the range of cases usually 
analysed in the literature and to be flexible enough to accommodate further cases of 
(potential) (EU) influence on regional cooperation. In light of the analysis and its 
results, the following paragraphs evaluate the contributions to these goals and point 
out some avenues for further research that follow from our results and from the 
limitations of this study. 
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9.2.1 Appraisal	of	the	analytical	framework	
To address our research question, we designed an analytical framework based on a 
diffusion approach that allows us to build upon a wide variety of theoretical accounts 
to hypothesise on the EU’s possible impact on regional cooperation. Scope conditions, 
i.e. factors that are expected to modify and influence the effect of the EU in promoting 
regional cooperation, served to survey the role of aspects that are likely to differ 
between the regions – such as the EU’s degree of leverage over its partners or local 
conditions. The framework focused on studying the ‘decision points’ of local actors 
when confronted with EU influences. This micro-approach allowed us to process-trace 
claims of causality against empirical evidence, something which is not possible with 
systemic approaches. 
We used the flexibility of this framework to study two EU relationships that 
capture the wide range of biregional relationships towards which the EU promotes 
regional cooperation, but which had so far not been studied under one common 
framework. The analytical framework allowed us to use one common approach to 
study two regions and seven cases with different traits, institutional setups, 
governance systems and contexts. In light of the fact that the model has served to 
analyse cases from these a priori very different regions, there is no apparent reason 
why this approach could not be used to also for further regions and cases. Further 
refined and in conjunction with the lessons drawn from other diffusion approaches, 
this model may well serve to analyse instances of potential EU impact on other matters 
than regional cooperation. This could represent a contribution to increasing the 
literature focused on the impact of EU external action. 
Beyond these considerations, several points that have emerged from the 
analysis deserve special attention with a view to further research: the EU’s impact and 
the role of local agency, multicausality and utility- versus legitimacy-driven 
explanations, and a possible underestimation of conditionality. These are briefly 
discussed in turn. 
EU	impact	and	local	agency	
The results of our analysis highlight the relevance of local agency and the role that a 
mix of international diffusion and domestic influences play even in situations with 
strong EU leverage. In general, one can state that the powerful roles of lesson-drawing 
and critical junctures highlight that EU impact on regional cooperation is as much a 
matter of EU action as it is one of local agency. The role of mixed sources of diffusion 
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becomes clear in the case of the Mercosur Parliament, where a lesson-drawing process 
combined an EU template with local requirements. As the case of the regional FTA in 
the Western Balkans has shown, conditionality played a decisive role in pushing for 
and establishing a specific EU-favoured solution. But it did so only after local actors 
had succeeded in modifying the EU’s initial proposal to a considerable extent. A 
research design focused on structure would have overlooked these influences. As a 
consequence, it would have possibly overestimated the EU’s influence. 
Multicausality	and	utility-driven	versus	legitimacy-driven	explanations	
When setting up our theoretical framework in chapter 3, we argued that it was 
important to cover as many explanatory mechanisms as possible to achieve higher 
explanatory value, taking into account that EU influence was likely to be multicausal. 
The selection of a process-tracing analysis was also justified with the opportunities it 
offers to assess evidence for different hypotheses. Indeed, our results have confirmed 
that paths of EU influence do almost never come alone and often even interact with 
each other – as in the case of ‘assisted lesson-drawing’ in the Mercosur Parliament.  
At the same time, we have also seen that legitimacy-driven explanations – 
persuasion and emulation – play almost no role, not even in the Western Balkans, 
where we expected them to be prominent due to the region’s dependence on EU 
legitimisation. While our study also found plausible reasons for this, the modest role 
of these mechanisms raises the question of whether this can be seen as a general 
pattern or whether a different research design or a larger number of cases would lead 
to different results. Larger-n studies would be useful to detect this. If legitimacy-driven 
mechanisms happen to have no explanatory power by themselves, future studies 
could leave them aside and concentrate on utility-driven paths of influence.  
Uncovering	a	shadow	of	conditionality?	
It remains a rather surprising result that conditionality has no measurable impact in 
the transformation of the SP into the RCC while the context and the declared lack of 
motivation of the Western Balkan governments all indicate that they only followed the 
EU’s will to avoid the costs of not doing so – a classical conditionality situation. If we 
assume that this finding is not the result of a measurement error, then this situation 
raises theoretically interesting questions. It might indicate that our model – focused 
as it is on detecting influences on a micro-level is less suited to detect what we could 
term as a “shadow of conditionality”, i.e. a situation in which all actors are aware of 
the fact that the EU could apply conditionality to ensure compliance – and knowledge 
about this implicit ‘threat’ makes it unnecessary in practice. Testing for this effect in 
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practice is difficult and could be a subject for further research. Strategies to uncover 
such an effect could include openly asking local actors whether they would expect 
conditionality as a second-round reaction to non-compliance. 
While we can conclude that the analytical framework has proven useful for our 
research question, the fact that it has also raised some new questions provides room 
for further research – beyond the always welcome replication of this study or an 
expansion by further cases. Some of these avenues for further research build upon the 
issues mentioned above; others depart from the limitations inherent to this study. The 
following section will discuss them. 
9.2.2 Paths	for	further	research	
The need to limit the study to a manageable size and effort in terms of the number of 
cases studied, the empirical evidence collected and the number of inferences drawn 
from the analysis imply some limitations that could be addressed either with 
alternative research designs or larger studies. 
Dependent	and	independent	variables	
For example, our dependent variable was intentionally reduced to “institutional 
change according to EU aims”. While this makes sense in a study that assesses the 
impact of a deliberate EU policy, it is also evident that a less deterministic definition of 
our DV could lead to new insights. It could provide a null hypothesis that would 
increase the robustness of our findings and it might also allow detecting unintended 
consequences of EU promotion of regional cooperation – for example, the adoption of 
specific institutional patterns by other institutions than those targeted by the EU. It 
seems though that such an approach would require a large-n design or at least many 
more measurement points with the corresponding additional empirical effort. To a 
certain extent, such an approach would also counteract our efforts to keep our studies 
as narrow as possible to oversee other exogenous influences on regional cooperation. 
Again, countering this effect would require expanding the number of cases and 
measurement points. 
 Remaining with our DV, our study has also shown some limitations of using 
‘institutional change’ as a variable. Several cases have shown that if our research 
interest lies in assessing the EU’s success in promoting regional integration, 
institutional change is a very close proxy and a precondition but no guarantee that the 
EU’s influence is stable over time or trickles down into political practice. To name one 
example, the creation of the Mercosur Parliament is a case of EU success in terms of 
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institutional change, but one can doubt that it has contributed to closer regional 
integration. The reasons for this lie not with the EU: local political motives have 
hindered the Mercosur Parliament from using its acquired competences – and it 
cannot be ruled out that this will change in the future. This study has addressed these 
issues by including the context in our analysis, but a DV that peers into political practice 
might come with more explanatory power. 
 It remains open for discussion whether an individual assessment of our IV for 
each and every case would have added significant additional explanatory power to our 
study compared to the region-based analysis that we used for reasons of time and 
space. While it would have increased the number of possible inferences in our cross-
case analysis, it is likely that variation would have been limited. Grouping our IV 
according to logics of external action – e.g. as a threat, a role model, etc. – instead of 
policy fields seems a better choice. It would have allowed comparing our IV on a more 
abstract level while keeping the additional effort in check. A possible approach is 
outlined in Annex D. 
Bringing	the	scope	conditions	to	the	front	
Our study has shown that local factors and specificities are very important to 
understanding the EU’s impact on encouraging regional cooperation. Specifically, the 
study has substantiated the importance of critical junctures and the attachment to 
national sovereignty as explanations for the EU’s different effectiveness in Mercosur 
and the Western Balkans. These results – and the impossibility of establishing causal 
inferences at that level with our research design – make it worth exploring approaches 
that place a stronger focus on the role of these scope conditions. A radical but 
interesting option could be to use a research design that places relevant scope 
conditions as independent variables and tests for their influence on our dependent 
variable. This would allow us to test for causal relationships and not just for 
coincidence or correlation as is the case here. Building on the results of our present 
study, such an analysis could concentrate on critical junctures and national sovereignty 
as these have been found to be relevant here. But it could also put all scope conditions 
to the test to substantiate or disconfirm this result. A further approach would build on 
our results and entail a quantitative or a mixed-methods study. This would provide 
additional evidence and allow searching for correlation between our DV, our IV and 
our scope conditions to put the most promising relationships to a detailed empirical 
test. 
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9.3 Implications	for	the	policy	and	its	impact	
From the policy perspective, the research interest of our thesis was driven by two main 
motives, both of them connected to our focus on studying policy impact. First of all, 
we wanted to establish whether the EU manages to play a role in promoting regional 
cooperation and integration as a contribution to a ‘negotiated world order’. Secondly, 
we wanted to assess the EU’s performance as a relatively novel foreign policy actor 
that is subjected to special pressure to justify its role. Borrowing from Frank Sinatra284, 
in both cases the underlying expectation was that if the EU does not ‘make it here, it 
will not make it anywhere’. After all, conditions for an EU influence have rather 
worsened than improved in a multipolar world increasingly shaped by large emerging 
powers and in light of the EU’s comparative advantage and decades of experience in 
regional cooperation and integration. Our empirical results allow us to reflect on these 
points and also highlight a number of further implications that are worth discussing to 
better understand the nature of the EU’s impact and improve its track record. 
 The fact that the EU has been largely successful in promoting regional 
cooperation beyond its borders provides us with some comfort in terms of our 
research interest. It is reasonable to conclude that the EU has indeed been able to 
influence and shape how other actors cooperate within their regions. Certainly, further 
cases and additional data along the lines discussed in the previous sub-chapter would 
contribute to a more significant overview, but it is fair to say that our expectations 
have been confirmed even with two regions in which the EU encountered varying local 
conditions and used different strategies. Whereas the EU supported an existing 
organisation as a whole in the Mercosur region, the political context in the Western 
Balkans required a ‘piece-meal approach’ focused on building issue-specific 
‘initiatives’. Beyond this, a number of other traits have become apparent and are 
discussed in turn. 
Not	the	only	game	in	town,	but	the	best	–	influence	by	exposure	
Especially our Mercosur case studies, but also individual ones from the Western 
Balkans, reveal that the nature of EU influence on regional cooperation is closely 
connected to its presence and to a certain sense of mission. The EU’s role in promoting 
regional cooperation may well be seen as an effort to create constant exposure to its 
model and proposals. In doing so it increases the probability that other regions will 
follow its example instead of other choices. But whether this is successful or not hinges 
                                                             
284 And from Fred Ebb and John Cander, the authors of the song ‘Theme from New York, New York’. 
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upon a number of further factors such as the adequacy of the EU’s solutions to the 
problems at hand and the political support and local ownership that these solutions 
receive – and on the EU’s will and ability to connect its proposals to conditions and 
incentives. 
In many cases, the EU’s role is that of a ‘standard’ of regional cooperation and 
integration. Its counterparts resort to this standard, measure themselves against it or 
may even define themselves in opposition to it. This becomes especially clear across 
the case studies analysed for Mercosur. One case in point is whenever the EU is seen 
as an instrument to build confidence and shepherd colleagues through the 
negotiations (as in the cases of FOCEM or Mercosur’s macroeconomic coordination). 
While this pattern is less frequent when the EU has a priori stronger influence on its 
counterpart, we also witness it in the Western Balkans. The clearest case here is that 
of the accession-connoted CEFTA trade agreement. Whether and by whom the EU’s 
‘standard’ is taken up in negotiations depends on the local bargaining structures and 
interests. In most cases, smaller and often more pro-integrationist states (Uruguay, 
Paraguay or also Montenegro), or those that were new to the negotiation table (the 
FR Yugoslavia after the toppling of Milošević) found it easier to relate to the EU’s rules- 
and institution-based approach. The fact that, in most of our case studies, the EU had 
the ears of the ‘technicians’ before it had those of their political ‘masters’ does also 
speak in favour of its role as the ‘standard’. In sum, often the EU impacts others less 
through direct means than by actively presenting itself as the leading example for 
regional integration. 
This role as a standard of ‘technical excellence’ also comes with limitations 
beyond the afore-mentioned fact that technical influence does not always translate 
into political influence. The EU’s rather technocratic approach focuses on 
strengthening governance capacity but often has an only indirect and limited effect on 
nurturing trust – which can be seen as a very important factor for successful and 
sustainable regional cooperation. While only further time can tell, it seems that the 
‘coal and steel’ approach – fostering cooperation by binding states together through 
factual necessities – is not applicable everywhere. As a critical appraisal from within 
the Commission noted on its efforts towards Mercosur, being “ahead of the curve” 
(Commission 2005a: 1) – i.e. ahead of local interests and political support – does not 
always work when trying to achieve sustainable results. 
Institutions	and	practice	
Their focus on institutions is a defining moment for the EU’s activities. However, our 
analysis has shown that institution-building does not mean that these institutions also 
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work in practice. Mercosur establishing a macroeconomic convergence regime while 
the Argentinean government was doctoring its inflation numbers is certainly the most 
striking example, but also the afore-mentioned political irrelevance of Mercosur’s 
parliament or the symbolically important but useless ten-day membership of Bulgaria 
and Romania in CEFTA2006 do also reflect this dissonance between institutions and 
practice. As put by a senior EEAS official referring to Mercosur, many projects were 
well implemented, but “they were not taken up” [#52]. The implicit expectation that 
‘spill overs’ or even ‘ever closer union’ could be fostered from outside seem far-
fetched. Our analysis has shown that the ultimate effect depends on the local context 
and political opportunities.  
In terms of political practice, the question is how to deal with such situations. 
Two options are available in principle: either to continue and possibly even increase 
EU support to regional cooperation or to stop the support altogether in light of the 
difficulties encountered in predicting its effect. Leaving aside other considerations like 
package deals or an intrinsic motivation of the EU to promote regional cooperation, 
our evidence suggests that it is worth maintaining support or even increasing it in such 
cases in which the EU expects that the target region might be prone to lesson-drawing. 
This has proven to be the most sustainable and effective path of EU influence, even 
above conditionality. At the same time, in this context in particular, the EU needs to 
factor in that its preferred recipes might be altered to meet local needs.  
The EU’s own practice since 2012 seems to indicate that it has decided to 
concentrate its efforts on regions where they are taken up or where it expects a direct 
dividend from closer cooperation. This has led to supporting regional cooperation in 
the Sahel (with a focus on security and migration, e.g. Union Européenne and Pays du 
G5 Sahel 2018) and to severely reducing it in the Eastern Partnership (Marciacq and 
Flessenkemper 2018: 12–4), to mention just two examples. 
EU	assistance	–	what	value	for	money?	
Beyond the dissonance between institutions and practice, our results also carry more 
immediate implications with regard to the effectiveness of EU promotion of regional 
cooperation. The first implication follows from the role of EU assistance. As we have 
seen in our assessment of EU instruments, the EU has spent considerable resources on 
technical assistance and development cooperation for Mercosur and the Western 
Balkans. At the same time, our process-tracing revealed that assistance had a 
significant, but only complementary impact on the cases of substantial institutional 
change. It assisted or enabled learning from the EU or allowed the receivers of EU 
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influence to honour their commitments, but it never shaped institutional change 
completely. This suggests that EU impact can be relatively independent from the 
financial and technical resources spent, a result that sparks interesting discussions: in 
how far were the EU’s resources adequately spent? In the case of Mercosur: could the 
same effect have been achieved with a smaller sum than the over 110 million € 
budgeted for over two decades of EU assistance?285 In how far is a certain ground level 
or ‘ambient noise’ of assistance necessary for the other mechanisms to come to 
fruition? 
This last question is closely related to the interaction between the different 
paths of EU influence, which is also interesting from a policy perspective. We observe 
that the assistance mechanism is complementary to other mechanisms but not a self-
sufficient influence on institutional change. To mention an example, in the CEFTA2006 
case-study, assistance played a supporting role. Once the countries in the region had 
agreed to negotiate free trade agreements amongst each other, it allowed them to 
surpass their own technical limitations. In a similar vein, during the transformation of 
the SP into the RCC, assistance did not have a significant impact on institutional change 
as such. Instead, it served to signal to the countries in the region that EU support was 
there to stay despite the wish to increase ‘regional ownership’. This did probably have 
an appeasing influence in light of the fears that the EU would retreat from the region.  
In between the conclusions and inspirations for further research a take home 
message shines through: EU impact in regional cooperation beyond its borders is there 
and it is considerable, but its degree and shape are often beyond the EU’s own control. 
EU influence on regional cooperation is certainly as much a matter of EU action as it is 
one of local agency.  
                                                             
285 This sum is calculated from the data in table C.3 in the annex. It must remain approximate due to 
different currencies, fluctuations over time and as a result of unspent budgets. 

 Annex	A:	Population	of	EU	relationships	with	other	
regions	
The list below shows the population of all relationships relevant for our research 
questions, i.e. all relationships between the EU and other regions towards which the 
EU seeks to engage as a region-builder. A relationship was included in this list if an 
EU strategy exists to promote regional cooperation and this is reflected in a strategic 
EU (or joint) policy document. These documents were retrieved from the websites 
of the different institutions in the ‘RELEX family’ and from the databases of 
international agreements maintained by the EEAS (EEAS 2013) and the Council 
(Council 2013a). In individual cases, policy documents that were not publicly 
available had to be requested from the EEAS, the Commission or the Council 
according to the procedure established by Regulation (EC) 1049/2011 on public 
access to documents (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 
2001). The information was contrasted with the literature in order to ensure that no 
cases were left out from the survey. Cases were included in this list if the respective 
EU policy was active at least between the end of 2010 and mid-2012. A follow-up 
check in 2015 showed that there were no newer policies to add. In individual cases, 
newer documents have been added for informational purposes. As mentioned in the 
introduction, regions are most often not formally constituted with precise borders. 
Therefore some of the regions mentioned below overlap.  
In order to structure the list, it distinguishes between different kinds of relationships: 
(a) institutionalised relationships between the EU and other regions with a 
continental scope; (b) relationships with formalised sub-regional organisations; (c) 
relations with groups of countries that are not (yet) established as formal 
organisations; (d) relationships in the context of the ENP and (e) relationships in the 
context of accession. 
Table A.1: Population of EU relationships with other regions 
# Name Policy Document(s) Brief description / Comments 
(a) institutionalised bi-regional relationships 
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# Name Policy Document(s) Brief description / Comments 
1 EU-Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
Council 2013c: EU-CELAC 
Action Plan   
EEAS 2011: Regional 
Indicative Planning Latin 
America 
Commission 2009: EU 
and Latin America 
Commission 2009: EU 
and Latin America 
EU cooperation with CELAC (Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States) includes a focus 
on regional cooperation and integration, both on 
a continental level as well as referring to 
cooperation and trade relations between the EU 
and the different sub-regional organisations in 
the region. 
The EU strategy on cooperation with Latin 
America and the Caribbean does also include 
increased cooperation with the Organization of 
American States (OAS), to which the EU is a 
permanent observer. More detailed info on EU 
cooperation with the OAS can be found here: OAS 
2013: Permanent Observer EU  
2 EU-Africa EU, AU & Morocco 2010: 
Action Plan 2011-2013 
 
EU, AU & Morocco 2014: 
Roadmap 2014-2017  
Since Morocco is the only African state that is not 
a member of the African Union (AU), EU 
cooperation with the African continent includes 
AU states and Morocco as individual co-
signatories on the African side. 
3 EU-Asia 
(ASEM) 
Commission 2010f 
Regional Strategy for 
Asia 2007-2013 - Multi-
Annual Programme 
From being a meeting between the then 15 EU 
and 7 ASEAN members, the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) evolved into a forum between the EU, its 
members, 21 Asian states and the ASEAN 
secretariat. The EU supports and largely finances 
initiatives to encourage further cooperation in its 
context.  
4 EU-East 
Asia 
Council 2012d: 
Guidelines on Foreign 
and Security Policy in 
East Asia 
 
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a regional 
security forum established to bring together 
actors with a stake in South-East Asian security. 
While the aim of the meetings is to maintain and 
increase security in the ASEAN region, the 
participation of further Asian (e.g. China, India, 
Japan, DPRK) and international partners (US, EU, 
etc.) makes it a bi-regional initiative. EU 
participation takes place under a CFSP mandate. 
5 EU-Europe 
(Council of 
Europe) 
Council of Europe and 
European Union 2007 
MoU on Cooperation 
 
TEU (Lisbon 2010): 
Article 6(2) (EU 
accession to the 
European Convention on 
Human Rights) 
 
Cooperation and EU support are channelled 
through funding and institutionalised political 
meetings, the establishment of respective 
representations and the EU acceding to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
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# Name Policy Document(s) Brief description / Comments 
6 EU-OSCE286 Organization for Security 
and Co-Operation in 
Europe 2006: Rules of 
Procedure  
Informal cooperation between the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) 
and the Commission exists since the Helsinki Act 
from 1975 and was formalised in November 2006 
by including the Council Presidency and the 
Commission in the OSCE rules of procedure. 
(b) relationships with formal sub-regional organisations 
7 EU-League 
of Arab 
States 
European Union and 
League of Arab States 
2012a: Ministerial 
Meeting  
 
European Union and 
League of Arab States 
2012b: Joint Work 
Programme 
 
Ashton 2012: Remarks at 
EU-LAS Ministerial 
Regular meetings are held on a ministerial level 
between the League of Arab States and the EU. 
While the Joint Programme does not include any 
objectives specifically to encourage further 
regional cooperation, the fact that interaction is 
held at this level expresses EU support for the 
regional format. 
8 EU-West 
Africa 
(ECOWAS / 
UEMOA) 
Communaute 
Européenne and Afrique 
de l'Ouest 2008: 
Stratégie régionale 
 
EPA negotiating 
directives Council 
decision 17 June 2002 
EU commits to support the further regional 
integration of West Africa in its joint cooperation 
strategy with the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) and the Union 
Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine 
(UEMOA), one of two envisaged currency unions 
inside ECOWAS. Negotiations on a regional trade 
agreement (Economic Partnership Agreement – 
EPA) are conducted with ECOWAS. 
9 EU-
Southern 
Africa 
(SADC) 
European Community 
and Southern African 
Region 2008: Regional 
Strategy 
 
Commission, SADC et al. 
2015: Regional Indicative 
Programme  
EU support to the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) concentrates on encouraging 
further regional integration. A trade agreement 
(Economic Partnership Agreement) between the 
EU and most of SADC’s members was signed in 
2014 (other members negotiate with the EU as 
part of other groups). 
10 EU-Central, 
Eastern 
and 
Southern 
Africa 
(COMESA) 
European Community 
and Region of Eastern 
and Southern Africa and 
the Indian Ocean 2008: 
Regional Strategy  
 
EPA negotiating 
directives Council 
decision 17 June 2002 
 
Central and Eastern Africa are dealt within a joint 
strategy for the Eastern and Southern African 
region, also including several central African 
states. COMESA (the Common Market of Eastern 
and Southern Africa) spans from Northern Africa 
to Southern Africa, covering most of the central 
and eastern African states. 
                                                             
286 The EU’s relations with the OSCE and the CoE are presented as two relationships because they 
are governed by different strategies / memoranda. 
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# Name Policy Document(s) Brief description / Comments 
Commission, COMESA, 
et al.2015: Regional 
Indicative Programme 
11 EU-Eastern 
Africa 
European Community 
and Region of Eastern 
and Southern Africa and 
the Indian Ocean 2008: 
Regional Strategy   
 
Commission, EAC, et 
al.2015: Regional 
Indicative Programme 
Commission, EAC, et 
al.2015: Regional 
Indicative Programme 
Eastern Africa is dealt within a joint strategy for 
the Eastern and Southern African region. The EAC 
(Eastern African Community) includes Burundi, 
Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania.  
12 EU-IOC 
(Indian 
Ocean 
region) 
European Community 
and Region of Eastern 
and Southern Africa and 
the Indian Ocean 2008: 
Regional Strategy  
Commission, IOC, et 
al.2015: Regional 
Indicative Programme 
The Indian Ocean Region is dealt within a joint 
strategy for the Eastern and Southern African 
region. The IOC (Indian Ocean Commission) is 
formed by Comoros, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Madagascar and the French department of 
Reunion.  
13 EU-Central 
Africa  
Communaute 
Européenne and Afrique 
Centrale 2009: Stratégie 
régionale 
The EU Strategy for cooperation with Central 
Africa includes the relationship with three 
regional organisations with partly overlapping 
memberships: CEMAC (Communauté 
économique et monétaire de l’Afrique centrale), 
CEEAC (Communauté économique des Ètats de 
l’Afrique centrale) and CEPGL (Communauté 
économique des pays des Grands Lacs). 
14 EU-
Caribbean 
(CARICOM, 
OECS, 
Cariforum) 
European Commission 
and Caribbean Region 
2008: Regional Strategy 
 
EPA negotiating 
directives Council 
decision 17 June 2002 
EU cooperation with the Caribbean is 
concentrated on relations with CARICOM 
(Caribbean Community) and OECS (Organization 
of Eastern Caribbean States). Trade relations 
between the EU and the Caribbean region are 
conducted by the Cariforum for the Caribbean 
side, a format that gathers all CARICOM members 
except Monserrat (a UK territory) as well as Cuba 
and the Dominican Republic. In addition, the 
European Commission has observer status at the 
Association of Caribbean States. 
15 EU-Andean 
Region 
(Andean 
Commission 2007d: 
Andean Community 
Strategy Paper 
Cooperation between the Andean Community 
(CAN) and the EU did also aim at the conclusion 
of a biregional trade agreement. After the 
withdrawal of Ecuador and Bolivia from 
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Community
) 
negotiations in 2008, the trade agreement was 
concluded in 2012 with Colombia and Peru only. 
Ecuador decided to accede to the agreement 
later on – its accession is pending ratification. 
16 EU-Central 
America 
Commission 2007c: 
Central America Strategy 
EU cooperation with Central America as a region 
began in 1994 with the so-called ‘San José 
Dialogue’, a process initiated to support the 
peace process in the region by engaging Central 
American states in a regional dialogue.  
The EU strategy focuses on support to SICA 
(Sistema de Integración Centroamericana – 
Central American Integration System) with a 
focus on institution-building. An association 
agreement including a trade agreement was 
signed on 2012 with all members of SICA except 
Belize and the Dominican Republic (which 
negotiate with the EU in the Cariforum group – 
see above). Due to the ‘graduation’ of most Latin 
American countries, now considered middle-
income countries, Central America is the only 
region remaining with a sub-regional support 
programme financed from EU ODA from 2015 on. 
17 EU-
Southern 
Cone 
(Mercosur) 
Commission 2007g: 
Mercosur Regional 
Strategy 
Commission 2010b: 
Mercosur Mid-Term 
Review and Regional 
Indicative Programme 
Cooperation between Mercosur (Mercado 
Común del Sur - Common Market of the South) 
and the EU started in 1992 with EU support to the 
institutionalization of Mercosur and has 
continued since then. In 2000, the EU and 
Mercosur started negotiations on an association 
agreement, including a trade agreement. These 
negotiations were interrupted in 2004 and 
restarted in 2010.  
18 EU-Persian 
Gulf region 
(GCC) 
European Economic 
Community and Gulf 
Cooperation Council 
1988: EEC-GCC 
Cooperation Agreement 
Cooperation between the EU and the Gulf 
Cooperation Council started in 1988 with the 
signature of an agreement between both 
organisations. The agreement provides for 
regular ministerial meetings attended by the 
HR/VP for the EU. Several attempts to negotiate 
a trade agreement on the basis of the 1988 
agreement have failed so far. 
19 EU-Pacific 
region  
European Community 
and Pacific Region 2008: 
Regional Strategy 
 
EPA negotiating 
directives Council 
decision 17 June 2002 
The EU supports regional cooperation in the 
region through cooperation with the Pacific 
Islands Forum Secretariat, the Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC) and PICTA (Pacific 
Islands Countries Trade Agreement, the trade 
agreement of the Pacific Islands Forum) 
20 EU-South 
East Asia 
(ASEAN) 
EU and ASEAN 2012: 
Plan of Action  
Commission 2010d: 
Regional Strategy Asia 
 
The relationship between the EU and the 
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
belongs to the most long-standing ones between 
the EU and other regional organisations. Under its 
current strategy, the EU has committed to 
support ASEANs further regional cooperation 
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# Name Policy Document(s) Brief description / Comments 
Trade negotiating 
directives of 2007 (from 
2009 pursued in a 
bilateral mode) 
 
HR/VP & Commission 
2015b: ASEAN 
partnership 
through an exchange of experiences and funding 
for specific integration measures (such as 
regional trade). Negotiations for a bi-regional 
trade agreement were disregarded in favour of a 
bilateral approach with individual ASEAN 
countries in 2009.  
21 EU-
Southern 
Asia 
(SAARC) 
Commission 2010d: 
Regional Strategy Asia 
EU support to the South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) focuses on 
encouraging regional integration in selected 
technical policy fields, such as disaster risk 
reduction and environmental issues. SAARC is 
formed by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
22 EU-Horn of 
Africa 
European Community 
and Region of Eastern 
and Southern Africa and 
the Indian Ocean 2008: 
Regional Strategy 
 
Council 2011a: A 
Strategic Framework for 
the Horn of Africa 
 
Commission, IGAD, et al. 
2015: Regional Indicative 
Programme 
The Commission’s strategy is focused on 
cooperation with IGAD (Intergovernmental 
Authority on Development), formed by Ethiopia, 
Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, 
and Uganda. 
The Council strategy from 2011 builds upon the 
previous document and maintains its focus on 
encouraging regional cooperation and adds on 
security matters. 
(c) relations with groups of countries 
23 EU-Sahel Commission & 
HR/VP2011: Strategy for 
Security and 
Development in the 
Sahel  
 
24 EU-Central 
Asia 
Council 2007: EU-Central 
Asia Strategy 
 
Council 2012b: 
Conclusions on Central 
Asia 
 
Council 2015: 
Conclusions on EU 
Strategy for Central Asia 
 
Commission 2007b: 
Regional Strategy 
Central Asia 
The EU’s Central Asia strategy seeks to encourage 
cooperation between the five Central Asian 
countries considered (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) on 
specific policy fields (e.g. combating the 
production of drugs or on water management), 
but does so addressing them individually and by 
funding cooperative efforts. 
25 EU-Arctic 
region 
Commission & HR/VP 
2012b: An EU policy 
towards the Arctic. 
The current aim of the EU is to enter the region 
as an actor (i.e. by becoming observer in the 
Arctic Council), regional cooperation is pursued 
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EU, Iceland, Norway and 
Russia 2006:Northern 
Dimension Policy 
Framework 
and supported through the Northern Dimension 
and participation in the BEAC (Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council), mostly by financing projects. The 
Northern Dimension does also reflect relations 
with the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 
and the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM). 
(d) sub-regional and multi-country initiatives in the ENP 
26 EU-Eastern 
Partnership 
 
  
 
 
Commission & 
HR/VP2012a et seq.: 
ENP Implementation 
Regional Report 
 
Commission n.a. [2010]: 
ENPI Regional East 
Programme  
 
DG DEVCO 2013: 
Regional Programmes 
Eastern Partnership & 
Russia  
Regional cooperation in the framework of the 
Eastern dimension of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy is organized in the so-
called ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) and takes place 
in two ‘modes’: multilateral cooperation and 
multi-country cooperation. Multilateral 
cooperation does in principle include all EaP 
participants and focuses on specific themes such 
as energy security or democracy. Multi-country 
cooperation is focused on cooperation between 
two or more states, for example on border 
management. Where such projects include more 
than two non EU-members, they fall under our 
definition of regional cooperation.  
27 EU-Black 
Sea region 
Commission 2007: Black 
Sea Synergy - A new 
regional cooperation 
initiative 
 
Commission & HR/VP 
2015a: Black Sea 
Synergy Review 
The Black Sea Synergy supports regional 
cooperation between states around the Black 
Sea, e.g. on maritime issues. Part of the policy is 
currently suspended in response to the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia.  
28 EU-Euro-
Med / 
Union for 
the 
Mediterran
ean 
Commission 2010a: 
Regional Strategy and 
Regional Indicative 
Programme for the Euro-
Mediterranean 
Partnership  
 
Commission 2007a: 
Regional Strategy and 
Regional Indicative 
Programme for the Euro-
Mediterranean 
Partnership  
Under the umbrella of the EuroMed Partnership 
/ Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), both 
bilateral initiatives (e.g. bilateral trade 
agreements) and regional cooperation projects 
coexist.  
29 EU-
Maghreb  
Commission & HR/VP 
2012c: Closer 
cooperation and 
regional integration in 
the Maghreb  
The EU strategy seeks to encourage regional 
cooperation and integration between the five 
Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, 
Morocco and Tunisia). In this context, the EU 
provides financial and technical support to the  
Arab-Maghreb Union (UMA) and encourages 
regional cooperation on infrastructure or security 
matters. 
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30 EU-Arab 
Mediterran
ean 
Countries 
(AMFTA) 
Commission n.a. [after 
2009]: Support to the 
implementation of the 
Arab-Mediterranean 
Free Trade Agreement . 
 
 
EU support to the establishment of the Arab-
Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement (AMFTA, 
also known as Agadir Agreement), which is 
formed by Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. 
An association agreement with the EU is among 
the conditions to join the Agadir Agreement.  
(e) accession-related sub-regional cooperation 
31 EU-
Western 
Balkans 
Commission 1996: 
Prospects for regional 
cooperation 
 
Council 1997: 
Conclusions of 29/30 
April 
 
European Council 1999: 
Cologne European 
Council. Presidency 
conclusions 
 
Sarajevo Summit 
Declaration 1999a 
 
Stability Pact for South-
Eastern Europe 2007: 
Statute of the Regional 
Co-operation Council  
 
Commission & Stability 
Pact 2010: Proposals on 
the Regional Ownership 
Process  
 
Commission, Stability 
Pact et al. 2002: Danube 
Co-Operation Process 
EU encouragement of regional cooperation in the 
Western Balkans takes places through a myriad of 
initiatives and organisations focusing on different 
sectors and aspects of regional cooperation (e.g. 
trade, security, etc.). Many of these initiatives 
were developed in the framework of the EU-
sponsored Stability Pact (now Regional 
Cooperation Council), itself a regional 
cooperation instrument initiated by the Cologne 
European Council in 1999. A European 
Commission strategy to encourage regional 
cooperation was drafted already in 1996. 
Virtually all these initiatives do also pursue the 
objective of strengthening the links of the 
Western Balkans with its neighbours; therefore 
the membership of several initiatives spans 
beyond the Western Balkans and includes further 
countries in South-East Europe. For example, the 
Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) includes 
Turkey as a beneficiary. 
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The figure below places the 15 pre-selected EU relationships with other regions 
along the intensity of the independent variable ‘Use of EU instruments to encourage 
regional cooperation’. The figure reflects the estimates for the three components of 
the independent variable: trade and economic relations (y axis), development and 
technical assistance (x axis) and political relations (size of the bubble).  
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Figure A.1: Pre-selected regional relationships and estimated array along the independent 
variable 
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Annex	B:	List	of	interviews	
All names of the interviewees have been removed from the published version of this 
study. The codes assigned to the interviews do not reflect the chronological order in 
which the interviews took place. Whenever more than one interviewee participated 
in the conversation, each person is coded with an individual number. One 
interviewee is listed with two codes reflecting different positions held by this person. 
An attribution to the same code would allow his or her identification. 
Code	 Position	 Place	and	
date	of	the	
interview	
Mentions	in	the	
text	(page	
numbers)	
#01			 Former	EU	senior	official	 Brussels,	May	17th	2011	 	#01		25,	26,	27,	28,	146,	147,	148,	154,	156,	157,	158,	170,	186,	192,	206,	221,	222,	224,	349		
#02	 Currently	Director	of	the	Institute	for	International	Trade	at	Standard	Bank	Foundation,		former	Undersecretary	of	Economic	Integration	of	the	Argentine	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and,	as	such,	National	Coordinator	of	the	Common	Market	Group	of	the	Mercosur	(1991-1992),	former	Undersecretary	of	Foreign	Trade	at	the	Ministry	of	Economy	of	Argentina	and	member	of	the	Common	Market	Group	of	Mercosur	(1998-99),	former	member	of	the	High-Level	Group	for	the	preparation	of	a	protocol	for	the	Mercosur	Parliament	(2005).	
Buenos	Aires,	August	31st	2012	 	#02		145,	154,	167,	204,	208,	209,	225,	349	
	
#03	 then	Peruvian	ambassador	to	the	EU,	held	several	high-ranking	posts	in	the	Peruvian	foreign	ministry	and	participated	in	negotiations	between	the	Andean	Community	and	the	EU	
Brussels,	May	20th	2011	 	#03		26,	350		
#04	 Head	of	Unit	‘Latin	America’,	DG	External	Policies,	European	Parliament	 Brussels,	October	19th	2011	 	#04		25,	29,	158,	159,	207,	350			
#05	 EEAS	senior	official	 Brussels,	May	17th	2011	 	#05		27,	28,	29,	30,	350		
#06	 European	Commission	official,	DG	DEVCO	 Brussels,	May	20th	2011	 	#06		146,	147,	148,	156,	350		
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#07	 European	Commission	official,	DG	DEVCO	 Brussels,	May	20th	2011	 	#07		26,	350		
#08	 EEAS	official	 Brussels,	May	17th	2011	 #08		29,	350		
#09	 Training	coordinator,	CEFIR	 Montevideo,	September	10th	2012	 #09		150,	193,	350		
#10	 Head	of	Section,	Argentinean	representation	to	the	EU	 Brussels,	July	17th	2012	 	#10		137,	350		
#11	 Head	of	Section,	Brazilian	representation	to	the	EU	 Brussels,	July	18th	2012	 	#11		350		
#12	 Economic	and	Trade	Affairs	official,	Brazilian	representation	to	the	EU	 Brussels,	June	28th	2012	 	#12		142,	350		
#13	 Former	official	of	the	European	Commission	delegation	to	Uruguay	 Brussels,	June	27th	2012	 	#13		25,	29,	133,	146,	150,	156,	187,	350		
#14	 Former	Council	official	with	a	leading	position	on	Western	Balkans	policy	 Brussels,	June	17th	2012	 #14		28,	242,	246,	247,	249,	252,	253,	255,	264,	277,	289,	350		
#15	 EU	official	at	the	EU	delegation	to	Uruguay	 Montevideo,	September	4th	2012	 	#15		27,	29,	142,	150,	156,	221,	224,	350		
#16	 Economic	Affairs	Expert,	Mercosur	Secretariat	 Montevideo,	September	7th	2012	 	#16		185,	187,	189,	190,	191,	195,	196,	350		
#17	 Uruguayan	representative	to	Mercosur,	former	coordinator	for	trade	affairs	in	the	Ministry	for	Economic	Affairs;	participated	in	the	negotiations	that	led	to	Mercosur’s	FOCEM	in	2003/2004	
Montevideo,	September	7th	2012	 	#17		143,	148,	168,	173,	174,	216,	219,	220,	221,	224,	351		
#18	 Official	in	the	Secretariat	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	working	on	interparliamentary	affairs	 Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 		
#19	 Former	official	of	the	CPC	and	the	Mercosur	Parliament	 Buenos	Aires,	August	30th	2012	 	#19		137,	142,	150,	159,	195,	200,	201,	202,	203,	204,	205,	207,	208,	209,	210,	351		
#20	 Former	senior	official	at	the	Argentinean	MFA,	former	director	for	international	economic	negotiations,	former	director	for	Mercosur,	former	economic	attaché	at	the	Argentinean	representation	to	the	EU	
Buenos	Aires,	August	29th	2012	 	#20		25,	26,	143,	147,	148,	149,	150,	153,	154,	157,	162,	164,	171,	192,	196,	221,	222,	224,	351		
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#21	 Programme	Director,	Friedrich-Ebert	Stiftung	Uruguay	(FESUR)	 Montevideo,	September	11th	2012	 	#21		201,	210,	351		
#22	 Professor	at	the	Universities	of	Buenos	Aires	(UBA)	and	San	Martín	and	consultant	 Buenos	Aires,	August	30th	2012	 	#22		162,	181,	185,	190,	192,	195,	196,	351		
#23	 Former	head	of	staff	to	the	president	of	the	CRPM	 Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 	#23		167,	351		
#24	 Official	at	the	Uruguayan	representation	to	Mercosur	 Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 		
#25	 Counsellor,	Brazilian	representation	to	ALADI	and	Mercosur;	participated	in	the	2004	negotiations	on	the	establishment	of	FOCEM	
Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 	#25		147,	154,	158,	167,	168,	174,	175,	216,	221,	224,	351		
#26	 Official,	Secretariat	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	 Montevideo,	September	4th	2012	 	#26		204,	205,	352		
#27	 Senior	official,	FOCEM	secretariat	 Montevideo,	September	7th	2012	 	
#28	 Former	Undersecretary	for	Latin-American	Economic	Integration	and	Mercosur	in	the	Argentinean	Foreign	Ministry	and	Argentinean	national	coordinator	for	Mercosur;	participated	in	the	negotiations	that	led	to	Mercosur’s	FOCEM	in	2003/2004	as	well	as	in	the	negotiations	with	the	EU	in	2004	and	2010.	
Phone	interview,	October	23rd	2012	
	#28		142,	149,	157,	170,	173,	174,	207,	352		
#29	 Official	in	the	Secretariat	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	 Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 	
#30	 Senior	official	at	the	Argentinean	representation	to	Mercosur	and	ALADI;	formerly	director	for	Institutional	matters	of	Mercosur	at	the	Argentinean	MFA,	formerly	part	of	the	working	group	that	negotiated	the	Protocol	of	Olivos	
Montevideo,	September	6th	2012	 	#30		219,	352		
#31	 Cabinet	member,	European	Commission	 Brussels,	November	7th	2012	 	#31		235,	246,	247,	252,	253,	352		
#32	 Senior	official	of	the	European	Commission,	DG	Enlargement	 Brussels,	November	6th	2012	 #32		246,	247,	249,	250,	253,	255,	277,	301,	352		
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#33	 European	Commission	official	working	on	regional	cooperation,	DG	Enlargement	 Brussels,	November	7th	2012	 	#33		247,	249,	253,	255,	287,	295,	298,	301,	352		
#34	 Official	in	charge	of	rule	of	law	projects	at	the	EU	Office	in	Kosovo	(2005-2009),	European	Commission		 Phone	interview,	June	5th	2012	 	#34		235,	295,	296,	352		
#35	 CEFTA	official,	formerly	expert	t	at	the	Trade	WG	of	the	Stability	Pact	 Brussels,	January	15th	2013	 #35		262,	264,	296,	353		
#36	 RCC	official,	former	senior	political	official	at	the	Bulgarian	MFA,	i.a.	at	the	Bulgarian	representation	to	the	EU	 Brussels,	January	15th	2013	 	#36		262,	263,	264,	267,	270,	275,	276,	277,	279,	353		
#37	 European	Commission	official,	DG	Trade	 Brussels,	January	16th	2013	 #37		25,	29,	147,	154,	155,	353		
#38	 Former	official	at	the	Working	Table	II	of	the	Stability	Pact	 Brussels,	January	16th	2013	 	#38		247,	250,	260,	261,	263,	264,	265,	267,	268,	276,	277,	279,	289,	290,	353		
#39	 Official	in	the	staff	of	Mercosur’s	High	Representative	 Phone	interview,	February	5th	2013	
#39		145,	167,	353		
#40	 Official	working	on	Mercosur	trade	negotiations,	Brazilian	mFA	 Brasília,	February	25th	2013	 #40		143,	144,	148,	154,	155,	157,	158,	167,	353		
#41	 EU	official,	cooperation	section,	EU	delegation	to	Brazil;	previously	at	the	EU	delegation	to	Uruguay	 Brasília,	February	26th	2013		 	#41		150,	255,	353		
#42	 Head	of	the	Political,	Economic	and	Public	Affairs	Section,	EU	delegation	to	Brazil	 Brasília,	February	26th	2013	 	
#43	 International	Negotiations	Specialist,	CNI,	National	Confederation	of	Industry	 Brasília,	February	27th	2013	 	
#44	 Head	of	Division	for	Europe	III,	in	charge	of	the	political	chapter	of	the	EU-Mercosur	Association	Agreement,Brazilian	MFA	
Brasília,	February	28th	2013	 	#44		151,	353		
#45	 Official,	Division	for	Economic	Coordination	and	Trade	Affairs	of	Mercosur	(BMC),	Brazilian	MFA		 Brasília,	February	28th	2013	 	
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#46	 Senior	official	working	on	trade	matters,	previously	on	political	affairs,	EU	delegation	to	Brazil	 Brasília,	March	1st	2013	 	
#47	 Senior	official,	Directorate	General	for	Integration	and	Mercosur,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	Uruguay	 Montevideo,	September	10th	2012	 	#47		148,	149,	152,	185,	216,	219,	221,	224,	354		
#48	 EEAS	official	 Brussels,	March	26th	2013	 	#48		142,	148,	151,	156,	354		
#49	 Serbian	diplomat,	Serbian	representation	to	the	EU,	formerly	involved	in	the	negotiation	of	regional	cooperation	initiatives	
Brussels,	March	25th	2013	 #49		235,	254,	287,	295,	354		
#50	 Serbian	diplomat	and	trade	ministry	official,	formerly	involved	in	the	negotiation	of	CEFTA2006	 Brussels,	March	25th	2013	 #50		260,	264,	265,	267,	354		
#51	 EEAS	official	 Brussels,	March	25th	2013	 #51		235,	246,	247,	253,	277,	287,	354		
#52	 Head	of	Division,	Mercosur	Countries,	EEAS	 Brussels,	March	26th	2013	 #52		27,	29,	147,	149,	155,	203,	338,	354		
#53	 EU	official,	Cooperation	section,	EU	delegation	to	Uruguay	 Montevideo,	September	4th	2012		 #53		29,	147,	148,	149,	150,	354		
#54	 Representative	of	the	Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation	 Buenos	Aires,	August	28th	2012	 #54		203,	210,	354		
#55	 Parliamentary	Secretary	(i.e.	head	of	the	secretariat)	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament;	former	member	of	the	High-Level	Group	for	the	preparation	of	a	protocol	for	the	Mercosur	Parliament	(2005).	
Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 	#55		159,	204,	208,	210,	354		
#56	 Senior	official,	Subdivision	American	Economic	Integration	and	Mercosur,	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs,	Argentina	 Buenos	Aires,	August	30th	2012	 	#56		157,	171,	190,	354		
#57	 Official	working	on	International	Affairs,	Mercosur	Parliament	 Montevideo,	September	5th	2012	 #57		159,	218,	355		
#58	 Official	at	the	Mercosur	Secretariat,	former	coordinator	for	Mercosur	at	the	Argentinean	Ministry	of	Finance	(1998-2007)	
Montevideo,	September	7th	2012		 #58		187,	189,	191,	195,	196,	216,	355		
#59	 Official	in	charge	of	regional	cooperation	initiatives,	MFA	of	Croatia	 Zagreb,	June	10th	2013	 	#59		247,	275,	277,	281,	282,	290,	291,	299,	355		
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#60	 Senior	official	at	the	Croatian	Ministry	of	Regional	Development	and	EU	Funds	 Zagreb,	June	11th	2013	 #60		301,	355		
#61	 Former	assistant	minister,	Ministry	of	European	Integration	of	Croatia	 Zagreb,	June	11th	2013	 	#61		235,	253,	261,	264,	265,	266,	269,	271,	275,	281,	282,	355		
#62	 Deputy	Head	of		the	Croatian	State	Office	for	Trade	Policy,	Croatian	representative	in	the	SP	Trade	WG	from	2005	on	
Zagreb,	June	12th	2012	 	#62		263,	265,	268,	269,	270,	355		
#63	 Counsellor	to	the	Head	of	the	State	Office	for	Trade	Policy,	Croatian	representative	in	the	SP	Trade	WG	from	2003	on		
Zagreb,	June	12th	2012	 #63		263,	264,	266,	267,	268,	269,	282,	355	
#64	 Official	at	the	Serbian	EU	Integration	Office,	SEIO	 Belgrade,	June	18th	2013		 #64		247,	355		
#65	 Serbian	official,	Ministry	of	Foreign	and	Internal	Trade	and	Telecommunications,	formerly	participated	in	the	Stability	Pact	and	in	the	CEFTA2006	negotiations.	
Belgrade,	June	20th	2013	 #65		28,	250,	263,	264,	265,	266,	267,	268,	269,	270,	355	
#66	 Official,	Department	for	Political	Criteria,	Serbian	EU	Integration	Office,	SEIO	 Belgrade,	June	20th	2013	 		#66		235,	355		
#67	 Official,	Department	for	Cross-border	and	Transnational	Cooperation	Programmes,	Serbian	EU	Integration	Office	(SEIO)	
Belgrade,	June	18th	2013	 #67		235,	356		
#68	 Official,	Department	for	Cross-border	and	Transnational	Cooperation	Programmes,	Serbian	EU	Integration	Office	(SEIO)	
Belgrade,	June	18th	2013	 		
#69	 Senior	official	in	charge	of	regional	cooperation	policies,	Serbian	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	 Belgrade,	June	19th	2013	 #69		279,	295,	296,	299,	356		
#70	 Senior	official	working	on	political	affairs,	EU	delegation	to	Serbia	 Belgrade,	June	20th	2013	 	#70		253,	356		
#71	 Official	working	on	technical	cooperation,	EU	delegation	to	Serbia	 Belgrade,	June	20th	2013	 		
#72	 Former	senior	official	at	Working	Table	II	of	the	Stability	Pact	 Brussels,	July	10th	2013	 	#72		28,	242,	250,	263,	264,	266,	269,	270,	276,	289,	293,	294,	295,	297,	298,	299,	301,	356		
#73	 Senior	official	at	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Trade	and	Economic	Relations	of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina;	former	CEFTA	 Sarajevo,	December	4th	2013	 	#73		235,	247,	250,	260,	261,	
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contact	point	for	BiH,	took	part	in	the	Stability	Pact	Working	Group	on	Trade	 266,	267,	268,	269,	270,	356		
#74	 Official	at	the	BiH	Ministry	of	Foreign	Trade	and	Economic	Relations	 Sarajevo,	December	3rd	2013	 	#74		269,	356		
#75	 Senior	official,	Regional	Cooperation	Council;	former	Macedonian	Stability	Pact	Coordinator	(until	2008),	former	head	of	the	Macedonian	representation	to	the	EU	(from	1996	on)	
Sarajevo,	December	5th	2013	 	#75		247,	268,	276,	278,	287,	299,	356		
#76	 Senior	official,	Regional	Cooperation	Council,	former	SP	coordinator	of	Serbia-Montenegro,	former	Assistant	Foreign	Affairs	Minister	for	Economic	Relations	of	the	FR	Yugoslavia	(2000-2004)	
Phone	interview,	December	10th	2013	
#76		235,	261,	264,	269,	279,	292,	297,	298,	299,	357		
#77	 Secretary-General	of	ALADI,	former	President	of	the	Mercosur	Committee	of	Permanent	Representatives	(CRPM,	2005-2009),	former	Vice-President	of	Argentina	(1999-2000)	
Montevideo,	September	6th	2012	 	#77		158,	162,	185,	196,	217,	218,	220,	221,	357		
#78	 Ambassador	to	the	EU	of	a	Mercosur	state	 Brussels,	June	27th	2012	 #78		154,	157,	158,	171,	357		
#79	 Senior	EEAS	official	working	on	Latin	America	 Brussels,	January	17th	2013	 #79	28,	357	
  
 
 
Argentina Brazil 
 
GE RL GE RL  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1996 0,27 62,44 0,04 52,63 -0,15 50,73 -0,33 41,63 
1998 0,38 67,80 -0,04 50,24 -0,11 52,20 -0,31 41,63 
2000 0,06 58,54 -0,20 44,98 0,05 58,05 -0,30 42,58 
2002 -0,26 46,83 -0,82 25,36 0,03 58,54 -0,30 44,98 
2003 -0,01 58,54 -0,82 23,92 0,18 61,46 -0,40 40,67 
2004 -0,02 58,05 -0,83 21,53 0,07 60,49 -0,39 40,19 
2005 -0,09 53,66 -0,58 34,45 -0,10 52,68 -0,49 37,32 
2006 -0,04 54,63 -0,60 33,49 -0,23 46,34 -0,41 43,54 
2007 -0,03 53,40 -0,63 32,54 -0,20 49,03 -0,43 42,11 
2008 -0,13 50,97 -0,70 28,85 -0,09 51,94 -0,37 43,27 
2009 -0,33 45,93 -0,71 29,38 -0,10 51,20 -0,22 48,82 
2010 -0,19 48,33 -0,62 32,23 -0,04 53,59 0,00 54,98 
2011 -0,14 49,29 -0,59 32,86 -0,12 49,76 -0,01 56,34 
2012 -0,25 45,45 -0,71 28,91 -0,12 50,24 -0,11 51,66 
Mean -0,06 53,85 -0,56 33,67 -0,07 53,30 -0,29 44,98 
Median -0,06 53,53 -0,63 32,38 -0,10 52,07 -0,32 42,93 
 
Annex	C:	Tables	and	data	
Table C.1: scores and ranks for government effectiveness and rule of law for the Mercosur 4 
countries. Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al. 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Paraguay Uruguay 
 GE RL GE RL 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1996 -0,95 15,61 -0,82 25,36 0,50 68,78 0,43 61,24 
1998 -1,09 11,22 -1,07 16,75 0,45 70,24 0,50 66,51 
2000 -1,17 9,76 -1,08 15,79 0,43 68,78 0,53 64,11 
2002 -1,09 10,73 -1,17 11,00 0,58 72,68 0,59 65,55 
2003 -0,91 17,07 -1,10 14,83 0,50 69,76 0,59 68,90 
2004 -0,90 15,61 -1,04 15,31 0,35 66,83 0,42 63,64 
2005 -0,79 25,37 -1,04 15,31 0,51 69,27 0,43 62,20 
2006 -0,89 20,00 -1,03 14,83 0,39 65,85 0,47 63,64 
2007 -0,85 19,90 -1,06 14,83 0,51 70,39 0,52 65,55 
2008 -0,87 18,93 -1,00 16,83 0,51 68,93 0,55 66,83 
2009 -0,92 18,66 -0,96 17,54 0,60 70,33 0,68 69,19 
2010 -0,94 18,18 -0,91 20,38 0,64 70,81 0,70 70,14 
2011 -0,84 20,85 -0,85 23,00 0,56 69,67 0,65 69,01 
2012 -0,90 19,62 -0,87 21,33 0,44 66,51 0,54 66,35 
Mean -0,94 17,25 -1,00 17,36 0,50 69,20 0,54 65,92 
Median -0,90 18,42 -1,04 16,27 0,50 69,47 0,54 65,95 
 

  
Albania Bosnia and Herzegovina  
GE RL GE RL  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1998 -0,69 24,88 -1,20 11,00 -1,08 12,20 -0,64 29,67 
2000 -0,83 20,00 -1,24 10,53 -0,86 17,56 -0,64 32,06 
2002 -0,57 32,68 -0,92 21,05 -0,97 13,17 -0,67 31,10 
2003 -0,61 31,22 -0,88 21,53 -0,77 22,44 -0,69 28,71 
2004 -0,44 40,49 -0,76 26,32 -0,57 31,71 -0,49 37,32 
2005 -0,63 31,22 -0,81 25,84 -0,72 26,83 -0,56 35,89 
2006 -0,46 39,02 -0,73 27,75 -0,60 30,24 -0,50 38,76 
2007 -0,38 42,23 -0,70 27,75 -0,81 21,84 -0,48 38,28 
2008 -0,35 44,17 -0,64 32,69 -0,59 33,98 -0,41 40,38 
2009 -0,24 48,33 -0,53 36,49 -0,70 27,75 -0,36 44,08 
2010 -0,27 45,45 -0,44 40,76 -0,73 27,75 -0,37 43,60 
2012 -0,28 44,98 -0,57 34,60 -0,47 39,23 -0,23 48,34          
Mean -0,48 37,06 -0,78 26,36 -0,74 25,39 -0,50 37,35 
Median -0,45 39,76 -0,74 27,03 -0,72 27,29 -0,50 37,80 
 
Table C.2: scores and ranks for government effectiveness and rule of law for the Western  
Balkans 8 countries Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al. 2010. 
  
 Croatia Macedonia 
 GE RL GE RL 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1998 0,06 57,56 -0,34 40,67 -0,62 28,78 -0,48 34,93 
2000 0,31 65,37 0,01 51,67 -0,78 22,44 -0,66 31,58 
2002 0,34 64,88 -0,17 48,33 -0,50 34,63 -0,63 33,01 
2003 0,38 66,83 -0,05 51,20 -0,33 43,90 -0,56 33,97 
2004 0,47 69,76 0,05 54,55 -0,13 53,66 -0,25 44,98 
2005 0,48 68,29 0,09 55,50 -0,28 45,85 -0,37 41,63 
2006 0,56 70,73 -0,05 52,63 -0,10 53,17 -0,56 36,84 
2007 0,47 68,93 0,04 55,02 -0,20 49,51 -0,46 39,71 
2008 0,57 71,36 0,08 55,29 -0,02 54,85 -0,37 42,79 
2009 0,61 71,29 0,14 58,29 -0,09 51,67 -0,27 46,92 
2010 0,63 70,33 0,17 60,19 -0,15 49,76 -0,29 46,92 
2012 0,70 72,25 0,21 59,72 -0,07 51,67 -0,24 47,87 
 
        
Mean 0,47 68,13 0,02 53,59 -0,27 44,99 -0,43 40,10 
Median 0,48 69,34 0,05 54,78 -0,18 49,64 -0,41 40,67 
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Montenegro Serbia  
GE RL GE RL  
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1998   
  
  -0,85 18,54 -1,33 8,13 
2000   
  
  -0,85 18,05 -1,34 8,13 
2002   
  
  -0,55 33,17 -0,97 19,62 
2003   
 
-0,36 43,06 -0,62 29,27 -0,94 19,62 
2004   
 
-0,35 43,06 -0,17 50,73 -0,74 28,23 
2005 0,36 64,39 -0,28 44,50 -0,31 44,88 -0,91 19,62 
2006 -0,13 51,71 -0,34 44,98 -0,20 49,27 -0,56 36,36 
2007 -0,17 50,49 -0,19 49,28 -0,22 47,09 -0,50 37,32 
2008 -0,02 55,34 -0,07 53,37 -0,19 47,57 -0,53 37,02 
2009 0,00 56,46 0,07 56,40 -0,04 53,11 -0,44 41,23 
2010 0,09 57,42 0,00 55,45 -0,05 51,67 -0,40 41,71 
2012 0,13 59,33 -0,01 55,45 -0,11 50,72 -0,39 44,08          
Mean 0,04 56,45 -0,17 49,50 -0,35 41,17 -0,76 28,42 
Median 0,00 56,46 -0,19 49,28 -0,21 47,33 -0,65 32,30 
 
Table C.2 (continued): scores and ranks for government effectiveness and rule of law for 
the Western Balkans 8 countries 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators, Kaufmann et al. 2010. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Slovenia Kosovo 
 GE RL GE RL 
 Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
1998 0,79 78,05 1,22 86,60   
  
  
2000 0,73 77,07 1,01 82,78   
  
  
2002 0,90 80,00 0,96 79,90   
  
  
2003 1,07 82,93 0,95 80,86   
 
-1,06 15,79 
2004 0,97 81,46 0,92 79,90   
 
-0,96 18,66 
2005 0,92 77,56 0,86 77,03   
 
-0,99 17,70 
2006 0,98 80,00 0,87 77,51 -0,37 41,46 -0,91 20,10 
2007 0,94 80,10 0,88 78,47 -0,21 48,06 -0,78 24,40 
2008 1,19 84,95 0,98 82,21 -0,50 37,38 -0,60 34,13 
2009 1,16 83,25 1,06 83,89 -0,42 42,58 -0,63 32,23 
2010 1,03 81,34 0,98 80,57 -0,61 32,06 -0,64 31,28 
2012 1,02 80,86 0,98 80,57 -0,39 42,11 -0,56 35,07 
 
        
Mean 0,98 80,63 0,97 80,86 -0,42 40,61 -0,79 25,48 
Median 0,98 80,48 0,97 80,57 -0,40 41,78 -0,78 24,40 
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Table C.3: EU technical assistance projects in support of Mercosur.  
Sources: Botto(2009), Comisión Europea and Mercosur(2001), Comisión Europea and 
Mercosur(2007), European Commission(2002; 2004a; 2005a; 2007g; 2010b), Grupo de 
Cooperación Internacional del Mercosur(2012); Secretaría Mercosur(n.d. [2007]), Ugarte 
et al.(2004a; 2004b; 2004c), Instituto de Relaciones Europeo-Latinoamericanas 
(IRELA)(1995); Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe (SELA)(2007 - 2008); 
Commission (2016); Comisión (2003). 
Time	
span	 Project	name	
Project	aim	/	
counterpart	
EU	
financing287	1992-1995,	1998-2006	
Support	to	the	Administrative	Secretariat	of	the	Mercosur	(1st	,	2nd	and	3rd	phases)	 Administrative	Secretariat	of	the	Mercosur	 1.920.400	€	1992-1994	 Fund	to	Support	the	Pro	Tempore	Presidencies	(PPT)	of	Mercosur	 Each	PPT	of	Mercosur	 1.000.000	€	(250.000	€	per	country)	1992	 Funds	to	train	Brazilian	and	Paraguayan	Mercosur	officials	 Brazil	and	Paraguay	 500.000	€	1992	 Assistance	Programme	for	Integration	into	Mercosur	 Paraguay	 250.000	€	1993-	 Mercosur	Customs	Harmonization	Project	(1st	phase)	 TC	2288	‘Customs	Issues’	of	Mercosur	Project	coordinated	in	Uruguay	and	implemented	in	the	four	states	
965.000	€	
1993-	 Technical	Assistance	on	agricultural	issues	cooperation	project	(Animal	&	Vegetable’s	Health)	(‘SPS	I’)	 WG	8289	‘Agriculture’	of	Mercosur	Project	coordinated	in	Paraguay	and	implemented	in	the	four	states	
11.200.000	€	
1993-	 Cooperation	and	Technical	Assistance	in	Technical	Regulation	issues	 WG	3	‘Technical	Standards’	of	Mercosur	Project	coordinated	in	Brazil	and	implemented	in	the	four	states	
4.000.000	€	
1993	 Establishment	of	CEFIR	(Center	for	Regional	Integration	Training)	 Established	in	Uruguay	 212.000	€	1994-	 Mercosur	et	Pact	Andine,	developpement	industriel	 	 245.000	€290	
                                                             
287 Numbers represent EU commitments, not actual expenditure, and stem from the sources 
mentioned above the table. 
288 ‘TC’ stands for Technical Committee, subgroups of the Mercosur Trade Commission (CCM) 
where specialised officials from the Mercosur states discuss and prepare norms to be decided 
upon by senior officials in the CCM (or presented to ministers in the Mercosur Council). 
289 ‘WG’ stands for Working Group, subgroups of the Common Market Group (GMC), where 
specialised officials from the Mercosur states meet to discuss and prepare norms to be decided 
upon by senior officials in the GMC. 
290 Shares for each region are unclear. 
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1995	 Seminars	and	studies	for	civil	society	in	the	region	 	 852.000	€	1995	 Training	programme	for	the	officials	of	the	joint	parliamentary	commission	(CPC)	of	Mercosur	 Joint	Parliamentary	Commission	of	Mercosur	 120.000	€	1995	 Study	programme	for	diplomats	of	Mercosur	states	 Mercosur	member	states	 185.440	€	1995	 Diplôme	de	formation	européenne	hauts	fonctionnaires	des	administrations	publiques	et	cadres	supérieurs	
	 70.000	€	
	 Customs	Cooperation	Project	(2nd	phase)	 TC	2	‘Customs	Issues’	of	Mercosur	Project	coordinated	in	Paraguay	and	implemented	in	the	four	states	
5.300.000	€	
1996-	 CEFIR	(Regional	Integration	Training	Centre)	 Institute	based	in	Uruguay	 4.828,536	€	1996-	 Short-term	personnel	exchange	EU-Mercosur	 Mercosur	institutions	 28.296	€	1996	 Presse	et	intégration	regionale	 	 180.000	€	1996	 Seminar	on	the	Interregional	Framework	Cooperation	Agreement	 	 155.000	€	1996	 Conference	on	customs	issues	 	 41.000	€	1997	 Seminars	on	‘Union	Européenne	et	Mercosur:	le	role	des	organes	de	jurisdiction’	and	‘L’experience	des	organes	de	controle	de	L’union	européenne	apport	a	la	consolidation	du	Mercosur’	
	 72.000	USD	
1999	 Parliamentary	Cooperation	 Joint	Parliamentary	Commission	of	Mercosur	 917.175	€	
1997-2003	 Statistical	Harmonization	Project	 Statistical	Institutes	of	each	Mercosur	country	Project	coordinated	in	Argentina	
4.135.000	€	
1999-	 Consolidation	nouvelle	structure	CEFIR	 Institute	based	in	Uruguay	 9.300.000	€	1999	 Training	on	the	role	of	law	in	the	regional	integration	process	 Courses	for	Mercosur	lawyers	 120.000	€	2000-2005	 Technical	Assistance	to	the	Uruguayan	Sectorial	Commission	for	Mercosur	 Uruguay	 350.000	€	2001-	 Customs	cooperation	EU-Mercosur	 	 5.300.000	€	2003-2004	 Improvement	of	the	dispute	resolution	system	of	Mercosur	 Academic	institutions	and	experts	in	EU	and	Mercosur	states	to	prepare	and	appraisal	and	reform	proposals	for	the	Mercosur	DRS	
240.000	€	
2003-2009	 Vers	plus	de	citoyennete	active	das	Mercosur:	s’appropirier	le	local	pour	vivre	l’integration	regionale	 	 1.000.000	USD	
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2004-	 Support	to	the	Mercosur	Permanent	Court	of	Appeals(TPR)	 Mercosur	TPR	with	the	goal	to	“to	create	institutional	and	operational	capacity	for	the	MERCOSUR	Permanent	Court	of	Appeals	in	order	to	enhance	its	performance	and	ensure	uniform	and	generalised	implementation	of	MECOSUR	legislation.”	
300.000	€	
2004-2006	 Social	and	labour	dimension	within	Mercosur	 WG	10	‘Labour,	Employment,	Social	Security	Issues’	Economic	and	Social	Consultative	Forum	Social	and	Labour	Commission	Project	coordinated	in	Brazil	
980.000	€	
2005-2008	 Harmonization	of	Technical	rules	and	procedures	 WG	3	‘Technical	regulations’	Project	coordinated	in	Uruguay	
4.000.000	€	
2005-2011	 Biotechnology	development	within	Mercosur	 Specialised	Meeting	of	Science	and	Technology	of	Mercosur	Project	coordinated	in	Argentina	and	implemented	in	the	four	states	
6.000.000	€	
2005-2011	 Statistical	Cooperation	II	 National	Statistical	Institutes		Project	coordinated	in	Argentina	
2.000.000	€	
2006-2014	 Harmonization	of	sanitary,	veterinary,	phytosanitary	and	food	standards	and	procedures	and	differentiated	agricultural	production	(‘SPS	II’)	
WG	8	‘Agriculture’	of	Mercosur	Project	coordinated	at	the	Argentinean	Ministry	of	Economy	and	Production	snd	implemented	in	the	four	original	member	states	
6.000.000	€	
2006-	 Support	to	the	establishment	of	the	Mercosur	Parliament	 Parliament	of	Mercosur	Project	based	in	Uruguay	 917.000	€	2007-2011	 Support	for	Macro-economic	monitoring	 Macroeconomic	Monitoring	Group	of	Mercosur	Project	based	in	Argentina	
7.100.000	€	
2007	 Support	to	the	Mercosur	Secretariat	and	to	the	Implementation	of	the	FOCEM	(Fund	for	the	Structural	Convergence	of	Mercosur)	
	 1.400.000	USD	
 
 
  348 
2008-	 International	Technical	Assistance	for	the	Mercosur	Parliament	 	 84.350	€	2008-	 University	Network	on	‘Comparative	Perspectives	and	cooperation	in	the	Mercosur	and	EU	integration	processes”	
	 210.000	USD	
2008-2013	 Information	Society	in	Mercosur	(“Mercosur	Digital”)	 Specialised	Meeting	of	Science	and	Technology	of	Mercosur	WG	13	‘Electronic	Commerce’	Project	coordinated	in	Brazil	and	implemented	in	the	four	member	states	
9.623.600	€	
2009-2014	 Red	del	Sur:	Promoción	del	Cooperativismo	de	trabajo	ascoiado	y	fortalecimiento	de	las	redes	de	micro	emprendimientos	de	la	economía	social	del	Mercosur	
	 465.000	USD	
2008-2013	 Apoyo	al	Programa	de	Movilidad	Mercosur	en	Educación	Superior		 Support	to	the	establishment	of	student	exchange	programmes	and	financing	of	approx.	170	exchanges	
3.000.000	€	
2011-2015	 Programa	de	Apoyo	al	Sector	Educativo	del	Mercosur	(PASEM)	 	 6.700.000	€	2009-2015	 ECONORMAS	Project	 WG	3	‘Technical	norms’	WG	6	‘Environment’	Objective:	Support	the	convergence	of	technical	norms	to	increase	intra-regional	trade	while	promoting	environmentally	sustainable	production	–	creation	of	regional	laboratories	to	certify	observance	of	these	norms	
12.000.000	€	
2009-2016	 Audiovisual	Mercosur	 Specialised	Meeting	of	Cinema	and	Audiovisual	Authorities	 1.500.000	€	2013-	 Biotech	II	–	Biotechnology	development	within	Mercosur	 Project	coordinated	in	Argentina	and	implemented	in	the	four	original	Mercosur	stated	
2.600.000	USD	
 Annex	D:	An	alternative	approach	to	aggregate	EU	
instruments	
This annex shows an alternative way to group (and later assess) the EU instruments 
to promote regional cooperation. The instruments are grouped into categories that 
reflect their respective logic of external action, allowing to later compare and assess 
them across policy fields. Across the three fields, we identify instruments aimed at 
promoting regional cooperation and classify them in four fields according to their 
logic of external action: threat-, condition- assistance- and role model-based 
instruments. 
Between	threat	and	role	model	–	Aggregating	EU	instruments	
While the instruments found in the different policy areas of EU external action are 
often specific to their field, they all stand for similar logics of external action. This is 
instrumental in classifying the instruments on a higher level of abstraction that 
allows to compare them also across the cases and regions studied here. On the basis 
of the instruments found, four categories can be formed: threat-based, condition-
based, assistance-based and role model-based mechanisms. 
The first category, threat-based instruments, includes those cases in which 
the EU coerces its partners into action, threatening to punish them otherwise. Such 
threats could for example include the reversal of trade preferences or the use of 
sanctions. We expect this type of action to be the least frequent, both because of 
the legalistic and ‘soft power’ character of the EU as a foreign policy actor that strives 
for a “negotiated world order” (Smith 2013: 659) as well as because of the nature of 
regional cooperation as a non-critical policy objective. After all, non-fulfilment by a 
partner does not represent an immediate existential threat to the EU. The second 
category, condition-based instruments, includes those cases in which the EU spells 
out results to be delivered by its partner in return for a certain benefit. An example 
for such an instrument is the iunctim once established by the EU tying the entry into 
force of the SAA with Bosnia and Herzegovina to the application of the Sejdić and 
Finci ruling (Council 2013b: 40).291 The third category, assistance-based instruments, 
represents cases in which the EU sets up instruments that aim at making regional 
                                                             
291 The Sejdić and Finci ruling is a ruling of the European Court of Human Rights requiring Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to ensure that citizens belonging to all ethnicities can be elected to the presidency 
or the upper house of parliament. The constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina foresees that only 
ethnic Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks can be elected.  
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cooperation less costly and/or more attractive, but without tying them to a specific 
result. The direct funding of feasibility studies or of institutions would be examples 
for such instruments. In practice, both condition- and assistance-based instruments 
may be used at the same time, as in the case of the financial and technical assistance 
offered to accession candidates through the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA). Nonetheless, a distinction can be established according to the predominance 
of one or the other. If EU assistance is mostly granted ex ante, i.e. without being tied 
to prior action by the EU’s partner or to a reward in case of success, but rather as a 
bet on future developments, it is fair to speak of assistance instead of conditionality. 
In line with the EU’s character as a foreign policy actor we expect conditions and 
incentives to be the most frequent logic of action. The final category, role model-
based instruments, includes those instances in which the EU presents itself as a 
successful case of regional cooperation and portrays its example as one worth 
following. Highlighting the virtues of regional cooperation and integration in 
overcoming the post-world war divide and economic depression in Europe when 
meeting EU partners would represent an example for this logic of external action.  
Following this rationale, the table below pictures how the individual 
instruments and their appearances can be classified in the four categories. For 
several instruments, such as mentions in speeches, the classification depends on the 
specific content, making them applicable to all four logics of external action. For 
other instruments, the allocation is more obvious as in the case of the 
implementation of technical assistance projects.  
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Operationalisation IV ‚Use of EU instruments to promote regional cooperation‘ 
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...in speeches
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development 
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...in treaties
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Table D.1: EU instruments according to logic of external action 
	 	
trade and economic 
relations
emphasis of 
mentions
...in speeches
...in strategy documents
...in interviews with EU policy-makers
...in interviews with policy-makers from EU partners
development 
cooperation and TA
emphasis of 
mentions
...in interviews with EU policy-makers
...in interviews with policy-makers from EU partners
...in strategy documents
...in speeches
political relations emphasis of 
mentions
...in speeches
...in strategy documents
...in interviews with EU policy-makers
...in interviews with policy-makers from EU partners
...of statements and delclarations mentioning regional cooperationrelevance
...of political dialogues with a regional focus
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